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A B S T R A C T 2
According to our present interpretation of Islamic 
legal history, the total body of the traditional 
SharT*a reflects an evolution of social circumstances 
and moralities of past days. Now that social cir­
cumstances of the twentieth century are different 
from the previous centuries of Islam, one would ex­
pect that the SharT*a, when enforced today as a law 
of personal status, is still evolving, this time ac­
cording to twentieth century circumstances and values. 
True to expectations there have been changes in the 
SharT^a as now applied in statutes. A question still 
remains, however: How deep and within what limits
are these changes? The original limits on the growth 
of the SharTca were only the Qur*an and the Sunna of 
the Prophet and of Followers. As the centuries pro­
gressed, the limits oh the SharTca became more nu­
merous. The law became what the jurists dictated.
The "door of * ijtihad" closed. H.A.R. Gibb succinctly 
describes the import of the closing of the door: "The
principles on which jurists built the system were re­
garded as immutable and in time the system built on 
these principles was itself considered an inseparable 
part of the principles and hence immutable too."
(Mohammedanism,Oxford, 1962, page 95) In this century
two Muslim countries are considered to have diverged 
radically from the "immutable" system. They are 
Turkey and Tunisia.
Turkey totally rejected the SharTta as a source of 
law to be enforced by the State, even though her leaders 
and citizens profess the Muslim faith. One may follow 
the SharTca in private life, but never expect the State 
to enforce claims on the basis of the SharTca. The 
logic behind the rejection is compelling: The Qur*an
can be viewed in its history as a manual that people 
expected to be enforced in a day when onefs religious 
status was to a large extent one’s legal status.
Today-one’s religious status is a personal matter, not 
affecting one’s legal capacities. Therefore, people 
cannot expect the Qur^an to be enforced as a law of 
the State. Islam will still prosper, but only as a 
religion.
Tunisia, on the other hand, has retained legal en­
forcement of some provisions of the SharTca and dis­
pensed with others. Tunisia has not explicitly re-s 
jected the QurJan as a basic source of law, neither has 
she explicitly named it as a basic source of law. In 
contrast, Moroccan law provides that where the Code of 
Personal Status has gaps, the traditional SharTca 
shall apply (article 82 of the Code du Statut Personnel
et des Successions, Dahir No. 1-57-343 of Rebia II 1377 
(22 November 1957) for Parts I and II). Tunisia came clos 
est to denying that the Islamic ethic is the source of 
the law when one of its enactments provided that no one’s 
religions creed has enough authority to deny the 
authority of the Tunisian law (Law 57-40 of 
27 September 1957:(2 Rabia I 1377) on the suppression 
of the Rabbinical courts; Beylical decrees of 
25 September and 25 October 1956 on suppression of 
the courts of the SharTta —  By these three laws all 
Tunisians became subject to the Code of Personal Sta­
tus promulgated by Beylical decree of 13 August 1956, 
effective 1 January 1957). On the other hand there 
are many indications that the law of personal status- 
grew and continues to grow out of the Islamic ethic.
The annotated version of the Code of Personal Status 
(M.T• Es Snoussi, 1970), government memos, the Con­
stitution of June 1959 (Preamble: "The will of the 
people is to remain bound to the teachings of Islam"
—  J.O.R.T. No. 30 of 1 June 1959) all imply that judges 
shall refer to the SharTta to answer points not 
covered in the Code of Personal Stauts. Furthermore, 
when the Tunisian judges and the President himself 
speak of the historical evolution of the SharTta ac­
cording to social circumstances, the meaning of evolu- ,
tion covers only the reasoned interpretations which 
old jurists have placed on the Qur*an and the JahadTth. 
The concept of evolution does not apply to the QurJan 
and the JahadTth. These basic religious sources re- 
main for all time; it is the deductions from these 
sources that change. Tunisians recognise that, in the 
past, deductions from the Qur*an were coloured with 
opinions of what was possible and what was not within 
given century. Today people have a different sense 
of what is possible and what is not.
It is the Tunisian, rather than the Turkish, al­
ternative to legal reform that motivates this disserta­
tion. Tunisians have, in terms of Gibb, kept the 
principles of Islam immutable; but the system built 
on them is no longer*regarded as immutable. Tunisia 
accepts the "mol'al imperative" of Islam (Gibb, page 191) f 
that is, the obligation to give legal force to the 
QurJan as a practical expression of obedience to Allah. 
Why Tunisia has chosen to accept the imperative; how 
far she practises obedience; what she has substituted 
for old interpretations of the QurJan and JahadTth 
and the traditional methodology for arriving at a new 
practical expression of Islam are questions to which 
this dissertation addresses itself.
In answer to these questions the dissertation begins
with an analysis of the legal system of Tunisia —  the 
hierarchy of courts, the codes applicable, The time 
setting is from the Ottoman era to the present. The 
primary source material —  not used heretofore in 
studies of Tunisian Islamic law —  for this topic 
comes from the official historical archives, which con­
tain official correspondence, memos from government 
bureaux commenting on proposals for law reform, 
government officials’ analyses of the legal scene be­
fore the French Protectorate, during the Protectorate, 
and now after the abolition of the Protectorate.
The study of the legal system serves as background 
for an ensuing study in depth of the application of 
points of substantive law. The substantive laws chosen 
for the study are the law of wills and the law of prop­
erty. The Code of Property Rights (ijiajallat al hugug 
al taihiyat) and the Code of Personal Status (majailat 
al Jahwal as shakhsTya) contain the relevant provi­
sions for acquisition of property by succession. While 
the two codes provide for the same subject, they have 
different juridical roots. The provisions on wills in 
the Code of Personal Status are derived from the SharTca 
The Code of Property Rights was promulgated with an 
eye to the economic needs of the twentieth century.
Given two laws having different historical roots-yet 
impinging on the same subject, the dissertation pays at—
tention to how these two codes both dovetail and con- 
tradict each other.
Wills and property rights, however, cannot be 
studied in isolation. They will be put in the context 
of other laws. Wills are : seen as part of the laws 
of gifts, and written contract. The Code of Property 
Rights is seen as part of a land reform programme 
that began with the abolishment of the law of wagf, 
and moved onto cooperatives and eventually less co- 
ownership .
The primary source materials for the case study 
are enacted codes, preparatory drafts of the codes, 
court cases —  mostly decided since 1957> the year the 
Code of Personal Status commenced. Most of the cases 
have never been published. In their judgments judges 
use two sources when applying the codes: the Islamic
f.igh and the broad provisions of the Code of Obliga­
tions and Contracts (ma.jallat al Jittizamat wa*l fcugud), 
which is a synthesis of the best of French legal think­
ing and Islamic legal thinking.
It is not difficult to show that Tunisia has in fact 
acknowledged the need to keep Tunisian law of personal 
status islamicised; it is part of the evolutionary 
and gradualist politics of Bourguiba. The problem lies 
in her methodology. With all due respect to the dif­
ficulty which reformers encounter in the intricacy of 
the SharTca, one sees that Tunisia has not settled on a 
methodology to redefine islamicising of the law con­
sistently. She has not been ruthless in scrutinizing 
every provision of the SharTca. in the light of past 
and present rationalisation. She has been bold in re­
examining the law of polygamy and talag, but not the 
law of succession. She has allowed economic pressures 
to affect the laws of property, but not the laws of 
succession. She has reopened the "door of J i.jtihad", 
but has not tackled the traditional acceptance of 
♦ahadTth for interpreting the QurJan. In the law of 
wills, traditions are especially important, having been 
used as conclusive proof of the fact that the suwar 
of inheritance abrogated the suwar on bequests in the 
Qur>an. This need not be so, for the QurJan enjoins 
the faithful to provide for the needy. Surely when 
heirs refuse to validate an ultra vires bequest, the 
courts should determine whether their refusal works 
great hardship on the needy legatee. In summary, Tunisia 
has not tackled firmly enough the issue at stake, namely, 
what does it mean to islamicise in the twentieth cen­
tury. The old jurists had to islamicise old situations 
such as agnatic dominance. New jurists have to
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islamicise new social values such as equality of the 
sexes•
The first challenge to the SharTca came with the 
arrival of the Europeans. Reforms were only illusory 
because they rested on a desire for immediate political 
gain. When the Protectorate was established, Tunisians 
became accustomed to, though they resented, a dual 
system of law. Tunisians had a choice between going 
to French courts and going to the courts of the SharTca, 
depending on whether they had adopted French nationality 
or had their land registered. The relative efficiency 
of the French system impressed Tunisians, who rec­
ognised that efficiency can work to the advantage of 
Islam. When Independence was won, Tunisians organised 
a system which took the best from two worlds. Since 
reverence for Islam is an acceptable working base, the 
law of personal status brought new hopes for proving 
that Islam can meet the twentieth century with renewed 
strength. The next burst of reform came about the 
mid-sixties, when economic ambitions predominated. Some 
reforms have remained; others have not. Again the 
reason for the unappealing reforms that did not remain 
is that they had only a secular base, not an Islamic 
one.
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T A B L E  O F  S T A T U T E S ,  Orders, circulars
Relating to Tunisia (Published in French and Arabic)
23 January 1846
14 November 1856 
10 September 1857
7 February 1860 
26 April 1861
26 April 1861
25 April 1862
4 November 1868 
4 October 1869
3 September 1872
2 July 1873
19 March 1874
6 April 1874
13 April 1874
2 June 1874 
22 December1874
13 January 1875
8 February 1875
26 December 1875 
1 May 1876
Decree prescribing the emancipation 
of slaves and ordering measures 
for doing so _ _
Decree organising the Shari*a of Tunis
Fundamental Pact (*Ahd al JAman), 
containing the general bases for 
conduct and legislation which the 
Bay agrees to undertake in future 
Law fofc recruitment for Tunisian 
army (modified decree of 28 June 1886) 
Decree on the political organisation! 
of the Regency (Constitution of 
January 1861)
Decree regulating the penal and civil 
law for criminal and civil courts
of Tunisia __
Decree relating to the ganun for olive 
trees and date trees
Decree regulating the dime for grains 
Decree regulating the medjba and 
the dime for grains
Decree determining the judicial com­
petence of the Rabbis 
Decree on the judicial competence of 
the guwwad (calds) _
Decree instituting^ Jam *iya for 
administering Jahbas
Decree for appointment of magistrates 
of the SharTca of Tunis 
Decree regulating collection of 
revenues from *ahbas composed of agri­
cultural lands and regulation of 
khamm5s contracts _ _
Decree regulating Jamlya of Jahbas 
Decree appointing magistrates of 
the Shari ca and gudah for interior 
Decree regulating Studies at Sadiki 
College
Decree relating to choice of rite 
(Malik! or Hanafl) before the Sharica 
Decree regulating studies at the 
Great Mosque (Zaituna)
Decree prescribing to ca'ids (g59 id) 
maintaining of a book-register
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25 May 1876 
27 January 1878
29 December 1880
12 May 1881 
27 May 1881 
9 June 1881
22 April 1882
4 November 1882
4 February 1883 
27 March 1883
5 May 1883
8 June 1883
4 April 1884
9 April 1884 
31 July 1884
4 October 1884
Decree regulating functioning_of the 
Sharica of Tunis and the Sharica and 
courts of qudah in the interior 
Decree conceding to Bone-Guelma Company 
the^lenghtening up to Gfhardimaou of the 
railway line from Tunis to Dakhka- 
Djendouba (Souka al Arba)
Decree conceding to Bone-Guelma Company 
construction of railway line from Tunis 
to Haroman-Lif
Franco-Tunisian Treaty establishing the 
French Protectorate over the Regency 
French law approving Franco-Tunisian 
treaty concluded on 12 May 1881 
Decree charging Resident Minister of 
France to Tunis with the duties of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tunisian 
Government
Decree of President of the French Republic 
fixing the powers of the Resident Minister 
in Tunis and organising the running of 
the French Protectorate 
Decree instituting a Bureau (Direction) 
of Finances
Decree instituting Secretary General of 
the Government of Tunisia 
Law of France_creating court of first 
instance at Tunis, justices of the peace 
at Tunis, Bizerte, Susa, Sfax, Le Kef; 
jurisdiction over French nationals and 
French proteges (J.O.R.F. 28 March 1883; 
J#0.T. decree of 18 April 1883)
Decree relating to extension of French 
jurisdiction to nationals of foreign 
powers renouncing their consular juris­
dictions
Treaty of La Marsa between France and 
Tunisia regulating relations and dealing 
with the guarantee of the Tunisian debt 
by the French Government 
Decree regulating penal competence of the 
Driba (Regional Court, Tunis)
French law approving treaty of 8 June 1883 
concluded with Bay of Tunis 
Beylical decree extending jurisdiction of 
French courts to Europeans and European 
defendants; specifying jurisdiction of 
religious courts; maintaining secular 
Tunisian courts; creating commission for 
drafting the Code Foncier 
Decree of President of the French Republic 
on organisation of corps of French con­
trol eurs civils in Tunisia
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10 November 1884
15 December 1884
16 December 1884
25 January 1885
14 February 1885 
27 May 1885
23 June 1885
1 July 1885
24 August 1885
2 September 1885
2 January 1886
8 May 1886 
16 May 1886
14 June 1886
12 October 1886
15 February 1887
9 April 1887
19 September 1887 
29 October 1887
1 December 1887 
22 June 1888
French Presidential decree delegating 
power to Resident General to approve 
all Beylical decrees 
Order from Resident General approving 
series of decrees of the Bay rendered be­
fore 1884 (listed in Bompard#s Legislation) 
Decree on execution of civil and penal 
jurisdiction of Ouzara and delivery by _ 
greffier of Ouzara of copies of the ma crud 
(modified by decree of 23 January 1885) r 
Circular from Prime Minister to the 
guwwad (Calds) on citing parties to 
Ouzara and execution of judgments of Ouzara 
Decree regulating functioning of Ouzara 
Decree regulating appearance of advocates 
ai*d wakTl before the Ouzara 
Decree of President of the French Republic 
on powers of Resident General in Tunis 
Law on immoveable property in Tunisia 
Order of Prime Minister dividing penal 
section of Ouzara into two divisions 
(criminelle, correctionelle)
Decree on competence of French courts in 
penal matters - over Tunisians who commit 
crimes to prejudice of Europeans 
Decree organising Sadiki College
Order of Prime Minister on competence of
two penal divisions of Ouzara
Decree modifying law of 1st July 1885
Decree relating to organisation of 
Tribunal Mixte
Decree giving competence to Ouzara in col­
lection of revenues from agricultural 
*ahbas and regulation of khammas contracts 
De&ree giving competence to French courts 
in certain matters of personal status among 
French Muslim subjects
Decree specifying that Tunisian notaries 
are authorised to receive documents re­
lating to personal status of Algerians 
Decree fixing recompense accorded to ad­
ministrators of properties of minors 
Decree of President of French Republic on 
creating of provisional justices of the 
j^ eace at Ain Draham, Beja, Souk al Arba, 
Nabeul, Gabes, Djerba^ Qafas (Gafsa),Maktar, 
Kairouwan, Tozeur
Decree of President of French Republic in­
stituting court of first instance at Susa 
Decree regulating adjudication of inzal 
on immoveable properties of public and 
private Jahbas
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17 July 1888
6 November 1888
28 May 1890
18 March 1896
3 May 1896
15 December 1896 
9 May 1897
23 May 1900
22 January 1905 
15 December 1906
24 December 1907 
3 May 1913
9 July 1913
26 April 1921
31 December 1921 
(effective 1st of 
March 1922)
14 July 1922
14 July 1922
27 May 1937
28 March 1938
23 July 1938
Decree of President of French Republic on 
competence of French courts in Tunisia 
in matters of immoveable properties 
Decree modifying different articles of law 
of 1st July 1885 
Decree prohibiting slavery 
Decree giving civil and penal competence 
to provincial (regional) courts at Sfax, 
Gabes , Qafas (Gafsa); regulating appeal 
to Ouzara
Circular from Prime Minister to ca’ids 
(cruwwadT on execution of prescriptions of 
decree of 18 March 1896 and confirming use 
of registers (decree of 1 May 1876)
Decree modifying decree of 25 May 1876 
in regard to registers for cases for ex­
pediting affairs __
Decree regulating profession of wakil be­
fore Tunisian courts (lawyers exempted 
from examination). Abrogates decree of 
27 May 1885 _
Decree giving competence to caid (qa'id) 
in some penal and civil matters? regulating 
duties of French d^l&gu^ to the Driba 
(Regional court of Tunis); affirming use 
of registers by quwwad (decree of 1 May1876) 
Decree on sale of inzal 
Decree promulgating Tunisian Code of 
Obligations and Contracts (modified decree 
of 30 June 1907 in J.O.T. 6 July 1907)
Decree promulgating Code of Civil 
Procedure for secular Tunisian courts 
Beylical decree giving administration of 
#ahbas whose beneficiaries are minors to 
government Bureau of muqaddam, Section 
d'Etat
Decree promulgating Criminal Code of 
Tunisia
Decree creating Ministry of Tunisian 
Justice; appointment of French magistrate 
as d£l£gu£ to the Ministry (J.O.T. of 
30 April 1921)
Decree promulgating Code of Criminal Pro­
cedure for Tunisian courts (J.O.T. No. 105 
bis t 31 December 1921)
Decree creating Direction de la Justice 
Tunisienne and Direction G^nferale de 
1•Interieur
Reform in procedure before Ouzara 
(J.O.T. 30 April 1921)
Decree allowing courts of the Sharica to 
give judgments by default 
Decree amending arts. 37 et sq. of law of 
1st July 1885 (loi fonciere)
Decree creating cantonal courts at 
Mekknine, Nabeul, Bizerte* ;
20
9 Jane 1941
28 March 1942 
5 August and
2 September 1948
16 June 1949 
27 June 1952
3 June 1955
31 May 1956
12 July 1956
3 August 1956
13 August 1956
25 September 1956
25 September 1956
19 February 1957 
9 March 1957
11 March 1957
4 June 1957
24 June 1957
24 June 1957
18 July 1957
25 July 1957
Lav creating French Court of Appeal at 
Tunis (J.O.R.F. 15 June 1941,p.2503)
Decree modifying art# 37 of Code Foncier 
Decree promulgating Code of Civil Pro­
cedure for Courts of the Sharica 
(J.O.T# of 14 September 1948)
Decree appointing commission for drafting 
Code of the Sharica (J.O.T. no.55 of 
5 June 1949)
Order from Ministry of Justice extending 
comihission appointed to draft Code of the 
Sharica (J.O.T. no52 of 27 June 1952) 
Franco-Tunisian Convention Judiciaire 
(J.O.T. no. 71-73, 6 September 1955)
Decree abolishing public Jahb5s 
Decree on personal status of non-Muslim 
and non-Hebrew Tunisians (J.O.T. of 
13 July 1956). Modified by decree of
24.6.1956 in J.O.T. No. 51 and decree of
27.9.1957 in J.O.T. No. 19
Decree abrogating Code of Procedure for 
Courts of Shariea of 1948 and decree of 
25 May 1876 (J.O.T. no. 65 of 14 Aug.1956) 
Decree promulgating Code of Personal Status, 
modified by Law no. 40 of 27.9.1957 in 
J.O. No. 19 (Code in J.O.T. 28 Dec. 1956) 
Decree intecrratinq_courts and abolishing 
courts of the Sharica (J.O.T. No. 77 of 
25 September 1956)
Decree on retirement and appointment of 
judges upon abolishing of courts of the 
Sharica (J.O.T. 25 September 1956)
Decree on reorganisation of Tribunal 
Immobilier of Tunisia (J.O.T. 22 Feb. 1957) 
Franco-Tunisian Convention Judiciaire sup­
pressing French courts in Tunisia (Law 
No. 57-760 of 10 July 1957 in J.O.R.F.
11 July, p.6818} J.O.R.F. 2 Feb.1958,pi266) 
Decree making French representative to 
Tunisia an ambassador (J.O.R.F. March 1957, 
p.2790)
Decree relating to land transactions (re­
quirement of authorisation for any trans­
fer of rights in agricultural immoveables) 
(J.O.T. No. 45 of 4 June 1957)
Decree modifying art. 366 of Code Foncier 
Decree abrogating law of 13 April 1883 and 
art. 2 of law of 1st July 1885; replacing 
French law with provisions of Tunisian Code 
of Obligations and Contracts (J.O.T. of
25 June 1957)
Decree abolishing private and mixed *ahbSs 
Proclamation of Tunisian Republic (J.otR.T.
26 July 1957)
Zl
1 August 1957
27 September 1957
28 January 1958 
1 June 1959
19 June 1959
5 October 1959 
15 Jlily 1963
20 February 1964
20 February 1964 
12 May 1964
28 May 1964
4 June 1964 
12 February 1965
3 June 1966 
22 September 1969
14 January 1971
Law no. 57-3 regulating civil status 
(found in Code of Personal Status)
Law no. 40 abolishing Rabbinical courts 
(J.O.R.T. No. 19 of 27 September 1957)
Law no. 1 abrogating arts 217-227 of Code 
Foncier (J.O.R.T. No. 9)
Constitution of Tunisia (J.O.R.T. No. 30 
of 1st June 1959)
Law no. 59-77 enacting law of wills 
(J.O.R.T. No. 34 of 1959, part of Code of 
Personal Status)
Law no. 59-130 promulgating Code of Civil 
and Commerical Procedure (J.O.R.T. of 
13 November 1959)
Law no. 63-25 relating to immoveable 
transactions (modifies decree of 4 June 
1957) (requires authorisation for transfer 
of rights in agricultural operations 
(J.O.R.T. No. 33 of 12-16 July 1963)
Law no. 64-1 relating to marriage between 
persons below certain age (J.O.R.T. of 
20 February 1964)
Law no. 64-2 modifying law of civil status 
in regard to effects of void unions
Law no.2, forbidding non-Tunisians to 
own agricultural lands in Tunisia 
(J.O.R.T. No. 24 of 12 May 1964)
Law no. 64-17, enacting provisions for 
hiba (J.O.R.T. No. 27, part of Code of 
Personal Status)
Law no* 64-38 on formation of cooperative 
lands (J.O.R.T. No. 28 of 2-5-June 1964)
Law no. 65-2 promulgating Code of Property 
Rights (Discussion by National Assembly 
10 February 1965)
Law no. 66-49 amending law of guardianship 
(J.O.R.T. of 3 June 1966)
Law no. 69-56 relating to reform of 
agriculture (allowing freedom to with­
draw from cooperatives) (J.O.R.T. of 
23 September 1969)
Law no. 71-7 modifying the law on lands in 
cooperatives (private titles to such lands) 
(J.O.R.T. 14 January 1971)
Z l
Non-Tunisian 
30 August 1816 
1938
Code Civil of France
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 
(1 & 2 Geo* 6, c.45)
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HISTORY OP THE OTTOMANS AND THE BEGINNING OE FRENCH RULE
IN TUNISIA
When the Muslim Arabs attempted to move against the
Byzantine Empire by attacking the Turkish route to
Europe, they met resistance# Instead of discouraging
them, resistance forced them to channel their energy into
another part of the Byzantine Empire, namely, North
Africa. Only twenty-five years after the flight of
Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, the Muslim governor of
Egypt invaded the southern desert of Tunisia where he
found the Byzantine governor had become independent of
the Eyzantine emperor already. By 698 A.D. all of Tunisia
had fallen from the hands of the Berbers and Byzantines
to the Muslim Arabs.
Consolidated rule began in the eighth century A.D.
with the Aghlabids, who accepted the policy of the
^AbbasTds to support the collection of Jahadith for
developing more systematic judicial thought. The school
of Malik owes a debt to Asad b. al-Furat, pupil of
Ibn al-Kasim of Egypt, and to Furatfs pupil Sahnun.
for making MalikT thought dominant in Tunisia. Sahnun
*
had been particularly active as qadi of Kairouan, the 
centre of Islamic learning and the capital of the Muslim 
military invaders, it being far more important, ■until the
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twelfth century, than Tunis.
Tunisia did not escape the invasion of the Fatimids 
(909-1171). Tunis remained orthodox while Kairouan fell 
to the ShTca.
When the caliph al-Mansur took over Tunisia and made 
a province of it for his governor Abd al-Wahid b. AbT b. Hafs 
(1206-1221), who ruled in the name of the caliph of 
Marrakesh, the Hafsid dynasty made its debut. On and 
off the throne for three and a half centuries, the 
Hafsids restored Maliki doctrine to North Africa, but 
never completely pacified the Berber-Arab triiies who domi­
nated the interior. By the end of the first century of 
Hafsid rule, the legalists were benefiting from the Muslim 
refugees fleeing Christians in Spain. The chief qadi,
Ibn al-Ghammaz, had come from Valencia. Despite politi­
cal troubles from intrigues over the throne and Crusader 
invasions, the next century, the fourteenth, was described 
by the traveler Khalid al-Balawi (1335-1340) as the 
golden age of North African jurists. This was the time 
of the chief qudah Ibn lAbd al-Rafi1, Ibm lAbd al-Salam,
!Isa al-Ghabrini, Qadi Ibn Rashid al-G-afsi, and mufti 
Ibn Harun.
By the middle of the third century of Hafsid rule 
Tunis had gained in importance, being a port which 
attracted European merchants, especially Italians. Also 
by the same time tribal rebellions in the interior had 
weakened the dynasty even more. Maraboutism, or popular
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veneration of pious Muslims had taken hold. In time 
the groups who dedicated themselves to the upkeep of 
the memory of a shrine for a deceased pious Muslim
1
brother became consolidated into large followings.
In 1535 the Spaniards, in* venegeful pursuit of Turkish 
corsairs, made Tunis a vassal state. The Spanish did 
not stay long, suffering severely from attacks from 
the interior. Kairouan produced the rebel Sidi cArafa, 
and central Tunisia held out under the marabout con­
federation of the ShabbTya.
The Turks struck the final blow to the Hafsids 
and the Spaniards. In the east of the Islamic Empire, 
the Turks had been challenging the iAbbasids in 
Baghdad ever since the 1000*s, and the Ottoman branch 
of the Turks had established the Ottoman dynasty by 
the 1300*s. While the Byzantine rule had ended quite 
early in North Africa, the Muslims did not destroy 
Byzantine rule in Turkey until 1453# Once the Turks 
then defeated the Mamluk dynasty (themselves of Turkish 
and Circassian origins) in Egypt in 1517, the way was 
open to North Africa, as part of consolidating the 
Empire against the Europeans. Perched in Algiers, the 
Ottomans under cAli Pasha invaded Tunis in 1569 when 
the son of the Tunisian vassal of Spain dethroned his
i
‘Jean Ganiage, Les Origines du Protectorat Brancais en 
Tunisie, 1861-1861 (Maison Tunisienne de l1Edition, 
December 1968), p. 145.
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father and fought the Spanish. After a setback from
Don John of Austria, the Turks did not win Tunis until
1574, when Sinan Pasha led troops directly from
Constantinople into Tunis.
Tunisia became a province of the Ottoman Empire.
At first the Turks appointed a pasha to rule Tunisia
from Algiers. Erom 1587, the Sublime Porte (Constantinople)
took direct responsibility for Tunisia. The descendants
of the Ottoman rulers were to stay for the next three
hundred eighty-three years. In religious and legal
institutions, the Hanafi school was to be placed on a.
par with Maliki thought. In terms of population, the
Maliki school held the greater sway among Tunisians and
the Hanafi advocates were largely confined to the .
ruling Ottoman elite.
Ottoman rule in Tunis did not begin peaceably. The
Ottomans first had to settle struggles for power among
themselves. In 1591 there was a bloody revolt against
the diwan, the tyrannical governing body of higher
military officers. The deys (da*y, a military title,
commander of every one hundred men in a unit of four
thousand under an agha) then took full power. The
pashawat, representatives of the Ottoman Sultan at.
the Porte, had no longer any substantial power behind their 
official position.
It was not long before one of the deys (da\y)
(1594-1610) laid the rudiments of systematic rule.
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He issued a code of laws called mizan to clarify duties 
and organised officers with the title of bay into armed 
units to collect taxes twice a year. Shortly in time 
the deys (da*y) became subordinate to the officers 
with the title bay. However, before the decline of 
the deys (da*y)« Prance, later to become the dominant 
power in Tunisia, established diplomatic ties with 
Tunis. She had already paved the way with diplomatic 
capitulations from the Porte.
The first Bay (1612-1631) was originally a Corsican 
called Pasha. His son succeeded in extending Ottoman 
military control outside Tunis over the main towns 
in the northern half of Tunisia, where the better agri­
cultural lands are situated. Yet civil uprisings 
from Tunisian tribes and attacks from Algerian border 
tribes continued. In 1686 and 1694, Algerians were 
strong enough to invade and occupy Tunis.
Military and administrative centralism in the 
Tunisian province did not begin until the early eighteenth 
century when the military commander combined in one 
person, himself, all the titles of bay, dey, pasha, and 
agha. In July 1705, Husain b. cAli TurkT, was proclaimed 
Bay. He was founder of the Husseinite dynasty which 
ruled Tunisia until July of 1957- He wanted to 
establish a dynasty based on a regular order of succession 
of his direct descendants. However, ambitions of 
agnatic collaterals, supported by Algerian invaders,
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thwarted his dreams* Husain*s nephew ruled next, to be
dethroned by his own son who was followed by the son of
Husain (Muhammad, 1756-59)• The throne passed to the • •
second son of Husain, then to a grandson. Between 1759
and 1814 under the reigns of these last two, Tunisia
came into being as a semi-autonomous province of the
Ottoman Empire. The Bay began signing consular treaties
with Europe as if he were a sovereign monarch. Eighting
with the Algerians and with the rebellious Turkish
infantry continued. Events in Europe iegan to influence
North African politics more often than not, and in
more subtle ways than the Crusaders. After the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 the European powers forced the Tunisia
Bay to suppress the pirates. Tn 1830, France established
herself militarily in Algeria, at the protest of the
Ottomans in Constantinople.
Then for eighteen years Tunisia experienced a surge
of military and fiscal assertions by the Bay *Ahmad
(1837-1855). In the Ottoman tradition of preserving
rule through efficient military power, 3Ahmad Bay built.
up the Tunisian military on European lines, with the 
advice of French instructors. Jean-Baptiste Campenon, 
a French general, was dispatched to head one of the first 
non-religious educational centres in the Islamic province, 
the military school of Bardo (location of the palace of
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the Bay). He kept in close touch with the French Minister 
2
of War*
Buying arms, uniforms, and paying men for the new army 
were not without expense* As was happening in other semi- 
autonomous Ottoman provinces, such as Egypt under 
Muhammad cAli , the military was draining the state coffers. 
This was setting a trend in government expenditures which 
at the end of the nineteenth century made many a ruler 
totally in deht to his own people and to European 
bankers* * Ahmad Bay met his new expenses in the conven-
m
tional manner at first: levying new taxes* He introduced
the qanun and the mahsulat. The qahun was a fixed tax
on olive and date groves. The mahsulat: was a tax on
3 ”
sales and gifts.
The most well-known legislation of 1 Ahmad Bay is the«
decree facilitating emancipation of slaves (only in 1890 
after the Protectorate was established was slavery fully 
forbidden). The decree is a good example of the sovereign!s 
interference in the Shari*a— justified by new pressures 
from the presence of Europeans— in a matter over which 
his jurists disputed for lack of a : definite text on the
2
Uaniage, p. 576, in "Biographies1 (Caxnpenon) .Letter 
published from Lt.Col. Campenon to Marechal Randon, Minister of 
War, 1862, pp.76-78.
•2
Jean Poncet, La Colonisation et 1*agriculture europeene 
en Tunisie depuis T581 (Mouton, 19^2)« P#85.
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4
’question:
Decree prescribing the emancipation of slaves,
23 Jan u ary  1846*
We are completely certain that most of the inhabi­
tants in the Kingdom abuse the right of property 
which they have over the blacks and that they mis­
treat these inoffensive creatures* You are not 
unaware that our learned jurisconsultants are not 
in agreement on the question of knowing if slavery, 
in which the black races have fallen, is supported 
by a formal text; thatthe light of the religion 
has penetrated into their country for a long time; 
that we are very far ' from the era when the 
masters conformed, in the enjoyment of their 
rights, to the prescriptions issued by the most 
eminent of the Messengers (Muhammad) before his 
death; that our most sacred law emancipates by 
right the slave mistreated by his master; and 
that the legislation (laws so far created) has a 
marked tendency towards the extension of liberty.
As a consequence we have decided, in the present 
interest of the slaves and the future interest of 
the masters, as well as in the aim of preventing 
the former (the slaves) from demanding protection 
from the foreign authorities, that notaries will 
be established at STdT-Mahrez, at Sidi-Mansour, 
and at Zaouia Bekria, for delivering to any slave 
who will demand of them, letters of emancipation 
which will be presented to us to be stamped with 
our seal*
On their part, the judges of the SharT*a must 
send to us all the matters on slavery on which 
they are petitioned, and all the slaves who 
address themselves to them to demandtheir liberty. 
They must not allow their masters to take them 
back, their ; court being a place of inviolable 
refuge for the persons who flee slavery, whose 
legality is doubtful, and who argue with their de­
tainers over rights which are impossible to admit 
in our Kingdom; for if slavery is licit, the con­
sequences whibh they entail are contrary to 
religion, and it follows, to avoid them, all the 
more when a considerable public interest is 
involved in this act.
. Translated from the French of Jean A. Marty and Roger 
Maarek, Recueil general and practique de Legislation 
Tunisienne (Patronage : Autorit£s de la M^tronole et de la 
RSgence), Vol.2 of the Encyclopedia of Islam,1918-1930, 
"Tunisia”, states that this decree of 1846 abolished slavery
I have interpreted it as facilitating emancipation when slaves 
chose so. The Marty/Maarek collection of laws cites both the 
1846 decree of emancipation and the decree of 28 May 1890
31
After the reign of 3Ahmad Bay the European consuls 
were no longer blamed, as implied in the Emancipation 
decree of 1846, for legislation which was designed to 
protect the authority of the Bay against foreign encroach­
ments. The Europeans under ^Ahmad^ cousin, Muhammad.  .
(1855-1859), won credit for encouraging legislation
which forced the Bay to define his political position in
legal terms. Muhammad began with the *AhdL al-5Aman
(Fundamental Pact) of September 9, 1857, which used
the authority of the Bay to guarantee basic civil rights
of life and property for non-Muslims. The *Ahd al-*Aman
did not set a precedent . in the Islamic world.
Constantinople, more sensitive to non-Muslim pressures,
as the centre of the Empire, had promulgated in 1839
the Khatt-T sherif of Gulkhane which >Ahmad Bay had ■ *•*   •
refused to apply when the Sultan issued it, and the
5
Hatt-i humayoun in February 1856. Nonetheless, the 
dramatic circumstances which directly led up to the 
cAhd al-»Aman are important to note. . They ^erve as a 
background to the policy of triple jurisdiction (Muslim, 
Rabbinical, French) which the Protectorate later sup­
ported. Author Jean Ganiage recounts the circumstances 
from letters exchanged between the French consul and the
prohibiting slavery.
^Ganiage, p.68.
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Paris Foreign Office (page 65 et sq.):
In June 1857 Samuel Sfez, a Hebrew cart-driver, ran 
over a Muslim child in a street in Tunis. He was drunk, 
and when assailed by a crowd, shouted blasphemies, cursing 
the Bay and the Islamic religion. Taken immediately to 
the court of the SharTca, he was condemned to death. 
Despite efforts of the French and British consuls to 
obtain a suspension, Sfez was decapitated in twenty-four 
hours. In Tunis emotion continued to rise over the 
execution and provoked an explosion of popular fanaticism. 
Bands armed with sticks terrorized the Hebrew quarters.
The general European community barricaded itself against 
possible invasion and appealed to their consulates to 
take action. The consuls strictly speaking could not 
condemn the summary execution. Sfez was a Tunisian sub­
ject, a Tunisian Hebrew. He had been brought before the
court of the SharTca, under the presidency of the Hanafi.
grand mufti and Sheikh-ul-Islam, MuhammadBeyram, the.
brother-in-law of the Bay Muhammad. It could hear cases 
not only on personal status or hubus (waqf), but also 
any affair involving public cursing. In strict law, the 
penalty for blasphemy was death. Yet no one had known 
in recent years, according to the French consul, the 
penalty to have been enforced. The speedy execution of 
Sfez was interpreted as a sign of fanaticism among the 
muftun against foreigners and non-Muslims. The affair 
provided enough alarm in European capitals to justify
demands to the Bay for legal changes which would benefit
the Europeans living in Tunisia* Prance and Great
Britain had won concessions from the Ottomans in
Constantinople to introduce mixed courts where strict
SharTca yielded to European notions when Europeans were
involved* Now Prance and Great Britain wanted to use
the occasion to persuade the Bay of Tunis to grant the 
6
same.
About ten days before the cAhd al-*Aman was pro­
claimed, a' Prench gunboat paid a calllfof courtesy”*
When Muhammad Bay proclaimed three months after the 
Sfez affair the cAhd al->Aman before a group of high 
Tunisian officials and foreign consuls, he essentially 
made a promise to write a code which would satisfy 
everyone. To lend weight to his word, he had already 
appointed a committee to draft the code. On the com­
mittee were representatives of the political cabinet 
of the Bay and representatives of the SharTca: the 
Prime Minister, chairman, the Minister of War, the 
Minister of the Navy, the Keeper of the Seal, a general, 
a ca#id (qa*id. provincial administrative official), the 
two Maliki mufti, and the two Hanafi mufti, who
7
apparently were decidedly disinterested in the meetings*
7~
_ Ganiage does not consider the possibility that the 
muftun may have applied the penalty for a noni-Muslim 
killing a Muslim, not the penalty for blasphemy.
7
•Ganiage, page 67.
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The *Ahd al-*Aman provided the basic guidelines for elabo-
8
ration of the code. The text follows:
Fundamental Pact of 10 September 1857 
(20 Moharrem 1274)
1 In the name of God the meroiful and the 
compassionate. Praise to God who opened the way 
to justice, who gave equity to guarantee the con­
servation of order in this world, who has ruled 
the gift of knowledge of law according to his 
interests, who has promised reward to the just and 
punishment to the oppressor. Nothing is truer 
than the word of God.
2 Blessed be our Lord Muhammad, whom God, in 
His Book honoured with titles of humane and com­
passionate, and to whom He sent the practice of 
the right way, and who has taught and explained 
to us, as God ordered him, the bases of the law 
which wants approval of the just and protection 
from the unjust, in such a way that the word of 
God has not been the object of vicissitude nor 
false interpretation. May health and blessings 
be on his familytProphet1s} and his companions 
who knew how to teach the truth to whomever 
desired to know it, and who have convinced others 
by their learning and their proofs, and who knew 
the law by text and by interpretation, and who 
left us as striking proof of their exemplary 
conduct, their justice and equity.
3 I ask You, Oh God, to grant me your powerful 
support to arrive at acts which please You, so 
that You help fulfill my princely task whihhis 
the heaviest burden any man could carry. I put 
all my confidence and all my hope in You. What 
greater support than that of the Highest I
4 The mission which God has given us, in 
charging us (the Bay) with governing His creatures 
in this part of the world imposes on us command­
ing duties and religious obligations which we can 
fulfill only with the help of His aid alone. 
Without this aid, who could satisfy his duties 
towards God and towards men?
5 Convinced that it is necessary to follow 
the prescriptions of God in everything relating to
His creatures, I have decided no longer to let 
weigh upon those (creatures) who are confided to 
my care injustice nor contempt: I will neglect
Marty and Maarek, vol.1, Annex No.1.
nothing in putting them in full possession of 
their rights.
Can one slack, whether in his acts, or in 
his intentions, in such duties, when one knows 
that God does not commit the slightest injustice 
and that He reproves those who oppress His 
creatures?
God said to His beloved Prophet: "0 David!
-I made you my caliph over the earth; judge men 
according to justice, do not let yourself be guided 
by passion, for it will remove you from the way 
of God, and those who remove themselves from the 
ways of the Lord are destined to the most fright­
ful torments, for they have forgetten the day of 
recompense.n
God is witness that I accept His high pre­
scriptions to prove that I prefer the happiness 
of my Realms to my personal advantage. I have 
dedicated my personal advantage to assure the 
happiness of my Realms. I have dedicated, to 
assure this happiness of my Realms, my time, my 
strength, and my reason. I have already begun, 
as is known, to alleviate the taxes which weigh 
on my subjects* God has permitted that this 
reform be a source of good, and these happy 
results have made our people hope for new im­
provements.
The hand(s) of the infidel agents found 
themselves from then on paralysed.
To arrive at improvements it is necessary 
first to establish the general bases for them. To 
want to attain them in one blow, without support­
ing them with bases, would be to create insur­
mountable difficulties.
We are convinced that most of the inhabitants 
of our Realms do not have a complete confidence 
in what we have done with the best intentions.
It is a law of nature that man can arrive at pros­
perity only as long as his liberty is completely 
guaranteed to him, as long as he is certain to 
find refuge against oppression behind the ramparts 
of justice, and he sees his rights respected 
until the day when unimpeachable proofs show 
his guilt, only as long as he will be sure that 
this guilt will not result against him from In­
sulated witnesses.
The guilty man who finds himself judged by 
many does not hesitate, in order to preserve 
their light of reason, to recognise his crime, 
and must say to himself: "Whoever surpasses the 
limits fixed by the Lord condemns his very self."
We have seen the Sheikh ul-Islam and those 
great powers who by their wise policy have placed
themselves at the head of nations,in-giving the 
most complete guarantees of liberty; they have 
understood that that is one of their first duties, 
dictated by reason and by nature itself. If 
these advantages that have been conceded are real, 
the Shar±ca must consecrate them, for the SharTca 
was instituted by G-od to defend man against bad 
passions. Whoever submits to justice and swears 
by her approaches piety.
The heart of man which has faith in liberty 
reassures itself and strengthens itself.
We have lately informed the great culama* 
of our religion and some of our high officials 
of our intention to establish courts composed 
of eminent men for dealing with crimes and mis­
demeanors as well as the disputes arising from 
commerce, the source of prosperity of our realms.
We have established, for the organisation of 
these coufts, principles consecrated by our law.
The sentences issued by the court of the 
SharTca will continue to have full effect. May 
G-od perpetuate until the Day of the Last Judgment 
the respect which this court inspires.
The administrative and judiciary code demands 
time for being edited, and adapted to the exigencies 
of our country. We hope that G-od, who reads 
our hearts, will confer the grace for establish­
ing these reforms in the interest of our govern­
ment, and may hot at all throw out the prin­
ciples which the glories of Islam have bequeathed 
to us. And we, the humble and poor servant of 
the Very High, hasten to conform to His will 
to reassure men. Nothing, in this code —  all 
can be convinced of it —  will be contrary to 
His prescriptions. Here are the bases:
I
A complete security guaranteed formally 
to our subjects, to all the inhabitants of our 
Realms, regardless of religion, nationality, 
and race. This security, will extend to their 
respected persons, to their sacred possessions, 
and to their honoured reputation.
This security will be subject to exception 
only in legal cases when the matter will devolve 
upon the courts^ then the matter will be sub­
mitted to us and it will be for us to order the 
execution of the sentence, either to commute the 
penalty or to prescribe a new one.
II
All our subjects are subjected to the tax 
existing today—  or to that which may be establish­
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ed later —  proportionately and whatever be 
the position of the fortune of individuals, 
in such a way that the great will not at all 
be exempt from the q^ nTln because of their ele­
vated position and the small will not at all 
be exempt any longer because of their weakness. 
The development of this article will take place 
in a clear and precise manner.
Ill
^Muslims and other inhabitants of the 
country will be equal before the law, for this 
right belongs naturally to man, whatever his 
condition.
Justice on earth is a scales which serves 
to guarantee right against injustice, the weak 
against the strong.
IY
Our Hebrew subjects will not submit to 
any constraint to change their religion, and 
will not at all be prevented in the exercise 
of their religion; their synagogues will be 
respected and protected from any insult, con­
sidering that the state of protection in which 
they find themselves must assure them our ad­
vantages, it must also impose on us their pro­
tection.
Y
.Considering that the army is the guaran­
tee of security for all, and that the advan­
tage which results from that is to the bene­
fit of the public in general; considering, on 
the other hand, that man needs to dedicate a 
part of his time to his existence and to the 
needs of his family, we declare that we will 
conscript soldiers only according to rules and 
according to conscription by lot. The soldier 
will not at all remain in the service beyond a 
limited time, and that will be determined in a 
military code.
VI
When the criminal court will pronounce a 
penalty incurred by a Hebrew subject, there will 
be attached to the said court Hebrew assessors. 
Religious law renders them, furthermore, the ob­
ject of benevolent recommendations.
YII
We will establish a court of commerce, com-
posed of a president, a chief clerk, and several 
members chosen from among Muslims and the 
subjects of the friendly powers. This court, 
which will judge commercial matters, will func­
tion after we have reached an agreement with 
the great foreign powers, our friends, on the 
procedure to follow so that their subjects 
are within the jurisdiction of this court. The 
rules for this institution will be developed 
in a precise manner, in order to prevent any 
conflict or misunderstanding.
VIII
All our subjects, Muslims or others, will 
be equally subjected to rules and usages in ef­
fect in the country; none of them will enjoy 
any privileges over the other.
IX
Freedom of commerce for all and without 
any privilege for any one. The government pro­
hibits itself any kind of commerce and will pre­
vent no one from doing so.
Commerce, in general, will be the object 
of a protective character, and any one who would 
cause obstacles to it will be thrown out.
X
Foreigners who will want to establish them­
selves in our Realms can exercise all indus­
tries and all trades on condition that they 
will submit to the established rules and to 
those which will be established later, on an 
equal footing with all the inhabitants of the 
country. No one will enjoy in this regard any 
privilege over the other.
XI
Foreigners belonging to various governments, 
which want to establish themselves in our 
Realms, can buy all kinds of properties, such 
as houses, gardens, lands, on an equal footing 
with the inhabitants of the country, on condi­
tion that they will submit to the existing rules 
or to rules which will be established, without 
shirking them.
There will not be the least difference in 
regard to them in the rules of the country.
We will make known the method of inhabitation, 
in such a way that the owner will have perfect 
knowledge of it and will be held to observe it.
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We swear, by God and by the sacred pact, 
that we will execute the grand principles whibh 
we have exposed, according to the method indi*- 
cated, and which we will follow up with the 
necessary explanations.
We will undertake matters, not only in our 
name, but in the name of our successors; none 
of them will be able to reign except after hav­
ing sworn to observe these liberal institutions, 
resulting from our care and our efforts; we 
take as witness before God, this illustrious as­
sembly composed of the representatives of the 
great friendly powers and the high officials 
of government.
God knows the aim, that I want known, 
and that I have just explained it to those 
who surround me; (it) has been placed in the 
bottom of my heart. God knows that my most 
ardent desire is to execute immediately the 
principles and consequences of these new insti­
tutions. One can demand of man only what is 
possible.
The one who has sworn by God must accom­
plish his oath.
Justice is the most solid good.
The life to come is the only to endure.
We receive the oath of the great persons 
and of the high officials of our government 
by which they undertake to join their intentions 
and their actions to ours in the execution of 
the reforms which we have just decreed. We 
say to them: Keep yourselves from transgressing
the oath which you have just made before God, 
for God knows your most secret intentions and 
acts.
0 God] Sustain those who have helped to 
contribute to the happiness of Your creatures; 
feed them with the nectar of Your grace.
0 GodI Grant us Your help, Your assis­
tance, and Your compassion; make this work pro­
duce its fruits. We ask You Your support in 
this task, and render thanks to You for the 
mission which You have confided in us. Happy 
is the one whom You have chosen to lead on 
the path of truth. Good is in what you decree.
After having taken the different opinions, 
we, poor servant of God, have promulgated this 
act, in which we have seen the utility for
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the prosperity of the country with the
blessing of the Qur*ah and the mysteries
of the Eatha.
•
Salutations from the servant_of his 
God, the mouchir Muhammad Pacha Bay, po*- ■ 
ssessor of the Kingdom of TTEnis,
12 Moharrem 1274#
Thus the Bay aimed to satisfy Hebrew, Muslim, Euro­
pean, and Tunisian alike* The Hebrew was to have as­
sessors attached to criminal courts (Article VI); who 
would preside over the criminal courts —  Muslims only, 
or Muslims and Europeans —  remained unclear in the 
Pact. The Europeans, however, clearly won a mixed com­
mercial court composed b£ Muslims and Europeans (Article 
VII). The Bay even conceded the right to own property 
by purchase to the Europeans (Article XI). Before the 
Pact Tunisian law forbade foreigners to own immoveable 
property in the realm. Europeans had tried to evade the 
law by controlling the land through fictitious deeds 
of hypothecation (mortgage)• The result was that a 
systematic control over transactions was lacking. At 
the same time, the Bay assured Muslims that while com­
mercial disputes would be subject in part to European 
authority, property disputes would be entirely subject 
to local-law applied in Tunisian courts, regardless of 
the religion and nationality of the disputants (Articles 
VIII, X, XI)• Tunisians, after the Bay promulgated 
the Pact, did not seem to take the concessions to the
41
Europeans seriously* No commercial court was established;
the government simply appeased by allowing Europeans
to compete in areas where the government previously
held monopolies* Buying property, however, was not so
simple in an Islamic country where some of the best
land was in hubus (waqf), which could not really be
alienated except through ways the Europeans had already
discovered* The European consuls still had to make
specific treaties recognising rights to acquire and
possess immoveables for their nationals (the English in
1863, the Austrians in 1866, the Italians in 1868, and
9
the French in 1871)* In whatever large commercial 
ventures the Europeans undertook involving possession 
of land, the Bay usually dictated conditions that aimed 
to assure that he too benefited from the new rights of 
the Europeans. Yet in the mid-nineteenth century, con­
flicts over rights with Europeans remained largely on the 
level of argument* It was not to be until the latter 
half of the century that Europeans engaged in important 
expensive business affairs and wanted to have guaran­
tees stronger than words.
The reign of Muhammad ended only two years after
0
the Pact was decreed* But before his death he bound his 
successor, his brother Muhammad Es Sadiq (1839-1882),
q ;
Ganiage, pages47-4?.
42
to elaborate the fAhd al-*Aman (Article XI) and to exe­
cute his dreams of a constitution which he announced at 
the same time as the Pact,
Faithfully Muhammad Es Sadiq set out to fulfill the 
• •
plans of his brother. During the. early years of his
reign, he promulgated (in 1860) a law on conscription,
10
as provided for in Article V of the Fundamental Pact.
In addition he approved decrees on subjects very generally 
mentioned in the cAhd al-*Amain. These decrees covered 
administrative organisations, such as defining ranks 
and duties of civil officers. Yet these no doubt laid 
a detailed basis for the general administrative, poli­
tical and legal structures of the constitution which 
was being prepared at the same time. The star piece
of the early reign of Muhammad Es Sadiq was the con-
• •
stitution, promulgated in January 1861, taking effect
26 April 1861.
The constitution was an example of legal reform
made not out of a new jurisprudential mentality, but out
of political impetuses. It represented innovations in
forms for executing power, but the substance of the power
represented a de facto situation.
To understand the politics of the constitution, one 
—
‘Article V: ...we declare that we will conscript soldiers 
only according to rules and according to conscription by 
lot. The soldier will not at all remain in the service 
beyond a limited time, and that will be determined in 
a military code.
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can begin with the occasion when Muhammad Es Sadiq met
• •
the Emperor Napoleon III in the French domains of Algeria*
The Bay had already prepared by September 1860 a copy
of the constitution to present to the Emperor at that
time# In the politics of this occasion was represented
both a change from and a continuation of what Tunisians
had known since the days of *Ahmad Bay# *Ahmad had set
• •
a definite tone# He wanted as much independence from 
the Ottoman Sultan as possible. Correspondence was
frequent between the Sultan and the Bay, but the word
_ 11
of the Sultan seemed to have remained on paper#
*Ahmad Bay had refused to apply the Khatt-i Sherif * . »
from Constantinople, granting capitulations to Europeans#
-j -j - -
Hobert Mantran, Inventaire de Documents Turcs d !Ar­
chives de Tunis du PcTr al Bay* University of Tunis-Publi­
cations of the Faculty des Lettres, 5th Series# Sources 
de lfhistoire tunisienne, Vol.I (Paris: Presses Universi- 
taires de France, 1961). _
Page 42: Fin Djoumada II 1258(5 August 1842), Firman 
du Sultun Abdul Me3id au mouchir de Tunis Ahmad Pacha, au 
sujet d !une femme nominee Fatime revendiquant la succession 
de ses parents (No.203, Dossier 340, carton 220).
2 Safer 1275 (2 October 1856), Lettre de 
es Seyyid Mehmed eAli, au bay de Tunis. Requete de la nom­
inee Fatim^ Hatoun concernant heritage en Tunisie (No.18308, 
Dossier 345, carton 220).
Page 48: 17 Rabi* I 1278 (22 September 1861), lettre 
de Mehmed Emir *Ali Pacha, grand vizir, au BeCy de Tunis. 
Requeste dfun nommd Chacban de Tripoli au sujet d Tun heri­
tage en Tunisie (No* 272, Dossier 345, carton 220)*
Page 89: 9 Cha€ban 1259 (4 September 1845), copie 
dfune lettre du Bay de Tunis Ahmad Pacha au governeur de 
Smyrne. Demande qufon envoie i*argent resultant de la 
vente des biens laisses en heritage d*Ali Aghazade Indje 
Mehmed (No. 595, Dossier 579, carton 222).
27 Djoumada I 1271 (17 March 1855), lettre 
dfAli Pacha, gouverneur de Damas au Bay de Tunis. Demande 
de protdger al Seyyid 1Abderrahman, qui vient recuellir 
heritage en Tunisie (No. 19216, Dossier 379, carton 222)*
He also left unexecuted the firman which the Sultan
12 #
sent in 1856 on the equality of all subjects. The 
Bay turned to Prance for encouragement in this policy 
of independence. *Ahmad selected the French as military 
advisors and visited Paris in 1846. Prance was a more 
likely partner than Great Britain, for many reasons.
The French, after the victories of Napoleon in Egypt 
shattered the faith of Muslims in their own prowess. 
Great Britain, however, had chosen a policy that sup­
ported the integrity of the power of the Sultan. She 
had not hesitated in 1840, only three years after
Ahmad had ascended the throne, to squelch the armies »
coming out of Egypt under Muhammad cAli, whose expan-.
sionist aims threatened the Turkish centre of the Otto­
man Empire. Great Britain could not tolerate any pro­
vincial military upstarts. France had another advan­
tage over Great Britain in regard to Tunisia. She 
held Algeria since the 1830fs against the wishes of
the Sultan in Constantinople. The Tunisians, well .
familiar with the troubles which the Algerian tribes 
inflicted throughout the centuries, wanted a peaceful 
Algeria, and France wanted a peaceful ally against the
Page 90: 3 Djoumada II 1273 (29 January 1857), 
lettre de Mahmbud Nedim, gouverneur de Smyrne, au Bay de 
Tunis. Testament dTIsmail Efendi b. Davoud (Davondzade) 
(No. 19218, Dossier 379, carton 222).
^Mantran, page 61. Lettre du 21 Djoumada II 1272 
(28 February 1856) dfAhmad Kechaf au Bay^de Tunis. Announce
lfenvoi d rune copie d ’un firman relatif a l^galite des 
sujets de l1empire ottoman.
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dominance of the Sultan*
The successors to the title of Bay who ascended 
the throne in the second half of the nineteenth cen­
tury continued to remain independent of the control of
the Sultan* Even when Muhammad finally submitted to • •
confirming in the cAhd al-7 Aman the same principle of
equality as in the Khatt-i Sherif of the Sultan of 1836
and the firman of 1856, he neglected any reference to
the faramln of the Sultan. Muhammad Es Sadiq continued
* * *
the tradition of autonomy in the constitution* It con­
firmed, without reference to the sanction of the Sultaii,
the right of the Tunisian rulers to determine their
12
own order of succession (Article one). Every Bay 
after ?Ahmad also continued to rely on France for en- 
couragement, rather than Great Britain. It was the 
French consul whom the Bay invited to review the French 
edition of the constitution, although the British con­
sul had suggested in 1859 the creation of a council of 
state or a Senate to assist the Bay in governing* The 
French Emperor seemed perfectly satisfied that the 
actions of the Bay neither violated the faramTn of the 
Sultan, nor did they acknowledge any other sovereignty
Tz.
Article 1: ,fThe succession to power is hereditary 
among the princes of the Husseinite family by order of 
age, according to the customary rules in the kingdom." 
Translated from the French of Marty and Maarek, Vol.I, 
Annex (Constitution of 1861).
except that of the Bay* The British would have had
both a constitution and a firman from the Sultan con-1 1,1 #
finning the Husseinite succession and internal autono­
my*
What had changed since the reign of 41 Ahmad Bay was
#
the nature of the influence the Bay accepted from the 
Europeans. ?Ahmad had rejected Western methods of 
governing, that is, by constitutional reins on the 
Sovereign. He had taken from Europe only what he 
thought might strengthen one of the traditional Otto­
man pillars of power, namely, an efficient military.
The main lever of French influence was thus in military 
advisors attached to the first secular school in 
Tunis, the military school of Bardo (suburb where the 
palace of the Bay was located). However, from the
time of *Ahmad's successor, Muhammad, and onwards,.  .
the Bay chose to communicate with Europeans through 
political and legal documents, pacts, and constitutions.
The reasons for the change were two: the greater
strength of the European influence, and the greater 
strength of a bureaucracy composed of the Mamluk 
ministers and tax collectors of the Bay. As we shall 
see, the strength which the bureaucracy of the Bay., at­
tained was in part due to a defensive reaction against 
encroaching Europeans. Both Europeans and Tunisian 
ministers had subtle mentalities. Both preferred to
rely more on edicts and authority of hierarchical 
organisation than on the military to achieve their 
ends.
Why had the European influence grown since the reign 
of ^Ahmad Bay? The Europeans of the nineteenth cen- 
tury had begun dealing with the Ottoman Empire ac­
cording to a strictly legal order of authority.
Eirst they worked with the Sultan. Great Britain had
#
naturally been drawn to the eastern part of the Otto­
man Empire because of its proximity to her own eastern 
empire. All other powers naturally gravitated towards 
the same area to counterinfluence one another. In 
time, the Europeans influenced and won from the 
Sultan commercial rights and mixed courts. As they ex- 
panded into other parts of the Ottoman Empire, they 
expected the same from the provinces. But finding 
that rights gained in Constantinople did not guarantee 
the same rights elsewhere, the Europeans dealt with 
the Ottoman provinces on an individual basis, making 
the same demands for guarantees on legal paper as they 
had from the Sultan. In regard to the Tunisian pro- 
vince, the French, quarrelling with Constantinople 
ever since the 1830fs when France took over Algeria, 
especially encouraged Tunisia to imitate the policy of 
the Porte of capitulations without the dominance of the 
Porte. The constitution that Emperor Napoleon III re­
48
ceived from the Bay served two purposes: one, to define 
internal governing structures and the extent of the 
rights of foreigners, and two, to reaffirm the autono­
my of the Bay and his rights to deal with foreigners
without the interference of the Sultan..
As for the greater strength of the ministers* , of
Muhammad Es Sadiq, most of them disliked any competitors,• .
European or otherwise, for the favour of the Bay and 
rights to own his lands. These ministeres were 
"mamluks", the main groups through whom the Tunisian 
rulers, like all other Ottoman provincial princes 
governed. The upbringing of the Mamluks was designed 
to insure a political corps loyal to the ruler. Origi­
nally Christian renegades of Greek or Circassian origin, 
the Mamluks were bought by Muslim princes when children 
as slaves in the markets of Constantinople. They were 
brought up in Islam then freed, but retained as loyal 
employees of the emancipator. The Bay chose among 
them his favourites, made them a part of his family 
by marrying them to his sisters or daughters, and gave 
them whatever positions of power he chose. Having no 
blood family, no roots in the country and no influence 
except through the Bay, the only stake they had in 
life was in power and politics. They had been bought 
by the Bay as political pawns, and the game was dan­
gerous. What fortunes and properties they built up
49
during their periods of favouritism more often than 
not aroused the suspicions of the Bay. Quick summary . 
justice which ended in loss of property or of life 
was the sole most effective weapon against their 
rapacity.
By the time the constitution was promulgated in
1861, the Mamluks, making up the majority of dignitaries
at the court, were the most powerful officials next to
the Bay. The Prime Minister who headed the commission
that drafted both the cAhd al-*Aman and the constitution
was a Mamluk, called Mustapha Khaznadar. Born in the• •
Aegean Islands, he had become brother-in-law of 1 Ahmad 
Bay and his treasurer (khaznadar). Under Muhammad 
Bay he became Prime Minister. Kept by Muhammad 
Es Sadiq, he rose to great power. Whatever opposition 
he faced on his commission from the Minister of War 
and the four muftun representing the traditional legal 
corps was in the minority. The Mamluks were in the 
majority. Even though there appeared to be solidarity 
then among the Mamluks, there sat on the commission .
another Mamluk who was to replace Mustapha in the latter..
nineteenth century as the result of a typical Mamluk
intrigue. He was Khair ad Bin Pacha (generally spelled
Kheredine), a Circassian Mamluk and son-in-law of
Mustapha, and Minister of the. Navy at the time...
In competing with the Europeans for power over the
Bay, the Mamluk ministers fought on the terms of the 
Europeans, namely, words with words. The first docu­
ment, the *Ahd al-3Aman, Mustapha edited when first _________ •»
made Prime Minister, under Muhammad Bay; it reflected 
in actuality the concessions to the desires of the Euro­
peans for an equal chance to compete in the Tunisian 
economy. The concessions appeared in the guise of the 
broad principle of equality of all inhabitants in the
Tunisian relams. The second document which Mustapha..
edited, the constitution, reflected more the realities 
of Mamluk power and the dreams of the Mamluks to per­
petuate by law that power.
Referring to themselves in the abstract as ministers 
and high government officials, the Mamluks achieved in 
the constitution two safeguards for their power. One 
was to interpose themselves between the Bay and all 
other subjects —  Tunisian or foreign, no matter. The 
second was protection of all subjects —  high officials, 
low officials, ordinary subjects, even members of the 
Royal Pamily —  from arbitrary judgments when disputes 
arose.
The role as intermediator betwesn the Bay and other 
subjects was written into articles regulating appoint­
ment and dismissal. Without a constitution, the Bay 
had a choice as to when he wanted to rule his subjects 
directly without interference of Mamluks and when he
wanted Mamluks to intervene for him. The constitution 
ended such choice. From the vagueness of the constitu­
tion about the appointment of ministers (provision 
being made for appointment of all other officials) 
one can surmise that the choice to appoint ministers 
or not was left to the Bay. But once he decided to 
appoint ministers, he had, by law, to rule through 
them, unless he could think of a clever way to override 
the Mamluks.
Beginning as soon as Article two of the constitu-
14
tion, the Ministers had a hand in the Royal Family.
The Prime Minister (Mustapha Khaznadar at the time) and•.
the President of the Supreme Council (Khair ad Bin in 
1861) were responsible for inscribing the civil list 
of the Royal Family, and as members of the Privy Council 
and ministers, they could be eligible to be appointed 
by the Bay to ad hoc commissions which would investi­
gate facts in disputes involving the Royal Family
15
(Articles six, seven, eight). As for appointments
‘Article 2: "There will be two registers signed by 
the Prime Minister and the President of the Supreme Coun­
cil where the civil status of the royal family will be in­
scribed. One of these registers will be deposited in 
the archives of the Supreme Council." Translated from 
the French of Marty and Maarek, Vol.I, Annex.
15Article 6: If as a result of a contravention against 
the present dispositions or for any other cause, a dis­
pute arises among the members of the reigning family for 
personal reasons, this dispute willbe arbitrated by a 
commission which the head of the family will institute 
ad hoc, under his presidency or under the chairmanship 
oT the principal members of the reigning family whom he
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and dismissals, the power of the Bay to choose and
name his subjects in high offices and to dismiss them
16
when he thought suitable (Article fourteen) was 
hedged by many other articles defining composition 
and attributes of officials. As mentioned before, there
will designate to that effect. This commission will be com­
posed of a member of the reigning family, the ministers, 
and the members of the Privy Council. The commission will 
be charged with making a report on the affair and if it 
establishes the existence of a violation, it will write 
on the report: "It is stated that the prince...is at 
fault", and it will present the report to the Head of 
State to whom belongs alone the right to punish the mem­
bers of his family in penalising them in any way he thinks 
suitable.
Article 7: Any misdemeanor committed by a member of the 
reigning family against a particular person will be judged 
by a commission which the Head of State will name on an 
ad hoc basis, under his chairmanship or that of a member 
of the family whom he will designate. This commission will 
be composed of ministers in active service and of the mem­
bers of the Privy Council; it will be charged with 
writing a report on the complaint and on the evidence 
produced in support of the complaint, and the commission 
will present it to the Head of State, who alone will 
pronounce the penalty to inflict, if guilt is establish­
ed.
Article 8: The crimes which will be committed by the
members of the reigning family whether against the State, 
whether against a particular individual, will not at 
all be judged by ordinary courts. A commission com­
posed of the ministers in active service, of the mem­
bers of the Privy Council and of the President of the 
Supreme Council, under the chairmanship of the Head of 
State himself or of the principal member of the reign­
ing family after him, whom he will designate to this 
effect, will be charged with conducting the matter 
and with pronouncing the penalty which the guilty will 
merit according to the Penal Code* This commission 
will present sentence, signed by the president and 
by all the members, to the Head of State, who will order 
execution or will grant a commutation of the penalty.
16Article 14: The Head of State chooses and names 
his subjects in the high offices of the kingdom and has 
the right to dismiss them from their functions when he 
thinks it suitable. In the case of misdemeanors or
was no .article specifically on the appointment of minis­
ters. Instead, the duties of ministers were designed 
to over-lap non-ministerial functions. One of such func­
tions was participation in the Supreme Council, a body
17
of not more than sixty members (Article forty-four).
Second to the corps of ministers in the political
hierarchy, the Council could act as a judicial body
(a criminal court of highest arbitration, or cour de
18
cassation f Article sixty). a semi-legislator (drafter
19
of new law projects, Article sixty-two), a general
deliberative body on all major matters, including ex-
20
planation of texts of codes (Article sixty-three),
21
and a budget manager (Article sixty-four)• By
22
Article forty-five the Bay could choose the members
of the Supreme Council only with the consent of the
ministers. Even if he bypassed their consent, Article 
23
forty-four ensured that at least one-third of the 
members of the Supreme Council were ministers and govern­
ment officials. The very list of other notables,from 
whom the remaining two-thirds of the members of the
Council were nominated by the Council, was prepared by
24
the Council (Article forty-seven), although the Bay 
could refuse to sign the list.
crimes, the officials will be dismissed only in the 
manner prescribed in Article 63 of the present code.
(Other footnotes 17 to 24 continued next pages)
footnotes
17Article 44: The number of members of the Supreme
Council cannot exceed sixty.
A third of this number will be taken 
from among the Ministers and the officials of the 
government of the civil and military order.
The other two-thirds will be taken from 
among the notables of the country.
This Council will have secretaries 
in sufficient number.
(Marty and Maarek)
1S'Article sixty: The Supreme Council is the 
guardian of the Fundamental Pact and of the laws, and 
the defender of the rights of the inhabitants. It op­
poses the promulgation of laws which will be contrary 
to or which will attack the principles of the laws, the 
equality of inhabitants before the laws, and the prin­
ciples of the tenure of the magistracy, except in the 
case of dismissal for a crime committed and established 
before the court. (Marty and Maarek)
19 Article 62: The Supreme Council can prepare pro­
jects of law in the large interest of the country or 
for the government. If the proposition is adopted 
by the Head of State in his Council of Ministers, it 
will be promulgated and become part of the laws of 
the kingdom.
(Marty and Maarek)
20'Article 63: The matters which can be decided
only after having been proposed to the Supreme Council; 
discussed in its midst; examined to see whether they 
conform to the laws, are advantages for the country and 
inhabitants, and are approved by the majority of its 
members, are: the promulgation of a new law, the aug­
mentation or diminution of taxes; the abrogation of a 
law by another one more useful; the increase of the 
armed land and sea forces, and military material; 
the introduction of a new industry and anything new; 
the dismissal of an official of the State who will 
have merited this penalty for a crime committed and 
judged; the solution of disputes which could arise 
among the employees for reason 6f service; and questions 
not provided for in the code; the explanation of the 
text of codes; the application of their dispositions 
in case of dispute; and the sending of troops for an 
expedition in the kingdom.
(Marty and Maarek)
footnotes p-
21 •Article 64: The Supreme Council will have the 
right of control over the expense accounts made in the 
past year, presented by each minister. It will study 
the demands for funds made for the following years, 
compare them with the revenues of the State during these 
same years, and will fix the sum allocated to each 
ministry so that each department can no longer spend 
more than the sum allocated to'it, nor spend on objects 
uutside the ones indicated for it. The details of 
these services must be discussed in the midst of the 
Supreme Council and approved by the majority of its members 
(Marty and Maarek)
22•Article 45: At the time of the installation
of this Council, the Head of State will choose its 
members with the consent of his ministers. Article 
44 refers to numbers in the Supreme Council.
(Marty and Maarek)
23 Article 44: The number of members of the Supreme
Council cannot exceed sixty.
A third of this number will be 
taken from among the Ministers and the officials of 
the government of the civil and military order.
The other two-thirds will be taken 
from among the notables of the country.
This Council will have secretaries 
in sufficient number.
(Marty and Maarek)
Article 47: The Supreme Council will establish 
with the consent of the Head of State, who will sign 
it, a list of forty notables from whom will be taken 
by lot the replacements of the departed members.
(Marty and Maarek)
25
Article fifty guaranteed the members of the Council
(ones who were not ministers) at least a five year
tenure, unless they committed a crime or misdemeanor.
No mention was made again of the right of the Bay to
26
dismiss (Article fourteen). As for the lower 
officials in the ministerial departments, the Bay ap­
pointed them, but again at the proposal of the Minis­
ter. Dismissal of any such employee was to be initiated
by the Minister and only sanctioned by the Bay
27
(Article thirty-six). Article eighty-one defined 
even more the conditions under which officials were 
to be dismissed: "No official, whatever his rank, can 
be dismissed except for an act or a speech contrary to 
the loyalty demanded of the position he occupies.
_
Article 50: The members of this Council will
be in office for the entire time specified in article 
46 (five years), unless they commit a crime or misdemea­
nor proved before the Council.
(Marty and Maarek)
Article 14: The Head of State chooses and names
his subjects in the high offices of the kingdom and has 
the right to dismiss them from their functions when he 
thinks it suitable. In the case of misdemeanors or crimes, 
the officials will be dismissed only in the manner prescribed 
in article 63 of the present code.
(Marty and Maarek)
^ ‘Article 36: All the officials of the various
departments are named by the Head of State, on the proposal 
of the competent Minister. If the Minister oonsiders the 
dismissal of one of his employees of any of his depart­
ments, he will propose it to the Head of State who 
will sanction his demand.
(Marty and Maarek)
57
His misdemeanor must be stated before the Supreme 
Council# If it is proved, on the contrary before the 
Supreme Council, that the official was accused wrong­
ly, he will continue to ocuupy his position, and the 
accuser will be condemned to the penalty in Article 
270 of the penal code#*1 Dismissal on any level was 
made even more difficult by the realities of appoint­
ment# Hothing in the constitution prevented one person 
from holding more than one position simultaneously#
In the nineteenth century ministers usually in fact
28
held several positions simultaneously.
Once the ministers had advised the Bay on appoint­
ment and dismissal and the Bay sanctioned the advice, 
the Minister assumed the most direct control over the 
subordinates in his department, especially in matters
of complaints against his subordinates (Article 
29
forty)• The Minister then was responsible for
taking the matter to the Bay or the Supreme Council
  -----------------------------------------------------------------
'Ganiage, pages 76-78#
29 Article 40: Complaints addressed to the Minister 
against whichever officials are under his department will 
be examined by him without delay, in a manner he will 
judge suitable for arriving at the truth of the matter#
In this case the Minister, judging solely the conduct of 
his subordinate, will not be obliged to follow the pro­
cedure in use before the ordinary courts for the inter­
rogations. When the truth of the facts willhave been 
stated, he will give the right of claim to the plaintiff 
if there be one, within a period that does not exceed one 
month# If after this delay he has not done justice to the 
reclamation of the plaintiff, the latter can address 
his complaint in writing to the Supreme Council#
(Marty and Maarek)
30
if necessary (Articles forty-one and forty-two)• .
Nonetheless, power of appointment or dismissal
meant little if one did not have funds to operate*
The purse strings were put in the hands of the highest
ranking Mamluk, the Prime Minister. Although certain
fixed sums were set aside for the expenses of the
31
Royal Family in Articles twenty-nine and thirty
(including the princesses to whom a Mamluk might have
heen married, such as Mustapha), the accounting for• •
the budget of the government was left to the Prime
30^ 'Article 41: In the case where a recourse is open 
to the Head of State on the matter of a complaint ad­
dressed to the ministerial department, the Minister can­
not pronounce his decision before knowing that of the 
Head of State.
Article 42: Complaints of the governors against the 
governed, and vice versa, when it is a question of 
matters of service, will be carried, with evidence to 
support, before the competent Minister, to be examined 
and then carried to the recognition of the Head of State 
in his Council.
(Marty and Maarek)
31^ 'Article 29: Out of the revenues of the government
will be raised a sum of 1,200,000 piasters every year for 
the Head of State.
Article 30: There will be equally taken out an an­
nual sum of 66,000 piasters for each of the married 
princes; 6000 piasters lor each of the unmarried princes, 
who are still under paternal authority; 12,000 piasters 
for each of the unmarried princes whose father is dead 
up until the time of his marriage; and 20,000 piasters 
for the married or widowed princesses; 3000 piasters for 
the unmarried princesses whose father is still living;
8000 piasters for the unmarried princesses, after the 
death of their father and until the time of their marriage 
12,000 piasters for each widow of the Head of State; 8000 
piasters for each widow of the deceased prince.
Furthermore there will be allocated 
the sum of 15,000 piasters to each prince and 50,000 
piasters to each of the princesses at the time of their
32
Minister (Article seventy-five). Each minister had 
to submit past expenses and estimates of future ex­
penses to the Prime Minister who in turn presented ac-
33
counts to the Supreme Council (Article seventy-? six)•
The Supreme council then allocated sums to the various
departments* The Bay was not involved (Article sixty- 
34
four). The bureaucracy consolidated its control 
over the collection of the revenues too in Article 
one hundred three: Persons outside the government were
to lose the power to buy out rights to collect taxes
marriages for the costs of the weddings.
(Marty and Maarek)
32^ 'Article 75: Each Minister must submit to the Prime 
Minister an account of the expenses spent on the credit 
and indicate the amount of the expenses to come. Thus, 
the first of moharrem 1277, each Minister must present 
an account of the year 1276 and indicate the necessary 
credits for expenses of the year 1277.
(Marty and Maarek)
’Z'Z
'Article 76: The Prime Minister will present to 
the Supreme Council the accounts and the supporting evi­
dence which will have been presented to him by the other 
Ministers, along with the necessary explanations.
(Marty and Maarek)
34 Article 64: The Supreme Council will have the 
right of control over the expense accounts made in the 
past year, presented by each Minister. It will study the 
demands for funds made for the following year, compare 
them with the revenues of the State during this same year, 
and will fix the sum allocated to each ministry so that 
each department can no longer spend more than the sum 
allocated to it, nor spend on objects outside the ones 
indicated for it. The details of these services must 
be discussed in the midst of the Supreme Council and ap­
proved by the majority of its members.
(Marty and Maarek)
35
and debts. Mustapha Khaznadar apparently succeeded
• •
in using all his powers as Prime Minister and budget 
manager to the fullest, Por historians credit him 
for manipulating Tunisia into financial bankruptcy.
The second achievement of the Mamluks —  that is, 
the protection from arbitrary decisions in disputes —  
took the form of various articles on rights of various 
organisations to undertake legal inquiry into the 
facts. A member of the Supreme Council appeared be­
fore his own peers, that is, the Council, if he com-
36
mitted a crime or misdemeanor (Article fifty). All 
other government workers, ministers, and government 
agents below ministerial level were examined before 
the Council only if the complaint against them related 
to their functions or violations of the law and regu­
lations, and if the penalty merited was no more than
dismissal, suspension, or payment of a fine (Articles
37
seventy and seventy-one)•
_  .
Article 103: All the rights and debts will no longer 
be farmed out, but will be collected by the employees of 
the government whose administration will be regulated by 
a special law which will be ultimately elaborated and 
made a part of this code.
OYIarty and Maarek)
36‘Article 50: The members of this Council (Supreme) 
cannot be removed for the entire time specified in article 
46 (five years) unless they commit a crime or misdemeanor 
proved before the Council.
(Marty and Maarek)
37‘Article 70: The complaints against the Ministers, 
for facts relating to their functions or for violation of
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Affairs that merited heavier penalties such as exile,
detention, forced labour, capital punishment, were
sent before the criminal court (Articles seventy
38
and seventy-one), which in the 1860?s was in fact 
headed by a Mamluk (see page 68 pgst)* The only 
difference between the ministers and subordinate agents 
of the government was that the ministers went directly 
to the Supreme Council, whereas the agents went first 
before the relevant Minister, who in turn was respon­
sible for recourse to the Supreme Council (Articles 
seventy and seventy-one)•
Yet for criminal complaints involving injury to 
private persons by a Minister or member of the Supreme 
Council or subordinate government agent, the criminal 
court handled investigation and sentencing once the
the laws, will be carried before the Supreme Council, 
with proof to support, for examination before it. If 
the deeds committed result in dismissal, suspension or 
payment of a fine fixed by the code, the penalty will 
be pronounced by the Council. If, on the other hand, the 
guilty merits a more serious penalty, the affair will be 
sent before the criminal court.
Article 71: The complaints against the agents of the 
government other than the Ministers for deeds relating to 
their functions will be carried before the Minister to 
whom they are subordinate, and from there to the Supreme 
Council, to be judged according to the dispositions of 
the code.
(Marty and Maarek)
■^•Article 71, above, footnote 37.
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Supreme Oouncil gave authority to do so (Article 
39
seventy-two) .
All civil disputes or debts against a Minister or 
other government agent went to the civil court without 
interference from the Supreme Council*
The most significant omission in these articles on 
the bureaucracy was the office of the Bay* His judicial 
powers were limited only to passing sentence on mem­
bers of the Royal Family; even inquiry was removed most
40
times from his hands (Articles six, seven, eight)*
 — ------------------------------------------------------------------
'Article 72: The knowledge of the crimes or misde­
meanors against private persons, committed by the Minis­
ters, by the members of the Supreme Council, or any other 
official of the government will devolve upon the criminal 
court, on condition, however, that it will not pursue the 
guilty without the authorisation of the Supreme Council* 
Nonetheless, in the case of flagrant abuse, the court can 
have the guilty arrested and demand authorisation from 
the Council to pursue the case* 
ferty and Maarek)
^ ’Article 6:If as a result of a contravention against 
the present dispositions or for any other cause a dispute 
arises among the members of the reigning family for per­
sonal reasons, this dispute will be arbitrated by a com­
mission which the head of the family will institute ad hoc* 
.under his presidency or under the chairmanship of the prin­
cipal members of the reigning family whom he will desig­
nate to that effect. This commission will be composed of a 
member of the reigning family, the ministers, and the mem­
bers of the Privy Council. The commission will be
charged with making a report on the affair*..and it will
present the report to the Head of State to whom alone
belongs the right to punish the members of his family in
penalising them in any way he thinks suitable.
Article 7: Any misdemeanor committed by a member 
of the reigning family against a particular person will 
be judged by a commission which the Head of State will 
name on an ad hoc basis, under his chairmanship or that 
of a member of the family whom he will designate. This 
commission will be composed of the ministers in active
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Although Article sixty-six was never called into opera­
tion, it represented a bold move by the Mamluks: The
Head of State could be called before a select sub­
committee of the Supreme Council if he violated the 
laws. The committee was responsible for taking the 
matter to the full Council. The Council had the right
to discuss the violation, but the article lacked pro-
41
vision for passing sentence.
service and of the members of the Privy Council; T't^ wTll 
be charged with writing a report on the complaint and on 
the evidence produced in support of the complaint, and the 
commission will present it to the Head of State, who, 
alone, will pronounce the penalty to inflict, if guilt 
is established.
Article 8: The crimes which will be committed by the 
members of the reigning family whether against the State, 
whether against a particular individual, will not at all 
be judged by the ordinary courts. A commission composed of 
the ministers in active service, of the members of the 
Privy Council and of the President of the Supreme Council, 
under the chairmanship of the Head of State himself or 
of the principal member of the reigning family after him, 
whom he will designate to this effect, will be charged 
with conducting the matter and pronouncing the penalty 
which the guilty will merit according to the penal code. 
(Marty and Maarek)
41 •Article 66: The complaints about violations of the 
laws, committed by the Head of State, or by any other in­
dividual, will be addressed to the Committee charged with 
ordinary service. The said Committee must convene for 
three days the Supreme Council, in time of vacation, and 
will make it aware of the said complaint. If the Council 
is in service, the complaint will be immediately 
brought to its attention for discussion.
(Marty and Maarek)
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Thus, by sheer number of articles, the Europeans
lost out in the constitution. The drafting commission
under Mustapha spent more time on articles defining .  •
legal rights of ministers and officials, who were
Mamluks, than on the rights of Europeans. So far as
42
Europeans were concerned, Article one hundred seven 
simply reiterated the cAhd al-*Aman (Article III on 
equality and security before the Tunisian law)• Yet 
equality as translated in the subsequent articles of 
the constitution meant no concession to the demand of 
the Europeans for special courts when disputes in­
volved Europeans. The mixed commerical court, pro­
mised in Article VII of the cAhd al-3Aman, was only 
briefly mentioned in the constitution; and who was 
to compose it was a question left unsettled: "There 
will be a court of commerce for dealing with commercial 
affairs.1 (Article twenty-five). Article one hundred 
fourteen more explicitly confirmed Tunisian juris­
diction over foreigners: Europeans could not have
special courts because special courts meant special 
rights, and every one living in Tunisia was supposed 
to be equal before the law. The Tunisians would try
/ O  ..............................
'Article 107: They Cforeign subjects} will en­
joy the same personal security guaranteed to the Tuni­
sian subjects by Chapter (Article) II of the Explana­
tion of the Fundamental Pact.
(Marty and Maarek)
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to give the Europeans the advantages the Europeans were
accustomed to at home, advantages which Muhammad Bay
*
had recognised in the cAhd al-^Aman ("We have seen... 
those great powers who by their wise policy have placed 
themselves at the head of nations in giving the most 
complete guarantees of liberty.” —  Introduction, para­
graph thirteen). The Tunisians would achieve the 
same by appointing good judges and having precise codes 
on which the judges were to base arguments. Yet no 
European could sit as a judge. The role of Europeans 
was either to appear as an accused or as a consul ac­
companying his charge to court and being present at 
43
the trial.
The most surprising affront to the Europeans, how­
ever, appeared in Article one hundred thirteen. It 
qualified the concession that had been made four years 
before in Article.XI of the cAhd al-3Aman: "Article XI
43^'Article 114: The creatures of God being equal be­
fore the law, without distinction, whether for cause of 
their origin or their religion, or their rank, the foreign 
subjects established in our Realms, who are called to 
enjoy the same rights and advantages as our own subjects, 
must be subjected, like the latter, to the jurisdiction 
of the various courts which we have instituted to this 
effect.
The greatest advantages are given to 
all, whether by choice of the judges, whether by the pre­
cision of the codes according to which the magistrates 
must judge, whether by the various degrees of jurisdiction; 
and yet, in order to give a greater security we have es­
tablished in the civil and criminal codes that the con­
suls or their delegates will be present before all our 
courts in the causes or trials of the persons within 
their jurisdiction.
(MatH;y and Maarek)
of the Fundamental Pact accorded to the foreign sub­
jects the capacity to possess immoveable properties 
on conditions to be established, but be what it may 
that all results from the said Fundamental Pact are 
obligatory, it has been recognised, considering the 
state of the interior of the country, that it is impos­
sible to authorise the foreign subjects to possess 
there (in the interior), for fear of the consequences. 
Also a special law will designate the localities of 
the capital and its surrounding areas, and of the 
cities of the coast and their surrounding areas where 
the foreigners will be able to reside.
Tt is well intended that the foreign subjects 
who will possess immoveables in the localities desig­
nated will be subject to the laws established and to 
be established on an equal footing with the Tunisian 
subjects.” In this article, to possess meant the 
same as in Article ninety-six: "All those of our sub­
jects who possess an immoveable, whether as a share­
cropper colonialist (colon partiaire), by perpetual 
rent (enzel, inzal)f or by right of enjoyment, can 
cede their rights of property by sale, gift, or any 
other manner, only to those who have the right to 
possess in the Kingdom...”
Europeans could not quarrel or contest over the 
new legal enlightenment in an area of the world known
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for its "oriental despotism". The grand principles 
of justice and equality before the law, instead of ar­
bitrariness, were adopted in Tunis. Whom they were 
to serve, the Europeans discovered to their conster­
nation, was another matter.
As to be expected from a constitution that reflected 
political interests, the victory of the Mamluks on 
one political front caused another front to erupt.
The battle took the form of a popular revolt in 1864, 
only three years after the promulgation of the consti­
tution. For the cumulative causes of the uprising in 
the Tunisian interior, historians have turned to the 
power which ..the Mamluks had accumulated and used to 
complicate the number of channels to the ear of the 
Bay. Both Europeans and Tunisians railed against the 
insulation which the Bay seemed perfectly content to 
allow, once he appointed the Supreme Council. As 
early as 1862 the French director of the military 
school of Bardo wrote: "Articles one, six, and seven
Cof the constitution} conferred upon the different 
courts the exercise of justice. From then on the Bay 
ceases to have a rapport with the country. Encased 
in Bardo (Palace), kept in sight day and night by the 
Prime Minister, who never lets him alone for one in­
stant, even with the consuls of the foreign powers, 
he has become nearly invisible to his subjects. Never
68
before has the constitutional formula —  the King reigns
•l
and does not govern —  been applied in a more absolute 
manner ..♦
"While the different articles of the constitution 
eroded successively the attributions of the power of 
the Bay, the Mamluks neglected nothing in collecting 
their due* Controlling the principal civil or mili­
tary offices, one of them presided over the criminal 
court of Tunis; another presided over the Supreme 
Council. In this Supreme Council are gathered at 
the same time the attributions of the legislative body, 
the Senate, the Council of State, the highest appellate 
court, and the Court of Accounting. The guarantees 
that all the governed people of constitutional states 
find in the division of powers no longer exist here, 
and one can hardly explain how the European consuls^ 
who...took part in the editing of the Tunisian consti­
tution, could be accomplices in the monstrous creation 
of this Supreme Council, where all the powers are confused
and which is only a revival of the old Turkish 
44
Diwan. It is true that the life of the Bay is no 
longer threatened each day Cas the day of the 
DTwan), but only on the condition that their power 
will be nothing, their intervention in all affairs
^*The tyranny of the Diwan, which had all power, re- 
sulted in a revolt among the military ranks in the six­
teenth century. See page 26 above.
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nothing. Near the Head of State, who is reduced to 
the role of an idle king, watches each day a permanent 
committee composed of about ten members of the Supreme 
Council. This committee, called the "committee of or­
dinary service", receives the complaints for infrac­
tions of laws committed by the Bay or by any other in­
dividual. It is composed of the most influential 
45
Mamluks.
"...The Tunisian constitution ended in the forma­
tion of a Council of ten, a kind of Commission of Sur­
veillance, analogous to the one which the French As-
46
sembly of 1849 invented..."
Among the Tunisians, the isolation from the Bay 
meant a siphoning off of power from local administra­
tors to the centralised unit of Mamluks in Tunis, who 
were the clearing house for both the Bay and the people. 
The Mamluk higher officials began dominating local of-
Article 54:. There will be detached from this (Su­
preme) Council a committee charged with ordinary service, 
such as giving advice to the Head of State or to the 
other princes when they demand it, on affairs which do 
not necessitate the approval of the Supreme Council: such 
as to prepare matters which must be submitted for deli­
beration of the Supreme Council, to designate the days 
of the meetings of the Council, etc. ...
(Marty and Maarek)
A ^
*G-aniage, pages 76-78. Quotes from letter of 
Lt. Col. Campenon to Marechal Randon, Minister of War,
31 May 1862. Letter published by P. G-randchamp in Docu- 
ments relatifs a la revolution de 1864 en Tunisie.
ficials by virtue of three innovations in the consti­
tution of 1861: power of appointment, government con­
trol over tax collectors, and secular courts.
Before the constitution, the chief local administra­
tors were appointed by the Bay. Upon the promulga­
tion of the constitution, the Bay could make no appoint­
ment without the consent of the Mamluk ministers. In 
fact, Mamluks not only influenced appointment of in­
digenous Tunisians to posts of caid (qa*id); they ap-
47
pointed themselves to the post of caid (qa^id).
For example, the Minister of the Navy was also the 
caid (qa*id) of the port of Tunis.
Even when the Mamluks refrained from replacing an 
indigenous ca*id (qa*id) with a Mamluk, they were given 
under the constitution the power to interfere with the 
revenue collecting functions of the caid (qa^id). Prior 
to the constitution, the caid (qaJid) regarded his 
office as a non-salaried benefice; they used whatever 
forces they had at their disposal to collect taxes, 
then deducted from their collection what they needed 
to maintain their households. Article one hundred 
three of the constitution threatened to regulate tax 
collection so that the caid (qa*id) would be an adminis­
trative official whose salary would be separate from 
the taxes( See footnote 35, page 60 above).
4 7 “    —
G-aniage, page 221.
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Soon to be deprived of his control over his personal 
income, the caid (qa*id) had already lost by virtue of 
the constitution his most important powers in repressive 
justice* The caid (qa?id) previously could remove a 
matter from a local qadT on the pretext that it in- 
volved public order* Articles twenty-two and twenty- 
three of the constitution set up police and criminal 
courts which took over much of the jurisdiction of the 
ca’id (qa* id) and centralised administration of justice 
in towns. The criminal court of Tunis had jurisdic­
tion over the entire country, although courts of first 
instance had been established in other main towns. 
Whichever court one chose to go to, and if one wanted 
appeal, one would have to go to Tunis, the only city 
with appellate courts. G-iven the chance to plead in 
the capital city, even for first instance matters, 
most plaintiffs went to Tunis, seat of the Bay. This 
caused overcrowding in the courts of Tunis and delayed 
hearings and the execution of judgments.
Defeated in competition with the Mamluks for 
higher posts, shorn of influence with the Bay for ap­
pointments, shorn of the right to determine their 
salaries from collected revenues, and shorn of most 
judicial duties, the qada sought channels of revenge. 
Their chances came when the general populace grew dis­
satisfied with the inconvenience of more centralised
72
justice —  longer trips, longer procedures. The qada
capitalised on such popular dissatisfaction by tolerating
disorder in their provinces to prove the ineffective-
48
ness of the new system. Even the Bedouins grew dis­
satisfied. They disliked the new formation of the new 
courts and could hardly understand reasoning based 
on codified principles. The French military advisor 
to the Bay was well aware of the growing discontent 
and summarised the situation: ff.*.CQhe Arab depended 
in former times administratively on the caid (qa?id), 
and judicially on the qadi, with final recourse to 
the Bay. He was, according to his pittoresque expres­
sion, eaten by two men, but by two men only. Today 
since most of the attributions of the caid (qa^id) and 
qadi have devolved on the courts, he is eaten by all 
members of the court. Formerly he yielded to the 
decision of local justice because it was prompt, and 
only in serious cases would he go to appeal to the 
sovereign. Today the inhabitant of Gables, eighty 
leagues from Tunis, who wants to appeal a judgment ren­
dered against him by the court of his locality, must 
go to Tunis. After this so burdensome dislodging, he 
no longer has the privilege to expose himself his 
griefs to the Bay; it is to a committee derived from
the Supreme Council, composed of a certain number of
  ----------------------------------------------------------------
'Ganiage, page 119.
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these detested Mamluks, who, transformed into members 
of the highest appellate court (cour de cassation), 
annul or validate the first judgment.
"Everything thus has been suddenly changed in the 
habits of these so unchangeable Arab people; also the 
germs of discontent have not been slow in forthcoming. 
Some months ago (in 1862) 1200 inhabitants of Tunis
went to Bardo Ctke Palace of the Bay) carrying ban­
ners of the most venerated marabouts. They went to 
demand of the Bay to deliver them from the innovations 
and to prevent the export of grains. The Bay held 
firm and had the principal leaders imprisoned. Un­
doubtedly, if he had conceded, serious disorders would 
have taken place in the European quarter of Tunis.
"In their cunning politics, the Mamluks have not 
failed to say to the people: fThe reforms against which 
you protest are not our work, but that of the Chris­
tians Cmemories of whose Crusader exploits were hard 
to forget)• Their consuls have imposed them on us
by force. Incline yourselves to what it takes to
49
rouse the 1 Betters*.* "
The populace continued to blame the Mamluks for 
finding so much advantage for themselves in surrender­
ing to the demands of the Europeans. The event which 
— -
G-aniage, pages 188-189. Quotes from It.Col. 
Campenon, 1862.
precipitated revolt in many parts of the country was
an increase in the tax of medjba (majban). The medjba
(majban) was a head tax which was introduced during
the reign of Muhammad Bay (1855-1859). A small tax
50
of a fixed monetary value (thirty-five piasters), 
it hardly affected urban areas, Muslim people of Tunis 
Kairouan, Susa, Monastir, and Sfax, government em­
ployees, soldiers, students, the culama?. and the
51
Hebrews of Tunis were exempted. In September of
1863 the government extended the medjba (majban) to
all Tunisians, without any consideration of class or
religion. Only three months later the tax was doubled.
The people of the southern desert refused to pay
and the nomadic tribes moved into Tripoli to escape
count. The French consul advised the khaznadar
(treasurer) to revoke the increase, and thereby won
the undying hostility of the Prime Minister of the 
_ 52
Bay. When the government agents began collecting
the tax in earnest, the revolt broke out. The revolt 
proved that the Mamluks who had denied in the constitu­
tion to the Europeans the right to possess land in 
the interior, had no capability themselves for con-
--------- g -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#0ne piaster equalled half a franc. See Article 3 
of the Convention of La Marsa, page 103 post.* footnote 
83,
51 #G-aniage, page 192. Also Encyclopedia of Islam, 
"Tunisia", First edition, 1918-1934.
52
'Caniage, page 192.
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trolling the interior (see page 66 above). Tribal 
leaders led an armed revolt. The most powerful was 
a qadi’s son who had studied at the Great Mosque 
Zaituna in Tunis. In the tradition of violent .up­
heavals in the day of the founder of the Husseinite 
dynasty, the tribal leader proclaimed himself Biay only 
ninety-five miles south-west of Tunis. At Kairouan, 
the city of orthodoxy, he tried but failed to organise 
a conference of tribal heads. All the villages in 
the Sahel, the eastern coastal region between the towns 
of Susa and Sfax, revolted. Yet the cities and most 
tribes staged a more passive revolt. They merely
refused to pay the medjba (majban) or any other debts
53
to Europeans or Hebrew creditors. , Tunis remained 
untouched. The rallying cry of the rebels was:
"Plus de capitation, plus de Mamluks, plus de consti­
tution” (No more head tax, no more Mamluks, no more
54
constitution).
In an effort to quell the revolt by appeasement, the 
Bay announced in April of 1864 that he renounced the 
doubling of the medjba (majban) and the judicial re-
55
forms, and he suspended the constitution temporarily.
^'Ganiage, pages 194-195.
54.Ganiage, page 188.
55 Ganiage, page 221.
Shortly afterwards the khaznadar negotiated with the 
Arab chiefs in the Kairouan area. He had the Bay an­
nounce measures dictated by the insurgents: uncon­
ditional amnesty, reduction of the medjba (manban) 
to about one-third of its original level under 
Muhammad Bay, reduction by half of the achour ( cushur, 
the tax in kind on grains, kept by the constitution,
which otherwise abolished taxes in kind, .Article
56 _
one hundred four), nomination of indigenous qada
instead of Mamluks for the provinces, abolition of 
the constitution, and suppression of the new courts 
installed in 1861. In July of 1864 four hundred 
cheikhs (shuyukh, assistants to qada) and notables sur­
rendered after having won their demands. Nearly one 
hundred years were to pass before Tunisia received 
another constitution.
The remaining eighteen years of the reign of 
Muhammad Es Sadiq after the revolt of 1864 were gen­
erally demoralising for the Tunisian government. In­
ternal bankruptcy was to reduce the leverage of the 
government with the Europeans, who were still demand­
ing economic influence, as well as with their own
    —   -----------
#Article 104: The government will no longer levy
tax by kind, with the exception of tithe (dime) on 
grains and olives.
(Marty atjd Maarek)
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Tunisian subjects, who were recuperating from the fe­
verish reformist era of the late 1850*s and early 
I8601s.
The revolt of 1864 revealed not only resistance of 
the interior to centralised administration, but also 
the troubled financial state of Tunisia. Even a dec­
ade before the revolt Muhammad Bay (1855-1859) had 
recognised that his Treasury received no more than one-
fifth of all the sums actually collected in the country
- 57 / \ by qada and shu.yukh. . The fixed medjba (majbanj,
head tax, which Muhammad introduced would have given.
a more stable income since taxes based on the value of
crops would fluctuate with the poor and good seasons.
By the time the number of acres under production was
falling in the reign of Muhammad Es Sadiq by one- 
58
third since the reign of Muhammad the government of
Muhammad Es Sadiq abolished all tax in kind (except 
• •
the achour, cushur, tax on grains) and doubled the 
medjba (majban)• The government had to make up for 
the terribly incomplete registers of the Treasury.
When the revolt actually broke out, the Treasury hard-
‘Ganiage, page 116. Erom information confided by 
the Bay in the French consul at the time, Leon Roches.
58‘Ganiage, page 192. From quotations of the French 
consul De Beauval after Roches left.
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1y had money to wage war against the rebels. The Otto­
man Sultan sent three squadrons and a commission of in- 
quiry. The British consul encouraged a detente between 
the Sultan and the Bay. He suggested that Constantinople 
grant Tunisia one hundred thousand pounds in return for 
the costs which the Bay had borne in sending troops 
to the Crimean War. In August of 1864 the Sultan
granted a gift of fifty thousand sovereigns to help the 
59
Bay.
Meeting the demands of the insurgents to reduce the
medjba (majban) and the achour (^ushur) drastically,
the government still had nothing to pay off the debts
which the Prime Minister Mustapha Khaznadar had made.
60
Famine struck for two years (1867-1869). It is 
small wonder that five years after the revolt, Tunisia 
had.no strength to resist the Europeans who imposed 
the International Financial Commission upon her. A 
Mamluk, Khair ad Din Pacha, was made its president. Al­
though he had held a ministerial post and the presiden­
cy of the Supreme Council for a year and a half in the 
constitutional era, he afterwards had held himself aloof 
from the government until the Commission was appointed.
The Commission grew increasingly dissatisfied with the
 ------------------------------------------------------------------
Ganiage, pager 208-210.
^•Poncet, page 44.
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floundering administration of Mustapha, the architect• •
of a constitution and treasury which were both in sham­
bles. He became a victim of a typical Mamluk intrigue, 
the sort of which he had hoped to end through his con­
stitution of 1861. He was dismissed in 1873* His snn- 
in-law, Khair ad Din, was appointed Prime Minister.
For the president of the International Financial Com­
mission, it was appropriate that he have also the exec­
utive power necessary to bring order to the financial 
administration of Tunisia.
Taxes concerned Khair ad Din foremost, as they had
Mustapha. Having faith in reorganising structures and • •
reappointing new personnel, Khair ad Din concentrated - 
on small sound improvements and detailed written instruc­
tions. To reduce pilfering of taxes, he fixed the 
salary of the qii3 id at one tenth of the sums each col­
lected, but required a detailed report of accounting 
and delivery of taxes so that he could judge whether 
local agents were following his own detailed instruc­
tions on ways to collect taxes. To reduce government 
expenses he replaced burdensome camps with light ex­
peditions to bring in tax collections to the capital.
Since taxes would be difficult to raise unless peo­
ple themselves had sources of income, Khair ad Din 
encouraged agricultural production. He gained control 
over whatever vacant or uncultivated lands he could.
For example, for lands around one of the main towns in
the south-west, he refused to renew the one hundred
year old grant which the Bay had made to a tribal family.
Instead, he kept the lands in the public domain and
sold them by means of long-term rent to small farmers
interested in the olive industry, a source of exports
61
and the tax of qanun. If he had renewed the grant 
as his predecessors had done, the revenues collected 
from these lands —  if any —  would have gone to the 
tribal family. This had been according to a special 
arrangement that had begun in the eighteenth century 
when the Bay made settlements by which various tribes
were to recognise him as principal defender of peace 
62 . ■ 
and order. To stabilise farming, Khair ad Din cod­
ified very precisely the rights and obligations of the 
owner and tenant signing a contract of khammas, a kind 
of share-cropping contract under which most of the
important cereals, source of the tax of &chour (cushur),
63
were farmed. The tenants were responsible for 
good agricultural methods of growing and storing grain; 
the landowners were responsible for paying taxes and
Jules Saurin, La Constitution de la propriete et 
les contrats de culture indigenes en Tunisie (Paris: Ber- 
ger-Levrault e7 C-^, 1897), page 377
6 2-Poncet, page 59* From documents from Affaires Indi­
genes from the Ministry of the Interior.
Saurin, page 3 4 .
for maintenance of farm tools. To avoid confusing 
holdings of the government officials with holdings of 
the government, he introduced in 1874 a special office 
having authority over government lands. Its duty was 
to keep an exact account of the extent of these lands.
In commerce Khair ad Din fared less well. Regu­
lating productions and tax collection in agriculture 
was easier than encouraging commerce. Commerce needed 
capital, and whatever money the government of Khair 
ad Din gathered went to paying off debts.
During the first five years,of his government,
Khair ad Din succeeded in reducing the budget to a 
level where it could support the foreign public debt, 
which absorbed one-half of the state revenues. G-ood 
crops over the two years after the famine of 1867 to 
1869 allowed the State to meet all its debts. By 1875 
the revenues could be used to discharge bonds and cou­
pons. Despite such progress the government would 
not have been in any position to survive a bad agri­
cultural year if it had occurred. Thai: is why the ef­
forts of Khair ad Din to keep account of public lands 
and dispose of them to persons who were willing to 
farm them were crucial.
In dealing with the perennial question of the status 
of non^uslims, Khair ad Din carried on the same pol­
icy of systematising existing practises without pro­
voking resistance. Europeans retained the right to
82
own immoveable property in Tunisia, as the Bay had 
granted in the cAhd al-*Aman. In return the Euro­
peans agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of Tuni­
sian courts only in property disputes# For civil, 
commerical, and criminal disputes, they refused to 
submit to the Tunisian courts. All such litigation 
went to the consulate. Just before Khair ad I)Tn had 
become Prime Minister, Khaznadar, the very Mamluk 
who had so confidently resisted the demands of the 
Europeans for a mixed court in the constitution, sub­
mitted, after a decade of financial and political ex­
haustion, a proposal for a mixed civil court to the 
Europeans. By the first year of the ministry of 
Khair ad Din, the Italian consul had drafted a pro­
posal. The mixed courts, according to his plan, would 
be composed of a majority of Europeans, under the 
presidency of a Tunisian; they would judge cases ac­
cording to a code that would be similar to codes else­
where in the Ottoman Empire. Tunisia accepted the pro­
posal. The consuls hesitated when the European mer­
chants objected. Khair ad Din set up a temporary com­
mission to carry out the functions of a mixed court 
until the court could be installed. Nonetheless, Italy
and Prance, who were later to vie for control over
64
Tunisia, stopped negotiations. The commission con-
Ganiage, pages 3 7 4 - 3 7 5
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tinued to hear minor disputes.
The status of the Tunisian Hebrew remained within
limits similar to those for the Europeans. Ehair ad Din
retained under his regime the decree of 1872 on the
Judicial competence of the rabbis when the rabbis in
Tunis, Susa, and other cities began to hear civil and
commercial cases among their co-religionists. The
Tunisian government forbade rabbinical courts to hear
disputes other than ones on personal status and suc- 
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cession. However j the Hebrew community had won in 
the cAhd al-^Aman the right to have assessors in 
Tunisian criminal courts, but no criminal, civil,or 
commercial courts of their own. Problems came under
Beylical Decree of 3 September 1872: We have
learned that the Rabbis of TTInis, SUsa, and other 
cities of the Regency are made aware of civil and com­
mercial affairs among their co-religionists.
This man­
ner of action being contrary to the rules of judici­
ary competence, it is forbidden to the said Rabbis to 
know these affairs and to judge litigations other 
than those relating to personal status of the Hebrew.
Footnote: "If, in Tunisia, the Rabbis had a cer­
tain power of exterior jurisdiction over their Tuni­
sian co-religionists, this jurisdiction applies only 
to contentions among the Hebrews and to the difficul­
ties touching on their personal status and their suc­
cessions. They had not jurisdiction in penal matters and 
cannot inflict, for whatever infraction there be, of 
religious or civil order, corporeal punishments or pen­
alties of imprisonment (Susa, 17 April 1893, Journal 
des Tribunaux de la Tunisie, 93*205 —  1893, page 205 —  
a case under the Protectorate).
Above translated from the French of Paul Zeys, Code 
Annote de la Tunisie: Recueil de tous les documents com- 
posant la legislation £crite de ce pays, au 1er Janvier 
1901 [Nancy: Imprimerie Berger-Levrault e T T ~ , 1901), 
VoT7 I.
the ministry of Khair ad Din as more Tunisian Hebrews 
claimed foreign citizenship to qualify for consulate 
protection. Khair ad Din met reluctance on the part 
of consuls to help him. By the time he won a tempo­
rary convention from the consuls, he was dismissed.
Khair ad Din did not stop at raising Tunisia out 
of political and financial flabbiness. His concern 
for education reflected a concern for disciplining as 
well the mental and moral lives of the Mamluks and 
Tunisians. His most imaginative effort was Sadiki 
College, founded by decree in January of 1875. It was 
the second attempt in Tunisia at secular, that is, 
non-Koranic, education. The first had been the mili­
tary school of *Ahmad Bay staffed by French advisors. 
Sadiki, however, was founded for different purposes be­
cause of the different disposition of its founder. The 
founder of Sadiki College had combined civil and mili- 
' tary posts in his earlier career (c^ld, qa^id, Minister 
of the Davy, President of the Supreme Council). Yet 
his most influential years just before entering the 
Prime Ministry were spent with the International Fi­
nancial Commission, whose European members had civil 
professional training. The time of 3Ahmad Bay had 
been dominated by Islamic military defeats at the hands 
of the Europeans. The period of the heyday of the 
Mamluks in the 1850fs and 1860*s was dominated by con-
suls who had political aims to achieve through legal 
means. By the time of the day of Khair ad Bin admin­
istrators who realised that loyalty to government 
rested on an intelligent sense of details of efficien­
cy were in demand. Financed by revenues from a
hubus (waqf) consisting of former lands of Mustapha . • •
Khaznadar, Sadiki College was to provide a steady
66
source of administrators. The curriculum was de­
signed to reflect variegated needs. Mathematics and 
science were to provide elementals for accounting and 
engineering. Instruction in French or Italian was 
to open students to a new world of literature and in­
crease competency to deal with Europeans. Since only 
Muslims were admitted to the school Islamic teachings 
held an important position in the curriculum too.
Next door to the school stood the Grand Mosque Zaituna 
of Tunis from where the teachers of the Qur*an came.
It would have been inconceivable to have neglected 
Islam at a time when many were probably wondering 
whether the decade of bankruptcy and revolt might 
have been due in part to a neglect of religious duties. 
Sadiki College was Intended to make contributions to 
the character of the Tunisian administrator by nur­
turing a desire to pursue higher education in Europe,
6 6
•G-aniage, page 373.
since the best students were to go oh to Europe; by 
creating a wider more popular source of administrators, 
since urban bourgeois sons attended along with Mamluks; 
finally, by giving administrators a sense of an inde­
pendent bureacracy with its own identity, since the 
school was located away from the royal harem where 
Mamluk administrators had been brought up as political 
pawns, and built nearer to the military fortifications,
Khair ad Din also tackled the bastion of Koranic
education. The bastion was the G-rand Mosque of Zaituna
of Tunis. It was originally Maliki, but the Hanafi
Ottomans assured equal representation of both schools.
Since the edict of 1842 of * Ahmad Bay, the government
had the right to appoint the teachers on the advice of
the Maliki and Banafi §heikh ul-Islam, while each
*
sheikh and each qadi, one from each rite, had the right 
to audit the accounts of the Bait al-Mal out of which 
the salaries of the teachers were paid (see page 281 
post of Chapter II). If funds of the Bait al-Mal 
were in great surplus, they could award financially 
the most diligent students. Thirty-five years later 
Khair ad Din, with his characteristic desire for de-
6 Y
‘Ganiage, page 373* Today the College still stands 
on a hill near the 7Kasbah, the area where the government 
offices are located. The military offices are near-by.
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tails of substance rather than for form and structure, 
issued a decree in December of 1875 on the curricu­
lum and student and teacher behaviour. Good behaviour
was strongly recommended. Doubting principles tradi-
_ 68 
tionally admitted by the culama* was prohibited.
The curriculum heavily emphasised techniques of writ­
ing and speaking, in addition to study of the sources 
of law (3usul al-fikh). The only science offered was 
astronomy. Arithmetic (hisab) was useful in the 
study of inheritance; mensuration and survey were use­
ful in land disputes; and Euclid geometry was an ex­
ercise in logic. Sadiki College, by comparison, aimed 
to achieve a greater balance among the literaryffor- 
eign and Arabic), scientific, and mathematical fields 
of knowledge. For future administrators had to be pre­
pared to deal with both their own people and the 
Europeans.
The efficiency and streamlining with which Khair 
ad Din approached existing institutions directly led to 
his downfall. When he proposed to economise the spend­
ing of the Royal Family, another Mamluk harem intrigue
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resulted in his dismissal in July of 1877# A year
later the Ottoman Sultan called him to Turkey to be*
----- gg-— — —  -----------------------------------------------------
'Article 19, as stated in Encyclopedia of Islam, 
First edition, 1918-1934* "Tunisia".
69 Ganiage, page 387. Source of material on
Khair ad Din is Chapter IX of Ganiage.
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first the Minister of Justice, then Grand Vizir*
Khair ad Din stayed in this latter position for only
a year, then retired* Eleven years later he died in
Constantinople, the place where his political career
had begun when he was sold as a Circassian slave.
During the next four years the instability of
Tunisian politics was a far cry from the days of
Mustapha Khaznadar, who held the Prime Ministry for 
• •
over fifteen years* After Khair ad Din, the son-in-law
of Mustapha Khaznadar, the office was jockeyed back
and forth between the Mamluks Muhammad Khaznadar, the
brother-in-law of Mustapha Khaznadar, and Mustapha
• • • •
ben Ismail, a schemining favourite of the Bay
Muhammad Es Sadiq. Muhammad Khaznadar became Prime 
• • •
Minister in 1877. Under the administration of 
Khair ad Din he had held the post of Minister of the 
Interior, a post created to alleviate the takK of 
the Prime Minister in supervision of domestic adminis­
tration. He held this post during the greater part 
of the administration of Khair ad Din. A year after 
Muhammad Khaznadar became Prime Minister Mustapha 
ben Ismail became Prime Minister. The International 
Financial Commission detested his fickle disposition
70
and total lack of .a sense of political administration.
70
•Ganiage, pages 361 ~3 £>z.
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Muhammad Khaznadar was returned to office in 1881* The 
eve of the French Protectorate had come*
Tunisians had neither the means nor the unity to 
fight back the encroaching protectorate* Up to then 
Tunisia had been able to keep the Europeans at bay 
by fighting fire with fire. In the 1840!s under 
Ahmad Bay foreign relations with France in particular 
had been cordial* * Ahmad needed an efficient army to 
support his policy of autonomy from the Sultan. The 
French gladly gave military advice, hoping that such 
ties wQould make her neighbour to the east a good 
obstacle to an Ottoman intervention from Turkey into 
Algeria* Cordiality increased over the next decade. 
France and the other European powers represented in 
Tunis influenced the Bay to issue the cAhd al-^Aman* 
which the Europeans regarded as a major step towards 
the same kind of capitulations which the Sultan had 
made some years earlier for Europeans in Constantinople. 
By the time the constitutional elaborations of the 
cAhd al-3Aman were put into effect, the Europeans 
realised that the Bay and his Mamluk ministers were 
determined not to grant as many capitulations as the 
Sultan; and what substitutes they had granted, such 
as civil and criminal courts, which were to hear Tuni­
sians and Europeans alijce, but were manned by Mamluks,
had "been turned into the advantage of the Mamluk minis­
ters. They proved quite good at playing the legal 
game. The French in particular grew resentful. Dur­
ing the revolt of 1864 the French military advisor 
and the consul openly derated the Mamluks for causing 
the Bay to approve a devastating tax increase and 
imposing a constitution that served neither Europeans 
nor indigenous Tunisian local officials. The consul 
interferred in domestic politics to the extent that 
he corresponded with the tribal leader of the revolt, 
the one who had proclaimed himself Bay. The Tuni­
sians fell out with the French and felt better dis­
posed towards the overtures from the British and the 
Turks. The Turks granted the Bay money to help quell 
the revolt, and the British used the occasion to en­
courage a Tunisian mission under Khair ad Din, who
had always preferred settling relations with the Sultan
•
before turning to the Europeans for support, i:o go 
to the Turks. In the proposed convention between 
the Turks and the Tunisians the Bay would have kept 
authority over internal affairs on the sole condition 
that he rule by way of civil and military officers 
whom he appointed and by written regulations and con­
stitutional rules. The only important submission to
—
'Ganiage, pages 211+ -113.
the Sultan would have involved treaties and military 
contributions. The Bay would have been able to sign 
any commerical or maritime treaty he wished, but the 
Sultan had to approve treaties affecting general secu- 
rity of the empire, such as treaties of alliance, ces­
sion of territory, and demarcation of borders. 
Constantinople would have been confirmed as military 
protector of Tunisia, since Tunisia would have had to 
make a yearly contribution to the Imperial Arsenal of 
the Sultan* Yet there would have been no explicit 
provision for forcing Tunisia to submit to the treaties
which the Sultan had made with the Europeans for mixed»
courts. Only a letter from the Vizir confirming the
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proposed convention was issued. The question of
72'Ganiage. page 232. Text of the proposed conven­
tion, (page 233):
ARTICLE 1 - The hereditary right of succession by right 
of seniority is forever confirmed in the Husseinite 
family.
ARTICLE 2 - The Bay will have the right to exercise his 
authority in the internal affairs of the Regency which 
he governs according to constitutional and administra­
tive laws.
ARTICLE 3 - Consequently, he will have the right to ap­
point civil, military, and naval officers, up to the 
rank of E&rrick.
ARTICLE 4 - The Bay will have the power to maintain ex­
ternal relations.
ARTICLE 5 - The Bay will have the right, as in the past, 
to make general treaties and conventions of commerce and 
navigation, but no treaty, convention, or other pact 
which will affect the general security of the Empire, 
such as treaties of offensive and defensive alliance, 
cession of territory, demarcation of the frontier, can _ 
be valid and executable without ratification by the Sultan.
the Sultan issuing a firman consisting of the proposed 
convention was suspended for seven years* In the mean­
time Mustapha Khaznadar, the Prime Minister then,
• *
hated by the French by now, sought another way to 
guarantee Tunisian autonomy and the right to determine 
her own policy of capitulation. He sought what the 
French called an internationalised protectorate which 
would usurp the position of Jrance as de facto pro­
tector. of Tunisia. Mustapha went so far as to con-
• *
suit Italy and Austria about a Tunisian Resident 
Minister in their capitals along with guarantees of 
Tunisian neutrality in time of European wars. Instead,
ARTICLE 6 - Upon the ascension of the Bay, he will de­
mand and receive, as in the past, his investiture from
the Sultan.•
ARTICLE 7 - The Bay will have the choice to go to Con­
stantinople, but every time he goes there, he will be 
received with all the honours due to the rank of a 
hereditary prince.
ARTICLE 8 - The present customs on such occassion are 
forever abolished and will be replaced by an annual con­
tribution to the Imperial Arsenal under the title of 
aid for the general defence of the Empire.
ARTICLE 9 - The Porte will recognise as in the past the 
distinctive flag of the Regency of Tunis.
ARTICLE 10 - His Majesty the Sultan will delegate to 
the Bay the right to give civil &nd military decorations.
ARTICLE 11 - .The. coinage will be struck in the name
of the Sultan.*
ARTICLE 12 — The Khutbah or public prayers will be 
recited in the name 6f the Sultan.
because of deteriorating finances, Mustapha received• •
an International Financial Commission.
Khair ad Din, made president of the Commission, aban­
doned the aim of Mustapha for an international pro-
• •
tectorate, and pursued the detente which he had sought 
seven years before with the Sultan. In 1871 he fi-
nally obtained a firman from the Sultan regulating re--r •
lations between the Bay and the Sultan. In the same 
year, France suffered a humiliating defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. By the middle of 
the ministry of Khair ad. Din, the firman hardly meant 
anything since Constantinople was on the verge of bank­
ruptcy, and in Europe events were moving in the direc­
tion of balancing European interests at the expense 
of the entire Ottoman Empire. Just when the Prime 
Ministry of Tunisia was entering its most unstable 
era of short appointments, and Khair ad Din had re­
turned to Constantinople to be Grand Vizir, the Euro­
peans and the representatives of the Sultan met at 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878. There the European 
settlement of the Balkan question began the serious 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. From then on 
France won as an appeasement for her humiliation in 
1871 a free hand in regard to North Africa. At the 
same time Great Britain ceased to resist France, as
she had done in 1864 in the name of the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire, and in 1878 concentrated on
preserving the Egyptian route to India. To cut short
any ambitions which the Italians hoped for in Tunisia
since the friendly overtures from. Mustapha Khaznadar,. •
the Erench proposed that G-reat Britain win from the
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Sultan the cession of Tripoli for Italy. Great
Britain was hardly responsive, and Prance turned to
consolidating her relations with Tunisia in Real-
politik terms, not by way of mere capitulations and
constitutional guarantees which every other European
power had sought in previous decades when the desin-
tegration of the Ottoman Empire was not discussed.
Pursuing a new approach towards Tunisia, Prance
at first did not think of exerting her influence by
military invasion as she had done in Algeria. The
Prench Assembly, rent between the pacificists and
the militants ever since the defeat of 1871, might
not have supported such military invasion. It was
hoped that a written treaty would convince the Bay
to keep amicable relations despite the cooling down
of relations since the revolt of 1864# Still the
friendly treaty would have been a military treaty to
deter any thoughts which Tunis or Italy had for other
■ ' — -------------------------------------
#Ganiage, page 429# Prom account of conversation 
between the Prench and British Foreign Secretaries,
4 September 1878, in Paris.
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plans. Very soon after the Berlin Congress the Prench 
Foreign Secretary, the Algerian Governor-General, and 
the Prench consul in Tunis proposed Prench occupation 
of key military points along the Tunisian coast. The 
Prench could argue particularly for one port which 
became a source of grievance when a Prench ship docked 
there had been pillaged with impunity (in 1878). In 
domestic affairs Prance proposed to limit herself 
to the reform of the police and constabulary and to 
guaranteeing pensions and a civil list to the Bay, a 
subject that had been a point of contention under the 
administration of Khair ad Bin, who had suggested a cut 
in the expenses of the Royal Family (see page 87 
above). Finally in 1879 the French consul in Tunis 
presented the Bay a convention of five articles. 
Articles one and three provided for a strictly defen­
sive alliance (preserving the policy of neutrality 
which Mustapha Khaznadar had sought earlier) by 
denying Tunisia the right to cede territory to a 
foreign power. Prance in turn would protect the Bay, 
his family, and his territory from any danger, no 
distinction being made between external and internal 
danger. It was an agreement similar to the one that 
Khair ad Bin had settled with Constantinople, the 
difference being that the duty of the Sultan to pro­
tect Tunisia was not as heavily emphasised* Article 
four of the proposed convention provided for an 
Algerian-Tunisian customs union* There was no ex­
press stipulation that Prance would take charge of 
the foreign affairs of Tunisia, although article 
five provided for a Prench Resident Minister who would 
have been charged with supervising all Prench inter­
ests in all administrative affairs common to Prance 
and Tunisia, but article five made no mention of a 
Tunisian counterpart in Prances ; and article four 
gave Prench consulates around the world the right to
take care of the interests of Tunisian nationals 
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abroad.
G-aniage, page 444, footnote 15# Text of conven­
tion:
ARTICLE 1 - H*H. the Bay of Tunis undertakes in re­
gard to Prance not to cede and not to permit any for­
eign power to occupy a part of territory or a port 
belonging to the Regency..*The government of the Re­
public undertakes on its side to swear its support to 
His Highness against any danger that could threaten 
H.H* Muhammad Es Sadok or his dynasty, or that could 
compromise the security of the Regency.
ARTICLE 2 - To facilitate the accomplishment of the 
obligations which the Prench Republic assumes by the 
preceding article, His Highness agrees that in the 
case where the security of the Regency or the present­
ly reigning dynasty would be threatened by a danger, 
internal or external, the President of the Prench Re­
public would cause to be occupied one or several points 
which he thinks necessary, such as, notably, the 
Islands of G-alite, and of Tabaraka, the bay of Bizerte, 
Cap Bon, the Island of Djerba.
ARTICLE 3 - H.H. the Bay undertakes not to conclude 
any act having an international character without having
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No Bay had ever signed such a treaty with any non-
Muslim power• Muhammad Es Sadiq had no more intention. •
of setting a precedent than he had of ceasing to in­
sist that Europeans he subject to Tunisian jurisdic­
tion in legal matters* The efforts of Khair ad Din 
to reach an agreement with the French over mixed 
courts had stopped at an interim measure, and none 
of his successors had gqne beyond. As the French con­
sul expected, Muhammad Es Sadiq. Bay refused to sign 
the treaty. The response of the consul to the refus­
al showed that France knew what would probably be the 
final trump card she would have to play: r!It is al­
ways the same fanaticism, the same ignorance, and he
will never be convinced. He will yield only by force
75
of events or bayonets.1
notified the government of the French Republic and with- 
out having previously reached an understanding with her.
ARTICLE 4 - The diplomatic and consular agencies of 
France in foreign countries will be charged with the 
protection of the interests of the Tunisian nationals. 
The French government and the Tunisian government 
will ultimately reach an understanding for the conclu-r 
sion of a customs union between the Regency and Algeria.
ARTICLE 5 - The government of the Republic will be 
represented before the BSy by a resident minister who 
will supervise the execution of the present act and 
who will be the intermediary for the relations of the 
French government with the Tunisian authorities for 
all administrative affairs that are common to the 
two countries.
75#Ganiage, page 445# French consul Roustan 
^ Desprez, Tunis, 15 July 1879.
For the next two years France waited for a pretext 
to play her trump card, and filled in the time with 
launching an economic offensive at Tunisia. French 
entrepreneurs vied for concessions of lands and con­
tracts for constructing public utilities, such as rail- 
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ways. Creditors and bankers followed close on the 
heels of the entrepreneurs. Despite the revenue which 
the public treasury could have gained from sharing in 
the profits of the foreign companies, the economic ad­
venturers were hardly welcomed by the Mamluk minis­
ters, no more than they had been in the 1850!s and 
1860!s when the Mamluks disliked having rivals for 
the lands of the Bay. Out of such manifest hostility 
came squabbles which were the background to some of 
the land reforms which the French later introduced 
when they occupied Tunisia. Even the Bay had his res­
ervations. He conceded a domain to a certain French 
adventurer on two conditions: that the Bay could re­
voke the grant in case the Frenchman failed in real-
Affair No. 26 of 28 December 1887 in the Chambre 
Mixte of the Tribunal Immobilierr Tunis. Case notes 
state that in May 1876 the Tunisian government (under 
Khair ad Din) promised a concession to the Compagnie de 
Chemin de Fer B6ne-Guelma. It was not until April of 
1879 that Mustapha, Minister of Foreign Affairs (under 
administration of Mustapha ben Ismail), gave a letter 
to the Compagnie to approve the route of the railway. 
The Tunisian state also gave free to the Compagnie all 
lands necessary for building the track and the 
stations.
(Found in the archives of the mahkama al caqarlyat also 
known as the Tribunal Immobilief, TtXnis)
ising a profitable venture, and that the Bay could 
share in the profits if the Frenchman succeeded.
The Frenchman failed and the property was transferred 
to the Societe Marseillaise, which had convinced 
the French consul to persuade the Bay that the 
Societe In partnership with the French adventurer 
could salvage the project. When Khair ad Bin in 
Constantinople sold in December of 1880 to the same 
Societe the huge estate (one hundred thousand hec­
tares) which he had acquired in earlier times as a 
gift from the Bay, the Mamluk Prime Minister, Muhammad 
ben Ismail, who had been instrumental in the downfall 
of Khair ad Din, grew rigid £n refusing to make new 
concessions, even refusing offers to exploit the min­
erals in the west. He tried to renege an offer
to the French company building the railway, and argued
77
over the route of the railway as a delaying tactic.
Nor did the Tunisian government sympathise with French 
real estate credit companies, and hence did nothing 
to solve the difficulties which such companies would 
encounter in a country that had no cadastre or sys­
tematic registering of private lands. Relations 
with France cooled considerably, and the Prime Minis­
ter of Tunisia swallowed his hatred of the Italians
77
* G-aniage, pages 480 ^  481.
and turned to them for reconciliation. The french
78imagined the Italians to he exulting. The Soci6te 
Marseillaise ran into opposition too. Their dispute 
with Tunisia was said later to have influenced in 
part the decision of France to invade Tunisia. The 
Tunisian notaries refused to register the sale of 
the estate of Khair ad Din without authorisation from 
the qudah (qadi), and the qudah made known their hos­
tility to the act. The final insult to the Tunisian 
government and courts came when the Soci^te Marseillaise 
went to the Sheikh ul-Islam of Constantinople, where 
Khair ad Din was living at the time, and obtained 
an advisory opinion in their favour.
The affair of the Enfida estate of Khair ad Din
was still unsettled when an unsettling rumour began
to circulate in January of 1881. The rumour was
that the Sultan, fed up with the longstanding policy
of autonomy of Tunisia, was preparing to depose the
Bay and name Khair ad Din as pasha over the Tunisian 
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realms. Europeans considered the rumour not to be
*G-aniage, page 482. French consul Roustan in 
Tunis a Courcel, Director of Political Affairs in the 
French Cabinet, 28 December 1881.
79‘G-aniage, page 502. French Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs in a meeting with the council of ministers on 
29 January 1881, where he supported intervention 
into Tunisia with force.
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very well-founded; but the French nonetheless sent 
the most powerful gunboat in their Mediterranean 
fleet to cruise off the Tunisian coast. Anger over 
the Enfida affair also motivated the French military 
intimidation. The affair involved much money; it 
was also the most clear-cut case for the longstanding 
contention of France that Tunisian courts were too 
prejudiced against Europeans to be fair judges.
The traditional courts had resented European inter­
ference in the Sfez affair, for under European influ­
ence, the Bay broke the traditional rule that no
80
foreigner could possess property in the realms.
The civil courts created after the Sfez affair were 
headed by Mamluks who were known to dislike any out­
side competition for the lands of the Bay. For the 
next following months complaint after complaint was 
made to the French government. The Khroumirs, Tuni­
sian border tribes, invaded Algeria on a personal 
avenge. The French railway company complained of 
difficulties due to poor police protection. The final 
sign of deterioration was an overture from the second 
presumptive heir to the Tunisian throne. He offered 
to go to Algeria under French protection then return 
to Tunis with French troops to dethrone his brother 
and usurp the rights of the first heir to the throne.
8 0
*See pages 40 and 41 ' . above.
The traditional agnatic struggle that had plagued the
throne up to the reign of J Ahmad Bay again reared its 
81
ugly head.
The Khroumirs again caused trouble, and the French 
proved to be no better neighbours than the Algerians 
who had invaded Tunis in the seventeenth century.
The French defeated the Khroumirs and marched onto 
Tunis where the Bay was again offered a military trea­
ty. Having been informed of the pretentions of a
usurper, Muhammad Es Sadiq Bay felt that he had no • .
choice this time, and signed. He got a worse bar­
gain this time, for although the treaty of Kassar 
Sa'id of 12 May 1881 was similar to the one offered 
earlier under peaceful conditions, the treaty of Kassar 
Said was designed more to seal military victory with 
unconditional humiliation. In the treaty of 1881 the 
interference of France into the foreign affairs of 
Tunisia was made more explicit than before: "The govern­
ment of the French Republic offers to guarantee the 
execution of treaties presently existing between the
government of the Regency and the various European
82
powers" (article four).
#G-aniage, page 538. Telegram from French consul 
in Tunis to Paris.
Also see page 27 above.
82'Text of Treaty of 1881: (Continued on next pages)
footnotes 1 3 3
The Government £f the French Republic and that 
of H.H. the Bay of Tunis, wanting to prevent forever 
the reoccurfing of the disorders which recently took 
place on the frontiers of the two States and on the 
coast-line of Tunisia, and being desirous of binding 
more closely their old relations of friendliness and 
good neighbourliness, have resolved to conclude a 
convention to that end, in the interests of the two 
contracting parties.
Consequently, the President of the French Re­
public has named as his plenipotentiary Monsieur 
General Br^ar^,who has come into agreement with - 
H.H. the Bay of Tunis on the following stipulations:
ARTICLE 1 - The treaties of peace, friendship and 
commerce and all other conventions existing today 
between the Republic of Prance and H.H. the Bay of 
Tunis are expressly confirmed and renewed Ce«g- "the 
convention of 1871 that the French nationals could 
possess land in Tunisia; see page 41 above}•
ARTICLE 2 - In view of making it easier for the 
French Republic to accomplish the measures which are 
necessary for attaining the aim which the eminent par­
ties propose to each other, H.H. the Bay of Tunis 
agrees that the French military authority may occu­
py whatever points it thinks necessary for the rees­
tablishment of order and security of the frontier 
and the coast-line. This authority will cease when 
the French and Tunisian military authorities recog­
nise, in a common agreement, that the local adminis­
tration is in a position to guarantee the maintenance 
of order.
ARTICLE 3 - The government of the French Republic 
undertakes to swear a constant support to H.H. the Bay 
of Tunis against all danger which would threaten the 
person or dynasty of His Highness or which would com­
promise the tranquility of the realms.
ARTICLE 4 - The government of the French Republic 
offers itself as guarantor of the execution of the 
treaties presently existing between the government 
of the Regency and the various European powers.
ARTICLE 3 - The government of the French Republic 
will be represented before H.H. the Bay of Tunis by 
a Resident Minister who will supervise the execution 
of the present act and who will be the intermediary 
of the relations of the French Government with the Tuni 
sian authorities for all the affairs common to the 
two countries.
footnotes
ARTICLE 6 - The diplomatic and consular agents 
of France in foreign countries will be charged with 
the protection of the Tunisian interests and of the 
nationals of the Regency., In return, H.H. the B3y 
undertakes not to conclude any act having an inter­
national character without having notified the govern­
ment of the French Republic and without having pre­
viously consulted with it.
ARTICLE 7 - The government of the French Republic 
and the government of H.H. the B3y of Tunis re­
serve to themselves the right to fix, by common agree­
ment, the bases of a financial organisation of the 
Regency, which are of a nature that assures the ser­
vicing of the public debt and guarantees the rights 
of the creditors of Tunisia.
ARTICLE 8 - A war tax will be imposed on the un­
subdued tribes of the frontier and of the coast-line.
An agreement in the future will determine the amount 
of it and the method of collection, for which the 
government of H.H. the Bay undertakes to be responsible.
ARTICLE 9 - To protect the Algerian possession 
of the French Republic from the smuggling of arms and 
war munitions, the government of H.H. the Bay of 
Tunis undertakes to prohibit all introduction of arms 
or war^munitions on the island of Djerba, the port 
of Gabes, or the other ports of the south of Tunisia.
ARTICLE 10 - The present treaty will be submitted 
to ratification by the government of the French 
Republic and the ratified document will be sent to 
H.H. the B^y of THnis in the briefest possible time.
Muhammad Es Sadiq (Sadok)
• •
General Breart 
12 May 1881 
Kassar-Sa’id
(Translated from the French of Marty and Maarek,
Vol. I, Annex)
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Relations between France and Tunisia stayed on a 
military level, but not without influence on other 
matters. A year after the treaty the Society Mar­
seillaise won from the civil court of Tunis a fa­
vourable judgment on the Ehfida estate. The widow 
of the chief contender against the Societe no longer 
claimed the lands. Despite such a happy ending 
France used her position as military protector to in­
terfere in civil affairs and provide laws which would 
deter any similar Enfida affairs from arising. Two 
years after the treaty of 1881 a tribal revolt broke 
out again in the interior. France used this occasion 
to sign a new convention with the new Bay, tA.lT, 
who would not have had his throne if the French had 
sided with the potential usurper under Muhammad 
Es Sadiq. Article one of the convention gave the 
French government the right to proceed towards the
administrative, judicial, and financial reforms which
83
the French government would judge useful.
—
“Text of the Convention of La Marsa of 8 June 1883:
Convention undertaken at La Marsa between France 
and Tunisia, for regulating the respective relations 
of the two countries in the Regency and carrying a 
guarantee of the Tunisian debt by the French govern­
ment. __ _
H.H. the Bay of Tunis, taking into consideration 
the necessity for improving the internal situation of 
Tunisia, on the conditions anticipated in the treaty of 
12 May 1881, and the government of the Republic , having
footnotes
at heart to respond to this desire and to consolidate 
also the relations of friendship fortunately existing 
between the two countries, have agreed to conclude 
a special convention to this effect. Consequently 
the President of the French Republic has appointed 
as his plenipotentiary Monsieur Pierre-Paul Cambon, 
his Resident Minister at Tunis, Officer of the Legion 
of Honour, decorated with the Haed, and the Grand 
Cross of the Nichan Iftikhar,etc...who, after having 
communicated his full powers_in good and due form, 
has drawn up with H.H. the Bay of Tunis the following 
dispositions:
ARTICLE 1- To make it easy for the French govern­
ment to accomplish its protectorate, H.H. the Bay 
of Tunis undertakes to proceed towards the administra­
tive, judicial, and financial reforms which the 
French government will judge useful.
ARTICLE 2 - The French government will guarantee 
in time and under the conditions which to it seem 
best, a loan to be issued by H.H. the Bay for the 
conversion or the reimbursement of the consolidated 
debt (perpetual debt whose realisation is postponed 
indefinitely and only the interest is paid; but it 
can be converted into a debt with a due date), rising 
to the sum of 125 million francs, and of the floating 
debt (for example, Treasury bonds, debts over a short 
time) up to an amount of 17,550,000 francs.
H.H. the Bay prohibits himself 
from contracting in the future any loan on the account 
of the Regency, without the authorisation of the 
French government.
ARTICLE 3 - Out of the revenues of the Regency, 
H.H. the Bay will raise: 1. sums necessary to assure
the servicing of the loan guaranteed by France;
2. sum of 2,000,000 piasters (1,200^000 francs), the 
amount of his civil list, the surplus of the revenues 
before being used for the expenses of administration 
of the Regency and for the reimbursement of the charge 
of the Protectorate.
ARTICLE 4 - The present arrangement confirms 
and completes, in as much as needed, the treaty 
of 12 May 1881. It will not modify the dispositions 
previously provided for the regulation of war.
ARTICLE 5 - The present convention will be sub- 
m itted for ratification by the French Republic 
and the document of the said ratification will be 
sent to H.H. the Bay of Tunis in the briefest possible
footnotes 107
time. In such good faith, Ali Pacha and Paul Cambon 
have drawn up the present act and have stamped it 
with their seals.
Journal Officiel de Tunisie,1884, 
page 313
(Translated from the French of Marty and Maarek, 
Vol.I, Annex)
In April of 1884 the French Senate sealed French 
control over Tunisia by issuing a decree delegating 
a French Resident Representative to approve in the 
name of the French Republic the promulgation and 
execution of all the decrees signed by the Bay. France 
thus achieved even more control over the internal 
affairs of Tunisia than the Ottoman Sultan ever had-.
Their victory spelled out the limited resources of 
the Tunisians. In the days when France tried to 
persuade by the language of constitutions and rights 
of property, the Tunisians could speak the same 
tongue and negotiate for their own interests. But 
when France spoke with gun^ and possible deposi­
tion of the Bay, the Tunisians could not even begin 
84
to whisper.
^*Text of the decree of 1884 from the French 
Senate: 9 Senate and Chamber of
Adopted 8 June 1883 Convention
Presidential decree of 10 November 1884
Seen the Acts of 9 April 1884 and of 
8 June 1883.
ARTICLE 1• The Resident Representa­
tive of the French Republic at Tunis is delegated to 
the effect to approve in the name of the French Govern­
ment the promulgation and the execution in the Regency 
of Tunis all the decrees made by H.H. the Bay.
ARTICLE 2. The President of the 
Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Guardian 
of the Seals, Ministry of Justice, are charged with 
execution.
Journal Officiel de la Tunisie, 
1884, page 453.
(Translated from the French of Marty and ^aarek,
Vol.I, Annex)
The administration which the French introduced 
remained basically the same for over half a century.
The overseer of French and Tunisian administration 
was the French Resident Minister. He was the Minis­
ter of Foreign . Affairs for the Bay. The Bay 
could not correspond directly to Paris. The Resident 
Minister also replaced a Mamluk as head of the Coun­
cil of Ministers of the Bay but with more power than 
a Mamluk president ever had: The Resident Minister
countersigned all the decrees of the Bay before 
they could be valid. The constitution of 1864 had 
simply pronounced that the Bay would guide the polit­
ical affairs of the Kingdom with the consent of the
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Ministers and the Supreme Council (Article twelve) 
without stating how the consent of the Ministers 
would be exercised. The Resident Minister had there­
by a far more centralised role than any article in 
the constitution of 1861 had provided. Ministers 
under the constitution countersigned the edicts of
the Bay only when they related to the particular min-
86
isterial department (Article thirty-eight)♦ The 
—
Article 12r The Head of State will guide the po­
litical affairs of the kingdom with the consent of the 
Ministers and the Supreme Council.
(Marty and Maarek)
86'Article 38: The Minister will countersign the 
edicts issued by the Head of State which relate to his 
department.
(Marty and Maarek)
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Supreme Council had power only to oppose decrees that 
were contrary to the principles of the laws, equality
of all inhabitants before the law, and the principles
87
of tenure of the magistracy (Article sixty). The
only power of positive sanction concerned the decrees
of the Bay regulating functions of ministers (Ar-
88
tide thirty-two) . The only article that came
closest to resembling the powers of the French Admin-
89
istrator had been Article sixty-two: The Supreme
Council prepared projects of law, but only the Head 
of State in his Council of Ministers could adopt 
them, whereupnn they : were promulgated.
In addition to his ministerial functions, the
87 Article 60: The Supreme Council is the guardian 
of the Fundamental Pact and of the laws, and the de­
fender of the rights of the inhabitants. It opposes 
the promulgation of laws which will be contrary to 
or which will attack the principles of the laws, the 
equality of inhabitants before the laws, and the 
principles of tenure of the magistracy, except in the 
case of dismissal for a crime, committed and estab­
lished before the court,
(Marty and Maarek)
88'Article 32: The laws sanctioned by the Head
of State and by the Supreme Council will regulate 
the nature of the functions of each minister, his 
rights and his duties, the nature of his relations 
with the various agents of the Tunisian government or 
of the foreign governments, and the internal organisa­
tion of each Ministry.
(Marty and Maarek)
89 Article 62: The Supreme Council can prepare 
projects of law in the large interest of the country 
or for the government. If the proposition is adopted 
by the Head of State in his Council of Ministers, it 
will be promulgated and become part of the laws of the 
Kingdom. (Marty and Maarek)
Ill
Resident Minister also commanded the administrative 
services and armed forces, in which French and Tuni­
sian armies were combined.
Below the Resident Minister was created a dual, 
or counterpart, administration. For every Tunisian 
high official there was a French equivalent. In the 
Council of Ministers sat Tunisian ministers as well 
as French "Directeurs", that is, French heads of 
departments. Each 1!DirecteurfT could issue by-laws.
For local administration, the ca’id (qa?id) was re­
tained, but placed under the control of a French 
"controleur civil"♦
While all legislation pertaining to Tunisian of­
ficials originated and was promulgated only in 
Tunisia, though approved by the French Resident Minis­
ter, laws relating to French administrators in Tunisia 
were issued by the President of the French Republic.
Before the nineteenth century was over, the 
French ended in one swoop the judicial question which 
had plagued every Bay since the days of *Ahmad Bay, 
that is, were Europeans to be subject to the juris­
diction of Tunisian courts or to special mixed courts? 
In 1884*even a few months before the Convention of 
La Marsa giving the French the right to effect admin­
istrative and judicial reforms, the French legis­
lature created French courts for Tunis. A month later
the Bay issued a decree that made all foreigners sub­
ject to French courts. The only mixed courts estab­
lished, two years later, had nothing to do with any
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of the promises in the cAhd al-^Aman. It was a
function of economic interests of French real estate
companies. The mixed court was one of the chambers
of the Tribunal Mixte (later called the Tribunal Im-
mobilier), a court for deciding what was sufficient
evidence a person could give to merit registration of
land in his name. In itself the mixed court did not
violate pre-Protectorate agreements which Europeans
made to submit to local courts for land disputes. It,
combined with the French civil courts, could be used
in practice to avoid the pre-Protectorate agreements.
For procedural laws allowed for any dispute involving
land registered by the Tribunal Immobilier to go be-
91
fore the French civil courts. The two parts of
‘Article VII of the cAhd al-*Aman: We will estab­
lish a court of commerce, composed of a president, a 
chief clerk, and several members chosem from among. 
Muslims and the subjects of the friendly powers.. This 
court, which will judge commercial matters, will func­
tion after we have reached an agreement with the great 
foreign powers, our friends, on the procedure to fol­
low so that their subjects are within the jurisdiction 
of this court. The rules for this institution will be 
developed in a precise manner in order to prevent any 
conflict or misunderstanding.
91 *Zeys, page 900, footnote (a) for Article 2 of the 
Code Foncier of 1st July 1885, as modified by Decree of 
TF"May 1886.
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the dual or counterpart judiciary of the French Pro­
tectorate in theory were not supposed to be in con­
tact or cause confusion of jurisdiction. How prac­
tise over time came to differ will be discussed in 
the subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OP LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND REFORMS
Introduction
As seen in the last chapter, the judiciary was at 
the centre of a controversy between Tunisians and Euro­
peans over capitulations. The Tunisians were pre­
pared to yield to Europeans only by creating a sys­
tem of justice based on written codes, similar to what 
the Europeans were accustomed to in their lands. It 
was a system not based on the SharTca. The Tunisian 
Turkish or Mamluk elite was predisposed to the. change 
because it would give them a chance to attain more in­
dependence from the Bay. The Europeans did not quar­
rel with the proposal of a secular system nor codes.
They quarrelled over personnel. They wanted Europeans 
and Tunisians as judges, not just Tunisian judges 
advised by European consuls on points of European 
law when an European was involved In a case with a Tuni­
sian. By the time the Europeans executed their 
wishes when the French occupied Tunisia and made a 
Protectorate in the treaties of La Marsa of 1883 and 
Kassar Sdid of 1881, the Islamic rulers of Tunis had 
already devised a judicial system which the French 
had little difficulty in remoulding to French interests.
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The judicial system of 1883 was the product of a 
"bureaucratic evolution in the Islamic empire since 
earliest times. The first empire rulers, the Benu 
^Umawiya, were known for organising a fiscal structure 
which would support the military, on whom expansion of 
the empire depended. At the same time executive con­
trol over the judiciary seems not to have extended 
much ."beyond the appointing of judges by the caliph,
(See Chapter Five on the Ummayyad in Joseph Schachtfs 
An Introduction to Islamic Law, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1964; and page 201 of his The Origins of 
Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1950). 
More than nine hundred years later when the Ottomans, 
the last of the Islamic Empire rulers, were firmly 
established in Tunisia, a large bureaucracy began to 
flourish. Religion still had a prominent place as 
Islam was the raison dT£tre of the Empire; nonethe­
less, religious matters became part of an over-all 
administration geared to maintaining temporal sov­
ereigns, namely the Sultan and his provincial princes. 
Not only did the Bay of Tunis appoint the qudah; he 
also legislated some of the laws which the qudah ap­
plied and gave himself and his executive officials 
the power to judge also. Under the Protectorate, the 
French, ruling through the Ottoman princes, essentially
kept the Ottomans* basic administrative concept, namely, 
political control over the procedures, if not always 
the substantive law applied, in the judicial bureauc­
racy. The long-revered manuals of substantive and 
procedural law composed by private jurists had great 
moral and social sway and were the cornerstone of the 
independence of the judiciary, but unlike qanun, were 
not declared as codes of law by a political ruler.
The more sensitive each Islamic province within the 
Empire became to its existence as an integral political 
entity, the more the judicial sphere became subject 
to political and administrative pressures. The history 
of the administration of justice in Tunisia as seen 
by various Tunisian senior judges and advocates of 
the 1940*s bears this out (see footnotes 3, 4, and 
20 post)•
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History of the Court System Before the Protectorate
The basic unit of the court system was the single
qadi , the one who judges disputes and pronounces what
is valid. The first Muslim with such duty was the
Prophet himself. The revelations of Allah assume
the existence of a judiciary and exhort it to mind
1
high principles. Yet the Prophet while alive was 
unique in powers. Not only did he pronounce judgmentj 
he also was responsible for the execution of the judg­
ment. *Abu Bakr, his immediate successor, followed 
the same example. Being political head did not deter 
him from being qadi too. After ^Abu Bakr, the judiciary 
became more highly differentiated. ^Qmar was the first 
to delegate his judicial powers to three qudah, in 
Madina (*Aba ad-Durdac shared duties with cUmar),
3
Basra (Sharihan), and Kufa (*>Aba Musa al-Ash'ari).
During the era of the ’UmawT, qudah were sent to the
^#Sura IV (an-Nisa*): 58,59; and Sura V(al-Ma*i_da) : 49
2
#Tahar Kheredine, Minister of Justice, "Reform 
of the Courts of the SharTca, M March 1924# Tahar 
Kheredine was the son of the former Prime Minister 
Khair ad DTn of the nineteenth century.
■z _    _  _r_
JalTl Sidi As-Sadiq al-JazirT, Deputy Public Prose­
cutor for the Chamber of Ta. appeal) of the Ouzara
(Wazara), "Al-Ma^akim at-THnisiyi" (Tunisian Courts),
Afl QadgJ at-Tunisl, 1947, page 31.
far ends of the Islamic Empire. The well-known ones
in Africa were *Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Rafi* at-Tanukhi,
the oldest qadi who believed in using the hadith to
guide his judgments, Sheikh 'Abd ar-Rahman ben Ziyad,
*4
andcAbed ar-Rahman ben Ziyad ben An'um. At first
in IfrTqiya (historical name for Tunisia) 
were sent outside the towns to dispense justice among 
the feuding Berbers. When qudah proved powerless be­
fore the growing sedition of the Berbers the political 
ruler felt no qualms about intervening. He, *Abed 
ar-Rahman, in the tradition of the Prophet and 'Umar, 
passed judgment himself and created a more highly cen­
tralised control over the qudah.
When Caliph Harun ar-Rashid sent in 800 A.D. his 
commandant Ibrahim ibn al-Aghlab to subdue the Berbers, 
the Aghlab dTjnasty ensued for a century and the qudah 
witnessed a rather free atmosphere for juristic learn­
ing. The qudah were aware of the madhab of the HanafT
and Maliki while the madhab. of Shafici and Ibn Hanbal
■ " ■ •
were still in formation. The basic qualifications for
a qadi under the Aghlabites were knowledge (cilm)
and piety (tuqan). Since the concept of madhab had not
'Umar as-SatarT. Deputy State Representative (Wakil) 
at the Ouzara(Wazara j, "Mauqicna al-jugrafiya wA 
taJthiruhu cala al-qada*f (G-eographical Events and Their 
Influence on Administration of Justice) in 
A1 Qada? at-Tunisl. 1949, page 85.
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fully crystallised, the qudah naturally exercised 
jtihad, that is, they had no formal guidelines nor 
fixed answers for the details which particular cases 
presented; and when there were guidelines, the qudah 
felt free to choose the appropriate guideline accord­
ing to their own discretion. One example cited hy
Sheikh 3Abu al Qasim ben Shabaluni during the time of 
5
5 Abu Muhraz concerns the witnesses who gave false
testimony. According to the Maliki madhab the fal­
sity would not entail a criminal.charge, but the testi­
mony certainly would not be accepted. The Zinduq 
madhab ("freethinkers") in Iraq was known to demand
repentance. However, Ibn Muhraz chose to follow the*
Hanafi madhab, the madhab of the majority, he is said
#  J" " "i l . —  r _T_ ” r lj
to have noted. In the same century there were other 
currents flowing in the direction of keeping a qadi 
within the particular madhab in which he had been in­
structed. Sahnun, the qadi in the Aghlabite capital 
of Kairouan, was known to propagate the Maliki doctrine 
actively throughout Tunisia. Once, however, he sent 
to the northern rich agricultural region Sulaiman 
Ibn ^maran as qadi.^  The people in that area com­
j= —
#Satan, page 86* Muhraz wrote a commentary on 
the Mudawwana called At-Tabassur. He authored Al Qasad 
and Al-t.iaz~ He died-450 A.Hi
^#SatarT, page 87.
12 8
plained when, contrary to their desires, Sulaiman 
ruled according to the Hanafi madhab. Faced with the 
complaint, Sahnun is said to have answered diplomat- 
ically that he preferred that the people be judged ac­
cording to what they believed in, but at the same time, 
he believed that a qadi should not venture to apply 
the principles of a madhab in which he had not been in­
structed.
The fluidity of the times, nonetheless, gave rise 
to the status of mufti, the most learned of the jurists, 
the one considered the most cognisant of various opin­
ions on legal problems, and specialist in interpreting 
unclear texts. As private individuals attached to 
the mosque, the muftun were at first only informal 
checks on the qudah when the qudah chose to seek the 
advice of the muftun. The qudah were not obligated to 
take their advice since at this time they still held
strongly to the concept of the qadi as a single judge
7
who alone was responsible for his judgment.
When the Fatimids invaded the Aghlabite state, and 
took Kairouan, the qudah changed political colours and 
madhab. The first ShT'T qadi under the Fatimids
was a member of a family of Kairouan. One of the out-
8
standing Maliki qudah (ibn Khalkan) changed to the
^•Jaziri, page 31*
8 — - —
*Satari, pag 87.
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leading madhab of the day and compiled a book on pro­
cedure and principles of fiqh. During the chaos en­
suing the fall of the Fatimids local North African rul- 
ers reimposed the Sunni madhab on the qudah and specif­
ically allowed only the Maliki opinions to hold sway.
Under the most stable dynasty of the medieval era 
(thirteenth to fifteenth century), the Hafsids, the 
basic outlines of Tunisian administration of justice 
crystallised. The MalikT madhab was in favour. The 
one-man qadi sessions were supplemented by a medjless 
(majlis), or a sitting of several judges. The polit­
ical sovereign in the capital appointed four qudah 
each with a different specialisation: the qadi of the
community, the equivalent of the head of the adminis­
tration of justice; the qadi of transactions; the 
qadi of marriage and marital relations; and the qadi 
who affirmed the appearance of the crescent moon.
Later there appeared the qadi of religion (faridat).
In the fifteenth century (ninth century A.H.) the 
unofficial checks on the qadi became incorporated in 
the judicial structure. The political sovereign still 
reserved to himself the right to intervene; but be­
tween him and the qadi came to stand the muftT who 
was officially Incorporated into the bureaucracy.
The opinions issued by the mufti still were not legally
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binding on the qadi, but it is not difficult to imagine 
that the mufti as part of the government structure 
would be subject to opinions of the sovereign and 
hence would hold sway over the qadT.
Alongside administrative changes, legal literature 
also was flourishing. The distinguished qudah of the 
era authored treatises which were still well-known
9
and used by judges far into the twentieth century.
Imam Muhammad Ibn as-Salam, who died in 759 A.H., com- 
posed a collection of the principles of Ibn al-Hajib.
It was an important source for the opinions of Khalil, 
the mainstay of Korth African Maliki legal rules. 
cAbed as-Salam Ibn ar-Rafiac and Al Barzali com­
posed a collection of fatawin which is considered 
the best expression of Tunisian administration of jus­
tice. Al JalmasT is known for his description of pro­
cedures. He justified the changes in the organisation 
of Tunisian justice on the ground ..of contemporary 
needs. Proceedings and custom changed according to 
the benefit which the changes would bring for warding 
off corruption, he argued.
Hence, by the time the Ottomans established domin­
ion over Tunisia, the earlier Tunisian rulers had sim­
plified and stabilised the administration and control
9 — _
Satari, page 58.
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of the qudah by channelling them into a definite 
madhab. The Ottomans being Hanafi brought a new 
complication onto the scene. However, the capacity 
of the Ottomans for organisation allowed them to make 
adjustments that kept the judicial organisation sta­
ble as it became more complex. The Ottomans had to 
reconcile two madhaban in case persons not of the 
same madhab disputed and had to reconcile urban and 
rural judicial authority, the ‘urban judges being con­
trolled by the Ottomans and the rural by the indig­
enous Tunisians. One of the first deeds of Sinan 
Pasha, the Ottoman conqueror of Tunisia, was to dele­
gate a HanafT Turkish qadi over the entire judiciary.
Trained in one madhab only, the Hanafi delegate en-
— — — — — — —  •
countered many difficulties in settling disputes a- 
mong the Maliki. By a sensible decision the Ottoman 
government started the practise of having Maliki as­
sessors sit with the Hanafi qadi. The assessors 
came from the office of the Maliki mufti and from a- 
mong the ordinary qudah. The division of the judicial 
system between a madhab of the ruling officials and 
a madhab of the populace made Tunisia unique in the 
Islamic Empire.
The Husseinites, the last dynasty in Tunisia, were 
responsible for the final organisation of the adminis-
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tration of justice. From the results one can infer 
that their organisation was guided by two interdepen­
dent considerations: desire for political survival
of a non-indigenous 6lite, and an equitable rule that 
granted concessions to the indigenous elite and popu­
lace, even at the expense of running contrary to the 
practises of Constantinople. For a start, in 1157 A.H. 
(eighteenth century A.D.) cAli Pasha, the founder of 
the Husseinite dynasty, obtained the right to re­
cruit in Tunis itself the Hanafi qadi, who had pre-.  •
viously been sent from Constantinople. Then in fair­
ness to Constantinople he continued to look upon the 
Hanafi qadi in Tunis as the overseer of the entire 
judicial machinery. In the next century under the
dynamic *Ahmad Bay, the Hanafi qadi in Tunis received
. • ■ r -
from Constantinople the title Sheikh ul Islam. In 
practise, however, the Husseinite Bay could not af­
ford to have the Sheikh ul Islam exercise all the 
functions which such a title conferred. The Bay gave
the Hanafi qadi priority only in rank in the official 
• •
retinue when appearing in public. The Tunisian 
Sheikh ul Islam had not the powers of his Constan­
tinople counterpart to censor Muslim works, send 
missions of judicial officials abroad, or be a part 
of the cabinet of ministers as chief of religious af-
ii
i
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fairs.^ Instead, the Maliki and Hanafi qudah were
• •
placed o n levels of more or less equal authority, de­
pending on the political realities of the urban or ru­
ral location. In Tunis, the centre of the political 
sovereigns as well as the centre of the Beylical repre­
sentative of the Hanafi Sultan, 3Ahmad Bay created
• • •
alongside the Hanafi Sheikh ul Islam a comparable post, 
the Bach Mufti, the chief consultant for Maliki af­
fairs. Each head was given power to judge and to super­
vise their respective court sessions in Tunis and de­
partments (consisting of lesser muftun, a qadi and 
supplementary qudah). Outside Tunis, only Maliki 
qudah were appointed since the number of Hanafr adher­
ents outside Tunis was very small and all the }.ocal
minor officials responsible for enforcing the judg- 
- - 11
ments were Maliki. The seeds for a systematic al­
lowance of appeals lay in this difference between ru­
ral and urban constituencies. In their effort to bal­
ance religious feelings in their principality, the 
Husseinite rulers allowed Hanafi adherents to appear 
before the local Maliki qudah. who in turn sent the 
issue to the Hanafi qadi in the capital. The Hanafi 
qadi formulated the rules applicable to the case and 
sent them to the Maliki qadT, who then passed judgment
’Tahar Kheredine, "Report”.
11 —  —-Satari, page 90.
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as representative of the Hanafi qadi# Later in the 
century the Europeans arguing for separate courts and 
judges for the Europeans pointed to the balance be­
tween the Hanafi and Maliki as an example of how they
12
wanted to be accomodated as a third "madhab11#
Thus because of more systematic bureaucracy based 
on hierarchy and supervision, the post of mufti attain­
ed its height of influence in the last half of the 
nineteenth century. This meant that the substance of 
the SharTca applied in civil matters was controlled by 
the mosque since muftun were recruited largely from 
the first class teachers of the Grand Mosque of 
Zaituna as were also the urban qudah subordinate to 
them. Hot trained in the law (as later political rul­
er after the colonial era was to be), not interested 
in the law unless it affected political stability, and 
having more contact with the urban muftun, the support­
ers of orthodoxy, than with the qudah, the Bay limited 
his legislative decrees largely to organisational 
concerns. Yet the style and the extent to which the 
decrees limited the control of the Bay over judicial 
affairs changed with each Bay. There was a tendency 
in the decrees of each successive Bay in the nine­
teenth century towards a formal style and towards the
12 — —#Satari, page 90.
creation of more layers of jurisdiction between the 
Bay and the qadi of first instance. *Ahmad Bay’s 
decree on the emancipation of slaves (in 184-6) ap­
peared at the beginning of this trend. In Chapter I
we cited the decree of * Ahmad Bay as an example of the.
pressures which the Europeans were putting on Tunisia’s
public interest. As a legal document, the decree is
an example of the interest of the Bay in the law when
It affedted political stability. While the qudah in
the formative years of Islamic law had used their
discretion to choose among various opinions argued by
various jurists, 5Ahmad Bay in the nineteenth century.
felt that there was still room for maneuvering and ex­
ercising his own opinion in an area where he saw that 
jurists still arguing. * Ahmad Bay’s view of himself
as being on a par with any jurisconsultant in his 
realm is manifested in the fact that he did not limit
Beylical Decree of 23 January 1846 on emancipa­
tion of slaves (Marty and Maarek’s Recueil de Legisla­
tion, Zeys, 384): ’’...You are not ign or ant "That our
learned jurists are not in agreement on the question of 
knowing whether slavery, in which the Negro races have 
fallen, is supported by a formal text; .that the light 
of religion has penetrated in their countries for a long 
time; that we are far from the era when masters c.on- 
formed, in the enjoyment of their rights, to the pre­
scriptions dictated by the most eminent of Messengers 
before his death; that our Sacred Law emancipates by 
law the slave who is mistreated by his master; and 
that the legislation has a marked tendency towards ex­
tension of liberty.”
See page 30 of Chapter I above.
the justification of his interference to' public inter­
est* He gave his decree the stamp of jurisprudential 
validity: no rights to those who abuse them even
though they were established in the time of the Prophet 
and used correctly at that time; no blind following 
of rules where the jurists disagree about the textual 
support of the right in question, that is, slavery of 
Blacks; emphasis on what the Sharira commends, namely 
emancipation rather than slavery; emphasis on laws 
that expand rather than restrict what the Sharica com­
mends. The provisions for the execution of the decree 
further showed that the Bay was reluctant to entrust 
reforms to men accustomed to old ways. He relied on 
new officers and himself. Notaries were to be created 
at certain centres to issue certifying papers without
intervention of the qudah as was the case in certify-* ■*
ing marriage contracts, or deeds of waqf. When the 
qadi was petitioned with a case of emancipation he 
was to relinquish jurisdiction to the Bay himself. This 
was the extent of 5 Ahmad Bay!s official intervention 
in the court system of the Sharica. In this way he 
differed from .some of the princes of the eastern states 
of the Ottoman Empire who had been undertaking large- 
scale^reforms in organisation (tanzTmat). The reor­
ganisations were largely of a legal nature that af­
fected the courts of the Sharif by confining them to
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family matters and removing them from certain commer­
cial and criminal jurisdictions.
The two successors of 3 Ahmad Bay came closest to
♦
adopting the concepts of tanzTmat. One year after the
death of 5Ahmad Bay, Muhammad Bay began with a decree . •
(of 14 November 1856) concerning organisation of the 
courts of the Sharica of the capital. In, terms of 
jurisdiction the decree seemed only to confirm what 
had been before: "([courts of the Shari^a arej for pro­
nouncing and having executed the judgments of the
14
law as well as for regulating religious affairs."
There was no definition of which "law"9and the example 
of religious affairs concerned verification of the 
crescent moon for Ramadan. The remainder of the decree 
was devoted to details of location, numbers of judges 
and standards of conduct expected of the judges. The 
details all point to an effort on the part of the po­
litical sovereign to remove the influence of the mosque 
on the judges and to make them appear more as secular 
officials even though the substance of their duties 
derived from the religious. A building, the Dar 
as Sharif, away from the respective Maliki and 
Hanafi mosques, was designated for the qudah as the
4 A
Beylical Decree of 14 November 1856 (l6_rabia 
al aoual 1275) on the organisation of the Sharica of 
Tunis, paragraph one (in Marty and Maarek, and Zeys,523)*
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place to pass judgments. The only other place where 
they were expected to appear officially was at the 
Palace of the Bay, once a week. Only later in the cen­
tury was the Bar as Shari*a made exclusively the place 
for qudah to pass judgments, this fact implying that in 
1856 the qudah might have sought to keep a measure of 
freedom in performing business in their respective 
mosques. Within the Dar as Sharica the arrangements 
made for sitting were similar to those the judges had 
been accustomed to when in the mosque. The west side 
of the Dar as Sharica was for the qudah, Hanafi and 
Maliki. The east side was for the Hanafi and Maliki 
muftun giving fatawin when requested and assisting 
the qudah at the request of the parties and substitut­
ing for the qudah in case of absence of the latter.
The qudah and muftun were treated like government bu- 
reaucratic officials when the decree specified the num­
ber of hours the courts of the Sharica were expected 
to function and prohibited judgments after hours. Un­
doubtedly knowledge and piety were assumed to be the 
two basic qualifications for judges; but the Decree of 
1856 added a bureaucratic morality, namely, judges 
were not expected to leave work early on days when the 
number of cases was small. They still had paper work 
and certifications to perform. Nor was any judge to
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leave a meeting of all the judges before its official 
ad j ournment.
The main innovation in the Decree of 1856 was the 
council of judges exclusively composed of the judges 
located in the capital —  the Sheikh ul Islam, the 
muftun, the qudah, the dey (da*y) —  one council for 
each madhab , Multiple jurisdiction was a departure 
from the traditional one-man, one judgment concept*
The individual qadi continued to sit alone, but he was 
supplemented now by mufti and council. The jurisdic­
tion of the council was left vague, outside its duty 
to verify the appearance of the crescent moon for 
Ramadan. In general the council would assemble in 
cases of a serious event, a condition which supposedly 
could be determined by the Sheikh ul Islam or the 
Maliki Bach Mufti, each of whom presided over their 
respective council, or by the Bay who could have them 
assemble at his Palace. Although the councils were the 
basis of an appellate organ, so designated
properly later, one can only infer a certain appellate 
jurisdiction from paragraph seven of the Decree of 
14 November 1856: Individual judges in Tunis were to
issue sentences to the provincial judges in the form of 
mrasla (murasala). Presumably the judges could do the 
same when meeting as a council. Cause for issuing a 
mrasla (murasala) arose when a provincial Maliki qadi
asked for .instructions from the Hanafi qadi in Tunis 
should the parties he Hanafi, or when the litigants 
in the provinces were dissatisfied with the local 
qadi and chose to seek judgment from the capital!s 
judges who supposedly were the most learned and in 
touch with the latest teachings and discussions held 
in the mosque schools. However, jurisdiction of the 
judges in the capital over the provincial cases was 
not strictly appe llate in the sense that a second 
instance judge has the legal right to force a first 
instance judge to withdraw the first judgment when 
that judgment is deemed contrary to law and evidence.
One year after the Decree of 14 November 1856, 
the cAhd al-*Amah was decreed and it brought Tunisia 
closest to the Tanzimat reforms. The Fundamental 
Pact of 10 September 1857 was the start of a short­
lived trend, before the establishment of the Protec­
torate, towards reducing the arbitrary intervention 
of the political sovereign into judicial affairs and 
towards a division of powers among the Bay, his most 
immediate assistants, the Mamluks, and the Europeans. 
On the surface, the cAhd al-3Aman was a respnnse to 
an increase in litigation, for it organised the judi­
cial system according to categories of action rather 
than according to categories of persons bringing ac­
tions. Article III read: "Muslims and other inhabi­
tants of the country will be equal before the law, for 
this right belongs naturally to man, whatever his con­
dition. Justice on earth is a scales which serves to 
guarantee right against injustice, the weak against 
the strong" (see page 37 of Chapter I above).
Article VIII added: "All our subjects, Muslims or 
others, will be equally subjected to rules and usages 
in effect in the country; none of them will enjoy any 
privilege over the.other." The cAhd al-1Aman di­
vided jurisdictions into commercial (Article VIII), 
criminal (Introduction and Article VI), real estate 
(Article XI), and the SharT^a (Introduction), the 
Sharica being in effect limited to religious af­
fairs and family matters. In fact, however, the di­
vision of jurisdictions reflected a highly politi­
cised atmosphere. Jurisdiction for each class of ac­
tions was not to lie in the hands of a well-coordi­
nated judiciary, but in the hands of those political 
blocs most interested in a particular class of actions. 
Thus the criminal courts were to be subject to the 
Bay for final sentencing (Article I). Commerical 
matters were to be handled by Europeans and Tunisians 
jointly (Article VII). The actual extent of the juris­
diction of the qudah outside of religious affairs
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was left vague, as was also the question of who was
to judge in real estate matters (Article XI) • G-iven
that even after the establishment of the Protectorate
the qadi had certain jurisdiction in land matters,
#
the silence in the cAhd al-^Aman on real estate matters 
no doubt meant a tacit sanction of the continuation of 
the courts of the qadi in land matters. What the 
cAhd al-3 Aman did not tacitly sanction was the muftun 
as chief coordinators of the new system of jurisdictions. 
The judges of the Shari^a had throughout the history 
of Islam been accustomed to the political sovereign 
usurping their criminal jurisdiction, since the emir 
desired control over all sources of physical power —  
police and prison keepers, not just the military. Orig­
inally the administrative medjless (majlis), called 
the Diwant was composed of the military officers.
They did not confine themselves to judging disputes
among soldiers; they also tried civilians for certain
15
felonies deemed to affect the interest of the state.
Yet the emir had appointed judges separate from the
qudah for crimes that had not been prescribed like the
hudud. The qudah had retained jurisdiction in the 
■* 3 "  16 ^
hudud. In the mid-nineteenth century the criminal
15 — —Satari, page 89.
^•Jaziri, page 45.
Ministry of Justice, "Report on Matters of Com­
petence in Penal Matters,,f (in Prench) 29 October 1941.
code which Muhammad Bay promulgated in accordance with 
the cAhd al-*Aman was extracted from the Islamic fiqh 
with one important omission. The hudud for misde­
meanors like theft were replaced by penalties of im­
prisonment and taczTr. The qudah were taken out totally 
of criminal jurisdiction. Only the Bay and the crimi­
nal courts remained, the courts investigating and 
judging the case, the Bay executing the sentence with 
leave to lighten or increase the sentence (article one).
A more serious blow was given to the authority of 
the officials of the Sharica as overseers of the gener­
al principles guiding the entire judiciary. The Bay 
seemed to have relegated that function to himself. He 
formulated the principles and made his royal successors 
responsible forever for the execution of the 
cAhd al-3Amah. He had consulted the Sheikh ul Islam 
and the great Culama3, but admitted that most of the
inhabitants in his kingdom did not have complete confi-
18
dence in his intentions. Certainly the Sheikh ul Islam^
^ ’Satari, page 90.
Article 2 of the Beylical Decree of 9 July 1913
promulgating the Tunisian Criminal Code (T.Snoussi!s
1957 edition): "The Code of 1913 abrogated the Code of
Muhammad Bay,11 (in Arabic).
♦
18 —’Introduction of the cAhd al-3Aman: "We are con- ,
vinced that most of the inhabitants of our Realms do
not have a complete confidence in what we have done with
the best intentions..." (see page 35 of Chapter I above).
(Marty and Maarek)
having opposed the Europeans in the Sfez affair (see 
page 32 of Chapter I above), opposed the principles 
of the cAhd al-3Aman which was the Bay's response in 
part to the demands of the Europeans in the Sfez af­
fair. The justifications for the cAhd al-3Aman ' 
were purely public policy, lacking the more precise 
jurisprudential references which *Ahmad Bay had given 
in his decree of 1846 on slavery. One can account for 
the difference by the fact that Muhammad Bay aimed at 
reconciling opposing political factions in Tunisia; 
doctrinaire jurisprudence would have hardened attitudes. 
Muhammad Bay worked on the principle that justice is 
the basic right of man, not just of Muslims: "It is a 
law of nature that man can arrive at prosperity only 
as long as his liberty is completely guaranteed to him, 
as long as he is certain to find refuge against oppres­
sion behind the ramparts ,of justice and he sees his 
rights respected until the day when unimpeachable 
proofs show his guilt, only as long as he Cis3 sure 
that this guilt will not result against him from insu­
lated witnesses... We have seen the Sheikh ul Islam 
and those great powers who by their wise policy have 
placed themselves at the .head of the nations, by giving 
the most complete guarantees of liberty; they have 
understood that that.'.is one of their duties, dictated 
by reason and by nature itself. If these advantages
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that have been conceded are real, the SharTta must con­
secrate them, for the Sharica was instituted by God to 
defend man against bad passions. 'Whoever submits to 
justice and swears by her approaches piety" (Introduc­
tion of cAhd al-3Aman). The criminal code itself af­
firmed the principle that a person is punished only in 
accordance with a written legal provision, but affirmed 
the principle as a right of man, rather than a right
of God like the hudud.-»• ■■
The fcAhd al-3Aman exposed a constitutional conflict 
in authority, namely, did the upholder and protector 
of the Islamic faith and laws have just as much right 
as a scholarly jurist to interpret the meaning of the 
Sharica? The Bay in 1857 was saying in' effect that he 
was not going to limit himself to upholding a Sharica 
that was exclusively defined by the culama*. He had his 
own broad interpretation of the dictates of God and 
was going to see that the Sharica incorporated those 
dictates. As the upholding of the Shari ^a was incumbent 
upon the political sovereign, so the Bay swore to bind 
himself and his successors to uphold the principles he
-  19-
himself had incorporated into the Shari fca. It was
 _■   —  =---------------
'Conclusion of the cAhd al-^Aman: "We will under­
take matters not only in our name, but in the name of 
our successors: none of them will be able to reign ex­
cept after having sworn to serve these liberal institu­
tions, resulting from our care and efforts; we take as 
witness before God, this illustrious assembly of the 
representatives of the great friendly powers and the 
high officials of our Government."
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ironical that the Bay who had traditionally been re­
garded as arbitrary in criminal law outside the hudud
was determined not to be arbitrary when be no longer
2 0
included the hudud in his criminal code* —■
Apart from the political pressures of the moment 
and its affront to the details of the law of the 
SharTca as interpreted by the muftun and the qudah, 
the cAhd al-JAmah can be viewed as part of an evolu­
tion in Islamic law in general in Tunisia* As a writ­
ten document, the cAhd al-^Aman was a culmination of 
a long evolution in Islam towards putting into writing 
legal rules that would apply to a given community.
First the oral revelations were collected into a writ­
ten Qur*an. Then the sunna of the Prophet and his Com­
panions were recorded after an intense study of the
2o ~ ''Speech of the first president of the mahkama
al-tacqXb (highest appellate court), SldT Musa"*a 1-Kazam, 
” —  •
Al Qada7 at-TunisT, 1957, page 154:
"For the princes and rulers challenged the 
authority of the qudah and the rulers created 
limits for the Shan't ca• Then they invented the 
siyasa jurisdiction, a domain that had no limit 
and there was added to that the inabilities of the 
administration of justice to seize the chains of 
national dominion within their own house over for­
eigners seeking protection in the consular conces­
sions since the tenth century hegira.
1 The Tunisian country underwent suffering 
from the lengthiness of the malise, its terrible­
ness and its wickedness. So the administration of 
justice in Tunisia became weak in expression, pre­
carious in existence, limited in power by the courts 
of the bayat (Bay), the qawad (ca'id) and the day at 
(dey), who took over settlement of disputes within 
the scope of what G-od revealed about authority.
So the exceptions and the special rights were
oral traditions and published as collections of aahadith. 
In the meantime jurists were composing their legal opin­
ions in manuals that established sufficiently coherent 
principles to form a madhab. Political rulers, qudah, 
and muftun then simplified administration of justice by 
forcing qudah of a particular region to confine their 
legal consultation to one madhab. Under the Ottomans 
the Islamic principalities sa,w administrative organisa­
tion and control grow in the form of decrees and ordi­
nances from the political sovereign. In the late six­
teenth century in Tunis the early Ottoman dey (da*y) 
(officers elected by the Ottoman infantry called the 
Janissaries) issued the mizah (justice, a code of
laws for maintaining order and collecting taxes in 
21
the country. Throughout the nineteenth century the 
Sultan had his firman and the Bay his ^amr to make known 
the rules by which they specifically wanted to govern 
their subjects. Prom this mass of literate wealth 
one can see that a certain .confusion resulted over 
how the sources of law related to one another. All the 
writings grew out of an effort to balance the positiv- 
istic reality of temporal government and the religious
generalised and "the original administration of justice 
was divested of its executory power, a power which is 
the soul of the judiciary character..."
21
*Encyclopedia of Islam, "Tunisia”, 1934 edition.
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raison d !§tre of the Islamic Empire. Sources^ like 
the Qur^an and 3ahadXth connected with the religious 
raison d'etre derived from authors other than the 
ephermeral "people" or ruler. The reverent respect 
for Allah and the Prophet made it impossible to change 
their words without their consent. The Qur^an could 
abrogate itself but no one else could. 1 Hence, sub­
sequent writings of jurists and decrees of political 
rulers could only supplement and interpret the Qur^an 
and ^ahadith, not abrogate them. In reality the effect 
of abrogating could be achieved by rulers ignoring 
or rendering impossible the operation of provisions
of the Qur^an (like the Tanzimat reforms in criminal
• ■ ■ #...
law.) Still it was not direct abrogation and there 
was a limit on the extent to which one could answer 
definitely the following question: To what sources of
law did the courts .appointed by the political sover­
eign turn to seek principles to apply to particular 
cases?
The cAhd al-3Aman ban be1 seen as an effort to make 
order out of the mass of written sources of law. The 
instruction to all judges, qadi or otherwise, was that 
the word of the Bay was the most immediate source of 
law applicable in the courts. It was his right to de­
cide what were the legal sources supporting his word.
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He endowned his right with the same eternal binding
force which the jurists had proclaimed for the Qur^an
and *ahadTth. In this case Muhammad Bay chose to af- 
•  •
firm the principle of uniform justice for all mankind 
living in his realms* The principle was to be expressed 
through the judgments of the courts of the Sharica, 
through the criminal code not applied by the judges of 
the courts of the Shari*a, and a commercial code bor­
rowing from European and Muslim usages. Although 
Muhammad Bay in fact only changed the criminal law of 
the Sharica, his Fundamental Pact had the makings of a 
bold systematisation of legal authority in the Islamic 
state.
The next major legislation was the constitution of 
1861 during the reign of Muhammad Es Sadiq. Its reali- 
sation, however, was a continuation more of the politi­
cal tone of the cAhd al-^Aman rather than an exposition 
of jurisprudential principles. The Mamluk ministers 
who drafted the constitution needed laws which protected 
them from the arbitrary power of the Bay to dismiss his 
appointees rather than laws which upheld the tradi­
tional Sharica. For the Shari^a was long on private 
rights, but short on administrative rights such as ten­
ure or pension. The constitution of 1861 proclaimed 
essentially administrative rules for the government of 
the Bay.
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In judicial concerns the constitution had three 
ends: allocating responsibility for upholding the
cAhd al-*Aman; a general outline of judiciary struc­
ture for judgments not based on the Sharica; and pro­
tection of the rights of employment of administrative 
officials. Articles nine and eleven covered protec­
tion of the cAhd al-^Aman, which came to be considered 
the only indication of the legitimacy of a ruler since 
every ruler had to swear to uphold its provisions. 
Physical might or religious piety no longer were to 
suffice in themselves. The'only public crime speci­
fied was the failure of the Bay to uphold the princi-
22
pies of the 5Ahd'al-3Aman (Article nine). Even 
though it was incumbent upon both the medjless (majlis) 
of the Sharica (the council instituted in Muhammad 
Bay!s decree of 1856) and the legislative-administra­
tive body called the Supreme Council to hear each as-
22 ‘Article 9: Any prince upon his ascension to the
throne must swear in the .name of God to do nothing con­
trary to the principles of the Fundamental Pact and the 
laws deriving therefrom, and to defend the integrity of 
the Tunisian territory. This oath must be solemnly made 
and in a high voice, in the presence of the members of 
the Supreme Council and the members of the SharTca medj­
less (majlis). It is only after having fulfilled this 
formality that the Prince will receive homage from his 
subjects and that his orders must be executed.
The Chief of State who voluntarily 
violates the political laws of the Kingdom will be shorn 
of his rights.
(Constitution of 1861, Marty and Maarek)
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cending Bay swear allegiance to the cAhd al-*Aman, it
was only to the Council (headed by a Mamluk) that the
Bay was held responsible for violating the laws (Arti- 
23
cle eleven). The Sharica had no part. Chapter III
on the Organisation of the Supreme Council and the
Courts created new courts without reference to the
courts of the Sharica, thus implying that a new system
for criminal, civil, commercial, and military matters
would he set up alongside the traditional system for
24
personal and land matters. The main structural dif-
23 Article 11: The Head of State is responsible
for all his acts before the Supreme Council if he con­
travenes the laws.
24^■'Article 22: There will be a police correctional 
court for judging simple police infractions.
Article 23: There will be a civil and criminal 
court for dealing with affairs other than those which 
depend on military councils and courts of commerce.
Article 25: There will be a court of commerce 
for dealing with commercial affairs.
Article 26: There will be a council of war for 
dealing with military affairs.
Article 60: The Supreme Council is the guardian 
of the Fundamental Pact and of the laws, and the de­
fender of the rights of inhabitants. It opposes the 
promulgation of laws which will be contrary to or which 
will attack the principles of the right of tenure of 
the magistrates, except in the case of dismissal for a 
crime committed and established before the court.
It will deal with recourses against 
the judgments rendered by the court of review in crim­
inal matters, and will examine whether the law was 
well applied. When the law is pronounced, there will 
be no other recourse.
(Marty and Maarek)
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ference between the new system and the system of the
Sharica was to lie in the provision of Article twenty-
four for an appellate court: "There will be a court
of review for dealing with appeal on facts from the
judgments rendered by the civil and criminal court
and court of commerce." The new system even differed
from the system of the Sharica in its most immediate
legal sources of authority. The civil, criminal, and
commercial courts were to judge according to legal
codes drafted by the Supreme Council with the Bay's 
25
approval. ho one had ever promulgated the legal man­
uals from which the qudah drew their principles of law.
25
"Article 27: The judgments rendered by the courts 
instituted by the present law must act according to the 
articles of the codes edited for their use.
Article 62: The Supreme Council can prepare 
drafts of law in the large interest of the country or 
for the government. If the proposition is adopted by 
the Head of State in his Council of Ministers, it will 
be promulgated and become part of the laws of the King­
dom.
Article 90: The crimes, misdemeanors, and vio­
lations which our subjects commit whatever their reli­
gion will be judged only by the constituted courts, as 
it is prescribed in the present code, and the sentence 
will be pronounced only according to the dispositions 
of the code. (Marty and Maarelc)
HadT Madini of the staff of the publication of _
A1 QadH* wa*l tashrtca of the Ministry of Justice, Tunis 
discusses the draf.t of the Commercial Code,completed in 
January of 1864, in numbers 6 and 7 of A1 Qada* waJl 
tashrTca of June 1971 and July 1971 respectively, from 
pages 57 and 41 respectively.
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Presumably the codes for the new courts would have 
specified in detail the jurisdiction over matter and 
persons. The constitution only stated certain juris­
dictions which had to appear in the codes. The gener­
al jurisdiction of the civil and criminal and commer­
cial courts was to cover all Tunisian subjects (Arti-
26
cle eighty-seven) regardless of religion and all
foreigners residing in Tunisia (Article one hundred 
27
fourteen). As for subject matter these courts were
28
to hear all crimes (Article ninety). Criminal juris­
diction over foreigners was not per se specified. It 
appears to have been merely included in the general 
subjection of foreigners to Tunisian courts (Article 
one hundred fourteen):
The creatures of G-od, being equal before
‘Article 87: All our subjects without exception
have the right to see to the maintenance of the Funda­
mental Pact, and to the execution of the laws, codes, 
and rules promulgated by the Head of State in confor­
mity with the Fundamental Pact. Towards this end, they 
can all be aware of the laws, codes, and rules above 
mentioned, and denounce before the Supreme Council, by 
way of petition, all the infractions which they know of, 
even when these infractions do not impinge on a third 
party. (Marty and Maarek)
27‘Article 114: The creatures of Gbd, being equal 
before the law, without distinction, whether for cause 
of their origin or their religion, or their rank, the 
foreign subjects established in our Realms, who are 
called to enjoy the same rights and advantages as our 
own subjects, must be subjected, like the latter, to the 
jurisdiction of the various courts which we have insti­
tuted to this effect... (Marty and Maarek)
footnote 26.
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the law,•••the foreign subjects established 
in our Realms, who are called to enjoy the 
same rights and advantages as our own sub- 
> jects, must be subjected, like the latter, 
to the jurisdiction of the various courts 
which we have instituted to this effect.
• ••CA}nd yet., in order to give a greater 
security we have established in the civil 
and criminal codes that the consuls or their 
delegates will be present before all our 
courts in cases or trials of the persons 
within their jurisdiction.
The qad? was excluded definitely from any criminal juris­
diction by Article ninety:
The crimes, misdemeanors, and violations 
which our subjects commit whatever their 
religion, will be judged only by the consti­
tuted courts, as it is prescribed in the 
present code and the sentence will be pro­
nounced only according to the dispositions 
of the code.
In commercial and land matters, the constitution was 
more ambiguous, not expressing exclusive jurisdiction of 
the commercial or civil courts in such matters. Actions 
brought by Tunisians and foreigners in these areas 
were merely subject to the rules already established 
and rules to be established. Rules already established 
referred no doubt to the Sharica and previous Beylical 
decrees. Provisions for commercial competence read:
(Article ninety-seven)
All our subjects who exercise any indus­
try must submit, to the rights already es­
tablished or those to be established in 
future relating to rights of entry and de­
parture on the products of the land or on 
manufactured ones.
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(Article one hundred twelve)
The foreign subjects established in the 
Tunisian realms will be able to undertake 
commerce of importing or exporting on the 
same footing as the Tunisian subjects and 
they must submit to the same charges and 
restrictions as those to which the said 
Tunisians submit.
Likewise in property matters, the constitution did not 
specify how far the civil courts would compete with 
the courts of the ShariCa. In regard to the Tuni­
sian subjects, the reference to them is only in terms 
of rights not jurisdiction of courts:
(Article ninety-six)
All those of our subjects who possess 
immoveable (property), whatever it be, 
whether it be like a share-cropping ten- 
nant, whether by perpetual rent, whether 
by right of enjoyment, can cede their 
rights of property by sale, gift, or any 
other manner, only to those who have the 
right of possession in the kingdom. The 
concession to any other is invalid.
Ones who did not have rights of possession probably 
referred to foreigners not established in the Tuni­
sian realms.
Since the land rights of Tunisian subjects were 
intricately bound up with the rules of the SharTca 
on succession, partition, and co-ownership, one could 
presume that matters of land rights still fell under 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the Sharica. For­
eigners, however, had disputed hotly being subject
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to the Shari*a in land matters. Hence, the constitution 
spoke about jurisdiction over foreigners in terms of 
"laws to be established":
(Article one hundred thirteen)
•♦♦It is well intended that the foreign 
subjects who will possess immoveables in 
the localities designated will be subject 
to the laws established and to be estab­
lished on an equal footing as the Tunisian 
subjects.
As for civil matters, there is only one clue as 
to the scope of civil laws, that is, debts (Article 
seventy-three)• Other "civil matters" later came to 
mean all contracts concerning moveables and immoveables 
(by the Code of Contracts and Obligations of 15 December 
1906).
Aside from the provisions on the general jurisdic­
tion of the new civil, criminal, and commercial courts, 
the constitution of 1861 also carried articles speci­
fying the jurisdiction of the courts over administra­
tive officials. From a strictly legal point of view, 
this equality before the law aimed at protecting the 
administrative officials from arbitrary dismissal at 
the whim of the Bay. In principle the criminal sen­
tences determined by the new criminal courts were re­
moved from the Beylical controls. Serious criminal 
sentences automatically resulted in dismissal, without
any interference from the Bay (Articles eighty-one,
x 29eighty-two;. Lighter sentences were not to affect 
the employment of the accused official (Article eighty- 
four) . In practice the administrative officials as­
sured their efforts to escape Beylical interference in 
legal matters by placing some of the administrative of­
ficials on the Supreme Council —  a body at the apex 
of the legislative, executive, judicial organisations —  
and by conferring on the Council wide judicial powers. 
Bor despite the existence of a criminal code the Coun­
cil had the right to discuss any sentence that auto­
matically meant the dismissal of an official (Article 
sixty-three). The general judicial jurisdiction of 
the Council was to cover in effect anything affecting 
public policy. The Council was to uphold the general 
principles underlying all the laws:
(Article sixty)
The Supreme Council is the guardian of the 
cAhd al-^Aman and of the laws, and the de­
fender of the rights of the inhabitants. It
29 Article 81: No official, whatever his rank, can
be dismissed, except for an act of a speech contrary to 
the loyalty demanded in the position he occupies. His 
misdemeanor must be stated before the Supreme Council. 
If it is proved, on the contrary, before the said Coun­
cil that the official was accused wrongly, he will con­
tinue to occupy his position and the accuser will be 
condemned to the penalty of article 270 of the penal 
code.
(Marty and Maarek)
Article 82: The distressing and infamous penal­
ties pronounced by the civil and criminal csurt carry 
with them dismissal (from office).
(Marty and Maarek)
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opposes the promulgation of laws which 
will be contrary to or which will attack 
the principles of the laws, the equality 
of inhabitants before the laws, and the 
tenure of the magistrature, except in the 
case of dismissal for a crime committed 
and established before the court,..
The wording of Article sixty seems not broad enough 
to have allowed the Council much interference in the 
courts of the Sharica except by way of any decrees 
affecting these courts like the Decree of 1856 on 
organisation of the courts of the Sharifca of Tunis, 
or legislation that promulgated new codes for new 
civil and criminal courts. However, the more de­
tailed references in subsequent articles to the ju­
dicial powers of the Council in criminal matters 
tended to restrict the Council to surveillance over 
only the new courts not applying the Sharica. This 
is not surprising when one considers the politics of 
the era. Finding political competition strongest 
in civil and criminal matters rather'than in family 
matters, the Mamluks writing the constitution had 
more interest in controlling criminal matters that 
affected their political rank which in turn deter­
mined their wealth. Stirring up a hornet!s nest by 
interfering with the Sharif would serve no political 
benefit. Article sixty-one made the Council serve 
as final arbitrator / in criminal judgments that were
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appealed from the ordinary criminal court:
In case of recourse against a judgment 
rendered by the court of review (jarticle 
twenty-four, providing for a court of re­
view dealing with appeal on facts from 
the judgments rendered by the civil and 
criminal court and court of commerce) in 
criminal matters, the Supreme Council 
will choose from its midst a commission 
composed of twelve members at least to 
examine whether the law has been violated* 
When this commission states that proce­
dure has been observed, that the law has 
been well applied, it will confirm the 
judgment under attack, and the party will 
no longer have means to validate his 
claim* If, on the contrary, the commis­
sion recognises that the judgment was 
not rendered in conformity with the law 
or procedure it will send the matter back 
to the court of review in pointing out 
the defects of the judgment.
Article sixty-three gave the Council first instance
jurisdiction in disputes over interpretation of all
the codes promulgated or to be promulgated* In this
way the Council was to serve as a mufti but with a
difference; the Council had substantial judicial
power and was not limited to any advisory capacity.
The article read:
The matters which can be decided after 
having been proposed to the Supreme 
Council, discussed, examined to see wheth­
er they conform to the laws or are advan­
tageous for the country and the inhabit­
ants, and are approved by the majority 
of the members are: [among others] the 
abrogation of a law by another more use­
ful; .. .questions not provided for in the 
code; the explanation of the text of 
codes; the application of their disposi­
tions in case of dispute...
Article eighty-seven , besides declaring the general 
responsibility of all citizens to uphold the law, al­
so aimed at keeping the Council abreast of all poten­
tial disputes in case the courts —  Shari*a or con­
stitutional —  were negligent about being informed of 
all infractions of the law:
All our subjects without exception, have 
the right to see to the maintenance of 
the *Ahd al-3Aman and to the execution of 
the laws, codes, and rules promulgated by 
the Head of State.in conformity with the 
Fundamental Pact. Towards this end, they 
can all be aware of the laws, codes and 
rules above mentioned, and denounce to the 
Supreme Council, by way of petition, all 
the infractions which they know' of, even 
when these infractions do not impose on a 
third party.
The third and final jurisdiction of the Council in­
cluded matters that one would today classify under 
administrative law. Articles forty-two and sixty- 
six gave the Council general powers to examine com­
plaints against all officials:
(Article forty-two)
Complaints of the governors against the 
governed, and vice versa, when it is a 
question of matters of service, will be 
carried, with evidence to support, before 
the competent Minister, to be examined, 
and then carried to the recognition of the 
Head of State in his Council.
(Article sixty-six)
The complaints about violations of the 
laws, committed by the Head of State, or 
by any other individual, will be addressed
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to the Commission charged with ordinary 
service. The said Commission must con­
vene for three days should the Council 
he on vacation, and will make it aware 
of the said complaint. If the Council 
is in service, the complaint will he im­
mediately brought to its attention for 
discussion.
What legal action the Council could have taken against
administrators was specified only for cases involving
Ministers -and non-ministerial agents:
(Article seventy)
The complaints against the Ministers, for 
facts relating to their functions and for 
violation of the laws, will he carried be­
fore the Supreme Council, with proof to sup­
port, for examination before it. If the 
deeds committed result in the dismissal 
from office, suspension, or payment of a 
fine fixed by the code (criminal), the pen­
alty will be pronounced by the Council.
If on the other hand the guilty merits a 
more serious penalty, the affair will be 
sent before the criminal court.
(Article seventy-one)
The complaints against the agents of the 
Government other than the Ministers, for 
deeds relating to their functions will 
be carried before the Minister to whom they 
are subordinate, and from there to the 
Supreme Council, to be judged according 
to the dispositions of the code.
If the deeds imputed to the agent are 
thosd which carry a serious penalty, such 
as exile, detention, forced labour, or 
capital punishment, the affair will be 
sent before the criminal court.
Even when the criminal courts were allowed to try a 
minister or agent of the government for serious crimes,
U 2
whose penalties entailed dismissal from office, the 
Council had the right to review such decision to test 
its conformity to the laws, as provided in Article 
sixty-three:
The matters which ^ canbe decided after 
having been proposed to the Supreme 
Council...are:...the dismissal of an 
official of State who will have merited 
this penalty for a crime committed and 
judged...
Unlike the criminal code which took away all crimi­
nal jurisdiction in hadd from the courts of the Sharica, 
the constitutional provisions for the Council’s powers 
to try administrative officials according to the crim­
inal code were not very innovative. The Council was 
designed to carry on the purposes for which the tra­
ditional courts of mazalim had been created. The
— *-----
courts of mazalim were courts of complaints; in par­
ticular, complaints against the unlawful acts of the
30
government officials, whether qadi, or tax collector.
qudah applying the Shari ca had long been accus­
tomed to the political sovereign using his power to 
control criminal and administrative affairs. The main
difference between the Council’s judiciary control
_  _ _  ~  ~
#3Abu al-Qasim al-Qaruwi as-Shabi, Assistant 
Public Prosecutor for the Court of Appeal (Tacqib), 
Tunis, ”Qadi al-mazalim,” A1 Qada* at-Tunisi, 1957, 
page 52. The study on the courts of .the magSlim was 
based on al-MSwardl'’s Al-Ahkam as-SultSniya.
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over officials and the jurisdiction of the courts of 
mazalim lay in their procedure* The Council had a 
code with determined rules to judge cases; the courts
31
of mazalim had no clear determined method.r J •
The constitution of 1861 did not stay in effect 
long enough (only three years) for a case history to 
develop and to point out what actual legal conflicts 
the provisions engendered. The cAhd al-3 Aman was to 
survive only as a pledge that the political sovereign 
would subject himself to laws and forego arbitrary in­
tervention into the legal system.. We have seen the 
political forces surrounding the two documents and ex­
amined the legal system they aimed to produce in the 
mid-nineteenth century. It remains for us to view 
the two in the light of how they forced Tunisian Mus­
lims to become part of the evolution of Islamic law. 
The cAhd al-aAman and the constitution of 1861 have 
become milestones in the evolution of the Islamic law 
over the last one hundred fifty years by the fact that 
they raised issues of reforms which never went away. 
The issues became latent during the Protectorate 
years, then flared up again as the time of Tunisian 
incdependence approached. These issues are what 
lie behind the crisis of conscience that plagues Mus­
lims in facing changes in the law. The influence of
”51 — ^ ‘Qaruwi, page 53.
164
the Europeans has "been believed to be responsible for 
the reforms in the Sharica for the last one hundred fif­
ty years. Yet the cAhd al-*Aman and the constitution 
of.1861 were not entirely dictated by the Europeans; 
nor were they wholesale adaptations of European customs. 
The Europeans were certainly catalysts to reform, be­
cause their presence raised questions that the Muslim 
world found pressing and unprecedented. Muslims had 
been accustomed to a history of conquering and overtak­
ing foreigners. The, nineteenth century brought for the 
first time traffip in the opposite direction. The for­
eigners were flowing into the Muslim state. There had 
been conflicts to resolve when the Muslims overran for­
eign lands; and a law was forged for the circumstances 
and remained in essence the same for centuries. There 
arose conflicts likewise when the Europeans moved into 
lands where Muslims had long established sovereignty. 
Could the law once established for certain conditions 
be changed to meet opposite conditions or could one 
cause conditions to revert to the original status quo? 
This was the question before the Muslims. The 
cAhd al-3Aman and the constitution of 1861 favoured 
adapting the law to the demands of the conditions. The 
cAhd al-*Amah, <a statement of principles, implied some 
guidelines for determining which classes of conditions
warranted changes in the law rather than spending time 
on reverting conditions to the status quo. Using the 
law to change the status quo was not at stake at that 
time, as was to he the case in the twentieth century. 
One guideline given by the cAhd al-3Aman was hardship. 
The conditions warranting change in interpretation of 
the law were those of adversity, brought about by per­
sons outside the community, and those of moral laxity 
within the community itself. In 1857 adversity took 
the form of Europeans who were too powerful to ignore 
or to defeat militarily. Moral laxity came in the 
form of a charge that the culama3, the traditional in­
terpreters of the Sharica had failed to incorporate in­
to the Sharica the principles of equality of G-od!s
creatures; so the political sovereign had to remedy
32
the situation. Because these themes were to appear
329Paragraph five of the Introduction of the 
cAhd al-*Aman: "Convinced that it is necessary to fol­
low the prescriptions of G-od in everything relating to 
His creatures, I have decided no longer to let weigh 
upon those (creatures) who are confided to my care in­
justice nor contempt: I will neglect nothing in putting
them in full possession of their rights."
Paragraph thirteen of the cAhd: "We have seen
the Sheikh ul Islam and those great powers who by their 
wise policy have placed themselves at the head of na­
tions, in giving the most complete guarantees of lib­
erty; they have understood that that is one of their 
duties, dictated by reason and by nature itself. If 
these advantages that have been conceded are real, the 
Sharica must consecrate them, for the Sharica was insti­
tuted by G-od to defend men against bad passions. Who­
ever submits to justice and swears by her approaches 
piety.1
Article III of the *Ahd: "Muslims and other in-
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throughout the history of legal reforms in Tunisia and 
help explain why certain reforms occurred and others 
did not, one should turn to the details of the crisis 
that produced the cAhd al-*Aman and the constitution of 
1861.
The cAhd al-*Aman and the constitution were basical­
ly redefinitions of the law of the dhimmi. In the 
Sunni madhahib the law divided non-Muslims into two 
categories: dhimmi and musta^min. The dhimmi was a
non-Muslim living as a subject in Muslim lands. Many, 
were descended from communities that were conquered by 
Muslims. Some, like the Hebrews, had fled to Muslim 
lands to escape persecution elsewhere. Regardless of 
origin, they accepted Muslim political sovereignty in 
return for certain safeguards of their religion and 
legal rights. They could not be.treated completely 
equal to Muslims, because religion determined rights, 
as citizens today of a particular country have more 
rights by virtue of having more duties than non-citizens 
residing in that country. The dhimmi was subject to
habitants of the country will be equal before the 
law, for this right belongs naturally to man, whatever 
his condition.
Justice on earth is a scales which serves to 
guarantee right against injustice, the weak against 
the strong.
(See pages 34-37 of Chapter I above)
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punishments of hadd except those which related to the'.1 '
Muslim religion like the hadd for drinking wine. Yet 
the Sfez affair of 1857 (see page 32 of Chapter I 
above) pointed out that the dhimmi was subject to the 
penalty for offences such as blasphemy and disrespect 
for the Islamic religious sentiment. In the law of 
procedure the dhimmi could not be witness for affairs 
of Muslims but could in affairs of another dhimmi.
In the law of contracts and commerce the dhimmi had 
full rights except in a contract called mufawada, a 
partnership with full liability and power of each part­
ner. In land law the dhimmi could own land as long as 
he paid the kharaj (land tax). Muslims were subject 
only .to taxes on crop production.
The non-Muslims who fell into the category of 
musta^min were originally from lands which the Muslims 
had not conquered, like Prance, England, Austria.
Hence, there was always a potential for war with these 
unconquered lands. They were called the dar al-harbi.
T--r—  r-i—  i i-
Mien any person from the dar al-harbi wanted to enter 
the Muslim lands, the Muslim political sovereign 
guaranteed by an agreement security of person and pos­
session. The visitor from the dar al-harbi then
' 1 11
became a musta*min, similar to the dhimmi in rights, 
but limited in his stay to a maximum of .about a year.
Whereas a dhimmi showing disrespect for Islam could
_ 33
he penalised the musta^min was supposed to he deported.
The non-Muslims who came from Europe, to Tunisia in 
the nineteenth century were not dhimmi. They came from 
the dar al-harbi. The question before the Tunisian 
Bay and his Mamluk ministers was whether to convert the 
status of the Europeans to that of dhimmi. The argu­
ment for accepting them as dhimmX .would have rested 
on the fact that the Sharica allowed musta3min who re­
mained for some while in Islamic territory to become 
dhimmi. The argument against conversion would have 
rested on the Europeans1 protest against full dhimmi 
status. The Europeans while establishing themselves 
in Islamic territory did not want all the duties at­
tached to dhimmi status. They continued to regard them­
selves as subjects of a foreign power, thereby keeping 
ties with the dar al-harbi. They did not want to be- 
come subjects of the Bay of Tunis like the indigenous 
Christians and Hebrews who were subject to Tunisian 
law regardless of their religion. The cAhd al-^Aman 
was the response to the conflict between the Euro­
peans1 desires and the principles of the Sharica.
■ T’? :
See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic 
Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, pages 130-133, and 
T5F.
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The solution was a half-way position for Europeans.
The very title cAhd al-*Aman means a treaty for "safe 
conductnf *aman heing reserved usually for non-Muslims 
from the dar al-harbi. However, the text of the 
cAhd al-3Vhnan in reality converted the European 
musta^min into a dhimmi. The Europeans were to be 
dhimmi in the sense that they could undertake commerce
34
and own property, subject to taxes (Articles X and XI). 
Those who wanted to protest that the cAhd al-*Aman con­
travened the traditional prohibition against foreigners 
owning land could not argue that a right was conferred 
without corresponding duties; the only way they could 
have protested the conferrment of land rights on the 
Europeans was to ask whether the Europeans could in the 
first place be converted to dhimmi status, especially 
if they were not willing to be called subjects of the
34 Article X: Foreigners who will want to establish 
themselves in our Realms can exercise all industries 
and all trades on condition that they will submit to the 
established rules and to those which will be established 
later, on an equal footing with all the inhabitants of 
the country. No one will enjoy in this regard any priv­
ilege over the other.
Article XI: Foreigners belonging to various 
governments, who want to establish themselves in our 
Realms, can buy all kinds of properties, such as houses, 
gardens, lands, on an equal footing with the inhabitants 
of the country, on condition that they will submit to 
the existing rules or to the rules which will be estab­
lished, without shirking them.
There will not be the least difference 
in regard to them in the rules of the country. We will 
make known the method of habitation, in such a way 
that the owner will have perfect knowledge of it and 
will be held to observe it.
(See page 38 of Chapter I above)
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Bay. The answer would have been that whether a Euro­
pean called himself a subject of the Bay or not had 
no relevance to the practical. As long as Europeans 
were in fact subject to each particular local rule cor­
responding to each particular right which they won, 
they were de facto if not de jure subjects of the Bay. 
The legal mentality of the Europeans was not satisfied. 
If Europeans were in law still European subjects, then 
the factual situation should' be a true reflection of 
the legal. Some Europeans came round to the Bay*s prac­
tical point of view on land rights within five years
after the cAhd al-3Aman was promulgated. Others held
35
out longer. The Europeans did win from the Bay a 
principle that paid in fact a certain deference to 
their legal status as foreign subjects. This principle 
was equality between the Europeans and the Tunisian 
subjects. Equality wasIwhat distinguished the 
tAhd al-*Aman of 1857 from 3aman in the traditional 
sense of the Sharif. Equality extended the principle 
that duty determines rights beyond its traditional 
scope. The discrepancy between duties and therefore 
rights of Muslims and of those of the dhimmi took into 
account a certain respect for and tolerance of dif­
ferent religious and legal beliefs co-existing in one
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state. Equality meant the end of tolerance of dif­
ferences. It could have meant that one side would 
have to how completely to the beliefs of the other.
Yet since in reality one could hardly expect one side 
to give in completely, equality entailed making up a 
new belief system that combined values from both sides 
but which was applicable equally to both sides.
Before the constitutional elaboration of the 
cAhd al-^Aman was promulgated in 1861 the Mamluk min­
isters were faced with several alternatives. The al­
ternatives were three: to treat the Europeans as
dhimmi without the full rights and duties of Muslims, 
especially in criminal matters; to allow Europeans 
to act as foreigners not controlled by Tunisian law, 
or to treat Europeans as Muslims with full rights un­
der Tunisian control. The Europeans on the other side 
of the negotiating table were too strong to be made to 
accept the status of dhimmi. If Tunisians had insisted 
on full status of dhimmi they would have been tempting 
the European states to come forcibly to the protec­
tion of their people. As for allowing Europeans to 
set up their own courts as if they belonged to a third 
"madhab" in a country that allowed two to function, 
Tunisians would have been in effect inviting a foreign 
power to make the Bay a puppet, taking orders for exe­
cution of judgments from another sovereign. The Euro­
peans on the other hand had not enough power in the 
mid-nineteenth century to ignore the logic of the Tuni­
sian point of view. For was there not a common system 
of law for all persons whether citizens or not living 
in any European country? Only diplomats were exempted 
and not all Europeans in Tunis were diplomats. The 
third alternative —  treating Europeans as Muslims —  
was a violation of the integrity of Islam. Full re­
ligious belief entailed full legal duties and rights; 
they were inseparable. It would have bden hypocriti­
cal to treat a person as if he were Muslim without his 
confessing the creed. That was why the status of 
dhimmi had been created —  to allow for the differences 
in religion and hence the difference in rights and 
duties.
Since no one alternative in itself was satisfactory, 
the answer turned out to be a legal system controlled 
by the Tunisians but attempting to meet European stand­
ards of administration of justice. A system of common 
law would override the traditional practise of treating 
non-Muslim foreigners as dhimmi, but at least would 
avoid a worse violation, namely, the violation of the 
principle of Muslim sovereignty. What were the changes 
that the Mamluk ministers of the Bay were willing to 
to concede in the confrontation between the European
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legal ways and the Islamic? A discussion of the 
changes and their import for the traditional legal 
system follows:
The formal procedures which the Tunisians set up for 
the new system of common law constituted the widest 
break from the traditional practises. As in Euro­
pean systems, the Tunisian law was divided into cate­
gories and each category assigned to a separate court. 
The Sharica too had its categories of law, but assigned 
all to one court, that of the qadi. And even though, 
as we have seen, the political sovereign removed cer­
tain criminal jurisdiction from the control of the 
qadi, the qadi still had competence in offences of
hadd, in addition to civil and commercial competence.♦
The mode of expressing the law through codes promul­
gated by a political sovereign was another European 
adoption. The codes were not to be merely another set 
of qawanin(qanun) or decrees (3amr) . that supplemented 
the interpretations of the Sharica already established 
in the madhahib. The codes were to be equivalent to 
manuals of a madhab in being coherent expositions of 
the monopoly which the muftun and the qudah had had in 
establishing and interpreting many of the laws of the 
land. Because of the reforms of 1861 the executive 
power was to be responsible for establishing and in­
terpreting codes that interfered drastically with the
former competence of the qudah and muftun. Tunisia
•  ~
was to wait until independence to reestablish a bal­
ance between the judicial responsibility of the judges 
(interpretation) and the judicial responsibility of the 
executive (promulgation)*
As for their substance, the codes promised to re­
tain rules of the SharTca th&t were already estab­
lished, while extending their application beyond Tuni­
sian Muslims to non-Muslim Europeans. The criminal 
code was the only one actually promulgated in the mid­
nineteenth century. It was an example of departure
from the substance of the criminal law in the Sharica.
36
The hadd was abolished and replaced by imprisonment 
an(^  ta czTr. Although abolishment of the hudud was a 
break from the Shari la, it was not a break from prac­
tise. The Sfez affair of 1857 (see page 32 of 
Chapter I above) illustrated practise. The case had 
produced such clamour because the Sheikh ul Islam ap­
parently invoked the hadd for sacrilege because of 
blasphemy despite the fact that people had long been 
accustomed to seeing a less serious penalty, or taczir, 
inflicted, even for blasphemies.
Hence, in light of the law the judges had been ac­
customed to applying, the reforms of 1861 appeared to
"Satari, page 90.
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be like pouring old wine into new bottles. There was, 
however, some advantage in the new bottles. Expressing 
the reforms in the form of codes introduced a new de­
finitiveness that undermined the arbitrariness of past 
practises. Prior to the codes, suspension of the hudud 
did not amount to abrogating the prescription of the 
hadd found in the jurists1 manuals. Purist qudah and' 
muftun or political sovereigns still could argue that 
they legally had the right to invoke the original pro­
visions of the Sharica despite customary practise. A 
code, however, requires a legal forewarning before 
there can be a change in the application of the law and 
does away with the possibility of a strict qadi or
41
mufti or political sovereign changing his mind over­
night, as in the Sfez case. As late as 1941 a case sim­
ilar to the Sfez case arose and revived the question of
37
reversal of criminal practises. The Bay of Tunis was
considering removing jurisdiction over infractions of
religious law (e.g., blasphemies, failure to observe
38
fasting, drunkenness during Ramadan) from secular 
courts (comparable to courts of common law created by 
the constitution of 1861) whose judges were trained in 
the College of Law, sponsored by the Ministry of Jus­
—  , _
'Ministry of Justice, "Note on the matter of 
competence in penal matters," 29 October 1941(in French).
58*Ibid.
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tice, to the Diwan. This would have meant in ef­
fect that such cases would he judged by the Sharica, 
not codes. Although the Tunisian Minister of Justice 
reacted against the Bay out of a desire to keep crim­
inal justice in secular courts, the Ministry could and 
did justify its opposition to. the Bay by the exigencies 
of codification. Abrogation of the existant laws 
and the drafting of new ones took more time than the 
traditional practise of the Bay intervening in the law 
and expecting instaneous results.
Despite their legal advantages, the reforms had 
immediate political repercussions, as seen in Chapter I 
(pages 73-76 above). The revolt of 1864 resulted 
in the Bay shelving the reforms. Shaken by disorder,
Muhammad Es Sadiq Bay reverted to old ways. He re- # »
sumed hearing disputes himself and applying the Sharica. 
The new criminal courts established in the provinces 
(one of the sources of irritation that sparked off the 
revolt) were abolished and jurisdiction over misdemean­
ors was given to administrative agents called cummal.
In Tunis the criminal court was kept but its jurisdic­
tion was considerably reduced. The qudah recaptured
#Jaziri, page 52. The Ministry of Justice started 
training for magistrates in law of Tunisian codes, com­
mercial law, and Islamic law of inheritance and gift. 
Qudah and muftun were trained in the mosques.
I l l
the authority to give sentences of physical punish-
40
ment and imprisonment. However, all the new juris­
dictions created by the constitution of 1861 were not 
totally abolished. Instead of distributing the juris­
dictions among various courts and the Supreme Council,
the Mamluks simply concentrated the various jurisdic-
41
tions in the office of the Prime Minister. There
were created in the Ministry branches for handling fi­
nancial, civil, criminal, and commerical affairs, and 
any matter touching public policy. The civil and penal 
branches of the Ministry had registrars for recording 
pleadings, complaints, summonses of accused parties, 
and their interrogations. Officials called the cUmmal 
were commissioned to investigate light commercial cases 
and small misdemeanors. The clerk then wrote a report 
on the case for the head of his department (civil or 
criminal division). The head then drafted a decision
#Ministry of Justice, "Report on the matter of 
competence in penal matters,1 29 October 1941: "His 
Excellency the Minister of Justice was only able to 
confirm to His Highness the Bay that the provisions 
of article 15 of the Decree of 25 May 1876 granting 
members of the SharTca of Tunis the power of physi­
cal punishment and penalties of imprisonment (taczTr) 
had been abrogated as a consequence of the organisa­
tion of the Tunisian penal code of 1913." (Translated 
from Erench)
^•Jaziri, pages 37-39.
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for the case and transmitted it to the Bay. Should 
the Bay stamp it with his seal while in Council (majlis), 
the decision became a royal marcrud.
The judicial system which followed the revolt of 
1864 remained until the beginning of the Protectorate. 
Tunisia was to wait fifteen years before any more com­
prehensive judicial legislation was attempted. Under
the Prime Ministry.of Khair ad Din, Muhammad Es Sadiq• •
Bay issued the Decree of 25 May 1876 on the functioning 
of the courts of the Sharica of Tunis and the courts 
of the interior. The decree was significant because 
it remained the basis for the organisation of the Tuni­
sian courts applying the Sharica until Tunisia won its 
independence. The decree of 1876 was typical of the 
desire of Khair ad Din to organise and work with what 
existed rather than to remake a system. We have seen 
how circumstances of adversity motivated the ministers 
of Muhammad Es Sadiq preceding Khair ad Din to re- 
define the status of dhimmi in the cAhd al-^Aman and 
the constitution of 1861, as well as how the 
cAhd al-*Aman used moral laxity on the part of the 
culama* to justify incorporating equality of Muslims 
and non-Muslims into the Sharica (see pages 163-166 
above). The decree of 1876 was not rooted in adver­
sity; it was rooted in a concern for moral laxity.
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Yet the concern of Khair ad Din for moral laxity was 
not a device for incorporating something new into the 
SharTca to meet an adverse situation. It arose out of 
a sense, of guilt over the lack of respect of the govern­
ment for the learned judges applying the Sharica.
Prom a strictly legal point of view, the decree of 
1876 was basically an attempt to clarify the competence 
of the qadi vis a vis the Ouzara (Wazara), the judicial
^ I J ^  • — « 1"  r-™  -  _L _ U!-; _
department of the Prime Minister. For ever since the
decree of 1856, which provided only for a council of 
muftun and qudah to replace the single qadi for impor­
tant decisions (see page 137 above), the courts of 
the qudah had not been given any clear definition of
their role in the judicial system which was changing its
face rapidly during the mid-nineteenth century. By
42
article fifteen of the decree of 1876 the courts 
of the Sharica of the capital regained their traditional 
civil and criminal jurisdiction. This meant that the 
jurisdiction of the court of the qadi and the court of 
the Ouzara (Wazara) overlapped. Either the qadi or 
the government could decide to transfer a case from
'Article 15: "...The Sheilkh Mufti will also have 
the right ,to order measures conforming to his compe­
tence, such as receiving proofs of acts of marriage, 
cheffa kemcha, for the greatest comfort of the public.
He will give reproaches (admonishments) to the parties 
who merit them, will order arrests he judges necessary 
and will write msraslas (murasala) to the qudah of the 
districts..."
(Marty and Maarek)
the court of its original registration to another court, 
as long as final judgment had not heen rendered. If 
the qadi decided to send the case befrre the govern­
ment he was to do so only because of uncertainty over 
the lav/ applicable. In Tunis it was the Council of the 
Sharica in particular that was subject to direct govern­
ment interference. Since the Hanafi and .Maliki Councils
#
of the SharTca each consisted of all the magistrates ap­
pointed from each madhab and handled serious questions, 
there arose the possibility of diverging opinions.
Where divergent opinions occurred, the government be-
43
came the final arbitrator. The individual qadi
judging in Tunis was subject to government interference
only indirectly. If the mufti disagreed with the
qadi, the matter could be submitted before the entire 
44
Council. The provincial qadi was likewise subject
Article 6: The examination of certain questions, 
provoking sometimes controversies on the matter of the 
application of the law, in the case where divergences(of 
opinion) occur among the opinions expressed by the mem­
bers of the Shari ca belonging to one or the other of the 
two rites, v/ithout the discussion leading them to a single 
and united opinion, the. Bach Mufti of the court where 
the division (of opinion^ occurred will draw up a report in 
which he will develop the arguments produced in support 
of each opinion; each judge will sign the opinion which 
he sustains and the report, thus drawn up and signed, ' 
will be addressed to the G-overnment.
(Marty and Maarek)
Article 7: If there__sits at the council only 
one of the mufti and the qadi or the mufti designated 
for serving in the absence 6f the qad£, and if the con­
demned party demands the sending of the affair before 
the sitting sheikhs, the sheikh who heard the affair
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to government interference indirectly* He went to
45
the Council of Tunis when in doubt about a judgment. 
When in doubt about the limits of his jurisdiction he
was to notify the government by way of one of the
. ' ■’ 46
qudah in the capital. If the mufti in the capital
will defer it until the meeting of the council, so long 
as it does not appear that his demand for deferral is 
a dilatory measure; if not, the judgment will be exe­
cuted. But if the three sheikhs are present at the 
council, the sheikh who heard the affair will have the 
judgment executed, unless the condemned party claims 
that the bach-muftT is of an opinion contrary to that 
expressed by the presiding judges, and in this case, the 
bach-muftT must explain himself on the opinion that one 
attributes to him, before the execution of the judgment.
But when the sheikh who heard the affair renders his 
judgment in the presence of the bach-mufti of his rite 
and agrees with him, the execution of this judgment will 
not be submitted to any formality.
(Marty and Maarek)
45 _ —Article 36: If a qadi of the province is preoc­
cupied with judging an aff&ir, he 'will submit it to the 
Council or to the mufti if there exists in the city 
only one mufti.
If all the magistrates issue the 
same opinion, he will fall in line with their opinion; 
if they are of a different opinion, he will consult the
qadi of Tunis who will submit the affair to the Shari ca
of*this city. _This consultation must equally take 
place if the qadi does not share the opinion of the 
MuftT.
(Zeys, 528)
A ^ —  —
‘Article 37: If a provincial qadi finds himself per­
plexed over having an act executed, according to the 
rules of the SharTca, he will write about It to one of 
the qudah of Tunis who will advise him or he will write 
about it to the government if that is necessary. If he 
has some doubts about the limits of his province of 
jurisdiction, he will address himself to the government
by way of one of the qudah of Tunis.
(Zeys, 529)
disagreed with the opinion of the qadi, the matter 
was to go before the Council, and if the Council . 
could not reach a unanimous decision, the govern­
ment gave the final decision.
While the government could demand to supervise 
certain cases brought before the courts of the 
Sharica, the courts of the Sharica did not seem to
have such power in reverse when the courts of the
Ouzara (Wazara) were seized initially with an af­
fair. The decree of 1876 reserved only to the 
government the right to have a case transferred from
the Ouzara (Wazara) to a qadi or the Councils of the
47
Shari ca • The only way the courts of the Shari ca
could guarantee independence of the Ouzara (Wazara)
was by the Council of Tunis reaching an unanimous
48
decision.
— —  ^ \ /
While the position of the qadi vis a vis the
47 Article 23: The affairs which the Government
will send to the SharTca will be'judged’ according to 
the rule that the defendant has the right to choose 
the rite by which he desires to be judged, if this is 
not when the Government has indicated in writing that 
the affair be judged by a particular rite (as modified 
by Decree of 15 December 1896, Article 1, section 1). 
(Zeys, 528)
A O
‘Although article 6 provides that in case of 
divergence of opinions, the government would settle 
the issue, the footnote in Zeys to article 26 cites a 
letter from the Director of the Judiciary Services of 
10 August 1896, saying that since the judgments of the 
Shartca are of last resort, they cannot be repealed 
by the Ouzara (Wazara).
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the government depended on the importance of a liti­
gation and the uncertainty of the qudah or muftun about 
the law applicable, the competence of the courts of 
the Sharica vis \  vis one another throughout the 
Tunisian principality depended on the locality of the 
court. The courts of Tunis, the capital, had the
widest jurisdiction territorially and in subject mat- 
49ter. In general both the courts of the Shari*a
in Tunis and the provincial courts were competent 
to settle disputes and to notarise acts such as mar-
49 H  '
Article 15: ...The sheikh mufti will also
have the right to order measures conforming to his 
competence, such as receiving proofs of acts of mar­
riage, cheffa kemcha, for the greatest comfort of the 
public. He will give reproaches (admonishments) to 
the parties who merit them, will order arrests he 
judges necessary and will write msraslas (murasala ) 
to the qudah of the districts, affixing them with 
his seal, without that, however, constituting a 
bar to the exercise of the power of the qadi within 
the limits of his jurisdiction. All that delates 
to what he can do outside the council...
The articles specifying the competence of the 
provincial judges were:
Article 27: Each qadi must limit his juris­
diction to the limits of hi ^'"district; but if the 
two parties not belonging to his district present 
themselves before him, he will be able to judge their 
dispute.
Article 28: There will be installed- in each
city possessing a Council of the Sharica (majlis) 
a distinct place for the meeting of this Council...
Eor the cities and localities where- 
this council does not exist, a choice will be made 
of a convenient place where the will sit to ex­
ercise his functions.
(Zeys, 527, 528)
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riage contracts and death certificates* The qudah
were to pay special attention to cases of guardian­
ship and declaration of age of majority* In criminal 
jurisdiction, the hadd was not provided for; only 
tafczTr ("giving reproaches to parties who merit them,"
51
from article fifteen). It was in criminal matters
that the competence of the courts in the capital and 
the provinces differed. Article fifty-four removed 
the right to make criminal judgment from the provin­
cial qadi and centralised the matters in the hands
_ 52
of the muftun in Tunis. The provincial qadi had
50 ■
“Article 15, see footnote 49 above.
Article 29: ...He Cthe qadi of the provinces}
can equally order, at any time and in any place, an 
arrest demanded by the circumstances, prescribe an in­
quiry, draw msraslas (murgsala) (as modified by Decree 
of 15 December 1896, article 4 et sq.), appoint 
guardians and administrators of estates, authorise 
the statements of death, and in general, do any 
such similar act.
51 “Ministry of Justice, "Report on the matter of 
competence in penal matters," 29 October 1941 (in Drench).
52 — ~ i-“Article 54: In criminal matters the qadi (jof
the provinces} will be able only to prepare th£T'inves­
tigation; the judgment of these affairs will take 
place in Tunis. He will be able only to order the 
arrest of the accused into the hands of the ca*id 
(qa3id) of his khalifa (officials assigned to the 
qa3'id) .
(Zeys, 528)
1SS
only powers of investigation. In land matters the 
decree of 1876 did not confine or limit the applica­
tion of the Sharica. It merely singled out certain 
areas of importance that needed to be better organ­
ised so as to facilitate the application of the 
Sharica. Article eighteen prescribed that the qadi 
keep a register of all the administrators of 3ahbas 
(waqf) appointed by the courts of the Sharica. This 
was part of Khair ad Din's campaign for centralising 
control over the properties held in hubus. Article’ 
eighteen was designed to work against corrupt adminis­
trators who would claim the properties held in hubus .
53 „  "
for themselves. Cases of enzel (inzal, perpetual
rent on a hubus) or exchange of lands held as 3ahbas
V ' " -----  ♦
could be heard only in the courts of Tunis, regard­
less of where’, the land in question was located. One 
could well assume that the provincial courts, however, 
retained power to judge on the validity of a consti­
tuted hubus or on distribution of revenue from the 
hubus as long as the hubus had remained solely in
53 Article 18: A register will be opened for in­
scribing the designation of each hubus to which an_ 
administrator will be named by decision of the Sharica. 
This inscription will serve for the administrator ren­
dering an exact account of the estate of hubus which 
he has been appointed to administer, and ftill prevent 
him from raising claims to the property of all of or 
one party of the hubus which he administers (modified 
by Decree of 15 Dieember 1896, article 5)*
(Zeys, 528)
the hands of the original beneficiaries and not been 
54
exchanged.
To what extent civil (contractual) and commercial 
affairs fell under the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the SharTca was not specified in the decree of 1876. 
Three years later, a decree relating to the keeping 
of a book-journal by the qaJid (cdid, district gover­
nors) indicated that quwwad (ca'id) were considered 
to have first instance authority in contractual, 
debit, and commercial litigation in the provinces.
The cdid (qa3id), however, could be ordered to trans­
fer the affair to the Ouzara (Wazara) or to the 
courts of the Sharica. Presumably transferal . 
would have occurred because of a difficult point of 
law or irregularity in evidence, or the possibility 
of a heavy penalty being imposed. In the absence of 
provisions for precise channels by which the courts 
of the Sharica and the Ouzara (Wazara) could have 
been informed of affairs before the ca#id (qa*id),
one would presume that transferals were a matter
55
of informal communications.
54 —Article 43: The qudah of the districts will
not be able to hear questions of enzel (inzal) or to 
exchange hubus whether there exist in the locality a 
Council (ftajlis) of the SharT^ or not. The exami­
nation of these questions is reserved to one of the 
two qadi in Tunis. (Zeys, 528)
C CJ
#Article 3: There will be registered in the
register in question, the affair carried before the
footnote
qa1 id, with the mention of the names of the plaintiff and 
of the defendant, of the purpose of the demand and of the 
document invoked by the plaintiff, of the response of the 
defendant, of the validity of or the nullity of the docu­
ment invoked from the point of view of the regulation of 
the affair ..• while designating equally if the defendant 
merited being imprisoned by his delay in payments ...? the 
same if it is necessary to stop in the court of inscription 
until the affair has been brought before the gaJ id, or until 
he has received the order, and if after having submitted 
to the qaJid, it Ithe affair] is sent back to the SharT*a 
or to the Ministry, that will be investigated...
(Zeys, Law 166, page 116)
Article 7: Xf the "qa* id receives the order to defer an
affair to the judgment of the Sharica, one will inscribe the 
contents of the order and its date; one will mention if the 
affair has been deferred on a simple injunction or if it has 
been with the sending of an agent of the public force.
(Zeys)
The above articles from the Decree of 1 May 1879 on the 
journal kept by the *£aMfl specify who shall go to the qai id 
from the SharTla, but not who would go from the c[c[^ id^  
to the Shari*a.
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The importance of the capital in the indigenous 
judicial system is seen even more clearly in the pro­
visions for supervision of the judgments of a qadi.
The decree of 1856 organising the Councils of the 
Sharica had merely provided for muftun to he present 
to offer their opinion should a litigant desire to
hear the opinion of one other than the qadi hearing 
56
the case. The decree of 1876 explained more fully
the importance of the opinion of the mufti when a lit­
igant chose to invoke a fatwa. If the mufti held an 
opinion contrary to that of the qadi,that was cause
for summoning all the muftun and qudah of the rite in-
“57
volved to settle the matter. In the provinces the
         ---------
'Article 6: The eastern part is that where will 
sit the two HanafT and MalikT mufti, on a rotating ba­
sis for the ifiuftun of the Court, for giving fatawin 
when it is required of them, for assisting the qudah 
with their enlightenment when the parties demand it, and 
for assuring the distribution of justice in case of 
absence of one of the qudah. (Decree of 14 November 
1856, Marty and Maarek)’
Confirmed by article 15 of Decree of 25 May 1876: 
The sheikh mufti shall give his opinion to the qadi when 
it is required of him and to the individual who con­
sults him._ He will exercise the role of substitute 
when the qadT is absent...
57 Article 7: If there__sits at the council only
one of the muftun and the qadT or the mufti designated 
for serving in the absence of the qadT7 and if the con­
demned party demands the sending 'of the affair before 
the sitting sheikhs, the sheikh who heard the affair 
will defer it until the meeting of the council, so long 
as it does not appear that his demand for deferral is 
a dilatory measure; if not, the judgment will be exe­
cuted. But if the three sheikhs are present at the coun­
cil, the sheikh who heard the affair will have the judg­
ment executed, unless the condemned party claims that
1S8
mufti appointed in the towns other than Tunis also
58
had an advisory role* An error committed by a pro­
vincial qadT was occasion for the mufti to notify the 
provincial Council of the SharTca or the Council of 
the SharTca in Tunis. The qadi too had the duty to
report to the Council of the Shari*a in Tunis if the
59
provincial mufti committed an error.
the bach muftT is ""of" an opinion contrary to that ex- 
pressed by the presiding judges, and in this case, the 
bach mufti must explain himself on the opinion that one 
attributes to him, before the execution of the judgment.
But when the sheikh who heard the affair renders his 
judgment in the presence of the bach mufti of his rite 
and agrees with him, the execution of this judgment will 
not be submitted to any formality. (Decree of 25 May 1876). 
(Marty and Maarek)
58 —*Article 50: The sheikh mufti, in the interior
of the Regency, must give his opinion to the qadi of 
his residence, when the latter demands it of him, just 
as he will be able to give his consultations, whether 
verbal or written, for affairs which are not on trial*
He has the right to condemn all acts contrary to the 
law and to give to the notaries authorisation to draw 
up contracts of marriage.
(Zeys, 528)
59 —Article 56: Every time a mufti finds an error com­
mitted by the qadT or by his deputy or by another mufti 
in what concerns the provisions in article 25 ([enforce­
ment of the provisions of the Decree of 25 May 1870, 
he must advise the qadT or muftT of it by a courteous 
letter by indicating to him the point of the error. If 
he recognises the fault, the incident will be closed; in 
the case to the contrary, the mufti will share his opin­
ion and should the qadT persist in his opinion, the 
bach muftT of the place will address a report on the 
affair to the MalikT council of Tunis.
If in the locality there does, not 
exist a Council, the mufti having raised the error__will 
address a report on the affair to the Sharica of Tunis 
and the qadT will not be able to pronounce the judgment 
before knowing its decision. Likewise, if the qadT per­
ceives some irregularity in the conduct of the muftT, 
he will act in the same ways. (Zeys, 528;
Taken as a whole, the system of supervision of 
the courts of the Sharica as outlined in the decree 
of 1876 was not an appellate system in the sense that 
various layers of jurisdiction are evenly spread over 
a country. The decree of 1876 provided for two layers 
of jurisdiction: the provincial and the capital (Tunis).
The system of supervision for the qadi in the capital 
itself reflected the evolution of the qadi1s role in 
the Islamic administration of law. Originally the 
single qadi had ruled supreme in the area of jurisdic­
tion allocated to him hy the political sovereign.
Qadi in district A was equal to qadi in district B.
As bureaucracy became more organised, a qadi of the 
qudah was appointed usually in a capital to supervise 
several qudah within the province. Later alongside the
qudah were appointed muftun, jurists who were not to • 1
interfere in the administration but to advise on how 
to maintain the quality of judicial reasoning demanded 
by the Sharif. By the late nineteenth century the 
post of mufti had evolved into one similar to that of
qadi of the qudah. The mufti came to exercise the 
same powers of judgment as a qadi whiJe at the same time 
retaining and strengthening his role as .advisor to other 
qudah. In cases of conflict between the muftT and the 
cjadi the opinion of the mufti was cause for serious dis­
cussion. In Tunisia the influence of the mufti de­
stroyed the equality of jurisdiction of all qudah in 
the country, lor the decree of 1876 accorded to those 
qudah who were most accessible to the chief mufti 
greater jurisdiction than those farther removed from 
the muftT. Only the first instance court of the qadi
I 60
in Tunis could hear cases on exchange of hubus or
_ 61 - I ~
enzel (inzal); and only the mufti in Tunis had power
62
to try criminal cases.
The union of two powers —  that of qadi and that 
of muftT —  in one person also obstructed in Tunis the
‘Article 18: The Sharica of Tunis was responsible
for keeping a list of the administrators of 3ahbas 
appointed by the decision of the Sharfca and f6r making 
these administrators•give account of the estate.
(See footnote 53 above)
6 1. -‘Article 43: The qudah of the provinces will not
be able to hear questions of enzel (inzal) or to ex­
change properties of a hubus whether' there exist in 
the locality a Council (majlis) of the SharTca or not. 
Examination of these questions is reserved to one of 
the two qadT in TUhis.
(Zeys, 528J'
62 ‘Article 15: ...fThe sheikh muft13 will give 
reproaches (admonishments) to the parties who merit them, 
will order arrests he judges necessary and will write 
msraslas (murasala) to the qudah of the provinces...
Article 54: In criminal matters, the qadT will 
be able only to prepare the investigationtKS judg­
ment of these affairs will take place in Tunis. He 
will be able only to order the arrest of the accused 
into the hands of the qa>id (ca’id) of his khalifa (of­
ficial assigned to the ~q aJ.Tdj.
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development of an appellate system in the sense that a 
judge superior in rank to the judge who originally 
hears the cases may disagree with the original judgment 
and replace it with his own opinion by reason of his 
superior rank. When serving as a mufti, the mufti knew 
that his opinion would be considered by the qadi hear­
ing a case in question. When serving like a qadi, the 
mufti passed judgment that was no more superior than 
that of another qadT judging on the same subject matter. 
The opinion of the muftT held superior weight to that 
of the qadT only as an opinion that could provoke a 
summoning of all the magistrates in Tunis (chief mufti,
four or five ordinary muftun, and one aadi for the
63
madhab involved ) to examine the original judgment.
It was the judgment of the Council that decided the issue. 
The procedures for initiating reexamination varied ac­
cording to who was hearing the case; they were appli­
cable in Tunis only before the judgment was executed. 
Article nine of the decree of 1876 provided that when 
an ordinary qadT investigated a case either of the lit­
igants could ask that the affair be submitted to the 
Council. The qadT in response could submit the case 
to the Bach (chief) MuftT if he were present. The case 
would be further submitted to the Council only if
   -
Tahar Kheredine, "Report’1.
193
the Bach Mufti disagreed with the opinion of the qadi.
If the Bach Mufti had agreed with the opinion of the 
aSdT the judgment would he executed. On the other hand, 
if the sheikh mufti were present when the litigant de­
manded submission of the case to the Council, the qadi 
was to present the case first to the sheikh mufti. If 
the sheikh muftT agreed with the opinion of the qadT 
and the litigant still disagreed, the affair was sent 
to the Bach MuftT, who, in case of agreement with the 
qadi and sheikh mufti, would have the judgment executed. 
In case of disagreement he was to submit the matter to
64
Council. If there were present at the Council only
Article 9: The affairs of_the Sharica which will 
be submitted to one of the two qadT will be judged by 
the rite which the defendant will*choose. Each of the 
parties can, when investigation of the trial has been 
done by the qadT alone, demand that the affair be sub­
mitted to the Council of the SharTca. If the sheikh 
Bach Mufti of the rite (involved) finds himself present, 
the qadT vested with the affair will submit it to him.
If he Shares the opinion of the qadT, the latter will 
pronounce and will have executed hiS judgment, and the 
yielding party will ho longer have anything to protest.
In case of divergence (of opinion) the 
affair will be submitted to the council.
For affairs presented on a day other 
that on which is found present the sheikh Bach Mufti of 
the rite out of which the affair arises, the qadT who 
will be vested of it (the affair) will send the affair 
to the sheikh muftT present at the Sharica; if the lat­
ter is of a contrary opinion, the affair will be sent 
to the council. If the muftT shares the opinion of the 
qadT vested with the affair and the party persists in 
demanding that the affair be submitted to the council, 
the judge vested with the affair will defer it to the 
Bach MuftT. If the latter shares the opinion expressed, 
the sentence will be executed without any objection; if 
he is contrary to the opinion of the qa<jTf the affair 
will be submitted to the council.
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one of the muftun and the qadi who heard the case, the 
affair could be submitted, on the demand of the con­
demned party, to a Council consisting of a mufti and 
two qadi. If the condemned party then alleged that 
the Bach MuftT was of an opinion different from that
of the Council, the Bach MuftT would have had to come to
65 _
the Council to explain* If the Council of two mufti
and two qadT still could not reach an unanimous decision,
the Bach Mufti was to draw up a report on the varying
66
opinions and address it to the government.
grr
Article 7: If there sits at the_council only one 
of the muftun and the q^ dt: or the mufti designated for 
serving in the absence of the qadT,' and if the condemned 
party demands the sending of the affair before the 
sitting sheikhs, the sheikh who heard the affair will 
defer it until the meeting of the council, so long as 
it does not appear that his demand for deferral is a 
dilatory meaoure; if not, the judgment will be executed. 
But if the three sheikhs are present at the council, 
the sheikh who heard the affair will have the judgment 
executed, unless the condemned party claims that the 
Bach MuftT is of an opinion contrary to that expressed 
by the presiding judges, and in this case, the Bach 
MuftT must explain himself on the opinion that one at­
tributes to him, before the execution of the judgment...
66'Article 6: The examination of certain questions, 
provoking sometimes controversies on the matter of the 
anplication of the lav/, in the case v/here divergences 
occur among the opinions expressed by the members of 
the SharTca belonging to one or the other of the tv/o 
rites, v/ithout the discussion leading them to a single 
and united opinion, the Bach MuftT of the court where 
the division (of opinion) occurred will draw up a report
in which he will develop the arguments produced in
support of each opinion; each judge will sign the opin­
ion which he sustains and the report, thus drawn up and
signed, will be addressed to the Government.
When the Bach Mufti (Hanafi or Maliki) had acted 
as a first instance judge, either ligitant could ask
67
that the affair he reexamined directly by the Council.
Thus, in providing alternatives to the judgment 
of the single qadi in Tunis, the decree of 1876 none­
theless required that the body of magistrates act as 
if it were one person (like the qadi). If it could 
not reach artunanimous decision, then the government 
was to issue an opinion. The government's opinion was 
in the form of a ma^ud, Beylical order, intended to
fix a principle and avoid in the future divergences of
68
opinion on the matter in question.
A litigant was not the only person who could ini­
tiate reexamination of a judgment given by one of the 
magistrates in Tunis. Since the system of reexamina­
tion was more like a system of search for anunanimous
opinion than a system of appeal, the qadi or mufti orig-• ~
inally hearing the case could also demand that the
^'Article 8: The Sheikh ul Islam and the Sheikh 
Bach MuftT have both the right to judge at the Sharica 
on the day when they are designated in turn. If one 
of the parties demands that his affair be submitted to 
the Council of the SharT^a, the sheikh vested with the 
affair will defer to this demand; he can even officially 
send back to the council the judgment of the affair.
68 _'Draft letter from the Wazir al kabir to M.Y.,
10 March 1941» proposing a ma crud on the problem of
credibility of titles of hubus versus the word of the
mokaddem (muqaddam) in Hanafi: law.
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Council give judgment instead of himself.
On the other hand, the provincial system of courts 
contained more elements resembling an appellate sys­
tem in the sense that a judge superior in rank to the 
judge who originally heard the case may disagree with 
the original judgment and replace it with his own opin­
ion by virtue of his superior rank. The Councils of 
the Sharica instituted in the decree of 1856 provided 
the base for an appellate system in the decree, of 1876.
As in Tunis the Councils of the Sharica of the provinces 
were composed of muf tun and qudah acting together, with 
power to issue a judgment. The provincial councils
heard difficult questions and appeals from judgments
70
of the provincial qudah. In turn the Council of the
          ----
‘Article 8: ...If one of the parties demands that 
his affair be submitted to the Council of the Sharica, 
the sheikb Csh eikh ul Islam or Bach Mufti} vested with 
the affair will defer to this demand; he Cthe sheikh) 
can even officially send back to the Council the judg­
ment of the affair.
Article 10: Bach of the two qadi (of Tunis} will 
have the right to postpone the sentence in order to sub­
mit it to the council even when none of the parties 
demand it.
70‘Article 42: In every locality where there is a 
Council of the SharT1^  (majlis) or a muftT, a full au­
dience will take place weekly...The muftun will be pres- 
ent_there to regulate the difficult questions which the 
qadi will submit to them and to rule on appeal. The 
Kh&lTfa or the G-overnor will equally take part in them to 
assure the execution of the judgment.
i£7
Sharica of Tunis could invalidate a decision taken
71
unanimously by the provincial council. All
mufjrun and qudah in the provinces were to respect
the judgment of the Council of the Sharica in Tunis
72
as last resort* The persons who could initiate re­
examination before a provincial council were either 
of the litigants or the provincial muftT or qadi him­
self*. If the muftT became aware of an error in law 
in the qadT*s judgment, or the qadT noticed an error 
in the judgment of the mufti, the affair was to go be­
fore the nearest provincial council if the qadi and 
mufti could not settle the matter between themselves.
If the council could not reach a reconciliation, the
73
Council of Tunis settled the matter.
71 'Article 47: If the council is unanimous in the 
sentence rendered and should the party want to appeal 
to Tunis, he will not be heard, and the qadT will have 
the sentence executed. If after that, the party de­
mands a copy of the judgment in order to produce it be­
fore the Sharica of Tunis, it will be given to him and 
the Council of Tunis will be able to invalidate the 
judgment if it were rendered contrary to the law.
72 --
'Article 52: The muf tun and qudah of. the Regency
must, according to custom, respect the "decisions of 
the Sharica of Tunis, whose judgments are rendered as 
last resort.
73'Article 56: ...CTjhe mufti will share his opin­
ion (about an error committed~~Tby a a adfl with the Coun­
cil of the Sharica of his residence’^ Tf there exists 
one. If the muftun sharetis opinion and should the 
qadi persist , in his opinion, the bach muftT of the 
plAce will address a report on the affair to the MalikT 
council of Tunis...
Apart from subjecting the twenty-year old provincial 
councils to the appellate jurisdiction of the Council 
in the capital, the decree of 1876 did not provide 
any clearly defined channels for appeal from the more 
traditional institution, namely, the provincial qadi, 
even though article forty-two . gave the provincial coun-
74
cils the power to hear appeals from the qudah. The
provincial qadi remained independent to the extent that • 1
he was not to be overruled automatically by another
qadi or mufti. He was merely expected to reach some * ~
modus vivendi when a conflict of opinions arose. Ar­
ticle thirty-three of the decree of 1876 allowed liti­
gants to agree to take the case out of the hands of
75
the provincial qadi and take it to Tunis, Circum-
stances under which the litigants could agree to go were
76
decided by customary practises in the district. If
only one of the litigants wanted to transfer the case 
to Tunis and the provincial qadT saw no good reason
74- —Article 42: ...The muftun (of the provincial
councils of the Sharif) wXll be present^.Ato regu­
late the difficult questions which the qadi will sub­
mit to them and to rule on an appeal...
75 Article 53: When the two parties agree to pres­
ent themselves before the SharTca of Tunis, the padT 
will take note of this agreement and send them bef5re 
the said court, whatever the affair be, according to 
custom followed.
76*Ibid.
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77 - , -rfor it, the qadT or mufti in Tunis could decide to
^ 78
return the affair to the original qadT* Whatever 
decision the judge in Tunis took —  to return the case 
or to judge on it in Tunis —  the provincial qadT was 
bound by it* Yet if the provincial qadT considered 
the decision wrong in law, he could suspend enforce­
ment and notify the magistrates in Tunis* How the judges 
in Tunis and the provincial judges were then expected 
to settle the controversy was left unspecified in the
decree* Superiority of rank did not automatically op-
79
erate to invalidate the gadTfs opinion* Not even .
77' ’Article 34: If one of the parties demands to be
sent before the Council of the_SharT*a at Tunis, whatever 
the cause at hand before the qadT alone or befDre^the 
SharT^a of the locality having A council, the qadT will 
send him there, whether it be the petitioner or the defen­
dant, unless the affair be so clear that it appears with
evidence that the intention of the one who demands this 
sending away (to another court) is only to gain time and 
to make the adverse party lose money injprovoking for 
him useful fatigue; in this case the qadT retains the af­
fair* •
If despite his decision, the affair is 
carried before the SharT^a of Tunis or before one of the 
two qadT of this city, it will be prosecuted in conformity
to article 20 of Title I*
78*Article 20: The two qadT and the members of the
Council of the SharTca have tTTS™power to defer judgments of 
affairs which are submitted to them by the inhabitants of 
the cities or of the interior of the Regency, to the qudah 
of these same localities*
_  79*Article 35: If a muftT or qadT of the SharTca of
Tunis writes to the qadT of a judicial district to indicate 
to him the decision in’a civil, penal or religious affair, 
the latter is held responsible for conforming to the order 
of the superior magistrate, unless he is of a contrary opin­
ion, supported by a text of the law* In this case, he will 
suspend the judgment and will make known to the said magis-
2GG
the government was involved unless the magistrates of 
Tunis had decided to take the matter to the Council of 
Tunis# Discussion until the provincial gadT and the 
judges of Tunis reached an agreement was probably the ex­
pected method for settlement, as was expected when sev- 
eral gudah were involved in the same case# Several gudah 
could become involved in the same case because of the
freedom granted to any gadT to hear parties not living
80
in his district# Such freedom worked against authori­
tarianism when appeal to a muftT or council was difficult. 
At the same time it caused confusion for the gadT in the 
district where judgment was expected to be enforced# In 
the event of various provincial gudah hearing the same 
case and sending it to different gudah in Tunis, the gadT 
who viewed the various communications from Tunis for en­
forcement and who could not reconcile them was to address 
the most significant jurist of the country, the Chief 
MuftT in Tunis (MalikT or HanafT, whichever madhab was in- 
volved). The MuftT was expected to resolve whatever dif-
trate the motive which stops him#••
'Article 27: Each gadT limits his jurisdiction to
the limits of his district; but if two parties not be­
longing to his district present themselves before him, he 
will be able to judge their dispute#
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ferences there needed to be reconciled in points of law
81
or in varying versions of facts*
The absence of one important provision in the decree
of 1876 helps one to place that decree in the context of
the nineteenth century conflict that had led the Tunisians
at one time to accomodate the non-Muslim Europeans by
creating new courts which rivaled the courts of the gadT*
These common law courts created by the constitution of
1861 had placed in doubt the status of the court of the
gadT* Were the courts of the gudah the basic unit
of judicial administration or courts of exceptional 
82
jurisdiction? The decree of 1876 avoided a precise def-
_
Article 35: ...Likewise if (the provincial gadT re­
ceives several communications from the SharTca of Trtftis, is- 
sued by magistrates of different rites or by several magis­
trates of the same rite, or by a single magistrate, he must, 
in the circumstances where it would be difficult to estab­
lish an agreement among them (the communications), or in 
the circumstance where the party who has obtained them would 
have distorted the facts, address on_this subject a report 
to the Bach HanafT muftT or to the MalikT Bach muftT accord­
ing to whether jthe orders which he received emanated from 
the HanafT or MalikT source.
# If in a similar affair orders are sent
to him by magistrates of the two rites, he will address 
his report to the HanafT Bach MuftT.
*But if these orders have been repeated 
to. him by a single magistrate, he will answer to his 
magistrate only.
82*It was well after the establishment of the French Pro­
tectorate that the Tunisian Minister of Justice admitted 
early in the twentieth century that the gadT had evolved 
from a judge of common law...(to a ) judge of exceptional 
jurisdiction confined to affairs of personal status, and cer­
tain real estate litigations. From Tahar Kheredine,
"Report".
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inition of the jurisdiction of the qadT’s justice. It 
did not bring the courts of the gudah within the same con­
fines as those specified for the Rabbinical courts in the 
decree of 3 September 1872. Rabbinical courts could hear 
only cases of personal status and succession. They had 
no penal jurisdiction whether for religious affairs or
not; they had no competence in commercial or civil (con-
83
tractual)affairs. The decree of 1876 for courts of
the SharTca gave the impression that in law the courts of
the SharTca remained the common law courts of Tunisia. In
reality, other judicial bodies, not mentioned in the decree,
had been created and served to limit the jurisdiction of
84the gudah to Muslims. Khair ad Din had created a mixed
o o
Decree of 3 September 1872 (Zeys, page 524):
_ We have learned that the Rabbis of Tunis,
Susa, and other cities of the Regency hear civil 
and commercial affairs among their co-religionists.
This manner of action being contrary to the 
rules of judiciary competence, it is forbidden to 
the said Rabbis to know these affairs and to judge 
litigations other than those relating to personal 
status of the Hebrews.
04
Article 17 (Decree of 25 May 1876): An obligatory
condition for the wakTl who pleads the causes carried be­
fore the SharTca is that he be subject as to his person 
to the jurisdiction of this court...
Note that this section of the article implies that some 
wukala* were subject to non-Muslim jurisdietions•
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committee of Tunisian and Europeans to settle commercial 
disputes among Muslims and non-Muslims (see page 82 
of Chapter I above). The Ouzara (Wazara) handled serious 
crimes. The government could interfere in civil matters 
brought before the court of the Shari^a of Tunis from any 
part of the Regency. The interference of the Bayfs admin­
istration into the judicial system did not only reflect 
the Ottoman penchant for centralisation. It was conve­
nient also that the government be most easily available 
for interference in the same urban locality as most Euro­
peans were found. In short, Khair ad Din could not have 
afforded to limit explicitly the courts of the Shari*a to 
an exceptional.status. The protest of 1864 was still 
clear in the minds of most. Nor could he have persuaded 
the Europeans to accept the traditional status of a non- 
Muslim (dhimmT) in a Muslim state. The result was the 
creation of a separate organisation which taken altogether 
encroached on the competence of the courts of the gudah; 
yet no one specified the exact status of the Muslims or 
the Europeans. Only the government was left to fill the 
position of ultimate arbitrator.
While the decree of 1876 held in abeyance a clear-cut 
solution to the problems of the Europeans, the decree also 
held in abeyance a solution to a purely Islamic conflict. 
That conflict was between the gudah and the jurists, or
204
muftun, on one hand, and the political sovereign on the 
other. Each side had been struggling since the death of 
’Abu Bakr over the control of the establishment and inter­
pretation of the lav. The jurists won a monopoly early 
after the caliph tumar set a precedent for delegating 
judicial matters to persons other than himself. Given 
the sheer volume of work how could any one expect him to 
be in three centres of the early empire, Basra, Kufa, 
MadTna, simultaenously hearing cases. Nor could one ex­
pect all persons from the three cities to flock to 
MadTna to be judged by the caliph. He could be available 
but not the sole person responsible for judicial affairs. 
Besides practical considerations there were certain ab­
stract concepts which made Muslims predisposed to accept­
ing the jurists as heirs to the Prophetfs judicial duties 
instead of the caliph. For one, the directness of the 
Prophetfs approach was reflected in the principle of a 
single gadT hearing any type of case, and being respon­
sible alone for the solution. Another was the religious 
respect for the unity of the law. This respect under­
lay the following simple scheme which was developed after 
the Prophet for the division of responsibilities for up­
holding the SharTca: Allah was the promulgator of the
Islamic principles. The jurists and gudah interpreted 
the principles and promulgated detailed rules that sup­
plemented principles and rules in the Qur*an, The caliph
upheld the Qur>an as the raison df4etre of the Islamic 
state and enforced the rulings of the gudah# Caliphs 
realised that if religion was to have any social and 
political force, it had to be given a legal expression, 
legal in the sense that set logical rules were imposed 
to push or keep behaviour of the ruled within certain 
channels# Finding the appropriate legal expression was 
a task for more than one man, even one generation# The 
caliph could guide its formation, appoint men for under­
taking it, encourage the formation, but not undertake it 
himself. Yet caliphs, like any other humans, developed 
their own political needs distinguishable from the grander 
reasons for which they as rulers existed# Hence, in 
time, the caliph and the provincial princes complicated 
the scheme of division of judicial powers by promulgat­
ing detailed rules, especially for criminal affairs, for 
chastisement of administrative appointees, and land dis­
tribution for military officers. These promulgations 
were accepted as part of his prerogative of siyasa# None­
theless, in theory the political ruler was limited in 
the exercise of siyasa# His rules had to conform to the 
limits of the SharTca, limits defined by the gudah and 
muf tun. * Ahmad Bay took pains to point out :1ihat his11 r - i . #
decree for the emancipation of abused slaves was within 
the limits of the SharT'a# Muhammad Bay, however, ex-
ceeded the limits of siyasa in the cAhd al *Aman. He 
was curtailing the arbitrary use of political power, as 
the Shari *a aimed to do while simultaneously redefining 
the established limits of the Sharica. If the gudah and 
muftun were not willing to redefine the established limits 
to meet new political exigencies, the government felt it 
still had the freedom to respond and seize the upper 
hand in the conflict between legalists and the political 
executive. The Bay would force the Shari ta to incorpo­
rate in its principles the equality of Muslims and non- 
Muslims subject to a Muslim sovereign. The decree of 
, 1876 prescribed a reconciliation. The courts of the 
SharTca were allowed to settle questions which were well 
defined and soluble within the rules of the SharTca. When 
they could not settle questions, the government inter­
vened, just as *Ahmad Bay had done on the question of
slavery, a matter on which the "learned jurists (were)
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not in agreement". In other words, the decree left 
to both the political ruler and judicial officers the 
right to establish and interpret rules within their own 
spheres of jurisdiction. There was no clear awarding of 
the exclusive power of establishing and interpreting all
8 6 .
Decree of 23 January 1846 on emancipation of slaves 
(Marty and Maarek, Recueil).
the rules to one set of officials over another set.
In the section which follows we shall see that the 
French established a clear-cut solution to the nine­
teenth century conflict over the judicial status of 
Europeans• The solution was a system of three jurisdic­
tions: European, Muslim, Hebrew. How these three worked
together is the story of the Tunisian judiciary under the 
Protectorate. As for the conflict between the Islamic 
political ruler and the gudah and muftun over the control 
of promulgation of and interpretation of laws, the 
French interfered little directly. However, by example 
of their own methods and because of the political obsta­
cles which they posed for independence, the French 
tipped the balance in favour of administrative control, 
at least over the promulgation, if not always the inter­
pretation, of principles guiding judicial decisions.
Administration of Justice Under the French Protectorate: 
French courts , Tunisian secular courts, mixed courts
As seen in Chaipter I, the French made few compromises
when establishing the Protectorate in 1883. During the
reign of Muhammad Bay the French had demanded separate
courts for Frenchmen and been refused. Having the upper
hand in 1883, they resolved that Europeans were subject
to French judicial authority. The system established in
March 1883 remained the same up to the time of Tunisian
independence in 1956. The law of 7 March 1883 (J.O.T# 53,
19 April 1883) created one court of first instance and
a justice of the peace in Tunis and justices of the peace
in four other major towns (Bizerte, Susa, Sfax, Le Kef).
Appellate jurisdiction at first lay with the Court of
Appeal in Alger. In 1941 Tunis was given its own Court
of Appeal. As litigation expanded the French made Susa
and Sfax seats of courts of first instance. The number
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of justices of peace increased to fourteen. Commercial, 
administrative, and civil (personal status, contractual) 
jurisdiction belonged to the courts of first instance.
The courts of first instance also held criminal and petty 
sessions. The justices of the peace held only exceptional 
jurisdiction in criminal matters. The French codes appli­
87.
Satari, page 94
cable to Europeans in Tunisia were the French penal code, 
the code of penal procedure, the code of commerce, the 
civil code, and the military code.
The French did not stop at organising courts for their 
own citizens. Administering a Protectorate also meant 
staying abreast of the Tunisians* activities so that the 
French could appraise how much Tunisians would support 
or hinder French preoccupation with lands and businesses. 
In order to let the Tunisians know their position 
vis a vis the French courts, the French, through the 
office of the Secretary General ( a Frenchman who was un­
der the jurisdiction of the Tunisian Prime Minister as 
well as liaison officer between the Tunisian and French 
governments) were responsible for reorganising the pre- 
Protectorate judicial system for Tunisians. The French 
kept the types of courts inherited from the Ottoman era 
—  the courts of the Ouzara (Wa*zara), the ga* id, the 
gadT, the Rabbis —  but replaced the blurred, or custo­
mary, lines of jurisdiction with lines defined by decrees. 
The French divided the Tunisian system of courts into two 
distinct jurisdictions: religious and common (cadlTya).
The Beylical decree of 31 July 1884 reserved to the re­
ligious courts (Rabbinical and SharT*a) the regulating
of the disputes relating to the personal status or to the
88
successions of the Hebrew or Muslim Tunisian subjects.
#Zeys, page 502. Footnote to Decree of 31 July 1884 
on procedure: "This (personal status and succession of
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The reorganisation of the *adliya courts was more complex. 
The French made use of the organisational concepts which 
had been promulgated in the constitution of 1861. At 
the bottom of the hierarchy as created in the late nine­
teenth century were the cdids (gada)» provincial governors 
who heard small penal and civil cases. The pre-Pro- 
tectorate decree of 1 May 1876 on the registers kept by 
the guwwad (term used also in Tunisia for Cctids) was con­
firmed by the French authorities by the circular of
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3 May 1896 and the decree of 23 May 1900. Above the 
guwwad were imposed regional courts (jihawT)• In effect 
the original criminal and civil courts provided for in 
the constitution of 1861 were revived. They were situated 
in 1896 only in the towns: Tunis (whose Regional court
was known as the Driba, or darlba), Sfax, Gabes, Qafas.
Two years later the orthodox city of Kairouwan received 
one; also Susa and Le Kef. Beja and Nabeul were late in 
receiving Regional courts, 1930 and 1948 respectively.
Muslims and Hebrew Tunisians} is a source of incompetence 
ratione materiae.lf
89.Marty and Maarek, Recueil, Vol. I, "Critical Appre­
ciation of the Tunisian Legislation" (Chapter IV): "The 
head of the French state in the presidential decree of 
10 November 1884 delegated the Resident General to approve 
all beylical decrees. So the Resident General on 
15 December 1884 published an order for approving en bloc 
a series of decrees rendered before 1884 and during the 
Protectorate by the Bay." (page 4)
The Regional courts corresponded to the French first 
instance courts in civil and criminal jurisdiction. The 
difference was that their jurisdiction depended largely 
on the nationality of the litigants. Although most major 
towns had both a French court and a Tunisian Regional court, 
the absence of a Tunisian Regional court in Bizerte indi­
cated the high concentration of Frenchmen at that former 
naval base; and the absence of a French court in a 
southern town like Gabes or a religious town like Kairouwan 
indicated a paucity of French inhabitants, for the Euro­
peans lived more profitably in the northern agricultural 
districts. Regional courts had both civil and penal juris­
diction. Maximum penal jurisdiction was five years of 
imprisonment. Maximum value for any civil case was twenty 
thousand francs. This value was also applicable to land : 
disputes. Allegations of injury in commercial transactions 
also were heard in Regional courts. Commerical trans­
actions affecting family relationships fell under the com­
petence of the courts of the SharTta. As for personnel, 
the Tunisians were appointed as magistrates and Frenchmen 
as commissaires.
With the revival of the civil and criminal Regional 
courts, the Ouzara (Wazara) might have become obsolete.
For when the revolt of 1864 had forced the Bay to rescind 
the creation of the new courts the office of the Prime
212
Minister simply took over the jurisdictions that had once 
been delegated to that set of courts. Instead, the French 
authorities made the Ouzara (Wazara) an appellate organ.
It remained in the office of the Prime Minister, but was 
removed from the direct control of the Prime Minister and 
placed under a Frenchman who had the title Director of 
Judiciary Services (Direction des Services Judiciaires)♦
The French also confined the Ouzara (Wazara) strictly 
to affairs assigned to the courts called *adlTya.
On 10 August 1896 the Director of the Judiciary Ser­
vices sent out a letter declaring that the Ouzara (Wazara)
had no appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the
90
courts of the Shari*a. Although it was pointed out
earlier that the Ouzara (Wazara) never had appellate juris­
diction in the strict sense of the word, the letter from 
the Director in effect meant that the qudah and muftun 
were not expected to apply to the government to settle 
disputes where the courts of the SharTra were competent.
This, however, did not prevent the government from inter­
vening to decide whether the courts of the SharTca or the 
^adllya or French courts would have competence in a case 
that raised difficult questions.
_ _  , ,
Footnote 2 of article 26 of the Decree of 25 May 1876
on the courts of the SharT*a (Zeys, 528).
See pages 177 & 179 above on the Wazara.
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Within the Ouzara (Wazara) itself, the civil and crimi­
nal divisions were maintained. Each division was then ■ 
broken down into clearer sub-departments. The civil di­
vision consisted of a department for receiving petitioners 
from the Regional courts (jihawT), a department for review 
of Regional judgments, and a department for repeal (cassa­
tion) from Regional judgments. The criminal division in­
cluded a court for hearing appeals from petty sessions 
(misdemeanors, or junah) of Regional courts; a court of 
criminal accusation; and a court having jurisdiction in any 
criminal matter (mostly felonies, or jinayaty disturbing 
public order) in any part of Tunisia. Five magistrates 
without a jury sat for the criminal court. During the 
first quarter of the twentieth century a Tunisian magis­
trate was president of the Ouzara (Wazara) (also known as 
the mahkamat an-naqd wa-l-ibram) for four years• Then 
from 1926 to 1947 a French magistrate replaced the Director 
of the Judiciary Services and became president of the 
*adlTya courts along the lines of a French system of lower 
and appellate courts, the French administrators allowed 
the Ouzara (Wazara) to continue to express its judgments 
in the form of the matrud, or the decision taken by the 
Bay on the basis of the report presented by the relevant 
department of the Ouzara (Wazara). In reality the macrud
became merely a formal procedural matter after the Ouzara 
(Wazira) and Regional courts (,iihawl) were made to draw up
214
their decisions according to the Tunisian Code of Criminal 
Procedures (1921), the Penal Code (1913), and the Tunisian 
Civil Code, known also as the Code of Obligations and Con­
tracts (1907).
On the Zhth of April 1921 the Tunisian Ministry of
Justice was created. It was responsible for all Tunisian
c o u rts  —  th e  guwwad (c a * id s ), th e  R e g io n a l c o u rts  ( j ih a w T ) ,
the Ouzara (Wazara), the SharT*a. A year later (14 July 1922)
a decree abolished the ma*rud for affairs before the
courts of the Ouzara (Wazara). The Bay was limited to
_ 91
receiving matters of gisas and to the right to waiver 
or lighten criminal sentences. The Frenchman who had 
headed the Direction of the Judiciary Services controlling 
the Ouzara (Wazara) became the Public Prosecutor with 
Tunisian assistants. A Tunisian was appointed to head 
the Ministry of Justice, while, as we remarked earlier, a 
Frenchman came to preside as president of the Ouzara 
(Wazara). (See page 212 above)
Another traditional vestige of the interference of 
the pffice of the Prime Minister in judicial affairs was 
the post of *ummal (agent). The cummal were agents com­
missioned by the Ouzara (Wazara) to investigate cases that 
interested the government. When the French administrators
9 1  •
JazTrT, page 4 9 .
s
f
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had presidents appointed to the first Regional courts 
(jihawi) on 23 May 1900 no *ummal were appointed. Later 
when the office of the Public Prosecutor was formed, the 
Public Prosecutor dispatched agents of investigation to 
the Regional courts.
The final reorganisation of the non-religious courts 
concerned the guwwad (caUds). Since the French had ap­
proved of the constitution of 1861 the revival of courts 
not applying the SharT*a was not setting a precedent*.
Yet the French were also aware that the provincial guwwad 
(c^ids) had supported the revolt of 1864 against the con­
stitutional reforms because the new civil and criminal 
courts usurped the jurisdictions of the ga*id. (See pages 
72-73 of Chapter I above) Hence, the French left room 
for the ga* id in the system of *adlTya courts created in 
1896 and simply attached French contr6leurs to supervise 
the guwwad (calds). By the mid-1920,s the French felt 
confident enough to replace the guwwad (caids) in light 
penal and civil (personal and moveable) cases with a 
set of inferior courts called cantonal courts (nawahT)*
The guwwad were allowed to have competence in civil affairs 
and only if no Regional or cantonal court were present
nearby. The first cantonal court was established on the
92island of Djerba in 1924* More than ten years later
Q O
. 'Smuggling of arms on the island had given the French 
an excuse to assume military control over Tunisia (article 
9 of the Treaty of Kassar-Said of 12 May 1881).
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the decree of 23 July 1938 created more in Mekknine, Nabeul, 
Bizerte* Mahdia, a southern desert town, was the last 
to receive a cantonal court in 1948* The judges appointed 
were analogous to the French justices of the peace* They 
were professional judges trained to apply the Tunisian 
codes promulgated since the beginning of the century for 
‘the cadlTya courts.
For the first time since the abortive efforts of 1861 
Tunisian sustained a complete judicial system of civil 
and criminal jurisdictions based on codes established by 
the political executive, not the judges themselves. Also 
for the first time Tunisian judges were subject to an 
hierarchy of rank based on the principle that the superior 
rank had the power to annul the judgment of the inferior 
by virtue of superiority of rank. The maintenance of the 
new principles of codification arid appellate jurisdiction 
was further reenforced by education. Shortly after the 
Ministry of Justice was created, that Ministry sponsored 
a two year course for judges and administrative agents for 
the *adliya courts. Since SadTkT College founded by 
Khair ad Din for training government administrators, the 
course was the second secular educational institution to 
cut into the monopoly of the mosques over education. The 
emphasis in training was on magistrates rather than lawyers 
even though the decrees creating Regional courts (.jihawT)
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allowed for lawyers (muhamuri) to represent litigants
' 93 94
before the radlTya courts* Lawyers trained in Algeria
or France (Bourguiba among them)* Only in 1947 was the 
course of the Ministry expanded so that it became a 
College of Law awarding a licence similar to the French 
licence en droit* Besides study of the codes of civil 
and criminal procedure, Code of Obligations and Contracts, 
and the Penal Code, the program began to cover commerical 
law (French-based since there was no Tunisian Code of 
Commerce) and Islamic law of inheritance and gifts (ne­
cessary for the land cases falling within the competence 
of the tadlTya courts)* Prior to 1947 the gadlTya judges 
had simply consulted the gudah and muftun when a point of 
Islamic law arose in a case falling under the competence 
of a code* The studies introduced in 1947 freed the 
*adlTya judges of consulting judges of the SharTca and 
taught them a selective approach to the body of the law 
of the SharT^a*
The judicial systems so far discussed for the era of 
the Protectorate were not revolutionary. They had been 
precedented. The system of *adlTya courts had basically
Q O ^
Jazin, page 42*
94.Marcel Morand, Avant Projet de Code, 1916, done at 
the University of Alger* ^
Conversations with established lawyers in Tunis*
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been preconceived in the cAhd al 3 Aman and the constitu­
tion of 1861* The French courts were only a more system­
atic application of the rules for consular courts* The 
third creation of the French administrators, however, was 
unique for Tunisia. This was the Mixed Land Court. A 
mixed commerical court had been promised in the 
*Ahd al 3Aman and the constitution of 1861. Yet land 
rights had been a delicate issue. The Bay had been willing 
to break the old rule that persons under the sover­
eignty of the dar al h arbT  could not own land in exchange 
for Europeans submitting to the land laws established 
under Islamic law and Ottoman rule. The issue was so 
important that the French decided on a solution only two 
years after the signing of the Treaty of La Marsa of 1883.
The solution in essence was to submit Europeans to those 
Tunisian rules which admitted alienation or transferral 
of use of land and to avoid those Tunisian conditions 
which impeded stability of possession of the land once 
rights over it were alienated or transferred. The struc­
ture created.to achieve the last purpose was the Mixed 
Land Court. The law it applied was the Code Foncier of 
1 July 1885* The magistrature reflected the character 
of the Tribunal Mixte, as it was known* For the first 
session of 7 October 1886 three chambers were established: 
French, Mulsim (or rather Tunisian), and mixed. The
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French chamber ■ consisted of one French President, two 
French judges, and one supplementary French judge who 
could substitute in case of absence of the one of the 
three regular judges* It heard cases involving only 
Europeans. The:Muslim chamber consisted of three 
Tunisian sheikhs (shuyukh)♦ They heard cases involving 
only Tunisians. The mixed chamber was presided over by 
the French president, the two French judges, and two of 
the judges from the Muslim chamber. This mixed chamber 
heard cases where Europeans and Muslims were involved, 
as when a European might be claiming possession of cer­
tain land while Muslim Tunisians objected to the validity 
of his claim. The office of clerk was divided between 
a Frenchman and a Tunisian. The preponderance of 
the French in the mixed chamber reflected the political 
purpose of the Code Foncier of 1885. The purpose was to 
guarantee by law the land rights of French immigrants.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal Mixte extended to 
all of Tunisia. Later auxiliary branches were established 
in the cities of Susa, Sfax, Bizerte, and Souk el Arba.
^ #In 1886 named to the French chanber were: Ferm£, 
President; Berge, Watrin, judges; Prope, complementary 
judge. Named to the Muslim chamber: Sheikh Amor ben Sheikh, 
Sheikh Moktar Chuika, Sheikh Si-Mahmound ben Mahmoud.
Named to the Mixed Chamber: Fermd, Berge, Watrin, Sheikh
Mokhtar Chouika, Sheikh Si Mahmoud ben Mahmoud. Greffier: 
Lhomme and Si Snoussi. (From the Minutes du Tribunal
Mixte, 7 October 1886 to 30 December 1889, in the present 
Tribunal Immobilier, Tunis)
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The courtfs judicial function was to accept or reject
requests from any inhabitant in Tunisia for standardised
registration of certain types of land rights. Acceptance
or rejection was based on the adequacy or inadequacy of
evidence presented by the petitioner in support of his
claim and the evidence presented by the party opposing 
96
such claim.
The kinds of land rights which the court was compe­
tent to recognise during the Protectorate were: right
of ownership; holding by enzel (inzalt perpetual rent paid 
for use of land constituted into hubus; the person paying 
the rent usually was not a beneficiary of the revenues
of the hubus; enzel in effect was a sale by way of per-
' 97
petual rent ); right of usufruct; usage (use of fruits 
of property for subsistence needs; a non-transferable 
right); right of habitation (use of a house, subject
96 •
Article 12: There are instituted, in Tunisia, a Land 
Court and conservateurs of landed property.
The Land Court passes judgment on the ad­
missibility of_the demands for registration. It has a 
main seat in Tunis and auxiliary seats in cities which are 
designated by decrees. Its composition and organisation 
are established by decree.
The Conservateurs of Landed Property 
are charged with: l) registration of immoveables
2) constitution of titles of property
3) preservation of the documents relat­
ing to the immoveables
4) inscription of the rights and obliga­
tions of these immoveables...
(Code Foncier, Annotated, t.I, edited Mohamed Tahar 
Es Snoussi, 1957)•
97*Codg Foncier, Annotated, t.I, paragraph 3 from 
bottom, page 64.
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to the same rules as usage); long-term leasing of land
(eighteen to ninety-nine years); right of construction
on anotherfs land; servitude; priority of creditor
(privilege); rights accruing from the contract of
antichrese (antichresis: creditor may collect revenue
from the land for payment of interest or principal of the
loan); rights of creditor in a pledging of property for
98
payment of an obligation (hypotbfeque)• The land in
question had to be defined by cadastral survey. By 1896
the secular civil court (French) of Tunis had established
that the petition for registration of land rights had
as a sole aim to fix the judicial status of the property
and to have the property regulated by Tunisian land law
(not necessarily the SharT*a); it did not aim to change
or transfer land rights from one person having such rights
to another not having them. It merely determined and
respected rights which it saw had been derived from ev-
99
idence of extant : possession. This conservative aim
no
*Article 13: The real landed rights are: immoveable 
ownership, enzel (inzal) and rent of enzel, usufruct of 
the immoveables, usage, and habitation,emphyteose, rights 
of construction, servitude, antichresis*creditors1 privi­
leges, and hypothecation. (Code Foncier, Annotated, t.I)
99.Judgment from French civil court, Tunis, 14 Decem­
ber 1896, Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 97,36; from court at 
Susa, 27 October 1896, J.T. 99,496 (Code Foncier, Annotated, 
t.I, footnote IV,b2, page 13).
Article 18: Registration has the sole aim of plac­
ing the immoveable submitted to registration under the 
regulation of the present law.
(Code Foncier)
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was later to give rise to the charge that the Code Foncier
was most useful for those whose land situation was al- 
100
ready sure.
Apart from recognising rights the Tribunal Mixte was 
incompetent. It had no power, for example, to order the 
creation of a servitude on a passage leading from a prop­
erty that was totally surrounded by other properties
101
(Decision of the Tribunal Mixte, 3 July 1897)• Regis­
tration was a recognition of existing rights, not a crea­
tion of new ones.
The criteria which the Tribunal Mixte used to decide 
whether the petitioner for registration had lacked suf­
ficient evidence for his claim were established by case 
law. The desire of the French to conform to local land 
laws as wanted by the Bay in the *Ahd al *Aman was most 
evident in this process of investigation of the evidence 
presented. Tunisia had recognised written land titles 
long before the French Protectorate. Even though holding 
land by written title was not standardised, many who
100.
J.M. Verdier, Professor, University of Tunis,"Les 
Principals tendances du droit foncier Tunisien de 1956 \  
1961," Revue Tunisienne de Droit, 1962, page 133.
101.
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 97,447 (Code Foncier,
Annotated, t.I, paragraph 3 from top, page 83 ) •
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came to the Tribunal Mixte for standardised registration 
presented ancient Arabic titles which the French tended 
to respect. The Court placed great credibility in the 
ancient titles in themselves and would accept notarised 
(written testimony of witnesses) declarations of land 
rights only as supporting evidence. Notarised declara­
tions of recent date certainly did not prevail over regu­
lar ancient titles. Consequently the Court rejected any 
petition for registration based solely on simple declara­
tion of rights when the party challenging the petition
102
argued on the basis of an old title. The Court,
however, had to be wary of unauthentic titles. As early 
as 1888 the mixed chamber heard a petition for registra­
tion from an European and opposition from a number of 
Tunisian Muslims. At first the challenging parties pre­
sented only copies of the title of the hubus, showing the 
origin of the rights in the property. When the Court 
demanded the original titles, the petitioner had none and 
one of the opponents could offer only a title which the
102 ‘Judgment of the Tribunal Mixte, 4 November 1893,
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 97,523 (Code Foncier, Annotated, 
t. I, paragraph 1 from top, pacje 26).
At al mahkama al *agariya I looked through some of 
the old Arabic: tTtles dating from the early nineteenth cen­
tury. They are made of dried animal skin and written 
over completely with Arabic. They give descriptions of the 
land, and dates of transactions concerning the land.
Several different seals on one title were evidence that 
the land in question had passed through several hands.
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Court considered suspect: "The paper appears stained
to make it appear old (1818) but the paper is too crisp 
to have passed from hand to hand since 1818. The sig­
natures of the notaries appear on a part that is not .■ 
stained and so seem to have been detached from another 
piece. Even the ink differs from the rest of the title•" 
The Court was not competent to decide any issue outside 
registration, much less to decide a case of alleged fraud. 
Nor did the Court think it proper to go against tradi­
tional procedure by throwing out an alleged ancient title. 
The Court decided to send the matter to the Public Pros­
ecutor for the French courts. The Prosecutor decided 
that there was no case and returned the matter to the 
Tribunal Mixte. Thereupon the Court undertook its own 
investigation, submitting the title to chemical tests by 
experts. The report of the experts confirmed the sus­
picions of the Court. Then considering other circumstances 
which cast doubt on the authenticity of the title, such 
as a HanafT court decision of 1876 which ruled in favour 
of the European in the absence of any title of hubus even
being produced, the Tribunal Mixte ruled for registration
103
in the name of the European petitioner.
3*CasE No. 33 of 20 June 1888, 4 March 1889, 14 May- 
1889, found in Minutes de .jugements du Tribunal Mixte.
7 October 1886 a. 30 December 18^9.
2 2 5
Later the Tribunal Mixte, by the help of decisions
from the regular courts, decided to discriminate among
authentic Arabic titles. An ancient title presented by
a petitioner or opponent which showed that there had not
been any alienation or judicial dispute concerning the
land for a long time and which was not supported by the
fact of possession would not prevail over evidence of pos
session which fulfilled all the requirements of prescrip-
104
tion (Civil court of Tunis, 14 June 1899). One cat­
egory of titles of which the Court was wary was the 
medmound (madmun)• When only a fraction of a land was 
sold one drew up a new title especially for the alien­
ated portion. This title was a medmoun (madmun), that 
is, a resum£ of the original ancient title. It indi­
cated the origin of ownership and the successive trans­
missions of the property, its original boundaries, and 
the contract of sale. This new title was given to the 
person who acquired the land while the ancient title re­
mained in the hands of the seller. On the ancient title 
was supposed to be made a note of the concession of 
rights over part of the property and a reminder that the 
title then applied only to the part over which the seller
104.
Journal Tunisien (j.T.) 99, 522 (Code Foncier,
Annotated, t. I, paragraph 4 from top, page 28T*
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_ 105
retained his rights (Civil court of Tunis, 29 April 1893).
The Tribunal Mixte. in conformity with its respect for
originals of ancient titles, accepted the medmoun (madmun)
as proof of rights only when the original ancient title
_ 106 
could not be presented (Civil court of Tunis, 6 May 1892).
Besides ancient land titles the Tunisians also pre­
sented notarised documents in support of their claims.
Notarised documents used in place of a title to land were 
called outika (wathTga)• The Civil court of Tunis placed 
these on the same level as titles only if they were of 
an ancient date. An outika (wathTga) of recent date had 
no weight in the face of persons whose factual possession
had begun far before the date of the outika (wathTga)
107
(judgment, 23 March 1889).
As for other notarised documents, such as ones wit­
nessing a contract involving the land in question, the 
Tribunal Mixte demanded that certain standards be met be­
fore the Court would consider them authentic. The docu­
ment which declared the existence of a certain right over 
the land had to be confirmed by actual possession. Its
journal Tunisien (j.T.) 96, 362 (Code Foncier,
Annotated, t.1, paragraph 2 from top, page 25).
"Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 94,186 (Code Foncier,
Annotated, t.I, paragraph 2 from top, page 26/•
107.
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 89, 133 (Code Foncier,
Annotated, t. I, paragraph 2 from bottom, page 28)^ .
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date had to be prior to the date on notarised documents 
presented by parties challenging the claims* It had to 
be confirmed by other notarised documents and the wit­
nesses for this corroborative evidence had to be well-
108
known (Tribunal Mixte, 15 December 1888). The
courts of the SharTca of TUnis (which rite was not spe­
cified) further ruled that anyone challenging the claims 
made in the notarised documents could also contest the 
competence of the witnesses whose signatures appeared on
the documents* The challenge, however, had to be pre-
109
sented within a defined period (three days). Corrobora­
tive evidence was especially important for establishing 
the origins of the property in question. For while a no­
tarised contract of sale might have met all legal require­
ments for witnesses and sealing, the act in itself might
be invalid if it involved land that was inalienable from
110
the start (Tribunal Mixte. 6 February 1897). the
108. :
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 97,481 (Code Foncier, 
Annotated, t.I, paragraph2 from top, page~29j*
109. ^
Judgment from courts of the SharTca, 1 May 1895, 
J ournal Tunisien, 97, 525 (Code Foncier, Annotated,t.I 
paragrapTT 5 Jrroin top, page 28 ).
journal Tunis ien (j.T.) 98,509 (Code Foncier,
Annotated, t.I, pages 23-24).
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notarised documents presented by the petitioner and op­
ponent before the Tribunal Mixte appeared to be equally 
authentic the Court gave preference to the document which
was supported by the possession of the longest time
111
(Tribunal Mixte, 26 March 1898)*
When parties could not produce written documents in 
support of their claims, the Tribunal Mixte recognised 
acquisition of rights by prescription* Evidence of owner­
ship could be derived from peaceful and long-recognised 
possession* The Court accepted the judgment of the courts 
of the SharTca on the basis of whether the lapse of time
warranted prescription (fifteen years in HanafT law,
_  ^  112 
ten years in MalikT law). Yet even when possession
had been for less than fifteen years, peaceful and well-
recognised holding was sufficient to warrant admissibili-
113
ty of the petition for registration. One modification
111.
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 98,273 (Code Foncier, Anno­
tated, t.I, paragraph 3 from top, page 29)•
112.
Code Foncier, Annotated, t.I, paragraph 6 "Prescrip­
tion", page 10.
113. _
Judgment from Susa, Civil Court, 28 February 1889, 
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 89,53 (Code Foncier, Annotated, 
t.I, paragraph 3, from top, page 26).
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which the Tribunal Mixte brought to the Tunisian law of 
prescription derived from the Court1s procedural require­
ments, Presenting a petition for registration of land 
rights risked raising opposition. Such had the effect
of interrupting the continuity of possession claimed by
114
the petitioner (Tribunal Mixte, 26 July 1899). Should
the claim of the petitioner be rejected and the peti­
tioner try at a later date to register his rights on the 
basis of prescription, prescription would be calculated 
frpm the date of the filing of opposition to the first 
petition.
Whichever evidence —  written or unwritten —  parties 
presented before the Tribunal Mixte to support their 
claims, the Court had to undertake considerable investi­
gation to verify the claims. When investigation revealed 
that the petitioner was only holding land by payment of 
enzel (inzal) rather than as pure and simple owner, the 
Court did not throw out the case. It only granted regis­
tration of the right of enzel (Tribunal Mixte, 17 January 
115
1893).
114.
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 900, 480 (Code Foncier, 
Annotated, t.I, paragraph 1 from top, page 28).
Article 52 of the present Code of Property Rights 
(promulgated in 1965) continues this policy with some quali­
fications: ,r Prescript ion can be interrupted only: l) by a 
petition before the competent court; the interruption has 
no effect if the petition is rejected because of form or sub­
stance, if the petitioner withdraws his claim or a judgment 
is entered on the basis of statute of limitations
115 .T ournal Tunis ien (J.T.) 93,93 (Code Foncier, Anno-
Like any other litigant who wishes to assert his 
rights, the petitioner for registration of land carried 
the burden of proof. Yet unlike a litigant in a regular 
lawsuit, the petitioner for registration did not benefit 
from the absence of opposition. Registration was estab­
lished on the basis of authenticity of documents, court 
investigations, and actual possession. The mere absence 
of opposition to the claim was not considered evidence 
that the petitioner had established his claim. ' The Tribunal
Mixte felt bound to reject a claim if proof presented
116
by the petitioner was inadequate. Findings of the in­
vestigation of the Court could be used to establish a 
claim when no opposition to the petition appeared, even 
though the petitioner could not produce his title to the 
property because it was either lost or destroyed. Such
117
findings had to demonstrate the legitimacy of the claim.
tated, t.I, pages 34-35).
-i 1 /r
‘Judgment from Tribunal Mixte, 17 February 1890, 
Journal Tunisien, 90,57(Code Foneier, Annotated, t.I, 
pages 36-37).
Judgment from Tribunal Mixte, 29 August 1896, Jour­
nal Tunisien (J.T.) 98,74 (Code Foncier, Annotated, t.I, 
paragraph 2 from bottom, page 22/.
Both ruled: Petitioner cannot argue that absence of 
opposition automatically means that he must be recognised 
as legitimate owner of the land in question.
117.
Judgment from Tribunal Mixte, 11 March 1896,
J ournal Tunisien (J.T. / "9#,' 199 (Code Foncier, Annotated,
t.I, paragraph 2 from top, page 23).
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Absence of opposition could be due to no intention on
anyone*s part to oppose or to failure of one intending
118
to oppose to meet the deadline for filing opposition.
If the petitioner could not establish a claim on 
the basis of mere absence of opposition, nor could the 
.opposing party establish a claim on the basis of opposing 
evidence. Proof offered by a party challenging the claims 
of a petitioner for registration could be strong enough 
to convince the Tribunal Mixte that the petitioner*s claim 
was unfounded and that the right in question belonged to 
the party challenging. However, unless the party chal­
lenging desired to file a request for registration after 
the rejection of the claim of the first petitioner, no 
Tunisian court recognised the rejection as a decision
to attribute the land rights in question to the party
119
originally challenging the claim.
118.
Judgment from Tribunal Mixte, 13 February 1896,
Journal Tunis ien (J.T.) ~9<S", 1^4, and 28 November 1896, J our­
nal Tunisien (J.T.) 96,599 (Code Foncier, Annotated, t.I, 
paragraph 3 from bottom, page 43).
119____________________________________ _'Judgment from French civil court of Tunis,
26 November 1894, J ournal Tunisien (J.T.) 95,23 (Code Foncier,
Annotated, t.I, paragrapli 3 Yr oirT¥o11om,page 36).
Later the decree of 28 March 1948 made this rule 
(rights of opposition) a part of the Code Foncier. Article 
37, section 3 of the Code read: "However it Cthe Tribunal 
Mixte]) can order registration in toto or in part of the 
land in the name of the opposing party or parties when the 
latter makes a request for registration and their rights 
are established."
i
s
'i
This ruling was later challenged by the Director
of Juridical and Legislative Services. The Director
proposed in the draft of the decree of 28 March 1942
120
(article thirty-seven of the Code Foncier) that the 
Tribunal Mixte order registration in favour of the op­
posing parties whenever their rights appeared to be well- 
established without obliging them to file a new petition 
for registration. The motive of the Director was ex­
pediency. By eliminating the step of a new petition for
registration after rejection of the original petition,
121
the opposing parties could avoid double costs. None­
theless, the decree which took effect, as evidenced in 
article thirty- seven of the Code Foncier, upheld the case 
law on the subject. The government of the Protectorate 
was not ready to compromise the principle that registra­
tion was by request and by clear establishment of claim.
The French insistence on the rule that absence of 
opposition was no proof of ownership was contrary to
120 #See footnote 119 above on article 37*
121.
Letter from Direction de la Service Juridique et 
de Legislation, No. SJL 6380 of 16 March 1942 to Resident 
General Esteva. Signature illegible. Object of letter 
was modification of Code Foncier. Found in archives of 
Par al Bay, Series E, carton 155, Dossier 1. I thank 
M. Abdeljelil Temini for his help in the Archives.
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the Tunisian practise. In an early case of registration 
the Tribunal Mixte was told that a Tunisian notary had 
confirmed the allegation of a Tunisian on the location of 
certain land boundaries. The notary had based his state­
ment on the fact of possession and absence of opposition.
In the absence of opposition, he felt no need to investi-
122
gate the titles. Since the French had already twisted 
in their favour the principle of territorial jurisdiction 
in land matters as originally postulated in the cAhd al*Afnan 
they were keen to see that the Tunisians have as much op­
portunity as possible in law to oppose petitions for reg­
istration. If they had registered the rights of the op­
posing parties in case of rejection of the petitioning par­
ties, they would have closed off the opportunity for a 
new opposition to arise.
One other feature which distinguished the Tribunal
Mixte from other courts was the absolute finality of its
decisions. There was no appeal from them. Hence, the
standard of proof which the Tribunal Mixte set for
itself was absolute certainty that the rights in ques-
123
tion were rightly attributed to the claimant. Once
ypb   " " ' 11 '■
•Case No. 6 of 2 July__l887 and 1 February 1888, 
Minutes du Tribunal Mixte. Tunis.
123 Judgment from Tribunal Mixte, 22 April 1896,
J ournal Tunisien (j.T.) 97,411 (Code Foncier, Annotated 
t.I, paragraph 5, page 34)#
Article 332 of the present Code of Property Rights 
of 1965 reads: "The decisions of the Court of Land Matters 
are not subject to any opposition, appeal, or any other 
recourse."
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the Tribunal Mixte decided in favour of a petitioner
for registration and the given right was registered
with the office of the Conservateur Foncier no one
124
could challenge those rights in any court. If
the Tribunal Mixte rejected the petition, the peti­
tioner was, however, free to renew his claim if he
brought forth new evidence and transferred his inten-
125
tions to another piece of land. From a practical
point of view, the finality of their judgments is un­
derstandable. It took time to file a petition and for 
the Court to undertake investigations to assure cer­
tainty of claim. Cases could and did go on for yearsf
as evidenced in the several preparatory judgments which
126
preceded the final judgment by as much as three years•
124. Judgment -from Tribunal Mixte, 8 April 1897,
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 97,310 (Code Foncier, Annotated, 
t. I, paragraph 3 from top, page 47).
125^'Article 31: From the time of the deposit of the
demand for registration and of the titles and documents 
attached to the application, the President of the Tribunal 
Mixte designates a judge of this court to proceed towards 
inquiries and to report according to the following condi­
tions:
This judge, apart from the obliga­
tions which are imposed on him by atticle 41, has the task 
of watching, during the course of the procedure for regis­
tration, that no landed right of incapacitated persons or 
r>f persons not present in the Regency are abused; and to 
this effect he proceeds towards all verifications and 
necessary investigations. The powers which are conferred 
on him in this case are discretionary...
1 Of
'From investigations of records of the mahakama 
al caqc[rTya , Tunis. *
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Appeal would have caused the litigation to be prolonged 
and increased costs. In some cases the Tribunal Mixte 
had to delay final judgment -until another court had set­
tled a question of authenticity or determined a legal sta­
tus, or the like of such matters, in which the Tribunal 
Mixte had no competence. If the litigants so chose, these 
cases went through the appellate channels for the regu­
lar courts, thus delaying even further the final judgment 
of the Tribunal Mixte. From a judicial point of view, ab-, 
sence of regular channels of appeal from a judgment by 
the Tribunal Mixte is not appalling. For the SharTca 
itself never provided for such institutional channels.
Yet absence of any body to hear appeals in cases of fla­
grant abuse of rights is asking one to accept that human 
judgment is infallible.
Because of the absolute finality of its judgments, 
the Tribunal Mixte tried to develop certain safeguards 
to protect the rights of those who were challenging the 
petitioner’s claim. The Court on its part undertook in­
vestigations of claims and evidence. Another purpose 
of such investigations appeared in article thirty-one, 
paragraph two of the Code Foncier: "This (investigating) 
judge (appointed by the President of the Tribunal Mixte)
... has as his mission to be careful that in the course 
of the procedure for registration no land right of any
person who has no legal capcity or who is not present 
in the Regency is abused; towards this end he must un­
dertake all verifications and necessary inquiries. The 
powers conferred on him in this regard are discretionary. 
At the demand of the investigating judge, for the in­
terests of the persons lacking legal capacity or persons 
who are not present, the President of the Tribunal Mixte 
can ... extend the delay [period of time within which 
opposition to the petition had to be presented} so that 
opposition to the registration can be formed in their 
name. Notification of this extension will be given to 
the officials who receive opposition (as modified by 
decree of 28 March 1942)." As for the persons who had 
legal capacity to act in their own name and who were 
not absent from the Regency, they had recourse against 
the final decision of the Tribunal Mixte if they proved 
abuse of right. The recourse was to a regular civil or 
criminal court but the award was only in terms of indem­
nity. There was no solution in equity whereby the par­
ty claiming abuse of rights could force the Tribunal 
Mixte to order removal of registration of rights from 
the register of the Conservateur Foncier. As early as 
1896 the civil court of Tunis ruled that it would award 
damages to the party who proved that the party who won 
registration had introduced the petition in bad
237
127
faith. Two years later in a more elaborate ruling
the civil court of Tunis recognised that when the Tri­
bunal Mixte rejected a claim for registration and pro­
nounced registration for the party which had originally 
opposed the petitioner, the rejected party could not 
petition the civil courts to recognise the rights which 
he originally claimed. Neither could the civil courts 
admit a subsidiary petition applying for the original 
titles so that the party rejected could challenge the 
party awarded registration. The only way a party who 
was rejected by the Tribunal Mixte could win damages
was to demonstrate that the party to whom registration
128
was awarded had acted fraudulently. Apart from fraud- 
ulence the civil courts awarded compensation to purchasers 
whose rights were abused. In 1897 the Tunisian civil 
court ruled that the decision of the Tribunal Mixte 
rejecting a petition for registration of land rights 
yet ordering registration in favour of a third party 
definitively settled for all courts the question of land 
rights. The original petitioner was definitely evicted
127 —•Judgment from French civil court of Tunis,
13 February 1896, Journal Tunisien (j.T.) 96,288 (Code
Foncier, Annotated, t.I, paragraph 2 from bottom, page 40).
128. __
Judgment from French civil court of-Tunis,
13 July 1898, J ournal Tunisien (j.T.), 98, 472 (Code 
Foncier, Annotated, t.I, pages 37-38).
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from the land. If the petitioner had acquired the land
by sale he still was evicted from the land. To recover
his loss in the sale transaction he could apply to a
civil court for compensation. Compensation, however,
129
could be awarded only in the form of moveables.
There was only one exception to the rule that a petition 
claiming abuse of rights because of the final decision 
of the Tribunal Mixte could ask only for compensation, 
not nullification of the registration. A petition from 
the government on behalf of the public domain was the 
exception. In order for the government to claim a par­
cel of land that was part of land already registered in 
the name of a private person, the government had to dis­
charge the burden of proof. For the legal presumption 
was in favour of the registered owner. Any evidence 
that caused the court to doubt the validity of the claim
of the government was interpreted as against the govern- 
130
ment •
129 —Judgment from French civil court of Tunis,
12 February 1897, J ournal Tunisien (j.T.) 97,125 (Code
Foncier, Annotated, t.I, pages 41-42).
130"Code Foncier, Annotated, t.I, paragraph 3 from 
bottom, page 45:
As an exception, one can admit the action for 
claim, exercised by the state in the name of the 
public domain, for a parcel, included in a regis­
tered immoveable. But registration having been es­
tablished, for the benefit of the person in the 
name of whom the immoveable was registered, a
239
Once the Tribunal Mixte admitted registration of a 
land right there was one more stage before the process 
was completed. All documents after judgment of accep­
tance of the petition went to the office of the Conser- 
vateur de la Propriete Fonciere. That office recorded 
all rights admitted by the Tribunal Mixte at the time of 
final judgment. Any changes in the holder of these rights, 
or any alienations or any obliteration of these rights
after the initial registration also had to be submitted
131
to the Conservateur. Article three hundred forty- 
three of the Code Foncier demanded that the following 
types of changes be brought to the notice of the Conser­
vateur: inter vivos agreements of a gratuitous or
onerous nature; any court judgment which constituted
legal presumption of ownership over the entire 
immoveable and over all its accessories, the 
burden of proving that the parcel being claimed 
would be part of the public domain, falls on 
the state and doubt must be interpreted against 
the latter* (Civil court, Tunis, 26 July 1897, Jour­
nal Tunisien (j.T*) 97, 436).
131*
In judgment number 7367 of 11 March 1971, the 
Supreme Court of Tunisia (Cassation, ta*agTb) held that 
rights not inscribed on the title when first granted by 
judgment of the Court of Land Matters are deemed non-exis­
tent (applying the very words of article 308 of the pres­
ent Code'of Property Rights of 1965). Such a ruling pre­
scribes anyone from challenging a registered title on the 
basis of rights that are alleged to have existed before 
the registration of the title, but which the Court of Land 
Matters did not have inscribed on the title. See
A1 Qad5* wa3l tashric No. 10, December 1971, pages 48-49.
(such as statement of validity of the creation of a hubus),
transmitted, or declared, or modified, or eliminated a
right over the property in question; redistribution of
rights after the division of land previously held in co-
ownership; redistribution of rights after the opening
132
of a succession; notarised deeds or judgments ending
shared ownership of a dividing wall; leases made for 
more than three years; notarised deeds or judgments de­
claring acquittal of more than a year’s rent when the rent 
had not come to term yet; agreements or judgments de­
claring the acquittal of a year’s worth of rent of enzel 
(inzal); any transfers of creditors* priority rights to
132
’Article 364: In the case of the death of a holder
of a real immoveable right that is not inscribed, inscrip­
tion. can, before liquidation or division (gasama), be 
taken in the name of the succession, on the single produc­
tion of the certificate 'of death, and these inscriptions 
will be modified after division, in conformity with the 
certificate of division presented.
Article 366: In order to obtain landed property
rights resulting from the opening of a succession, the peti­
tioners can present a certificate of death, and if the de­
ceased did not leave a will, they can present a certificate 
stating their civil status and their rights to the suc­
cession.
These certificates will be drawn up 
in Tunisia for the Tunisians by the presidents of the courts 
of first instance or their representatives or the cantonal 
judges in the place of domicile of the deceased. They will 
be drawn up for foreigners by the consuls and consular 
agents. The certificates drawn up outside Tunisia will 
be accepted in their authentic legal form (modified decree 
of 24-6-1957).
(Both articles from Code Foncier, al Qanun al cAgari,t.Il)
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other creditors; any change in the holders of hypotheca­
tion, or mortgage. Unlike the original land right in­
scribed on the registers of the Conservateur by virtue 
of a decision of the Tribunal Mixte, the validity of alien­
ations and transfers which were later brought to the no-
\
tice of the Conservateur could be challenged by third 
133
parties.
When litigation arose involving registered land, the 
full impact of the Tribunal Mixte in Tunisia became quite 
clear. The Tribunal Mixte as we have seen had exceptional 
territorial jurisdiction. It had competence to register 
land rights of any one living in Tunisia, irrespective of 
the personal status of the registrant. This exceptional
1QO
Article 343: The following must be rendered public
by being inscribed on the title of property, in order to 
be opposed by third parties: l) All transactions and agree­
ments inter vivos of a gratuitous nature or incurring ob­
ligation, all judgments that have the effect of constituting, 
transmitting, declaring, modifying, or extinguishing a 
real landed right, of rendering it inalienable, of restrain­
ing free circulation, or modifying any other condition of 
its inscription;
2) Transactions and judgments 
on the ceding of use of common walls;
3) Leases of immoveables ex­
ceeding three years as well as the leases of less duration 
or their renewals when they bring about disposing of the 
enjoyment of the immoveable for a period of time whose 
term exceeds the expiration of the third year from the 
date on which they made agreement...
4) Transactions and judg­
ments confirming the liberation or ceding of a sum superior 
to a year of rent...
5) Transactions and judg­
ments confirming the liberation or ceding of a sum superior 
to a year of arrears of enzel (inzal)•
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territorial jurisdiction gave rise to another exception
in a legal system where jurisdiction was normally based on
personal status of the litigants* The exception was that
French courts had jurisdiction over any litigation involving
134
land registered by the Tribunal Mixte* The exception was 
justifiable on grounds of public order. French control 
meant public rule based on French jurisprudence, not Tuni­
sian or Islamic. The legal provision expressing this poli­
cy and allowing jurisdiction of French courts over Tunisians 
involved in disputes of registered land was article two of 
the Code Foncier* Article two read:
Those provisions of the French Code which are not con­
trary to the present law (Code Foncier of 1885) nor 
to the personal status or to the rules for succession 
of the holders of land rights will apply in Tunisia 
to the lands which are registered and to the rights 
over these lands, (as modified 16 May 1886)*“ 9
134. Example of French courts dealing with Tunisians is 
the case of Ali Rabah Es Sehali vs* Azaiz ben Ali, Minute 
No. 151 of the French civil court of Tunis, 6 March 1947 
(second chamber), affair no. 314. The issue was that the 
defendant was claiming a part of a property that had been 
registered subject to co-ownership* He could not produce 
the document of sale by which he claimed that he bought one- 
half of the part belonging to his mother, nor had the trans­
action been inscribed on the land title* He sold the same 
parcel to his brother Rabah, who in turn could produce the 
the act of sale, Nor had he had it inscribed on the land 
title* The court rejected his petition.
13 5 Article 2 of the Code Foncier (Zeys, page 899): The
provisions of the French cTvil code which are not contrary 
either to the present law, or to the personal status
(a) or to the rules of successions (b) of the holders of real 
landed rights apply in Tunisia to the registered immoveables 
and to the real rights over these immoveables (thus ;
In 1891 the French supreme court (cassation) more clearly- 
ruled that the Tunisian land law of 1885 applied the dis­
positions of French law only to those lands which were
registered in conformity with the prescriptions of the 
136
French law. It was easy to apply to Tunisians "those
provisions of the French code which (were) not contrary 
to (the Code Foncier of 1885)", for the French Code Civil 
defined the same rights as the Code Foncier, excepting
modified by decree of 16 May 1886).
Footnotes:(a) The Tribunal Mixte does not have the 
power to settle disputes relating to the personal rights 
connected to the registered immoveables (Tunis, 23 May 1894, 
Journal Tunisien (j.T.) 94,350).
(b) Successions are regulated in Tunisia 
by the national law of the deceased, even in regard to im­
moveable property. This rule is established by the cus­
toms which have the force of law (Tunis, 31 May 1899,
Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 99,588).
(a) The Tunisian law of 1885 applies the pro­
visions of the French law only to registered immoveables 
in conformity with its prescriptions (Supreme Court of 
Appeal, 20 April 1891, Dalloz, Jurisprudence Generale 91,1, 
273), Zeys, page 900.
Article 2 was abrogated by the decree of 24.6.1957 and 
replaced by another article 2: The provisions of the Code
of Obligations and Contracts which are not contrary to the 
present law, nor to the personal status or to the rules of 
succession of the holders of real landed rights apply to 
the registered immoveables and to the real rights over these 
immoveables. Subject to the provisions of the present law, 
any juridical situation created in Tunisia before 
1st of July 1957, by virtue of the French law or of the 
Tunisian law normally applicable, continues to have effect.
136.
See (a)2, Zeys, page 900, footnote 135 above.
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enzel (inzal), which was a peculiarly Tunisian contract
137
since it derived from hubus. Article thirteen of
the Code Foncier corresponded to article five hundred 
twenty-six of the French Civil Code:
(article thirteen) The real rights of immoveables are: 
immoveable property, enzel and the rent of enzel, 
usufruct of the immoveables, usage and inhabitation, 
long-term leasing of land, right of construction on,lanci 
servitude, rights accruing from antichresis (contact 
by which a debtor gives up to his creditor possession 
and usufruct of a real estate in order to assure the 
relief of a debt3, priority of creditor, and rights 
of creditor in pledging of property for payment of 
and obligation (hypoth^gue).
(article five hundred twenty-six) The following are im­
moveables by virtue of the object to which they ap­
ply: usufruct of immoveable things 
servitude or land services
actions which aim at claiming an immoveable.
Articles ninety to ninety-four in the Code Foncier pro­
vided for usufruct as did article five hundred seventy- 
eight of the French Civil Code (Code Civil):
(article ninety) Usufruct of land is the right to enjoy 
an immoveable the ownership of which belongs to 
another but on condition that he preserve the sub­
stance of ownership.
(article five hundred seventy-eight) Usufruct is the right 
to enjoy things the ownership of which belongs to 
another faut on condition that he preserve the sub­
stance of ownership.
Article one hundred thirty-four of the Code Foncier pro-
1 Footnote 1, Code Foncier, Annotated, t.I, page 17: 
Sheikh Snoussi finds that the rights defined by this arti­
cle (13) are those provided for in artidle 526 of the Civil 
Code of France, except that enzel (inzal) is known only in
Tunisia and the legislator of 1885 admitted it in the law 
of 188 5. It specifies that enzel derives from hubus.
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vided for definition of rights of usage and habitation 
as did article six hundred twenty-five of the Civil Code:
(article one hundred thirty-four) The rights of usage 
and habitation are established and lost in the 
same manner as usufruct*
(article six hundred twenty-five) The rights of usage 
and habitation are established and lost in the same 
manner as usufruct*
Right of construction on another1 s land was covered by 
article one hundred fifty of the Code Foncier and article 
five hundred fifty-three of the Civil Code:
(article one hundred fifty) The right of construction on 
anotherfs land is a real property right which con­
sists in having building, enterprises or plantations 
on a land belonging to another.
(article five hundred f£ifty-three) All the constructions, 
plantations and enterprises on a land or in the in­
terior, are presumed to have been done by the owner
at his own costs and to belong to him, if the con­
trary is not proved; this is without any prejudice 
to the ownership which a third party might have ac­
quired or might be able to acquire by prescription, 
whether it be the basement of the building or any
other part of the building.
Servitude in article one hundred fifty-three of the Code 
Foncier corresponded to article six hundred thirty-seven 
of the Civil Code:
(article one hundred fifty-three) A servitude is an ob­
ligation imposed on an immoveable for usage and 
utility of the immoveable belonging to another owner.
(article six hundred thirty-seven) A servitude is an ob­
ligation imposed on a patrimony belonging to another 
owner.
24G
Priority of creditor was found in article two hundred 
twenty-eight of the Code Foncier and article two thou­
sand ninety-five of the Civil Code:
(article two hundred twenty-eight) Privilege is a real 
land right which the status of credit gives to a 
creditor as being preferred over other creditors 
even hypothecated creditors•..
(article two thousand ninety-five) Privilege is a right 
which the status of credit gives to a creditor as 
being preferred over other creditors, even a 
hypothecated creditor.
Rights accruing from the contract of antichresis (contract 
for use of land to relieve a debt) were protected in ar­
ticles two hundred seventeen to two hundred twenty-seven 
in the Code Foncier (abrogated by Law No. 1 of 28 January
1958, Journal Officiel No.9) and article two thousand
138
eighty-five of the Civil Code. Pledging of property
by hypothecation (or mortgage) appeared in article two 
hundred thirty-one of the Code Foncier and article twenty- 
one thousand fourteen of the Civil Code:
(article two hundred thirty-one) Hypothecation is a real 
land right over the immoveables destined for ac­
quittal of an obligation...
(article twenty-one thousand fourteen) Hypothecation is
] O Q
‘Article 2085 (Code Civil): Antichresis is estab­
lished only by written document. By the contract the credi­
tor acquires only the right to collect the fruits of the 
immoveable on condition of imputing them annually on the 
interest, if such is due, and then on the capital of his 
credit.
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a real right over the immoveables destined for ac­
quittal of an obligation.••
Regulation of long-term leasing of land (eighteen to ninety- 
nine years, called emphytdose) was covered by article one 
hundred forty-six of the Code Foncier and article seventeen 
hundred seventy-eight (sub articles 937-950) in the Civil 
Code. Although the contract of enzel (inzal) did not ex­
ist in French law, the French courts in Tunisia assimi­
lated enzel (inzal) to perpetual rent in general and ap­
plied relevant sections of the Civil Code, such as article 
twenty-two hundred seventy-seven, which provided that ar­
rears of lifetime and perpetual rents were no longer en-
139
forceable after five years.
When one compares the provisions of the French Civil 
Code and the Tunisian Code Foncier with the rules of the 
SharTca that were applicable to all land matters previous 
to 1885, one can see that the imposition of French public 
order on registered land was born of necessity. The neces­
sity was that French colonial settlers financed their land 
ventures in Tunisia through French financial concerns 
which were regulated by French law. The rules of the 
SharTca for land and commerce would have been inadequate 
if they had been left sovereign in land litigation. For 
example, the priority of some creditors over others in
V q q' ' 1 I’ ' | 1 ' —
Judgment from the civil court of Susa, 7 December 
1899, Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 900,380 (Code Foncier, Anno­
tated, t7T7^aragrapir"4 from bottom, page 58)•
reqard to land was not the same in French law as in 
140
Islamic law. In the law of joint ownership of prop­
erty , the French Civil Code was more flexible than the 
SharTca. Article eight hundred fifteen of the Civil Code 
allows any co-owner to demand division of the property 
into units of individual ownership. The Tunisian Islamic 
law allowed a co-owner only recourse to selling his par­
ticular share in the property when he wanted to end his
141
participation in co-ownership. The sale would not
terminate the co-ownership as a whole. The Tunisian sys­
tem of notarisation had also been a source of friction. 
When the Bay granted the French the right to own land in 
Tunisia (before the establishment of the Protectorate) 
the Sheikh ul Islam insisted that the Europeans* titles 
to holdings and documents of transactions be drawn up by 
the Tunisian notaries. This was to ensure that foreigners 
were conforming to the Tunisian land laws and customs 
since 'no notarised document contrary to the law of the
140. _
Judgment from civil court of Susa, 19 November 1897, 
J ournal Tunisien (j.T.) 98,304 and of the civil court of 
Tunis, 12 February 1897, J.T. 97, 301 (Code Foncier, Anno­
tated, t.I, paragraph 1 from bottom, page 6).
3.41.
Judgment from civil court of Tunis, 29 May 1896, 
Journal Tunisien (j.T.) 96,319 (Code Foncier, Annotated, 
t.I, paragraph 4 from bottom, page~^).
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land was executory. The French, however, were not
pleased about such restrictions. If French business
could not operate except by Muslim law, it would have had
to forego such French practises as charging interest on
loans. In Algeria the French had been able to establish
alongside Muslim notaries French notaries who drew up
contracts of interest. These documents were executed
by the French courts. Some Frenchmen wanted to propose to
the Bay to institute French notaries in Tunisia. Both
Tunisian Muslims and the French would avail themselves
of the French notaries when the transaction in question
143
could not be authorised by a Muslim notary. If the
Bay had instituted French notaries who authorised the 
Tunisians and the French to perform transactions against 
the local law and custom, he would have incurred the great 
displeasure of the Sheikh ul Islam. The French, instead, 
passed the Code Foncier. This was more in conformity 
with the terms of the Franco-Tunisian agreement about for-
142. _
Ahmed Ben Khoja, Sheikh ul Islam, _^Report_on 
Islamic Law,1 22 Caada 1300, Archives of Par al Bay, Series 
E, carton 155, Dossier 6 (SharTca law of Property).
143 • ^
Letter of 28j bre 188(?) from Vice-Consulate of 
France in Sfax on report of £heikh ul Islam on land law 
and notaries, Archives of Par al Bay, Series E, carton 
155, Dossier 6.
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eigners owning land than in conformity with local law. 
Through the Code Foncier the French simply had the local 
law changed and kept it applicable to Tunisians and French 
alike. Nor would instituting French notaries have solved 
the problem of French landowners being justiciable before 
courts of the SharTca. If a French business owning land 
in Tunisia had undertaken certain transactions before a 
French notary, then had to go before a court of the SharTca 
in case of litigation, his French notarised documents 
would probably have not been recognised by the gadT if 
they were contrary to Tunisian Islamic law. Yet the cre­
ation of a Tribunal Mixte gave the French business a 
chance to avoid the jurisdiction of the SharTca if it so 
chose to register its land under the Code Foncier.
No one, European or Tunisian, was forced to register 
his land and thereby have it regulated by French law.
The Code Foncier of 1885 simply provided an alternative 
to the land law applied in the qadT1s courts to unregis-t
tered lands. The only example of the owner of an unregis­
tered plot having to submit to the rules of registered 
land came from the law of servitude. Article twenty of 
the Code Foncier provided that Min case of dispute over 
the borders or servitudes of contiguous lands, when one 
of the two (wa£D registered and the other not, the Code 
Foncier would be applied.” The French civil court of
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Tunis conformed to the provision in ruling that only
the Tunisian Code Foncier of 1885 was applicable in regard
to servitudes when one of the two lands, whether serving
or being served, was registered. This was applicable
not only to properties which had been registered with a
servitude at the time of litigation before the Tribunal
Mixte but also to servitudes created after the initial 
144
registration.
In the domain of personal rights and succession, how­
ever, the exceptional jurisdiction of the French courts 
over Tunisians holding registered land was eliminated.
Any litigation involving personal rights or succession, 
whether to registered or unregistered lands, was regulated 
by the rules of personal status. This meant that only 
courts of the SharTca had jurisdiction over Muslim Tuni­
sians and French courts over Europeans in succession.
In 1894 the French civil court of Tunis initiated the fol­
lowing important jurisprudence: "The Tribunal Mixte has
not the power to settle disputes relative to personal
145
rights accruing to the registered lands (23 May 1894)•”
144 —Judgment from Justice of the Peace, Tunis, 26 July
1897, Journal Tunisien (j.T.) 97,441 (Code Foncier, Anno­
tated, t.I, paragraph 1 from top, page 82)• _
Judgment from Justice of the Peace, Tunis, 16 Decem­
ber 1896, Journal Tunisien (J.T.) 97,43 (Code Foncier, 
Annotated, t.I, paragraph 3 from bottom, page 82T.
14^*Footnote (a) to article 2 of the Code Foncier,
Zeys, page 899 (see footnote 135 above).
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And in 1899 it ruled: "Successions are regulated in 
Tunisia by the national law of the deceased, even in re­
gard to immoveables* This rule is established by the cus-
146
toms which have force of law (31 May 1899) *f The 
fact that the land in a succession matter was registered 
only necessitated that any changes be inscribed on the 
title awarded previously by the Tribunal Mixte* Article 
three hundred sixty-six of the Code Foncier provided:
"To obtain the inscription of names for rights of real 
property resulting from the opening of a succession the 
claimants shall produce, other than the statement of 
death, if it is a question of intestate succession, a cer­
tificate confirming their civil status and their exclu­
sive rights to the estate (as modified by the decree of 
16 May 1886)* These certificates shall be established 
in Tunisia by the justices of the peace or the consular 
agents, for the nationals and proteges of the various
European nations, and for the Tunisians by the justices
147
of the peace or the gudah* * *"
In practice life was not so simple as. the above court
"Footnote (b) to article 2 of the Code Foncier, 
Zeys, page 899 (see footnote 135 above).
147 Zeys, Loi Fonciere, 1 July 1885. In essence, this 
article remained the same in the 1957 edition of the Code 
Foncier* Only the names of the courts changed.
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decisions would have it seem* One set of litigants 
might have to go to several different jurisdictions to 
have solved all the issues raised* Nor were the judges 
free of doubt about which jurisdiction was applicable* 
Throughout the history of the French Protectorate there 
arose cases which demonstrate how the French allowed to 
the various jurisdictions in Tunisia much room for play, 
while at the same time insisting that French public pol­
icy underlie all jurisdictions. At the turn of this 
century the example in point was a case of shuf*a (right 
of preemption)* The property in question was an unregis­
tered parcel held in co-ownership. It was sold by one 
of its Muslim owners to a French protege and some Italian 
subjects. The contract of sale was before the French 
bar, that is, it was intended to be regulated by French 
law and was registered in the cahier of obligations. The 
sister of the seller sought the right of preemption over
three-eights of the parcel. The HanafT muftT of Tunis• r 1 r ~
serving as qadT summoned the foreigners to court. Then 
he declined competence in the matter on grounds that a 
sale, regulated by French law, and all litigation born of 
that sale were justiciable only before French courts.
The non-registered status of the property was not consid­
ered. The lawyer for the Muslim claiming the right of 
preemption requested the Secretary General (the liaison
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officer between the Tunisian government and the French 
Resident General) to order the HanafT gad! to hear the 
case. The Secretary General consulted and accepted the 
opinion of one of the French judges on the bench of the 
Tribunal Mixte. The opinion in essence was as follows:
The fact that property was sold before the French court 
did not change its status as unregistered property. All 
real estate actions involving this property could be heard 
by;the jurisdictions of the SharTca as long as the prop­
erty was unregistered. And even if Europeans were the liti­
gants the courts of the SharTca could decline competence 
only if the validity or regularity of the sale itself were 
contested. In such case only the French courts could pro­
nounce judgment on the sale effected before the French 
court. In the particular case at hand only shufCa was at 
stake and the court of the SharTca would have to hear the 
matter. But if in the course of the suit on shuf*a an 
issue was raised touching upon the sale itself, the court
of the SharTca was to send the parties before the French 
148
courts. Similarly in matters of succession one could 
well imagine that the unregistered estate of a deceased 
Tunisian Muslim could have been burdened with various
1 ‘Ministry of Justice, Note No. N.160-8 of May 1908 
to the Secretary General^ Answer of 28.2.1908. Also 
letter from the Hanaf*! gadx to the Secretary General of 
27 Xbr 1907. #
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legal charges which had to be settled before the heirs - 
could share in what remained. There appeared before 
the French appellate court in Tunis a case involving 
Tunisian Muslims and succession. The case had already- 
gone through several Tunisian courts. The facts were 
that the praepositus, a Tunisian Muslim and relative of 
the defendants, had leased an unregistered building from 
the plaintiffs. Since the lease was covered by provi­
sions in the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts 
(promulgated in 1906 to settle law of contract, espe­
cially contracts concerning unregistered land), the Re­
gional court (jihawT) of Tunis had taken the affair, 
then the Ouzara (Wazara)on appeal. Both courts had or­
dered expulsion of the heirs of the deceased from the pre­
mises. Later a French Muslim from Algeria was intro­
duced as an intervening party who claimed rights as a 
sublessee of the deceased. The plaintiffs took a suit 
to the President for urgent provisional judgments in the 
French jurisdiction. Precedent supported French juris­
diction over proteges such as the Algerians and natural-
149
ised Frenchmen despite their Muslim confession. The 
French court ordered expulsion of the intervening party 
from the premises • The defendant then obtained
’Letter from Director of Tunisian Justice to 
Resident General of 18 April 1933,No. j-766-I,
from the French civil court a decision forbidding the 
plaintiffs to continue further lawsuits purporting to 
expel the defendant from the premises of an estate in 
which the defendant claimed rights as heir to the deceased 
lessee. The French court accepted the defendant’s plea 
that he had not been party to the decisions given by 
the Tunisian Regional court (jihaw'T) and the Ouzara 
{Wazara). The plaintiffs appealed from the last order 
against them. The French appellate court upheld the 
court of first instance since the plaintiffs had not 
proved whether the judgments of the Regional court 
(jihawT) and the Ouzara (Wazara) were aimed at one and 
the same person. The name given by the defendant claim­
ing rights through the deceased lessee in the cases be­
fore the French jurisdiction was different from the 
name of the heir to the same deceased lessee in the judg­
ments of the Tunisian jurisdictions. The defendant al­
so presented a death certificate stating heirs whose 
names were different from the ones on the death certif­
icate presented by the plaintiffs. The French court of 
appeal ruled that the plaintiffs would have to return 
to Tunisian courts to settle the question of identity 
and decide which of the two death certificates presented 
was valid. This author did not find any other records 
of further litigation by the plaintiffs. If they had 
undertaken a case before the Regional court (jihawi), the
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the courts of the Sharica would probably have had to be
involved to give opinions on the validity of the death
150
certificate and the rights of each heir.
Likewise in a case of personal rights, specifically, 
maintenance (nafaga) and custody (hadana), the parties 
shuffled between French courts and courts of the SharTca 
to settle various issues involved. In one such case a 
Tunisian Muslim woman had obtained from the court of the 
Sharica of Tunis a judgment condemning her former husband, 
also a Tunisian Muslim, to pay her maintenance for their 
daughter. The judgment was rendered in 1953. A year 
later the same woman obtained from the HanafT gadT of 
Tunis a decision naming her provisional guardian of the 
same daughter. The woman then turned to the French civil 
court of Tunis with a petition for exeguatur. The 
French court granted her a judgment by default, ordering 
the 1953 judgment of the SharTca on maintenance to be 
executed out of the husband’s registered property. The 
former husband appealed against the French court’s deci­
sion to the French court of appeal in Tunis. The plea 
of the husband raised several points on the procedure 
which the French court had to follow in order to sanction
1 SO "Consorts El Mahdaoui vs. Abdelmajid B. Dabbagh, 
French Cour d’ Appel, Second Chamber, TTtnis, 21 January 
1957, Minute No.55*
a judgment foreign to French jurisdiction. The French 
court had to verify the regularity of form, the finality 
of the decision, its conformity to the law which it pur­
ported to apply, and its harmony with the exigencies of 
French public order. The French court of appeal af­
firmed that the HanafT judgment applied only for the
first nine years of the child’s age since hadana in
—«— »—  - -
HanafT law ceases for the daughter at the age of nine.
The French court also affirmed that the HanafT court right- 
ly demanded that the person holding the right of hadana 
seek the costs of the child’s maintenance from the father, 
who has a natural obligation of providing such mainte­
nance. The French court found the court of the SharT'a 
competent since the parties involved in the suit of per­
sonal rights were all Tunisians. The reading of the 
judgment of the SharTca condemning the husband convinced 
the French court that the gadi had observed proper form 
in stating particulars and in allowing the husband a de­
fence. The judgment of the SharTca was declared defini­
tive since there was no evidence that the husband had 
filed appeal to the superior court of the SharTca within 
the prescribed delay after the decision of first instance. 
The French court was also satisfied that the matter did 
not offend French public order, even though the liti­
gants were Tunisian Muslim. The French Civil Code (Code
Civil) like the Shari^a, consecrated the principle of
151
responsibility of parents to maintain their offspring.
In regard to the 1954 judgment of the SharTca appointing
the mother guardian, the French court declared itself
incompetent to appreciate its legitimacy. It concerned
only a right of personal status and was not a prerequisite
for awarding maintenance to a mother for her child.
Maintenance would be due irrespective of who was holding
the child. The court of appeal confirmed the order of
exequatur so that maintenance could be paid out of the
152
registered property.
151.
Article 203 of the Code Civil: The spouses togeth­
er undertake a contract, by virtue solely of their mar­
riage, to fulfill the obligation to nourish, maintain, 
and raise their children.
Article 213 of the Code Civil: Together the
spouses assure the moral and material direction of the 
family. They provide for the education of the children 
and prepare for their future.
Article 212 of the Code Civil: The spouses must
owe each other fidelity, aid, assistance, (footnote 4: In­
dependently of divorce or of separation...the spouse who 
invokes an injury that is foreign to that resulting from 
the rupture of the marriage tie is allowed to demand com­
pensation from her spouse...1).
All above articles taken from Code Civil, Dalloz, 1970-71.
152.
Tahar ben Lamouchi vs. Chadlia Bent Allala,
Cour d*Appel, Second Chamber, Tunis, 7 January 1957,
Minute No. 25.
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French Public Order in Tunisia
We have seen how the decisions of the Tribunal Mixte 
for registration of land rights provided one avenue by 
which the French courts came to exercise jurisdiction 
over Tunisian Muslims, Such jurisdiction, however, came 
about largely by the choice of the Tunisians' themselves.
If a Tunisian Muslim wished to register his land, he 
knew what the consequences would be for future litiga­
tion involving his land. Apart from land law, however, 
there were certain types of actions where the French 
courts imposed their jurisdiction on Tunisian Muslims 
without any choice on the part of the Tunisians. These 
actions were any civil and criminal litigation involving 
both Europeans and Tunisians. In the absence of a 
regular mixed court for handling civil litigation for 
parties of mixed nationalities, the French courts inter­
vened. There were various ways in which the French courts 
could intervene. When a European was called before a 
court of the SharTca having jurisdiction over him, as 
was the case when the European was party to a suit on 
unregistered land, the French allowed the court of the 
Shari*a to make its judgment, then gave the French courts 
a kind of supervisory jurisdiction by way of 
exequatur. The judgment of the SharTca would
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be executed only after review by the French courts.
An example involving unregistered land arose only two 
years after the promulgation of the Code Foncier. An 
Italian petitioned the Tribunal Mixte for registration 
of property. He presented evidence that the property 
in question had originally been a hubus, then alienated 
by way of enzel (inzal) to two persons, each of whom had 
authority to substitute any person whom they wanted for 
paying the enzel (inzal). In 1872 one of the original 
enzelists ceded his share in the hubus to another Tuni- 
sian Muslim whose widow and heirs upon his deceased ceded 
the duty of enzel (inzal)to the Italian. This last ces­
sion took place in 1884. In 1885 the second of the orig­
inal enzelists ceded his share to the same Italian with 
the consent of the Administration of 3Ahbas (organ 
created by Khair ad Din to put in order the administra­
tion of public hubus and supervise transactions involving 
private hubus). The Administration of ^Ahbas contested 
the boundaries of the lands held by the Italian. The 
Administration claimed that the boundaries of the Italian 
embraced parts of a domain belonging to the State. The 
dispute was taken before the court of the ShariCa, which 
ruled on 25 Feburary 1886 in favour of the State. Or-
153.
See pages 258-259 above on what constituted 
review by a French court of a decision of a court of the 
Sharica.
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dinarily the Tribunal Mixte was obliged to accept the 
settlement of a court of ordinary jurisdiction by virtue
of articles thirty-five and thirty-seven of the Code
154
Foncier as contributing to proof of a claim. In this 
case, however, the Tribunal Mixte could not accept the 
judgment of the SharTta as evidence against the Italian 
as long as the judgment had not been declared executory 
by a French court. The Tunisian state petitioned the 
French court for exequatur. If the French court granted 
exequatur the Tribunal Mixte would have had to reject
l 54’Article 35, section 1: The disputes presently
pending will remain submitted to the courts vested with 
them and registration will be suspended until the decision 
of these courts.
Article 37: The decisions of the Tribunal Mixte
will not be subject to any opposition, appeal or recourse.
The Court will pass judgment on sub­
stantive matters on all the disputes other than those pro­
vided for in the first section of Article 35*•• It will 
pronounce the Admission or the rejection, in toto or in 
part, of the registration and order in case of registra­
tion inscription of the real rights whose existence the 
court recognises.
In case of rejection the parties will 
be sent to make use of the competent jurisdiction.
(Above taken from Maurice Bompard, Legislation de la 
Tunisie, Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1888, at the library of the 
Court of Land Matters, Tunis)
The modification of article 35 by decree of 28.3.1942:
Any person before a jurisdiction of common law 
will be able, before defence in substantive law and by 
the completion of all formalities prescribed in articles 
23 and 24 (details for filing petition and paying costsQ, 
to divest the court of the affair, on condition that he 
follow up the matter upon his petition for registration.
Modification of article 37 by.decree of 28.3.1942 con­
firmed that judgments of the Tribunal Mixte were not sub-
the petition of the Italian for registration in regard
to the parcel claimed by the State. If the French court
annulled the decision of the court of the SharTca the
State would have had to provide other evidence to sup-
155
port its opposition.
In criminal litigation involving mixed nationalities, 
the French courts assumed direct control over the matter. 
The decree of 2 September 1885 made the French courts 
competent to hear all crimes alleged to have been com­
mitted by Tunisian subjects to the prejudice of Euro­
peans. For example, the Tribunal Mixte suspected an 
Arabic title presented by Tunisian litigants to be a
fraud and suspended decision until the French Public Pros-
156
ecutor had settled the matter.
In matters of personal status (other than land) the 
decree of 31 July 1884 had specified jurisdiction over 
persons and matters according to public order. Public 
order demanded that the courts of the SharTca have com­
petence only when all parties were Muslim Tunisians. The
ject to appeal.
155.Affair No. 9, 25 June 1887, Mixed Chamber,
Tribunal Mixte, Minutes du Tribunal Mixte, Tunis.
156*Affair No, 33, 20 June 1888 and 4 March 1889,
Mixed Chamber, Tribunal Mixte, Minutes du Tribunal Mixte, 
Tunis,
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courts of the Sharica were imcompetent ratione personae 
and ratione materiae for disputes relating to personal 
status of those non-Tunisians who were justiciable be­
fore the French courts. Such non-Tunisians included 
non-Muslims as well as converts to Islam (although na­
tionality remained French or European). In matters of 
marriage even if only one of the spouses or both had con­
verted to Islam, the French courts had competence to 
hear the case. When the spouses had retained their reli­
gious status (Muslim) but converted their nationality 
(especially in cases of Algerians naturalised as French), 
the French courts still had competence but were willing 
to apply the law which conformed to their personal status
rather than their acquired nationality, that is, the
157
French courts applied the Sharica. Nonetheless, the
French courts were under the first obligation to French 
public order and applied only those rules of the SharTca 
which were not contrary to French principles. For ex­
ample, French courts would not allow repudiation, or di-
158
vorce Muslim style. If the spouses had married only
157 'Note for attention of Secretary General of the 
Tunisian Government on the draft of the Code of the SharTca, 
28 July 1950, No. 918TSJ4.
i c O  .
* Roger Jambu-Merlin, Le^  Droit Prive en Tunisie 
(Paris: Librairie G£n£ral de droit et de jurisprudence,
R. Pichon et R. Durand, I960), pages 260-261. M. Jambu- 
Merlin was Ancien Directeur de la section d1Etudes juri- 
diques de lfInstitut des Hautes Etudes de Tunis, Professeur 
de droit ci la Faculty de droit et des sciences politiques 
de Caen.
by Muslim religious ceremony without appearing before 
the French notary in the French consulate, the marrage 
was regarded as marriage without contract; hence, the
French courts had to compare the relevant rules of the
^  1
SharTca with the French law of marriage without contract*
In internationally mixed marriages, such as between.a 
Muslim Tunisian man and a non-Muslim European woman, the 
nationality of the wife gave the French courts competence. 
One would presume that in suits on marriage and divorce 
the courts applied the law of the nationality of the hus­
band within the limits of French public order. When 
the Code of Procedure for the courts of the SharTca was 
promulgated in 1948 the courts of the SharTca were not 
allowed any jurisdiction in personal status or inheri­
tance of non-Muslims. They had jurisdiction in cases 
between Muslim Tunisians or between Muslims who were not
Tunisians or proteges (like Algerians) of a non-Muslim
160
power (articles two and seventeen). Matters of
16 9 —Ministry of Justice, Notes on cagd an-nikah,
February 1935- #
'Article 2: Cases of personal status and inheri­
tance in which the courts of the SharTca are competent are
those which are between Muslim Tunisian subjects or be­
tween Muslims who are not subjects and who are definitely 
not proteges of a non-Muslim state.
Article 17: Parties can raise the incompetence
of the Mahkama if the reason is the nationality of one of 
the partiis or is the failure to observe rules relating 
to the order of jurisdiction, and the court must even,
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non-registered land were of course the exception♦
in these two cases, declare itself incompetent*
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Reforms in the Courts of the ShariUnder the French 
Protectorate
After the French had promulgated the decree of 
15 December 1896, making minor changes in the system of 
the courts of the Shar7ca, the next most, significant leg­
islation did not appear until 1937* The decree of 
27 May 1937 provided for the courts of the SharTca to 
give judgment by default (hukm ^ala gayib)« For the law 
of contract and sale, judgment by default was not entire­
ly new. In the nineteenth century the MalikT Bach MuftT 
had written a report on the law of the Shar7ca of sale 
in order to make Europeans aware of the rules by which 
they had to abide when the Bay granted them the right to 
own property. The section on judgment by default ap­
plied to persons who were absent because of a journey.
The report read: "The judgment by default can be rendered 
against any person who is justiciable in a given district, 
who is absent from the district, or whose residence is 
unknown. The rule to follow in this matter varies ac­
cording to three cases: 1.) If the person who is justi­
ciable is absent at a distance of two or three days (and 
expects to return to the district of the court concerned), 
the magistrate (aadT) must warn him in writing of the 
petition and summon him to appear before the court within
a fixed delay* The defendant must appear or appoint a 
proxy. If he fails to do this he can be condemned to 
pay and his possession can be sold, without his having 
any other recourse since he has no appeal. 2) If the 
person who is justiciable is absent at a distance of ten 
days1 walk he can be condemned in personal matters (such 
as debt) but not in a matter of property. He preserves 
his right to appeal against the one in whose favour judg­
ment had been given. The court accepted his protest if 
he gave sufficient justification or new proof. 3) If 
the person who is justiciable is at a great distance, 
such as the distance between Mecca and Barbary or MadTna 
and Andalusia, the gadi will judge provisionally and the 
person absent is admitted to present his proofs upon, 
his return."'*'^
The decree of 27 May 1937 was aimed at persons who 
were residing in the district of the court issuing a 
summons but who failed to appear out of recalcitrance.
For that reason article one of the decree of 1937 abro­
gated article fifty-nine of the decree of 25 May 1876 
(basic decree organising the courts of the Shar7ca under 
Khair ad Din). The former article fifty-nine read:
The Governor (of the province) is held responsi­
ble for lending a strong hand to the Shar7ca or
l6l#Mcdik1: Bach Mufti, Report on contracts, Archives 
of the Par al Bay, Series E, carton 155, Dossier 6.
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to the gadi of his district to constrain recalci­
trant persons to appear in court before him. He 
will assist him equally in the execution of the 
judgments every time that he required this of him 
in writing.
By article one of the decree of 1937 persons were no 
longer constrained. They were free to decide what was 
to their disadvantage. The decree of 1937 took account 
only of distances between the locality of the court and 
the place of residence, not the place to where the per­
son summoned had traveled. The court had to allow for 
seven days between the date the summons reached its des­
tination and the date required for appearance' in court. 
One day more was added for every ten thousand metres 
(myriametre) if the person summoned resided at some dis­
tance away from the court.
The summons had to be issued three times before judg­
ment could be given by default (articles five and six).
In conformity with both MalikT and HanafT law, article 
seven of the decree of 1937 required that the court not
rule in default before it appointed a representative for
162
the defendant•
*Article 1\ If, on the date fixed by the third sum­
mons, the defendant rteither appears in person nor sends a 
representative, the gadT will designate a wakTl to repre­
sent him. This wakTl ifiust remain vested with the affair 
until the solution of the dispute.
If the defendant appears after the ap­
pointment of the wakTl and demands that he follow the trial 
himself, he will not be granted his demand. However, he 
will be able to be in contact with the wakTl who was ap­
pointed officially and to furnish him with all informa-
footnote 270
tions and documents useful for the proceeding, or he 
can immediately constitute another wakTl.
In case o f d e fa u l t  o r absence o f th e  
w akTl thus c o n s t i tu te d ,  th e  qadT w i l l  a p p o in t a n o t h e r . . .
Article 20: In all matters, if the defendant him­
self nor his residence have been discovered, the judge will 
publish three times in a daily newspaper in Tunis an ad­
vertisement containing the name of the petitioner, that 
of the defendant, the object of the petition, and if the 
defendant fails to appear within 40 days of the last ap­
pearance of the advertisement, in person or by represen­
tative, a judgment by default will be rendered.
If at the end of the above delay the 
defendant does not appear in person or send a representa­
tive, the qadT will appoint a wakTl to represent him...
Article 2317 (HanafT): If the defendant is absent
after what the plaintiff proves against him or the wakTl 
is absent after the court accepts the evidence, but be- 
fore the settlement, or the wakTl dies, then that evidence 
is abandoned and_the court does not pass judgment. (Foot­
note 1 - Abu Yusuf says to pass judgment as a courtesy 
to the people...)
Article 2321 (M a l ik T ) :  Judgment is against the de­
faulting party only after the w akTl for him is instituted 
to argue for his right. (Footnote 1 - This is the opinion 
of Sahnun who made it effective.) (Muhammad bin Sahnun 
al *Alim bin al *Alim, 202-256 A.H., btiried in Kairfiuwan)
(Articles^ 2317 and 2321 taken from the draft of the Code of 
the SharTca, Ma.jallat al ^Ahkama as Shar5fVa~)
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After judgment was given by default according to prescribed
(
procedures, the defendant, as in the rules of the SharTca,
had a right to present a plea in opposition within a
definite delay after notification of the decision (ar-
163
tide twelve).
Contrary to MalikT law, the decree of 27 May 1937 
abolished the distinction between personal matters and 
property matters, and applied judgment by default in all 
personal and property patters within the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the SharTca:
(article twenty, paragraph four) However, the judg­
ments rendered in matters of family maintenance 
or guardianship remain in every case regulated 
by the second paragraph of article thirteen (on 
the provisional execution of judgments by default 
in maintenance and guardianship).
(article twenty-one) The above provisions are equally 
applicable to the defendants who are under Tuni­
sian jurisdictions in land matters...
As for HanafT law, thirty years before the decree of 1937 
the HanafT muftT had been known to threaten to apply judg-
163 ’Article 12: The judgment by default will be served
by the head clerk to the defendant with mention that he has 
the right to put in opposition within 40 days from the date 
of receiving the notice.
This notification will be done in per­
son or left at his residence^., .by an intermediary of the 
Sheikh al MadTna or of the ga*id as far as our subjects 
are concerned.
If the defendant has not formed op­
position within the 40 days, the judgment will become exe­
cutory, excepting recourse before the Sharica of Tttnis if 
the decision comes from a provincial mahkama.
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ment by default in a matter of property* The mufti had
notified French and Italian proteges to appear or to
send their representatives to answer an action brought
by a Muslim Tunisian on shufca. He warned that failure
to appear would result in a judgment to the disadvantage
164
of the foreigners.
Harsh scrutiny of the courts of the SharTca did not 
take effect until the late 1940*s. To see how the changes 
came about one must look at events in an earlier period 
well before World War II. A few Tunisians had felt the 
need to reform the SharTca. The first Minister of Jus­
tice, Tahar Kheredine, son of the Prime Minister Khair 
ad Din of the nineteenth century, was deeply affected by 
the changes made a f t e r  World War I in Turkey, where he 
had lived when his father was exiled. Tahar Kheredine 
did not wish to change the substance of the SharTca so 
much as to get the qudah to learn a sense of e f f i c i e n t  a d -  
ministration o f , 'justice. The courts of the SharTca no 
longer held respect when compared with the Tunisian sec­
ular courts (Regional, jihawT, and cantonal, nawahT).
In 1924 Tahar Kheredine wrote a report on the reform of
16 *5the courts of the Shari*a. He pointed out three prob-
164 -r* -r-Letter No. 899 from Si Ahmed Bayroui, Hanafi mufti, 
to the Prime Minister, 29 October 1907*
1 6  S Tahar Kheredine, "Report**.
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lems and suggested solutions* The first problem was the 
religious control over the recruitment of the gudah in 
Tunis* The gudah were selected from the teachers of first 
class at the Grand Mosque. Their religious training 
had two detrimental results: First, their thinking was
giore theoretical than practical for "functions as deli­
cate as those members of a superior Court"* Second, 
the magistrates of the SharT*a continued their teaching 
duties at the Mosque, or their duties as heads of reli­
gious brotherhoodsf Employment in two different minis­
tries (education and justice) simultaneously produced ad­
ministrative complications and detracted from the quality 
of work expected of a magistrate in his legal duties*
Tahar Kheredine recommended separating what he considered 
two functions —  religion and law —  which were so foreign 
to each other* Like his father, who set up the first 
most important secular school for training administra­
tors, Tahar Kheredine recommended creating a school de­
voted only to Muslim law. The educational program at 
the Mosque was too diluted with religion* However, the 
Minister of Justice recognised that tool which was later 
to be most persuasive in convincing the magistrates of 
the SharTca to change their ways. That tool was raising 
the salary to a level sufficient to keep magistrates from 
seeking additional employment*
The second problem which Tahar Kheredine cited was 
the confusion of jurisdictions. The court of the SharTca 
of Tunis had first instance as well as review or super­
visory jurisdiction over every provincial court of the 
SharTca in Tunisia, In turn, the court of the Shar7ca 
of Tunis could transfer a case which came before it to a 
provincial court. The exchange of cases seemed based on 
no set criteria, no other reason than that a party or a 
magistrate thought it best. As a result of popular pref­
erence to take cases to Tunis, the two gadT of Tunis were 
"overwhelmed by a job which exceed(ed) human capacity".
No court exercised a superior appellate jurisdiction. 
Vesting appellate jurisdiction in the Bay, in whose name
the ma*rud was issued, was not attacked by Tahar Kheredine.
 ^T T 1 •1
\-7hat he disliked was the intervention of the executive in 
settling a divergence of views over the least details 
of procedure. Superior appellate jurisdiction should have 
been reserved for only the main arguments and facts on 
which a decision rested.
The third problem was the slow procedure that re­
sulted in lengthy trials. This defect cost the courts of 
the SharTca popular respect. The complexity stemmed 
partly from the gadT being judge, chief secretary, chief 
editor, chief registrar, all at once, without time to su-
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pervise his subordinate secretaries. Slow procedure was 
partly due also to the poorly qualified notaries. The 
notaries, Tahar Kheredine complained, often did such 
poor work in gathering clear statements of witnesses, 
or clear statements of the issues at stake, before the 
trial, that the gadi had to have the work done again. 
Attempts at verifying written documents like outikas 
(wathTga) giving erroneous limits to properties were 
shoddy or non-existent. It was easy for persons of bad 
faith to take advantage of the gudah. The vast number 
of and the complex writing style of the sources of law 
which the gudah consulted meant that a gadi would have 
to spend much time searching among many opinions to find 
a solution to a complex or unusual issue. He had no 
systematic or practical collection of legal opinions at 
his disposal. The secular courts, ruling by codes, had 
a tremendous advantage over the courts of the Shar1ea 
in this respect. Trials for land matters brought before 
the courts of the Shari*a were particularly cumbersome, 
since numerous parties with various claims and conflict­
ing evidence of boundaries were usually involved. En­
forcement of a judgment once passed was slow too. For 
the correspondence from the gadi to the agent of execution 
had first to go to the Ministry of Justice then to the 
agent. For solving these procedural problems, Tahar
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Kheredine proposed a code of procedure for the courts of 
the Shari*a. The code would have divided the legal sys­
tem into distinct jurisdictions. Supplementary executive 
orders from the Ministry of Justice would have established 
a service of inspection for rendering an account of the 
state of the courts of the Shar7ca.
The proposals of Tahar Kheredine obviously met re­
sistance, since Tunisia continued for the next two de­
cades to tolerate the courts of the Shari*a without change. 
The French officials of the Protectorate did not consider 
the political atmosphere sufficiently stable to inter­
fere too far into the domains of the muftun and gudah.
As late as 1930, after fifty-three years of control of 
Tunisia, French officials feared political repercussions 
in matters of Tunisian Muslims adopting French nationality 
by application to the government or by marriage. The 
French left the solution to such matters to the courts, 
but did not bar themselves from pressuring the gudah 
who were prone to exclude a naturalised French Muslim 
from his legal rights under Islamic law. In 1933 one 
of the French contrQleurs in northern Tunisia demanded 
an answer from Tunis about the rights of a naturalised 
Muslim Tunisian to revenues of a hubus. A Muslim 
Tunisian had applied for French naturalisation, then with­
drew his demand when his co-religionists harassed him,
277
as was "frequent in such circumstances". The Muslim 
had wanted to be a French national because French law 
would have recognised him as being of majority age. This 
would have permitted him to enjoy the revenues of his 
properties in the hubus immediately. As long as he re­
mained a Tunisian Muslim the SharT^a prevented him from 
sharing in the revenues yet for two years. The local 
gadi, however, destroyed his dreams by informing him that 
naturalisation would result in his losing all rights in 
his property in the hubus. The opinion which the Direc­
tor of Tunisian Justice sent to the Resident General on 
the incident was contrary to that of the gadT. He ar-i ■■
gued that in French law the naturalised Muslim was sub­
mitted to French personal status and hence could not him­
self found a hubus since such act was illicit in French 
lav/ (by reason of its inalienability). Yet French lav/ 
did not prevent him from enjoying his rights as a bene­
ficiary of the revenues of the hubus because such rights
• ^ T- -
were a result of usufruct, a concept which was not con­
trary to French law. In French lav/ rights deriving from 
one’s religion were not denied unless they were contrary 
in essence to French law. The position of the qadT was 
deemed untenable, first, because the traditional SharTca 
had never considered consequences of changes in nationality, 
and secondly, because the Maliki and Hanafi courts of
Tunis had issued fatawin stating that a Muslim naturalised
Frenchman was not excluded from the Muslim community.
166
The provincial qadT was to be warned of his error.
By the 1940fs there had matured a Tunisian elite of 
magistrates who worked in the secular Tunisian Regional 
courts (,j ihawT) and the Ouzara (Wazara). By 1947 they 
all formed an Association which published a journal 
(A1 Qada* at-TunisT) expressing their wishes for appoint- 
ment of only Tunisians to supervise the secular courts 
(for example, the Public Prosecutor for Tunisian courts 
was a Frenchman) just as only Frenchmen supervised French 
justice. The French at least had a reformist atmosphere 
on their side when they advocated implementing the 1924 
proposals of Tahar Kheredine. What immediately precipi­
tated the Code of Procedure for the courts of the S harTca  
was an action of review that was contrary to usual pro­
cedures. A decision of a gadi in Ttmis was reversed in
167
fa v o u r  o f a d e c is io n  by a p r o v in c ia l  qadT. The m a tte r
'Letter No. J-766-1 of 18 April 1933 from Director 
of Tunisian Justice to Resident General. Letter of 
21 Feburary 1933 from Vice-Consul to C0ntr6leur Civil. 
Letter No. 428 of 17 March 1933 from ContrOleur Civil to 
Resident General.
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''Sheikh Sidi Muhammad al-*Aziz Ja^it, Former Minis­
ter of Justice and MallkT Bach MuftT, At-TarTga al murdTya 
fT»l * i.jra1 ati as-^shahcTyati cala madhab al malilciyati 
(The Gratifying Way of the Rule's of the Sharica According 
to the MSlikT madhab) ('funis: lalftrada, Second
Edition, n.d.), page 287» footnote 1.
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was upsetting since the gudah of the capital regarded
16 Rthe provincial gudah as "judiciary deputies11* A*
reversal of a decision of the courts in Tunis was also
an affront to their country-wide jurisdiction. The
decree of 25 May 1876 had provided for interference in
the decisions of the courts in Tunis only if the muftun
and gudah could not reach an unanimous judgment (article 
l£9 '
six).
The interest of the French in settling matters of 
judicial competence through a code of procedure grew 
particularly keen when the Bay in 1941 ordered the Minis­
try of Justice to prepare a draft of a decree whose aim 
was to be to restore to the courts of the SharT^a penal 
competence in matters of infractions of the religious 
law (such as blasphemy, failure to observe fasting). The 
Bay had been upset when he learned that the Regional court
168.
Tahar ICheredine, "Report".
16 9.
Article 6 : The examination of certain questions,
provoking sometimes controversies on the matter of the ap­
plication of the law, in the case where divergences oc­
cur among the opinions expressed by the members of the 
SharTca belonging to one or the other of the two rites, 
without the discussion leading them to a single and united 
opinion, the bach-muftT of the court where the division 
occurred will draw up a report in which he will develop the 
arguments produced in support of each opinion; each judge 
will sign the opinion which he supports and the report 
thus drawn up and signed will be addressed to the Govern­
ment . (Decree of 25 Hay 1876)
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of Tunis (Driba, or Dariba) ruled on an affair of a Muslim -
being drunk during Ramadan after the HanafT oadT had• . ■ " # •—■
previously passed judgment on the same affair* The HanafT
♦
court had condemned the accused to one month of imprison­
ment on the basis of article fifteen of the decree of 
170
25 May 1876, While in prison he was summoned be­
fore the secular Regional court of Tunis and condemned to 
five days of imprisonment and a fine of twenty francs.
The Ministry of Justice explained to the Bay that arti­
cle fifteen of the decree of 1876 had been abrogated by 
the Tunisian penal code of 9 July 1913. Article seven­
teen prescribed that no one could be punished except 
by virtue of a written disposition of law. The penalty 
prescribed by the HanafT qadT had been of the category 
of taCzTr, which unlike the hudud, were not provided for
in written law but Y/ere according to the discretion of the 
171
judge.
 ^ 'Article 15: ••• CrhG SHeikh Mufti) will give re­
proaches (admonishments) to the parties who merit them, 
will order arrests he judges necessary and will write 
msraslas (murasala) to the gudah of the districts...
171 'Ministry of Justice, Note on the matter of com­
petence in penal matters, 29 October 1941.
The law for the jurisdictions of the courts of the 
SharTca needed clarifying. Just as the Sfez affair pre­
ceded the EAhd al *Aman, so the two above matters of 
jurisdictions in the 1940,s preceded the Code of Pro­
cedure for the courts of the SharTca.
The exposition of the motives for the Code of Pro­
cedure reveal the political methods which had to be used 
to persuade the traditional gudah and muftun to accept 
a code which affirmed certain previous practises as well 
as introduced practises contrary to traditional views 
on appellate jurisdiction. The morale of the gudah and 
muftun in Tunis had been deteriorating since the late 
1920’s. The Administration of *Ahbas began to find in the 
1920’s that it no longer could afford to increase its fi­
nancial obligations. This meant that the gudah suffered 
for lack of money for replacing or repairing buildings 
and furnishings. The government of the Protectorate 
decided to put the expenses of the courts of the SharTca 
on the credit of the State budget(tax revenues not rev­
enues from *ahbas) as were the expenses for the secular
. • 172Tunisian courts. Then only four years after Tahar
Kheredine lamented the paucity of salary which drove many
muftun and gudah to seek additional employment, the muftun
172 'Ministry of Justice, Report on the salaries of the 
Sharica, circa 1926 (see page 86 of Chapter I above).
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won the support of the Bay in a campaign to make the 
salaries of muftun at least equal to, if not superior 
to, the salaries of gudah by reason of rank* Under the 
system before the Protectorate, the gudah had re­
ceived higher salary because they had more work. In 1930 
the muftun and gudah of Tunis were demanding that their 
salaries be equal to those of the presidents of the
Chamber of the Ouzara (Wazara) for civil and criminal ap- 
173
peals. In 1945 the Resident General received a pro­
posal for elevating the muftun beyond the pay of the
President of the Ouzara (Wazara) up to that of a minis- 
174
ter. Aware of the financial dissatisfaction of the
judges of the SharTca, the Bay and the French government 
agreed to "assure to the religious magistrates salaries
in relation to the importance and dignity of their
17 5 ~rfunctions.•.," provided that the judges of the Sharica
would accept reforms in their organisation to simplify "■pro­
cedure. They had the following in mind: "The most im-
173.
Ministry of Justice, Petition to the Bay,
30 April 1930.
174.
Letter from Roger Gromand to the Resident General, 
No. 5614 of 24 November 1945.
175.
_ Letter from His Highness the Bay to the Sheikh 
ul Islam and to the Maliki Bach Mufti, n.d.
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portant of these reforms will consist in the codifica­
tion of the rules of procedure. It is essential that 
the total of these rules be presented in one form and 
with a method which, while suppressing as much as pos­
sible the controversies, facilitates the task of judges 
and avoids, for the persons who are justiciable, any 
uncertainty about the ways and means to be employed for 
making the most use of their rights. It is equally in­
dispensable that these rules be to all extent possible 
simplified and put in harmony with the modern conditions 
of existence.11"*"^
A consultative commission was appointed to give opin­
ions on the code. The members were the two chief mufti 
of the two rites in Tunisia, a subordinate mufti and two 
gadi from each, rite, and a judge from the Tribunal Mixte. 
The main principles which they were to consider were 
appellate jurisdiction and the means and conditions for 
appeal for reversal of judgment. Later the Minister of 
Justice, who was simultaneously the Malikl Sheikh ul 
Islam (Bach Mufti), issued a ministerial order appointing 
twenty persons to examine the Code of Procedure for the 
Shar1ca. Most were muftun and gudah from each of the 
two rites; members of the deliberative quasi-legislative 
body called the Grand Council; members of the highest
1 7 6 .
Ibid.
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appellate secular court, the Ouzara (Wazara); teachers 
of law from the Grand Mosque; Tunisian lawyers; and 
oukils (wakTl), or advocates, from the secular Tunisian 
courts. The committee was weighted heavily in favour 
of the magistrates of the capital, Tunis.
Finally on 5 August and 2 September 1948 there ap­
peared respectively a decree and a code prescribing proce­
dure for the courts of the SharTca. Despite the political 
tools used to persuade the judges of the Shariea to accept 
codification, the Code of 2 September 1948 was still in 
some ways a compromise. It was a compromise between advo­
cates of an uniform system and those high magistrates of 
the Shar7ra in Tunis who did not wish to lose their ancient 
prerogatives. As we noted earlier, the committee for draft 
ing the Code was weighted in favour of the magistrates of 
the capital. In matters of jurisdiction by subject matter, 
the chief muftun and qudah judging alone in Tunis won con- 
cessions. Generally, all courts of the SharTca —  in 
Tunis or in the provinces —  had jurisdiction only in mat­
ters of personal status of Tunisian Muslims and any foreign 
Muslims who were not proteges of the French Republic.
The listing of the categories of affairs of personal sta­
tus in articles one and two of the Code was sufficiently 
clear to avoid confusion over whether the courts of 
the SharX'a had competence to rule on penal punish­
ment in actions offensive to the public religious
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conscience (see pages 279-281 above). Article
seven of the Code reinstated a traditional division of 
functions among the gudah. In former ages, gudah had 
special areas of jurisdictions, such as a gadi for mar­
riage affairs, a gadi for guardianship. Article seven 
accepted also the customary distinction in Tunisia be­
tween gudah judging alone and gudah judging in a body 
(medjless, or majlis), then assigned personal status 
matters (marriage, repudiation, etc.) to gudah judging 
alone and property matters (hubus, shufca, etc.) to gudah 
judging in a medjless ( m a j l i s ) . T h e  provision was
Article 2: Cases of personal status and inheri­
tance in which the courts of the SharT*a are competent 
are those which are between Muslim Tunisian subjects or 
between Muslims who are not subjects and who are definitely 
not proteges of a non-Muslim state. _
As for cases of claim (* istihagag) 
the courts have competence in them equally b'et'we^ n subjects 
or between subjects and non-subjects.
If the cases be between subjects of 
a non-Muslim state they have no jurisdiction.
Article 1: The courts of the SharTca are compe­
tent in cases of personal status and in inheritance and in 
the validity or invalidity of contracts relating to per­
sonal status or the consequences of status for claim 
(*istihe]a<T ), and in the break-down of ties between spouses 
or actions of betrothal, and on the partition of property 
and its sale by auction.
(Articles 2 and 1 from the Code of Procedure for courts of 
the SharTca)
‘Article 7: The limits of the competence of the _
courts of the SharT*a are as follows: The provincial qadT
(nahiya) in the places where there are not majalis of 
Shari ca and the gad! in the towns which have a ma.ilis will
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largely a matter of putting into law the already exist­
ing tendency of Tunisians to take their land disputes to 
the medjless (majlis) rather than to a single qadT since 
the issues in land matters were usually complex* In mat­
ters of hubus particularly, opinions were many and varied* 
For example, it often happened that the magistrates com­
posing the HanafT courts disagreed over the amount of *
credibility to be given to written documents and titles 
of hubus. Certain magistrates in determining the bene- 
ficiaries to the revenues of land in a hubus depended on 
the list established by the mokaddem (mugaddam), or ad­
ministrator of the hubus * Other magistrates preferred
to depend on an authentic title in case the list of the
179
mugaddam and the persons named in the title differed.
r u le ,  in  l a s t  r e s o r t  s u b je c t to  appea l ( t a cgTb) , on p e r­
so n a l s ta tu s  such as th ose  p e r ta in in g  to  le g a l  competence 
( h a .jr ) , age o f m a jo r i ty ,  g u a rd ia n s h ip , m a rr ia g e  and i t s  
e f f e c t s ,  and in h e r ita n c e .
And the two Sheikhs ul Islam and the two gadT 
sheikhs will rule on a rotation basis, in last report and 
subject to appeal, in the capital in the capacity of single 
judge in cases of personal status and suits for claims
(aistihyag)»... .
The iftajalis of Sharica m  the provinces will rule 
in last resort subject to appeal on property cases, those 
concerning revenues from * ahbas, and those which are trans­
ferred by the gadT who judges alone.••
!79.D r a f t  No. 115, 10.3.41, fro m  W azTr a l  K abTr.
Ministry of Justice, "Report on credibility of 
titles of hubus," 4 June 1941.
While Tunisians took land disputes in general to 
the majalis, article 43 of the decree of 25 May 1876 on 
courts of the Sharica restricted hubus and inz£l to the 
qa<Ji and majlis of Tunis. All other land matters could 
have been heard by provincial courts.
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Since several litigants -were usually involved in complex 
land matters and there was bound to be at least one of 
them who disagreed with the decision of a qadT judging 
alone, the litigants saved time when they took their 
case befnre several gudah of a majlis from the start*
The chief muftun and gudah in Tunis did not want the same 
division of powers to apply to them* The two chief 
mufti and the gadi, therefore, were allowed to hear both 
cases of land and personal status, whether judging alone 
or in majlis * Two motives probably impelled them to de- . 
mand exception* First, they were particularly con­
scious of their status as the most learned of the gudah 
in the country. Secondly, they were aware of the many 
domains of law from which they had been progressively 
excluded (from criminal, from registered land, from 
French Muslims)*. The exclusion was contrary to Islamic 
law* Islamic law allowed the individual gudah to be con­
fined to particular kinds of cases (e.g*, marriage), 
but the gudah as a whole were responsible for all domains 
of law*
On the issue of jurisdiction by rank, that is, the 
appellate system, there were compromises too. Advocates 
of uniformity won the creation of two new organs. They 
were the supreme appellate courts of the SharTca (cas­
sation, or ta*gTb), one for each rite, endowned with ju­
risdiction over the entire country. They essentially
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replaced the two Councils of the decree of 14 November 
1856 organising the courts of the SharTca. The supreme 
appellate courts differed in composition from the 
Councils* Only the Sheikh ul Islam of the HanafT and 
MalikT rites and two subordinate muftT sat on the supreme 
courts. No qadT participated* The qudah in 1948 were 
confined to first instance affairs. The decisions of 
all provincial majalis (muftun and gudah judging in a 
group) and of any provincial gadT judging alone were 
subject to reversal on appeal by any of the litigants 
to the supreme courts in Tunis. The decree of 27 May 
1937 instituting judgment by default in the courts of the 
SharTta had already established the expectation that re­
course from provincial courts was to the capital when
a defendant did not present opposition within the re-
180 _
quired time of delay (article twelve). In Tunis
the decisions of only the gadT and subordinate muftT 
judging alone were subject to the jurisdiction of the su­
preme courts. Since each supreme court in Tunis was 
made up of chief and subordinate muftun who could also 
serve as gudah judging alone in first instance, the decree
180.
Article 12: ...If the defendant has not formed op­
position within the delay of forty days...the judgment 
will become executory, under reserve of recourse before 
the SharTca of Tunis if the decision was issued by a
mahkama of the provinces.
 - ■
accompanying the Code of 1948 clarified a point that 
was obscure in the decree of 25 May 1876 organising the 
courts of the SharTca. The Code of 1948 made it clear 
that any mufti who had participated in a given affair in 
the first instance debates or had given directives to
j
the provincial gadi whose decision was appealed in Tunis
could not sit on the supreme court for that case (ar- 
181
tide five). Such a safeguard against a prejudiced
appellate judge had been lacking in the decree of 1876,
since the Council hearing the cases deferred to it by
the gudah in Tunis was presided over by the same gudah
of Tunis who had heard the case in first instance (ar-
182
tide fifteen). The stumbling block to uniformity
in the appellate system was the majlis of Tunis. There
181. _
Article 5: The muftun who have, in their capac­
ity as representatives of the ^adT, had to know an af­
fair in first instance or to givAto the gudah of the in-* 
terior provinces directives on which the guASh have based 
their judgments, cannot sit on the supreme Court of ap­
peal (taJCgTb) to pass sentence on these same judgments. 
(Decree of 2 September 1948, attached to Code of 1948, 
J.O.T. 14 September 1948)
182.
Article 15: The sheikh muftT shall give his opin­
ion to the gadT when it is required of him and to the in­
dividual who Aonsults^Jiim. He will exercise the role of 
substitute when the gadT will be prevented from appearing.
AS for the council, all sheikhs 
form a united body, and the gudah preside over the de­
bates, each one in their rite.
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uras one for each rite. Consisting of the muftun and 
gudah, the majalis used to be the two Councils provided 
for in the decree of 1876 with country-wide jurisdic­
tion. When the two supreme courts replaced the two Coun­
cils, the majalis in Tunis became equivalent to any pro­
vincial majlis, the difference being that the majalis 
in Tunis were for the district of Tunis, no other.
The majalis in Tunis demanded that some special preroga­
tive remain with the majalis, so that they could con­
tinue to be distinguished from the provincial majalis♦
The prerogative granted was that certain of the decisions 
of the majalis in Tunis were not subject to the country­
wide jurisdiction of the supreme courts. These decisions 
were subject, instead, to reversal only if so granted 
by the Bay in a marrud (executive decision), the Bay 
being the gadT of the gudah.
Although the majalis of Tunis per se had no more com­
petence to take cases from the provincial gudah or 
majalis in any part of Tunisia, the members of the majalis 
of Tunis in practise retained country-wide jurisdiction. 
For the members of the majalis of Tunis and the supreme 
appellate courts were the same. The Sheikh ul Islam pre­
sided over both the HanafT majlis of Tunis and the 
HanafT supreme appellate court. The Bach MuftT presided
over both the MalikT majlis of Tunis and the MalikT
183 _  _ 
supreme court. Subordinate muftun in Tunis also
served on both courts. As a result, the changes in 
the jurisdiction of the courts of Tunis over all pro­
vincial courts simply amounted to two different posts 
being assigned to the same persons. Once that was ac­
complished for preserving the wide scope of the juris­
diction of the Sheikh ul Islam and the Bach Mufti, 
there was no choice other than to exempt the majalis 
of Tunis from the general rule of appeals to a higher 
court. The judges of the supreme appellate courts could 
not hear the appeals of their own judgments in the 
majalis of Tunis. Nor were the chief muftun apparently 
willing to give up the salary for the members of the 
majalis of Tunis. Thus, only the Bay was left to ar­
bitrate on appeals from the majalis of Tunis. There 
was no one in the legal profession possessing higher
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Article 50: The minimum number of those meeting
in every maj1is of the SharTca is three of the sheikhs.
The majlis in the capital is pre­
sided over by the head (the Sheikh ul Islam or Bach 
Mufti) if he is present, or by the most senior member in 
authority if he is not present. The provincial majlis 
is presided over by the chief muftT, and, where there is 
no chief muftT, by the gadT. (Code of Procedure, 1948)
_  Article 2: Each of these chambers (HanafT and
MalikT_chambers of ta^gTb) is composed of th£ Sheikh 
ul Islam of the rite m  question, in capacity of presi­
dent, and of the two mufti of the same rite in capaci­
ty of members.
In case of absence of the president, 
the latter is represented by the most senior muftT of the 
rite. (Decree of 2 September 1948)
learning than the Sheikh ul Islam and the Bach MuftT,
And only someone of superior learning or superior po­
litical authority could have reversed their judgments.
The most significant changes brought by the Code 
of 1948 lay in the very concept of the functions of ap­
pellate jurisdiction. The Code brought the Tunisian le­
gal organisation closer to a Western model. Such ap­
pellate system is characterised by distinct layers of 
jurisdiction, distinct reasons for appeals, preserva­
tion of control over all decision-making within the ju­
diciary, and efficiency in the administration of the 
law. As we discuss the changes brought by the Code we 
shall also note how compromise forced the changes to 
co-exist with some old practises. In regard to the 
first characteristic, the Code of 1948 clearly divided 
the courts of the SharTca into two layers: first in­
stance and final appellate. Yet it preserved the tra­
ditional practise of the qadT consulting the muftT if 
one of the litigants demanded (article five). In
regard to reasons for appeals, the Code was not expan­
sive. It specified grounds for appeal only when the 
majalis of Tunis applied for a ma^rud from the Bay.
184- •—Article 5: The muftun who have, in their capac­
ity as representatives of 'the g’M.T, had to know an af­
fair in first instance or to giv£ to the gudcth of the in­
terior provinces directives on which the gufeh have based 
their judgments cannot sit on the supreme court of appeal 
to pass sentences on these same judgments. (Decree of 
2 Septemebr 1948)
The one ground was "taadjize" (ta*ajTz), that is, the
decision of the ma.j 1 is had been based on inability of
the defendant to produce evidence sufficient to answer
the claims and proofs of the plaintiff (article seventy- 
185
four). Although the law of appeal applied to both 
the HanafT and MalikT chambers of the majalis of Tunis, 
the law of tacajTz was MalikT law, but reversal of that 
kind of judgment was HanafT law, A MalikT judge in tra­
ditional law could grant delay to the plaintiff or de­
fendant to procure enough evidence to challenge the ev­
idence already presented. When the time period for 
the delay expired, the judge ruled on whether the party
for whom the delay had been granted had or had not es-
186
tablished his plea. In traditional HanafT law the 
judge either accepted or rejected a plea without grants 
of delay. For example, if a party filed a petition
^•Article 74: Appeal (ta*qTb) will be accepted
for cases judged by a single judge or by a provincial 
maj1is of SharT'a. As for the judgments of the sessions 
of the majlis of the capital, appeal is accepted only 
after a beylical macrud is issued at the request of the 
the court when it is a'question of judgments based on the 
incapacity of the defendant to produce means of proof 
(tacajTz). As for judgments not based on ta^a.jTz, their 
appeal is not subject to a beylical authorisation. Such 
will be the case of judgments invoked by the party for 
being confirmed by another judgment emanating from an­
other court of the SharT'a,
186\ja*it, page 77 et sq.
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against a person who had use of a certain house and 
argued that the house was inherited by the petitioner 
from his father and established his claim, the judg­
ment was for the petitioner* Later if the ex-defendant 
brought to court a document showing that the father 
of the ex-plaintiff sold the house in question to the 
parent of the ex-defendant, the court reversed (naqd)
the first judgment after the ex-defendant established
187
his proofs and refuted the plea of the ex-plaintiff*
It would have been in the second instance when the ex­
defendant brought new evidence that.the majalis of Tunis 
would have applied for a ma*rud to reverse the first 
decision in favour of the ex-plaintiff* However, judg­
ment based on tatajTz was applicable only to those 
rights which once established could be abrogated by the 
person holding them (as in contracts of sale, debts)*
In regard to judgments of the majalis dealing with hubus, 
talag, affiliation, inheritance, that is, domains where 
rights once established, could not be abrogated, the 
Code of 1948 made them susceptible to appeal to the 
supreme appellate courts without any intervention on 
the part of the Bay* Appeal was at the initiation of 
the parties, not the majalis * The original draft of the
187.
The example is a translation of article 2252 
(Hanafi) from Majallat al JAhkam As Shar.cIya: (draft 
oJf the Code of the Shari^a).'
Code of 1948 had made all judgments —  whether based 
on ta ^ a jT z  or otherwise —  of the majalis of Tunis sus­
ceptible to reversal only by ma*rud. The final draft 
of the Code, as article seventy-four shows, consi­
derably encroached on the prerogative of the majalis 
in Tunis* The discrepancy between the original draft 
and the final draft of the Code shows that compromise 
was reached at the expense of simplicity in procedure. 
More important, the discrepancy shows that refdrm- 
minded Frenchmen and Tunisians were strong enough to 
force traditionally-minded muftun to subject important 
matters of family law (talaq, affiliation, inheritance) 
to a new system of procedure*
In the absence of any extensive definition of the 
grounds of appeal from the gadT judging alone or from 
the provincial majalis, one would presume that the mag­
istrates of the two supreme appellate courts heard ap­
peals according to their discretion. In traditional 
MalikT law a judgment was reversed only if grave injus­
tice or a blatant mistake had been committed* The worst 
a qadT could do was to contradict unmistakably the 
Qur?an, or the sunn a, or an 1 ijma*, or clear giyas. 
Determining what was the 3ijmafc, however, raised the 
most controversy. For example, there were varying opin­
ions on whether to accept a judgment based on the wit-
t
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nessing o£ a dhimmi to a will of a Muslim who was on
journey, or a judgment leaving inheritance to the ma-
188
ternal relatives, A judgment based on the testi­
mony of slaves, non-believers, or youths, or persons
who did not measure up to the standards of righteous-
189
ness (fasig) could be held in doubt. Whatever was 
grossly unfair in the judgment of a gadT known to be 
tyrannical was ground for reversal, even though the
190
judgment had the appearance of right judicial reasoning.
The level Of learning of the gadT also could give rise
191
to scrutiny of judgments. Litigants could dispute
judgments o f a m u g a llid  gadT who had f a i l e d  to c o n s u lt
men : more learned than he —  like the muftun of the
capital —  and had based his judgment on his discretion 
_  192
(* istihsan), However, the decision of a mugallid
i Q Q  ' Lpl ' ' ' ' , - ^ ,
#J[acitA  page 281. Based on Ibn Yunus, Al-Mazari, 
Ibn al-Majashun,
^ ^ #Jat*Tt, page 283, Based on Malik, Ibn al-Qasim,
Sahnun, Ibn ^Arafa.
•
^^•ja^Tt, page 285 • _Based on Ibn al-Qasira,
Ibn Muhraz, Ibn al-Maj ashun, M'alik.
191 —
_  #Ja*it, page 285# Based on Ibn Marzucj; Sheikh
Halulu, authdr of Mukhtasar; and sunna of Tunis,
192 —•*See pages 276-278 above on a gadi who had told
a Muslim Tunisian applying for French nationality in the
1930*s that his naturalisation would deprive him of his
rights in the revenues of the hubus. The French asked
that the yadi be referred to tfce fatwa of the muftun of
Tunis declaring that naturalisation did not result in 
denial of certain rights in the Shari*a.
gadT c o u ld  n o t be re v e rs e d  i f  th e  m a tte r  in  q u e s tio n
was controversial and not even the most learned muftun
193
had come to an unanimous agreement. In the HanafT 
madhab a matter of establishing beneficiaries to rev­
enues of a hubus by a title of hubus or by the word of 
the mugaddam would be an example of such controversy 
(see page. 286 above). Nor was a gadT al­
lowed to pass judgment on someone known to be his en-
194
emy.
In regard to the third characteristic of an appel­
late system —  preservation of control over decision­
making within the judiciary —  one may regard the right 
of the majalis in the capital to appeal to the Bay in­
stead of to the supreme appellate courts as more than 
an exception in an uniform appellate system. It rep­
resented,in addition,a great limitation on the Bay’s 
traditional interference in the majority of decisions 
of the courts of the SharTca. First of all, the Bay 
was limited to issuing a matrud reversing a decision 
of the majlis in Tunis only when the judgment was based 
on ta*ajTz (see page 293 above). The appellate juris-
193.
J afcTt, page 286..
194.
Ja*Tt, page 280.
diction of the Bay was further limited in that he could
not bring pressure to bear on the litigants to appeal
for a reversal of a decision of ta*ajTz which might
displease him; for only the members of the majalis
themselves could initiate appeal for reversal of their
195
decisions (article seventy-four). In the second
place the Code of 1948 removed all government inter­
ference in the decisions of the provincial courts. All 
provincial decisions were to be reviewed on appeal by 
the supreme appellate courts of Tunis. The decisions
of the supreme courts were final, whether they were by
196
majority or unanimous vote (article four). The Code 
ended the system of communication promulgated in the 
decree of 25 May 1876. According to the decree of 
1876, communications between the provincial courts (of 
the gudah or the ma.jalis) were such that any case which 
the.magistrates of Tunis removed from the provinces 
could eventually be presented to the government for final 
decision, especially when the magistrates in Tunis could
195.
Article 74: ...As for judgments rendered by the
majlis of the_capital, appeal is accepted only after a 
beylical macrud is issued at the request of the court 
when it is a question of judgments based on ...(tacajTz)..
196.
Article 4: ...The judgment of the chamber of ap­
peal (tacgib) is pronouncedjby the president of each of 
the two courts, HanafT or MalikT, on the majority of 
opinions. (Decree of 2 September 1948)
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not reach an unanimous decision (article six, decree 
197
of 1876).
While the Code of 1948 imposed greater limits on 
the Bay’s interference in the judiciary, the Code left 
certain key magistrates in Tunis an uncommon control 
over their own decisions. We noted that advocates of 
a systematic uniform appellate procedure persuaded the 
traditional muftun of Tunis to limit their prerogative 
to tacajTz and to submit all other cases to the supreme 
appellate courts without application for a macrud (see 
page 295 above)# The original version of article 
seventy-four on the extent of the prerogative (that is, 
cases of the majalis of Tunis bypassed the supreme court 
and were subject only to the macrud ) was changed without 
a change being made in the composition of the supreme 
appellate courts and the majalis of Tunis, Both were pre­
sided over by the chief muftT of the appropriate rite (ar-
198
t i d e  fifty in the Code, article two in the decree).
^ ‘Article 6: The examination of certain questions,
provoking sometimes controversies on the matter of the 
application of the law, in the case where divergences oc­
cur among the opinions expressed by the members of the 
SharTca belonging to one or the other of the two rites, 
without the discussion leading them to a single and united 
opinion, the chief muftT of the court where the division 
occurred will draw up a report in which he will develop 
the arguments produced in support of each opinion; each 
judge will sign the opinion which he supports and the re­
port,*,will be addressed to the Government.
'Article 50: The minimum number of those meeting
300
The Sheikh ul Islam and the Bach MuftT also each had
the right to hear first instance cases as a qadT sit-
199
alone (article seven). Although article five of 
the decree of 2 September 1948 stipulated that any mufti 
who had participated in a first instance case could 
not sit on the supreme appellate court, in practise an 
awkward situation undoubtedly developed# For the two 
chief mufti of the MalikT and HanafT rites were re- 
garded as the most learned of the qudah in the realm# 
They were available for passing judgment as well as for 
consultation by subordinate muftun and qudah# If the 
Sheikh ul Islam or the Bach Mufti had made a first in­
stance decision or presided over a majlis in Tunis, then 
was excluded from presiding over the supreme appellate
in every Sharica maj1is is three of the sheikhs.
The majlis in tne capital is presided over by its 
head (Sheikh ul Islam or Bach MuftT) if he is present.••
Article 2 (Decree of 1876): Each of these cham­
bers (HanafT and MalikT chambers of ta*gTb) is composed 
of the#Sheikh ul Islam of the rite in^question, in capac­
ity of president, and of the two muftT of the same rite 
in capacity of members...
19£*Article^7 (Code ofJL948): ...The two Sheikhs
ul Islam jHanafT and MalikT) of the two rites and the two 
gadT of Tuftis will hear equally in last resort subject 
to appeal (ta^glb), on the days when they sit respectively, 
as single judge, affairs of personal status and land 
actions.••
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court when the first instance decision was appealed, 
the subordinate muftun sitting on the supreme appellate 
court would hardly feel comfortable about reversing 
the opinion of the most respected magistrate, especially 
when no obvious wrong appeared in the reasoning of 
the first instance decision.
As for greater efficiency in the administration of 
justice, the division of the courts into distinct lay­
ers of jurisdiction reduced congestion. Jurisdiction 
in land matters was more evenly distributed through-out 
all the courts of the SharTra. The Code of 1948 re­
lieved the courts in Tunis of the burden of hearing all
cases in  in z a l  and hubus and had th e  p r o v in c ia l  m a ja l is
■* 200 
to share in such jurisdiction. The appellate sys­
tem of 1948 was more appropriate for a society ih.vfbieh
200. _
Article 43 (Decree of 1876): The qudah of the
provinces will not be able to hear questions’of inzal 
or exchange of properties of 3 ahbas whether there exist 
in the locality a council of th£ sharT^a (majlis) or 
not. The examination of_these questions is reserved to 
one of the two gadT of Tunis,
Article 7 (Code of 1948); ...The majalis of the 
Shari*a of the provinces will judge in last resort, with­
in the limits of their competence, subject to appeal 
(tacgTb), on land matters, those concerning the revenues 
of hubus and those, which being of the competence of — 
the’single judge, are communicated to them by the qudah.
litigation was increasing faster than the number of 
judges being recruited. In an appellate system an 
inferior judge could be done with caseA, for example, 
and while a superior judge was hearing the appeal from 
case A, the inferior judge was handling case B, The 
system of review promulgated in the decree of 1876, how­
ever, had been more appropriate for a society where 
litigation was light. Under the traditional system of 
the SharT*a an inferior judge could be spending so much 
time on case A that he either delayed hearing case B 
or handled them simultaneously. The complex proce­
dure under the system of 1876 illustrates this point:
The gadT was responsible for the first instance hearing 
of a case as well as for the review hearings. If he
or the litigants took a case to Tunis (article thirty- 
201 _ 
four), the magistrates of Tunis were to defer the
case back to the inferior qadT with an opinion or deci-
s o n  1
Article 34 (Decree of 1876): If one of the par­
ties demands^to be sent before the council of the 
SharTfa of Tunis, whatever be the cause at hand before 
the gadT sitting alone or before the SharT^ of the lo- 
c al i ty * having a council, the gadT will send him there, 
whether it be the petitioner or the defendant, -unless the 
affair is so clear that it appears with evidence that 
the intention of the one who demands this sending away
to another court is only to gain time and to make the
adverse party lose money; in this case the gadT retains 
the affair.
If despite his de­
cision, the affair is carried before the SharTca of Tunis 
or before one of the two gadi of this city, it will be
prosecuted in conformity to article, 20 of Title I.
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s io n  ( a r t i c l e s  tw en ty  and t h i r t y - f i v e ) .  If th e  in ­
f e r i o r  gadT d isag reed ^ h e  c o u ld  suspend th e  judgm ent
until the chief muf tT  in Tunis settled matters (articles
203
thirty-five and thirty-six). Tossing of the ball 
back and forth between the capital and the provinces
‘Article 20 (Decree of 1876): The two gadT and 
the members of the council of the SharTea have the power 
to defer the judgments of affairs which are submitted 
to them by the inhabitants of the_cities or of the in­
terior of the Regency, to the qudah of these same local­
ities •
Article 35 ^Decree of 1876): If a muf tT or gadT
of the SharT^a of Tunis writes to the gadT of a judicial 
district to indicate to him the decision'in a civil, 
penal, or religious affair, the latter is held respon­
sible for conforming to the order of the superior mag­
istrate, unless he is of a contrary opinion, supported 
by a text of the law. In this case, he will suspend the 
judgment and will make known to the said magistrate the 
motive which stops him.
Likewise, if he^ 
receives several communications from the SharTca of Tunis, 
issued by magistrates of different rites or by several 
magistrates of the same rite, or by a single magistrate, 
he must, in the circumstances where it would be diffi-^ 
cult to establish agreement among them, or in the case 
where the party who has obtained them would have dis­
torted the facts, address on this subject a report to 
the Bach MuftT (or Sheikh ul Islam) according to whether 
the orders he received emanated from the HanafT or 
MaiikT s ourc e . *
If in a similar af­
fair orders are sent to him by magistrates of the two 
rites, he will address his report to the HanafT Bach 
MuftT.
But if these or­
ders have been repeated to him by a single magistrate, 
he will answer to this magistrate only.
20^*See article 35 above.
Article 36 (Decree of 1876): If a gadT of the
ended in 1948. The litigants appealed from an inferior 
judge. The superior appellate judge was to notify the 
inferior judge of the appellate decision. Whether it 
was a reversal, affirmation, or a retrial, the inferirr 
judge was to accept it. If the decision were an or­
der for a retrial, the case was not sent back to the 
same first instance gadT. Another inferior gadT or
majlis was to be designated to rehear the case (article 
204 _
eighty). In practise, however, the provincial qudah
could have easily undermined the efficiency of the ap­
pellate system by continuing lengthy consultations with 
the muf tun in Tunis before judgment was given and the 
wheels of appeal could go into operation. Article 
five of the decree of 2 September 1948 permitted such 
consultative communications between the capital and
p ro v in c e s  is  p reo ccu p ied  w ith  an a f f a i r  he w i l l  subm it 
i t  to  th e  c o u n c il ( m a j l i s ) o r to  th e  m u ftT , i f  th e re  
e x is ts  in  th e  c i t y  o n ly  one m u ftT .
I f  a l l  th e  m a g is tra te s  is s u e  th e  same o p in io n , he 
w i l l  f a l l  in  l i n e  w ith - t h e i r  o p in io n ; i f ^ t h e y  a re  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  o p in io n s , he w i l l  c o n s u lt  th e  gadT o f I t in is  
who w i l l  subm it th e  a f f a i r  to  th e  S h a rT *a  d f t h is  c i t y .  
T h is  c o n s u lta t io n  must e q u a lly  ta k e  p la c e  when th e  gadT 
does n o t sh a re  th e  o p in io n  o f  th e  m u ftT . " T
204.
In  case o f  adm ission  o f a p p e a l, th e  a f f a i r  is  
s e n t b ack , f o r  a new e x a m in a tio n , to  th e  i n i t i a l  j u r i s ­
d ic t io n ,  on c o n d it io n  th a t  it be e n t i r e ly  composed o f  
o th e r  members, o r to  an o th e r com petent j u r is d ic t io n  
o f th e  S h a r T * a . . .
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and provincial judges.
The Code of Procedure for the courts of the SharTca 
gave rise to a spate of other reforms in substantive 
lav. Article sixteen of the Code promised a code of 
substantive law of the SharTca to be applied by the 
courts of the SharT^a in matters of family law and land 
law. Article sixteen read: "The right of choice (about
which rite would apply) for the defendant will subsist 
until the promulgation of the code of the SharT^a which 
will unify the rules to be followed and will suppress 
the right of option for the defendant." The time had 
come for Tunisia to stop labouring under two different 
rites. Undoubtedly the competition between the parti­
sans of the two rites for dominance in Tunisia was partly 
responsible for Tunisia*s being far behind the eastern 
Islamic states in codifying and modifying the substan­
tive law of the SharT*a. Discrepancies in salary re­
flected the conflict. During most of the years of the 
Protectorate, the Sheikh ul Islam received more salary 
than the MalikT Bach MuftT because the HanafT muftT be-
205. _
Article 5 (Decree of 1948): The muftun who have,
in their capacity as representatives of tlhe g^dT, had to 
hear an affair in first instance or to give toJthe qudah 
of the interior provinces directives on which the giufeh 
have based their judgments, cannot sit on the supreme 
court of appeal (ta*gTb) to pass sentence on these
same judgments.
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longed to the same rite as the ruling family. Just be­
fore World War II, the salaries were equalised. After 
World War II the members of the two rites collaborated
to draft the Code of Procedure for the courts of the 
206
S h a rT *a . They f u r t h e r  agreed to  c o n s o lid a te  c e r ­
t a in  domains o f law  ( a r t i c l e  t e n ) .  In th e s e  domains a l l
t
litigants would be subject to only one law, regardless 
of their usual ritual tenets. There was no right of op­
tion for the defendant in these domains. Only a special 
beylical authorisation could ask one of the judges of 
rites to rule on an affair which normally fell under 
the competence of the judge of the other rite. The 
Code of 1948 assigned to the qudah of the HanafT madhab 
cases dealing with the following subjects: non-exercise
of jabr by a father over his adult virgin daughter;
— *In 1865 under Muhammad Sadiq Bay the HanafT Sheikh 
ul Islam and the MalikT Bach MuftT received the same sal­
ary, according to a letter sent by the MalikT muftT and 
qudah of Tunis to the Bay, 30 March 1930. In 1876, the
gave the HanafT Sheikh ul Islam a special lifetime in­
demnity for his help in preparing the decree of 25 May 
1876 on the organisation of the courts of the SharTca.
By an administrative error the compensation was incorpo­
rated into the salary of the post of Sheikh ul Islam.
Thus his salary became more than the salary of the MalikT 
Bach MuftT. In 1928 the Bay refused to equalise the sal­
aries because the Sheikh ul Islam had the prestige that 
came from belonging to the same rite as the Husseinite 
ruling family (Letter from Director of Tunisian Justice 
to Resident General, 27 June 1928). By 1939 the Sheikh 
ul IslSm and the Bach Mufti were given equal salary (note 
of 24 November 1945, No. 5614, for Resident General from 
Roger Gromand).
shufca exercised by neighbours; validity of sale re­
serving the right of repurchase to the seller (bair 
al wafa?); validity of sale whose price was.raisdd 
by a small amount outside the agreed upon contract of 
sale (kamsha majhula); validity of a hubus founded for 
the profit of the founder. The MalikT qudah had ex- 
elusive jurisdiction over the following types of cases 
since they were not provided for in HanafT law: talag 
because of the inability of the husband to pay mainte­
nance; talag because of injuries (*adrar) committed 
by the husband on his wife; sale of property by auc­
tion in the situation where the co-owners inherited 
property in common because the land was of an indivis­
ible nature; division and distribution of rights by 
inzal; contract of mogharsa (mugarasa), or share- 
cropping; validity of a will in favour of persons not 
yet existing; validity of a gift of indivisible land 
held in joint tenancy.
The reform in article ten was an effort to liberal­
ize the law by means of taglTd, in the sense that all 
Muslims were allowed to take advantage of liberal rules 
found in the school to which they did not belong. It 
was also an effort to make the law catch up with prac­
tise. For example, Tunisian MalikT girls were known to
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marry according to Hanafi ceremony in order to avoid
a marriage to be forced upon them by their MalikT
fathers, or in order to marry against the wishes of
their fathers. Prior to the promulgation of the Code
of 1948, the MalikT father had the right to go before
the MalikT magistrates to have the marriage annulled.
There resulted a conflict of laws. The marriage was
valid by HanafT law, but invalid by MalikT law. The mag-
istrates of the MalikT court in Tunis agreed to allow
the HanafT magistrates to hear such cases on the fol- .
lowing conditions: l) that the marriage guardian was
the plaintiff; 2) that his action was for annulment
of an union contracted without his authorisation, or
for disputing the social parity of the spouses; 3) that
the act of marriage had been concluded by virtue of
authorisation from the HanafT judicial authority;
207
4) that the marriage had been consummated. The Min­
ister of Justice (who was also the MalikT Bach MuftT) 
at the time of the reform in article ten recognised 
that the reforms could be justified as being in the pub­
lic interest. However, the words "public interest" 
ring hollow unless one knows how the courts would tend
'Letter from Ja^t to Secretary General of the 
Tunisian Government on proposal for royal announcement 
for expanding the meaning of article ten of the draft 
of the Code of Procedure for the courts of the Sharica. 
Letter dated 21 February 1949.
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to fulfill the requirements of "public interest"• In 
208
a memorandum the Minister implied two possible ways 
by which the qudah could go about adjudicating cases 
where parties were asserting rights under two different 
laws. One way was to find points, however detailed, 
of agreement between the' two laws and make actionable 
only those points of agreement. A second way was to de­
cide which party had best proved that his needs and in­
terests were more important and in greater need of im­
mediate fulfillment. Whether the qudah were to realise 
it or not, the second way to judgment would logically 
lead them to rethink and change the substantive law of 
the SharT*a. The change would not be due to political 
exigency or penance for neglecting ritual duties; it
would be due to a clear recognition that a given rule
<
created more abuses than it cured and so should be 
dropped.
A year after the Code of Procedure for the courts of 
the SharT^a was promulgated, the same Minister of Jus­
tice (and MalikT Bach MuftT) was appointed to head a 
commission for drafting another code, the Code of the 
SharT*a (decree of 16 June 1949, J.O.T. No. 55 of 
5 July 1949)* No unusual case occurred to motivate the
208.
See footnote 207*
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commission, as had been the case before the Code of 
Procedure was drafted* The commission in 1949 was ap­
pointed to fulfill the promise made in article sixteen 
of the Code of Procedure for a code of the SharT*a*
An order from the Tunisian Minister of Justice in 1952 
(j*O.T* No* 52 of 27 June 1952) expressed disappoint­
ment in the commission appointed in 1949* It had failed 
to finish carrying out its duties* Only the first 
section on marriage had been completed. The order of 
1952 expanded the commission and instructed it to meet 
regularly and complete the drafting of the code of the 
SharT*a. Places on the enlarged commission were fairly 
evenly distributed among magistrates of the courts of 
the SharT*a of Tunis (two chief muftT from each rite, 
two MalikT muftT, one MalikT gadT, one HanafT muftT, 
one HanafT gadT); representatives from the Ouzara 
(Wazara) and the Tribunal Mixte; several professors from 
the Grand Mosque Zaituna; some Tunisian lawyers and 
notaries. Less than one-half had participated in the 
drafting of the Code of Procedure for the courts of the 
SharT*a.
The specific task of the commission was to reduce 
the case law of the courts of the SharT*a and the author­
itative works of the HanafT and MalikT jurists on the
*
Islamic law of persons, succession, and land rights to
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a single code. Such a task was selective and meant 
that among several possible views of authoritative 
jurists and commentators for a particular case, the 
commission would have to settle on one view. The Com­
mission opted for the more conservative of the choices 
which the Minister of Justice had implied three years 
before were possible in reform (see page 309 above). 
That choice was to scrutinize the laws of the two rites 
for points of agreement and make as many as possible 
of those points actionable rather than rethinking the 
entire law in the light of what abuses had crept into 
the law. The result was a code of two thousand four 
hundred sixty-three articlesf divided into Book One on 
Personal Status (aAhkam al*Ahwal As ShakhsTya) and 
Book Two on Land Claims. and Procedure (* Ahkam al Masa*il 
al cAgarTya). The Code was divided into two columns,
one for MalikT rules and one for HanafT rules. The com-.
mission modeled the code along the intent underlying
article ten of the Code of Procedure, that is, certain
rules were to be within the exclusive competence of
only one rite. In other domains both sets of courts
209
were competent. To crown its work, the commission
209 Article 4 of one of the several drafts of the de­
crees for promulgation of the First Book of the Code of 
the Shari*a: "Each rite, Hanafi or MalikT, is competent
only in the affairs requiring the application of the pro-
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proposed that the two ma.ilis of the SharTca in Tunis 
create a body to rule on gaps in the Code then add 
their solutions to the Code when the occasion arose.
Not every opinion could be put in the Code; not every 
case envisioned or not envisioned in authoritative 
works could be put in the Code. The proposal was in har 
mony with another principle protected by the Code of 
Procedure. That was the principle of consigning the 
protection of the interest of the judiciary to the 
few muf tun in Tunis. The average gadT was not allowed 
to interpret the Code where precision was lacking. He 
was to consult the learned muftun of Tunis as had been 
expected long since the nineteenth century. While the 
Code of Procedure assured to the judiciary of the 
SharTca independence from interference from the execu­
tive administration in judgments for cases, the commis­
sion for the draft of the Code of the SharTca had to
visions of the present code that are inspired from the 
doctrine and jurisprudence of the rite. One rite must 
refuse to continue a case in favour of the other rite 
when the litigation will require the application of pro­
visions designated for this other rite.
Each rite will continue, however, to hear 
matters when they involve application of provisions ad­
mitted uniformly by the doctrine and jurisprudence of 
the two rites.
I am indebted to the Honourable Sldi Mahmud Al cAnnabi 
and Professor J.N.D. Anderson for their'making avail­
able to me copies of the Code of the SharTca.
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compromise the independence of the judiciary to change 
the laws themselves. The muftun and qudah of Tunis 
were to be responsible for initiating proposals for 
changes in the Code of the SharTca once promulgated, 
but the opinions of the muftun had to be sanctioned 
by the Minister of Justice and in turn the Bay. Gone 
was the power of the judiciary of the SharTca to choose 
what rule it wanted to apply. According to the propos­
al of the commission, the judiciary would have won 
freedom to give judgment without interference while
losing freedom to choose the bases on which judgment 
210
was to rest.
The work of the commission was of little avail, how­
ever. The reactions of the judicial counselors, espe­
cially the French, were unfavourable to the monumental 
and monstrously lengthy draft code. The draft code 
won praise as a work of Islamic erudition. For it was
210 'Article 3 of one of several drafts for the de­
cree promulgating the Code of the SharTca: "The cases
which are submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of 
the SharTca after complete editing of the Code, comple­
tion of the work of the Commission, and final promulga­
tion, and which are recognised as belonging to the cate­
gories not provided for in the text of the Code, will be 
the subject^of common deliberation of the magistrates of 
the two majalis, HanafT and MalikT. They will search 
respectively for Solutions, agreeing or diverging, ac­
cording to the two rites and they will note the one 
which appears to them the most well-known. These two 
majalis thus meeting will substitute for the commission 
of the Code and will present to Our Minister of Justice
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an exhaustive reproduction of MalikT and HanafT rules 
on family law, succession, land claims, and procedure 
in a trial before a gadT, Yet the commission and its 
critics differed over the function of a code and forms 
and substance most befitting that function. The critics 
argued essentially that a code should unify rules of 
law in one edition. Unification of the law meant that 
all the competent judges would use the same source of 
law to serve as a basis for the reasons underlying 
their decisions. The merit of unification is the limit 
which it places on arbitrary decision-making. The form 
appropriate for a code is the form appropriate for a 
reference book, namely, broad classifications and sub­
classifications under which one can quickly find what 
one seeks. If one is going to limit judges to only one 
source of law, then the substance of that code should 
comprise rules which the judges wish and need to con­
sult. The rules which a judge would want to consult 
would be those designed to cover most of the situations 
coming before his court. Otherwise, the judge cannot 
fulfill satisfactorily/ his basic job, namely, to settle
a detailed report on the points of agreement or of di­
vergence which came out in the course of their delibera­
tion. A Beylical decree will promulgate the solution 
which will be adopted in the particular case and in all 
similar cases. The solution will be the subject of an 
addendum to the part of the Code treating the matter.”
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as many of the disputes as possible* This means that 
the substance of the codes must be kept up to date with 
the behaviour of a society. Otherwise, the code be­
comes a collection of knowledge that the judge would 
have little need to consult. He would have to go else­
where, like persons seeking the latest editions of an 
encyclopedia. The commission drafting the Code of the 
Sharica had members who were familiar with the form of 
a code, that is, classification of material and num­
bering of articles. The substance, however, consisted 
of much more than general rules; it posited past cases 
which many qudah had encountered and hypothetical or 
possible cases which a gadT might encounter. Certainly 
any set of rules reflect the general behaviour and 
drives (marriage, end of marriage, death, maintenance 
of a child) of a society, but a collection of detailed 
cases —  past or possible —  runs the risk of being 
outdated, as the details of general behaviour and drives 
change. Or it runs the risk of being irrelevant as 
the society may not follow the course which was hypoth­
esized. For example, one of the earliest drafts of 
the Code of the SharT'a contained articles on hadd for
'r" ■ ■ 1
adultery (article one hundred eighty-five), a domain
_ 211 
in which the qudah were no longer competent.
pi i
“Ministry of Justice, Note 918TSJ4 of 28 July 1950
Inheritance by slaves (article six hundred fifty-six)
was another example# It was an area that was relevant
to only a few possessions that fell into the hands of
the Chief of State in case of cessation of the line of
a former slave, for slavery had been abolished in the
212
nineteenth century. Since the substance of the draft 
code was divided into two possible rules or case situa­
tions, according to MalikT and HanafT views, the draft 
code did not serve the function which French critics 
expected. It failed to unify the rules and to cut off 
all option of choice of rite. We noted that the com­
mission wrote the code in the vein of article ten of 
the Code of Procedure, allowing only one rite exclu­
sive competence in certain domains and shared competence 
in others (see page 311 above). Yet article six­
teen had promised an end to shared competence. Only 
one view on a given rule or situation was to be sover­
eign, to the exclusion of other rules or views. This 
failure to carry out the mandate in article sixteen re­
flected how the Islamic jurists differed from the French 
in notions about the material sources of law (as op-
for the Secretary General of the Tunisian Government.
212.
Minister of Justice to His Excellency the Prime 
Minister of the King of Tunisia on the Code of the 
SharTta.
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posed to abstract sources like morality or habit).
The material sources of Islamic law are essentially 
tviQ kinds: the Qur*an and the commentaries. The
*ahadTth are the commentaries from the Prophet and his 
Companions; the works of the founders of schools of 
thought and the fatawin are commentaries of jurists 
on what has preceded them as well as on their contem­
porary situations. The function of the commentaries 
is to make order out of the Qur^an, whose form would 
scarcely qualify it as an easy reference book of rules. 
Each succeeding commentary attempted to make order out 
of the preceding. The fatawin especially represented 
efforts of muftun to bring order to preceding commen­
taries so that the wisdom of precedents could be brought 
to bear on factual situations that were not foreseen 
in any previous commentary. For lack of elaborate dog­
matism Islamic jurists could not impose one manfs com­
mentary on all believers, for the concept of law based 
on one manfs view would rival with the authority of the 
Qur^an. Nor could they use the Qur^an as a direct 
source of law because of its unwieldy form. Islamic ju­
rists agreed with the merits of the function of a code, 
namely, to unify the law and thereby reduce arbitrary 
decisions. Yet given the absence of dogmatism and the 
disorganised form of the Qur*an, the Islamic jurists
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had to achieve the same functions as a code would serve 
by a different route. The Islamic judiciary was sub­
ject to limits other than codified material sources. 
These limits were the satisfaction of the litigants with 
the jurisdiction of a given gadT; the conscience of 
the gadT; and the power of the muftT in urban centres 
to review decisions of the gudah. These were the tools 
which the Islamic society had for enforcing the limits 
of judicial reasoning as expounded in treatises studied 
at the mosques. The judges were no longer to use 
*ijtihad on the Qur^an and *ahadTth. The basic authori­
tative books of the founders of the madhahib had de­
limited the basic principles governing general social 
behaviour, such as no marriage without consent, legiti­
macy only through valid marriage at the time of concep­
tion of the child, validity of polygamy, sharing of
inheritance between the casaba and the fara*id. talag. *
as the right of the husband. No one dared change these 
fundamentals. Only minor details or rules for new sit­
uations were open to * ijtihad exercised by the muf tun, 
and that freedom was more or less a matter of choosing 
which of the several established differing views should 
apply. The commission for the draft of the Code incor­
porated this complex of tools and limits in the draft. 
The substance covered broad principles as well as im­
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probable and hypothetical case rules. Islamic jurists 
did not assume automatically, as French jurists, that 
a judge only wanted substance which he would find prac­
ticable most of the time. For the Islamic jurists had 
a different concept of the role of a judge. Given that 
the muftT was one of the tools which Tunisian society 
had f o r  unifying the laws, the presence of a muftT re­
sulted in an hierarchy of judges —  two kinds of judges 
with two d i f f e r e n t  fu n c t io n s .  One, the provincial gadT, 
was to pass judgment according to set rules. He judged 
with certainty only conflicts for which he had pre­
determined rules. If there were no rules for a particu­
lar set of facts, he was to pass the conflict on to more 
learned judges. Therein stepped the muftT who had the 
right of review over the mugallid gadT, and the right 
of limited 3 ijtihad in new types of conflicts. As we 
saw, the draft of the promulgation decree for the Code 
of the SharTca institutionalised the power of the muf tun 
in Tunis by allowing the ma.jalis of Tunis to propose
rules to fill in the gaps in the Code once promulgated
213
(see pages 311-313 above).
Ja*Tt uses the term 1 mug all id decision" (al *adl 
al mug all id)* page ? , article^ 2 8^ Reversal of' a '
decision upon appeal applied in M a lik T  la w  only to 
mugallid decisions. Since the rule in Tunisia was appli­
cable only to the gudah of the provinces and not to the
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The draft of the Code of the SharTca raised so many 
objections that it was fundamentally revised over the 
seven years following the creation of the commission. 
During those seven years Tunisia was simultaneously 
preparing for independence. The agreements and the strug 
gles between the French and the Tunisians over the price 
of independence profoundly affected the judicial order 
of Tunisia, How new demands caused the government to 
deal with past institutions is the topic of the fol­
lowing section.
m a g is tra te s  o f  th e  c a p i t a l ,  one can i n f e r  th a t  th e  m uftun  
o f T un is  when ju d g in g  as s in g le  gadT w ere n o t c o n s id e re d  
m u g a ll id . , *
_ On page £J , footnote 1, Ja*Tt uses the term
* ijtihad in the broad sense of discretion, as when a judge 
decides to punish by taczTr rather than apply the hadd.
The conditions for making such a choice were disputed 
among the Maliki jurists.
_The Tunisian secular jurisdictions (Regional courts, 
Ouzara) used the term 3ijtihad to mean power of a magis­
trate to interpret a code. For example, the Ouzara 
(Wazara) decided in 1945 the following: 11 It is possible
for first instance judges to exercise unlimited 3ijtihad 
on the question of whether a contract in which something 
has been sullied (mukhdush) is necessarily invalid because 
of a state of illness by virtue of article 59 of the 
Code of Obligations^and Contracts. Because of that, the 
Superior Court (Ouzara) does not have the right of en­
forcing its power of supervision over the *ijtihad if 
it is valid and if there is no obvious mistake in the 
judgment• ” Article 59 of the Code of Obligations and
Contracts reads: "The motives for annulment of consent
to a contract because of illness and other analogous 
cases are left to the appraisal (nazar) of the judge.”
(Ministry of Justice, garar 4624, in Arabic, of 6 March 1945) 
I am grateful to H5di Madinf in the Ministry of Justice 
for making available to me this collection of decisions 
from the Wazara.
321
Reforms in the Tunisian Legal System Preceding and 
Succeeding Independence
Between 1955 and 1957 politics grew heated in 
Tunisia* The result was independence from France, a 
new legal system, and the overthrow of the Bay* Although 
each of these three events can be analysed in their 
individual merits, one must also understand how they 
affected one another* Tunisian and French officials  ^
were negotiating constantly during these years, and 
negotiations involve give and take in the matter most 
immediately at hand as well as matters only indirectly 
relevant* The strictly legal justifications for the 
legal reforms of these years will be discussed later 
on their own merits (see Chapters IV and V), while, 
here, onefs attention will be turned to the political 
exigencies which forced leaders of a nation to find new 
jurisprudential bases for reforms*
The seeds of the legal reforms of 1956 and 1957 were 
sown in the Convention of 3 June 1955 between France 
and Tunisia (j.O.T* No* 71-73, 6 September 1955)* The 
Convention was an agreement on how Tunisia was to exer­
cise her right of internal autonomy. In regard to the 
Tunisian judiciary, the primary aim of the two govern­
ments was "the creation of an order of modern Tunisian
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courts” (article three, paragraph three, Convention 
Judiciaire, III), In regard to the legal rights of 
Frenchmen and Tunisians, the two governments aimed to 
assure that Tunisia "would engage in taking all measures 
of law or fact appropriate for assuring foreigners 
(Frenchmen, French proteges, non-Frenchmen for whom France 
assumed responsibility}, within the framework of 
(Tunisia*s^ } internal legislation, free exercise of their 
cultural, religious, economic, professional or social 
activities as well as for guaranteeing conformity with 
traditinns a complete equality among her (own} nationals 
whatever their ethnic origin or religious confession, 
notably in regard to enjoyment in law and in fact, of 
civil rights, individual and public liberties, economic, 
religious, professional or social rights, the collec­
tive rights generally recognised in modern states”
(article five, General Rules, I),
To fulfill these aims of equality among Tunisian 
nationals and protection of French nationals, the Con­
vention itself gave only the broad principles for guid­
ing the judiciary. The French nationals were to con­
tinue to be subject to the French courts:
The French nationals will continue to be 
regulated in Tunisia by their personal 
status, (Article one, Chapter one, Conven­
tion II on Status of Persons)
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A thorny problem lay with the Christians who were orig­
inally of French or Italian nationality but who ac­
quired Tunisian nationality by virtue of birth in Tunisia. 
A modern judicial system as aimed for in the Convention 
would require a more uniform law than had existed under 
the Protectorate. Uniformity meant that all Tunisian 
nationals regardless of origin would have to fall under 
the same jurisdiction. The Tunisians of non-Tunisian 
origin did not like the proposed scheme. France was
planning to limit the jurisdiction of her courts to per­
sons of non-Tunisian nationality and matters of public 
security:
These transfers (of French jurisdictions 
to Tunisian mixed courts^ will not affect 
the competences of the French courts in 
regard to litigations where no Tunisian 
is party; litigations relating to the per­
sonal status of non-Tunisians; criminal
affairs where a non-Tunisian is involved
and other penal affairs in which a non- 
Tunisian is charged. (Article three, para­
graph two, Judicial Convention, III).
It would have been contrary to the principle of inter­
nal autonomy if French courts had continued their for­
mer jurisdiction over any Tunisian national. Yet it 
was unfair that nationals of European origin go before 
the courts of the Shari*a or the Hebrew courts since 
neither of them was competent to appreciate non-Muslim 
or non-Hebraic laws of personal status. The secular
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Tunisian courts (Regional (jihawT)t cantonal (nawaihi), 
Ouzara (Wazara) 3 had no legislation promulgated to 
turn to for ruling on matters of personal status. France 
and Tunisia finally agreed that the French courts would 
apply temporarily the law of origin in cases of per­
sonal status for this category of Tunisian nationals 
of foreign origin. During the interim Tunisia had to 
prepare a legislation that would be appropriate for all 
three types of personal status found in Tunisia (Muslim, 
Hebrew, Christian). Nationalism heated the air and the 
discussions. It was a concept foreign to Islam. Islam 
had dealt with non-Muslims by creating a status of 
dhimmT, a second class citizen. Nationalism, however, 
needed uncompromising solidarity among all citizens, 
regardless of their personal customs. Hence, Tunisians 
were willing to condition their eventual solidarity on 
a modern code of personal status.
To fulfill the aim of a modern Tunisian court sys­
tem, the French and Tunisians settled for another in­
terim measure. Into the system of triple jurisdictions 
was to be injected mixed courts. Their jurisdiction 
rationae personae covered Tunisians and non-Tunisians 
who were involved together in a dispute. Their juris­
diction ratione materiae comprised cases falling -under 
social legislation and commercial law:
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The mixed jurisdictions will be competent 
in any litigation occurring between a 
Tunisian and a non-Tunisian concerning 
social legislation or commercial law.
In this connexion: the two govern­
ments will study the question of juris­
dictional competence in regard to com­
panies. (Article two, paragraph three,
Judicial Convention, III)
Whether the judges of the mixed courts were to be Tunisian
214
or French was to depend on the choice of the defendant.
Yet both French and Tunisian assessors were to be present 
215
always. These mixed courts were to be transitional.
Their political purpose was to provide training for
Tunisian judiciary officials before they assumed all
214.
Article 2 (Judicial Convention, III): The ser­
vicing of these jurisdictions (mixed) will be assured 
by the magistrates and clerks of French and Tunisian 
nationality to whom there devolve equivalent functions. 
To pass sentence legitimately, each court must be com­
posed of a president and an equal number of French and 
Tunisian assessors.
In case
of first instance, the nationality of the President will 
be left to the choice of the defendant. In cases of 
appeal, the President will be French if one of the par­
ties so demands...
(The article implies that ordinarily the President in 
cases of appeal would have been Tunisian.)
215.
See footnote 214, part one of Article 2.
powers appropriate for completely autonomous govern­
ment. The mixed courts were to be only one of many 
steps by which power was to be transferred from French 
jurisdictions to Tunisian. This was part of the agree­
ment expressed in article three of the Judicial Conven­
tion (paragraph one): "The two governments shall agree
by successive matters and steps on new transferals of 
competence from the French courts to the Tunisian mixed 
courts. These transfers will be effected by taking in­
to account in the area of jurisdiction under concern 
the guarantees which the legislation applicable and the 
conditions for the functioning of the new jurisdictions 
will assure to Frenchmen and foreigners." After 
fifteen years the "two governments (were!) to name a 
commission composed of magistrates and qualified per­
sons from the two countries with the purpose of examining 
whether the legislative and jurisdictional conditions 
have been fulfilled so that the courts of the Tunisian 
state would hear all affairs deriving from the powers 
of internal autonomy" (article three, paragraph three, 
Judicial Convention,III).
Such terms of the Convention were stiff. They re­
vived some of the issues which had confronted the Bayat 
in the nineteenth century. Those issues were mixed 
courts versus an uniform system of Tunisian courts having
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jurisdiction over all litigants (excepting when con­
sular jurisdiction was applicable). The Tunisians 
of the twentieth century were not any more willing 
to accept the mixed courts than they had been in the 
nineteenth century (see page 64 et sq. of Chapter I 
above)# The French were going to have to reckon with 
the eventuality of complete internal autonomy which 
would be a step away from independence. Tunisians pre­
pared fro a quicker way to winning back the judicial 
independence and uniformity which the Bay had lost in 
nineteenth century. They aimed to achieve within a 
year what France had planned to evolve over fifteen
years, namely, a modern Tunisian judicial system apply-
216
ing legislation which was modern. The first step 
was to consolidate Tunisian courts (Shar7ca and secu­
lar to the exclusion of the Rabbinical), as,under 
Bourguiba.. the highly nationalist Neo-Destour party 
(constitutional party crying for the return of a con­
stitution since its suspension in 1864) gained seats 
on the executive council. By the decree of 3 August 
1956 (j#0#T# No. 65, 14 August 1956, 7 Moharrem 1372), 
the Code of Procedure .for the; courts of the SharTca of
‘Ministry of Justice, "Note for the Council of 
Ministers” : Reform of the judicial organisation, the 
Code of Personal Status, outline of the steps needed for 
a shorter Code of Personal Status, the streamlining of 
the judicial system, and the abolishing of the courts of 
the Sharlca were all to have taken place by 1st of 
October 1956#
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1948 and the decree of 25 May 1876 concerning the or­
ganisation of courts of the SharT*a were abrogated*
The decree of 3 August 1956 aimed primarily to consoli­
date the Tunisian jurisdiction over land disputes. Under 
the Convention of 3 June 1955 France had transferred
jurisdiction over disputes involving land registered
217
under the Code Foncier of 1885 to Tunisian courts*
The Convention specified that only the Tunisian secu­
lar courts would be the beneficiary of the powers of the 
French courts. The decree of 3 August 1956 transferred 
the jurisdictions of the courts of the Shariea over non­
registered property to the secular Tunisian courts so 
that the secular courts held competence over all land 
matters, whether registered or -unregistered lands were 
in question. The transferal also meant that the secu­
lar Tunisian courts usurped the position proposed by 
the Convention of 1955 for mixed courts. For the courts 
hearing land cases could try both non-Tunisians and
217.
Annex 1 to the Judicial Convention of 6 June 1955 * 
"Jurisdictions ratione materiae attributed to French 
courts and which will be suppressed according to the con­
ditions provided for in article 1 of the Judicial Con­
vention: Litigations relating to registered immoveables
...will be judged, to the extent of their jurisdictions 
ratione personae, by the Tunisian secular courts applying 
the Beyllcal decree of 1 July 1885•”
Tunisian courts were limited in their jurisdictions ratione 
personae to Tunisian citizens, since French jurisdiction 
according to the Annex was to be based solely on nation­
ality, that is, it covered only Frenchmen.
329
218
Tunisians (article two). The more general aim of 
the decree of 3 August 1956 was to reorganise the en­
tire system of secular courts and to attribute to them 
the jurisdictions which had previously belonged to the 
courts of the SharTca by virtue of the decree of 
25 May 1876 and the Code of Procedure of 2 September 
1948. The cantonal courts (nawahT) remained (article 
two)• The court of appeal created in Tunis was origi­
nally one of the chambers of the Ouzara (Wazara) called 
^  —  219
*  i s t T * n a f. The c o u r t  o f f i n a l  appeal ( ta tg T b ) ( in
article eight) also was a former chamber of the Ouzara 
_ 220
(Wazara). The new courts were given jurisdiction
_ _ _
‘Article 2: Article one of the Tunisian code
for civil procedure is completed by the following:••.and 
likewise (they have jurisdiction irQ lawsuits occurring 
among Muslim Tunisians and among all other persons in 
the inheritance of a Muslim Tunisian and in lawsuits oc­
curring among Tunisians^and among non-Tunisians in cases 
of land claim (*istihgag,). (Decree of 3 August 1956,
J.O.T. 14 August~T95#)
219.Jambu-Merlm, page 154<(see footnote 158 above).
220.
Jambu-Merlin, page 154#
Article 7: The title of the second part of chap­
ter four (of the Code of Civil Procedure) is modified 
as follows: Part Two on Final Appeal (ta*gTb). Article
103 of the Tunisian Code of Civil Procedure is changed 
as follows: Every judgment of common law can be trans­
ferred to the supreme court of appeal (tatg'Tb), even 
after its conclusion or execution, and that would be in 
accordance with the demand from the public prosecutor 
before the supreme court of appeal in case it was nec­
essary. .. (rest of article remains the same)...
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over cases of personal status and land which had once - 
been attributed to the courts of the SharT*a. Article 
one of the Code of Procedure of 1910 for the secular 
courts was expanded to read: "Cases occurring among
Muslim Tunisians and among non-Muslim Tunisians in the 
inheritance of Muslim Tunisians and in litigations oc­
curring among Tunisians and non-Tunisians in matters of 
land claims (* istih (fall under their juris dietionO .1 
Article two of the Code of 1910 was modified to state 
the maximum monetary limits on the cases of personal sta­
tus . and moveables coming before the cantonal courts, 
the courts of first instance (3.ibtidal.i), and the courts 
of appeal (3 istT^naf), and cases of immoveables coming^ 
before the courts of first instance and appeal. As for 
the law which the new courts would apply in exercising 
their newly acquired jurisdiction, article four of the 
decree of 3 August 1956 simply read: "The (judgments of 
the) courts aforementioned in the matters of land claims 
would be issued on the basis of principles and rules 
in force at the time of our present decree." For reg­
istered land, one would expect the courts to apply the
Code Foncier of 1885• For unregistered lands the law
221
of the Shari*a applied. What law applied in matters
£7—  -
According to a judgment issued from the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, No. 2228 of 29 April 1963, under the^ _ 
presidency of Muhammad A1 Was if a (A1 Qada* wa*l tashri* 
No. 9 of 1963, page 39).
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of personal status was left unclear. Whether the courts 
of the SharT^a were to exercise jurisdiction concurrently 
with the secular courts remained unclear, A government 
notice later explained that the decree of 3 August 1956 
had "merged" the jurisdictions of the SharTca and the 
secular jurisdictions, while leaving unclear their exact
n < 222
position vis \  vis each other.
The next step in the Tunisians1 campaign for reform 
was the promulgation of the Code of Personal Status in 
the decree of 13 August 1956 (j,0,T, 28 December 1956),
The Code settled the confusion existing over what law 
the secular courts, created in the decree of 3 August 
1956, were to apply in matters of personal status. The 
more important purpose of the Code was to fulfill the 
stipulation in the Convention of 3 June 1955 that Tunisia 
promulgate a modern code of personal status:
The individuals who will acquire Tunisian 
nationality by virtue of the provisions of 
article eight (on Frenchmen by way of nat­
uralisation) , article eleven (on any for­
eigner by way of naturalisation), article 
twelve (claim by a person one of whose'parents 
is of Tunisian nationality), article thir­
teen (only unmarried minors of twenty-one 
could acquire naturalisation or claim citi­
zenship through parentage) and who would not 
be 6f Muslim or Hebrew confession, will be 
regulated by the rules of their personal sta-
 ---------------------------------------------------------
Ministry of Justice, Announcement on the Abolish­
ing of the courts of the Shari'a and the Promulgation of 
the Code of Personal Status, paragraph one, page 1
( JilgaJ al mahakim as sharciya wa sadur ma jallat al * ahwal 
as sHakhsiya)*
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tus of origin until the Tunisian legisla­
tion comes to include a modern statute 
for personal status* (Article fourteen,
Chapter two, Convention on Status of Per­
sons, II)
Since the Code of the SharT^a of substantive law, drafted
by the commission of Tunisian jurists in 1949, had not
been acceptable to the juridical counselors in the
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Justice directed
223
that another code be drafted* The second code did 
away with HanafT and MalikT jurisdictions and reconciled 
the views of both schools on all matters in question. 
Nonetheless, the code remained too traditional in sub­
stance for the tastes of the Ministry of Justice. The 
Ministry itself drafted then a code of personal status. 
The new draft was a much shortened summary (about one- 
quarter of the length of the second draft of 1950) of 
the earlier drafts and was confined to personal status,, 
to the exclusion of land matters, since personal sta-
V
tus was the most immediate concern of the times since 
the Convention of 1955* The style was concise; the 
wording of the articles was limited to principles and 
generalisations governing categories of matters. De­
tailed points were left to the reasoning, or ?ijtihad,
223.
Ministry of Justice, Note for the Council of 
Ministers on the Code of Personal Status and Reform of 
the Judicial Organisation.
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of the judges*
The substance of certain articles jolted Islamic 
legal thought and placed Tunisia, in the eyes of many 
Western Islamicists, in the forefront of reforms in 
Islamic law and jurisprudence* The I'door of 3 ij tihad 
was opened on the issues of polygamy and talaq. The 
traditional Islamic law in these two domains was re­
versed and replaced with a new interpretation of the 
_ _ ^  225
Qur>an and ^ ahadTth, respectively:
11 And never will you be able to treat women 
equally even if you strive to do so."
Yet in terms of the more immediate political concerns 
of Tunisians, the reforms in polygamy and talaq fulfilled 
some of the basic requirements of modern legislation* 
Those requirements for modernity were set by the French 
public order established by the French courts of the Pro­
tectorate (see page 258 above & ftn.226 poat)»The French
1 1 1  224  ' -   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ministry of Justice, Announcement on the Abolish­
ing of the Courts of the SharxTa and the Promulgation of 
the Code of Personal Status, listing 2, page 2*
(Sura four, Al-Nisa*. verse 129)
"Of all legal actions, the most reprehen 
sible to God is talaq."
Ibid
critics of the 1949 draft of the Code of the SharTta
had pointed out the challenge which such a code presented
226
to the French public order# Later when the French
and Tunisians agreed on assuring non-Muslim Tunisians a 
code in harmony with their personal status of origin 
(namely European), they were essentially agreeing to a 
code of personal status that would satisfy Muslim and 
non-Muslim attitudes on basic public issues like polyg­
amy and talaq. One of the critics of the early draft 
of the code of personal status had argued that the code
attributed to the competence of the courts of the SharTta
227
the marriage of persons converted to Islam# This 
was contrary to the decree of 31 July 1884, which at-
226 ’Ministry of Justice, Note for the Attention of 
the Secretary General of the Tunisian Government, 918TSJ4, 
28 July 1950, on the Code of the SharTta. The author 
of the note equates modernity with French public order# 
"Codification C°£ the SharT*a3 does not bring any inno­
vation: none of the prescriptions contained in the
Code of Muslim Marriage can be considered for the legis­
lator as being inspired by the necessities of evolution 
and universal progress# Any effort to bring Islamic 
law into the present has been neglected by the Commis­
sion of codification* This is why one encounters in the 
draft archaic provisions that are sometimes shocking 
and certain ones of which even go against our notion of 
public order (marriage or persons h0t of the age of 
puberty, assimilating marriage to a rescindable sale 
for latent defects, prohibition to the Muslim woman to 
marry a non-Muslim, etc••#)•"
227.
Ibid#
tributed to the courts of the Shari^a competence over 
only Tunisian Muslims who had regulated their affairs 
according to Islamic rules# The SharTta did not apply 
to converts to Islam whose marriage had been contracted 
prior to the conversion, albeit the marriage might have 
been contracted more islamica# The French courts or the 
Rabbinical courts, depending on the original personal 
status of the parties, had competence to pronounce on 
the validity of marriage, its annulment, and the legiti­
macy of the children# While the French were willing to 
give competence over all Tunisians to Tunisian courts, 
the French also wanted a code of personal status which 
would avoid complications arising from marriage between 
non-Muslims and Muslims, especially after the conversion 
of one of the spouses. Other Islamic countries, such 
as Pakistan, have faced difficulties in litigation con­
cerning the rules governing religiously mixed mar- 
228
riages. The French had been accustomed to having
only one law, namely, French lawy applicable# In mar­
riages between persons whose original personal status 
was different (such as between a Muslim Tunisian and a 
non-Muslim European) the French courts had competence#
p O Q
Doreen Hinchcliffe, "Law of Marriage and Divorce 
in India and Pakistan," Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
London, 1971.
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In marriages between Muslim proteg4s, like the Algerians,
229
the French courts had competence* To the Algerians
the French applied the Shari^a only to the extent that 
it did not contradict principles of French public order, 
such as the French would allow no divorce without the 
intervention of the courts regardless of the reasons 
or absence of reasons for divorce; nor would they allow 
marriage of minors* A code of personal status which 
reconciled Muslim and French standards would reduce the 
political friction between the French courts and the 
Tunisian courts* The prohibition of polygamy and the 
prohibition of divorce without the intervention of the 
courts in the new code of personal status were two grounds 
where Islam was reconciled with modernity* The pres­
sures for such reforms were political, a drive to throw 
off the French, but the approach was strictly in Islamic 
terms* ^
The last step —  one month after the promulgation of 
the Code of Personal Status —  towards fulfilling the 
conditions- of the Convention of 6 June 1955 was the 
outright abolition of the courts of the SharTca in the 
decree of 25 September 1956 (19 Sfar 1370) on the inte-
229 Ministry of Justice, Note for the Secretary Gen­
eral of the Tunisian Government on the draft of the Code 
of the Shar7*a, 28 July 1950, No. 918TSJ4*
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gration of the magistrates of the jurisdictions of per­
sonal status into the cadre of magistrates of the juris­
dictions of common law (J.O.T. No. 77, 25 September 1956). 
The abolition of the courts of the Sharrca was a log­
ical necessity since the decree of 3 August 1956 gave 
to the secular courts the same jurisdiction in personal 
status and land, matters: as the courts of the SharTra 
had at the time. The decree of 13 August 1956 then pro­
mulgated a Code of Personal Status with which most mag­
istrates of the SharTra agreed, but not all. Nor was the 
Code of Personal Status in any form with which the mag­
istrates of the Sharrta were long familiar. The form 
was more appropriate for the secular courts. Hence, 
the jurisdictions of the Shari^a became obsolete, and 
a chamber of personal status was established in each 
secular court, which hitherto had only chambers for civil 
(contractual) and criminal matters. Article'one of the 
decree of 25 September 1956 read: "The class of magis­
trates of the former jurisdictions of personal status 
(Supreme Court of the Sharlca of Tunis and the majlis 
and the mahkama of the provinces^ are suppressed and 
their officers turned over to the class of magistrates 
of the common tsecular3 law* The magistrates of the 
Sharrta, thus integrated, will submit to the same rules 
of remuneration, promotion, and discipline as those reg-
338
ulating the magistrates of the jurisdictions of common 
law*11 On the same day there were several other decrees 
(j•0#T* 25 September 1956, pages 1288 to 1292) pro­
nouncing the retirement of some of the former gudah and 
muftun, removal of others to non-judiciary posts, and 
nomination of many to positions in the secular courts*
Both of the chief mufti:of the Hanafi and MalikT rites,
t 1" 1 •
who had been presidents of the supreme appellate courts 
of the SharTtra, resigned, as did two other MalikT mufti* 
Another MalikT muftT, a judge on the supreme court of the 
SharT*a of Tunis and a former member of the commission 
which drafted the original Code of the SharT^a, was 
placed at the disposition of the Ministry of Education. 
Five other HanafT and MalikT muf tun, all of whom had been 
on the courts of Tunis and three of whom had been on the 
commission for the original draft of the Code of the 
SharT^a, were dismissed. As for the reappointment of 
the judges of the SharT^a to secular courts, the number 
of former judges of the SharT*a appointed to judgeships 
(excluding counselors) was slightly less than one-half 
of the number of former secular judges appointed to 
judgeships* Three of these former judges of the SharT^a 
had been on the commission for the draft of the origi­
nal Code of the SharT^a* In Tunis where the number of 
positions to be filled was highest (Supreme Court, Court
of Appeal, Court of First Instance, Cantonal Court), 
the number of former judges of the Shar7ca appointed 
to secular courts was about one-third of the number of 
secular judges reappointed to the new courts* In the 
provinces (first instance courts only), the average 
number of former judges of the SharTta in judgeships 
was two for every three former secular judges* The 
statistics imply that the integration of the former 
judges of the SharT^a into the new system was com­
plete* How much judges allowed the Islamic tradition 
to influence their interpretation of the Code of Per­
sonal Status in details left out remains to be dis­
cussed in the following chapters which analyse partic­
ular judgments.
In the next year, 1957# Tunisia undertook a series 
of measures which completed her independence of France* 
On 9th of March 1957 Tunisia and France signed another 
Convention which authorised the suppression of French 
courts at a date far sooner than the fifteen year 
period of French judicial presence agreed upon in the 
Convention of 3 June 1955* Tunisia had instituted a 
modern system of courts and a modern Code of Personal 
Status as required in the Convention of 1955* She had 
proved herself in the judicial domain to France and
no longer felt the need for French judges to train 
the Tunisian judges by sitting on mixed courts or by 
setting examples in French courts. The decree of 
24 June 1957 (26 Doul Kaada 1376) abrogated the decrees 
relating to the French courts in Tunisia. It abrogated 
the decrees of 18 April 1883 (creation of French courts 
applying French law in Tunisia), of 5 May 1883 (end 
of consular courts and extension of French courts1 com­
petence over all Europeans in Tunisia), and of 
31 July 1884 (procedure and limits of competence for 
the French courts). The decree of 24 June 1957 (j.O.T. 
of 25 June 1957, page 749) specified the procedure 
for the suppression of the French courts agreed on in 
the Convention of 9 March 1957• The system of Tunisian 
courts created in 1956 had the same structure as the 
French system, and hence, the cases before the French 
courts in 1957 could be easily transferred to the equiv­
alent jurisdictions in the Tunisian system, as de­
clared in article three: "The Tunisian jurisdictions
will hear affairs in process before the French cuurts 
on 1 July 1957 sitting in the same places as the French 
courts; the court of appeal (* istx*naf) (win take) 
the affairs before the French court of appeal of Tunis; 
the courts of first instance (* ibtida^T), the affairs 
before the French courts of first instance; the Gan-
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tonal Courts", the affairs before the French justices 
of peace; the councils of prudyhomines, the affairs 
before the conseil des prud'hommes. The ([Tunisian) 
jurisdictions thus involved will apply their own rules 
of procedure and of competence. If there be need, the 
president of the jurisdiction concerned will refer, 
by simple order of transmission and withodt costs, the 
case and the parties before the competent jurisdiction 
according to the said rules and will transmit the dossier 
by way of the chief clerks.” The only time the Tunisian 
courts were expected to apply non-Tunisian law to 
affairs which had been in process before the French courts 
was in criminal matters. Article twenty-five provided 
that the Tunisian courts would apply Tunisian law or­
dinarily to the cases transferred from the French courts, 
but ”if the fate of the accused would be more serious 
under Tunisian law the courts would apply the law which 
the French courts would have applied."
Upon the abolition of French courts in Tunisia there 
arose again the question of the status of the non- 
Muslim ahd non-Hebrew Tunisians. The decree of 24 June 
1957 ( J.O.T. of 25 June 1957, No. 51) on the personal 
status of Tunisians placed the non-Muslim and non- 
Hebrew Tunisians in a transitory state. They, like the 
French nationals, were to have only the Tunisian courts,
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no longer the French courts, to hear their disputes, 
but the Tunisian courts were to apply French law:
(Article I) Article 1 of the decree of 
12 July 1956 (3 doul hidja 1375) is ab­
rogated and replaced by the following 
provisions: Foreigners are regulated in 
matters of personal status by their own 
national law# For a temporary period 
Tunisian nationals of non-Muslim or non- 
Hebrew confession remain regulated in this 
matter by the provisions of the French 
civil law, in force at the date of the 
present decree.
The decree of 13 August 1956 promulgating the Code of
Personal Status had given all non-Muslim Tunisians
(Hebrews, Christians, etc.) the right to choose to
submit to the provisions of the Code of Personal Sta-
230
tus (article four). The choice once made was ir­
revocable. In 1957 the only change was in the courts; 
the law applicable remained the same. The Convention 
of 5 June 1955 had justified the application of French 
law to non-Muslim Tunisians by virtue of the absence 
of a modern code of personal status. Yet when Tunisia 
did promulgate such a modern code, the non-Muslim and 
non-Hebrew Tunisian nationals remained exempt from the 
Code of Personal Status unless they chose otherwise.
230•Article 4: Despite that, the Code of Personal
Status is applicable to those persons under Tunisian 
jurisdiction mentioned in the preceding article (Hebrews, 
non-Muslims, non-Hebrews} who present a petition of 
choice Cto be judged by the Code of Personal Status} on 
the basis of the conditions set out in article 5.«*
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The reason was that as long as Tunisia permitted the 
law of personal status to be divided, one for Muslims 
applied by secular courts and one for Hebrews applied 
in Rabbinical courts, the non-Muslim and non-Hebrew 
Tunisians had a case for equal treatment; they too 
would have their own laws of personal status.
The law of personal status was finally consolidated 
once Tunisia became a republic. The Bay was deposed 
and Bourguiba proclaimed president on 25 July 1957* 
Absolute unity of the nation became imperative. On 
27 September 1957 (J#0.R.T., 27 September 1957*
2 Rabia al Awl 1377, No. 19) the Rabbinical courts were 
abolished (Law No. 40-1957)* All cases in process be­
fore the Rabbinical courts on 1 October 1957 were to 
be transferred to the court of first instance in Tunis, 
which was to apply the principles and rules in force 
(namely, the Code of Personal Status). Btill a special 
chamber was to be designated by the president of the 
court of first instance for judging on former Rabbinical 
matters. The same decree nullified parts of the decrees 
of 12 July 1956 (article one, paragraph two) and of 
13 August 1956 (articles three, four, five) which had 
allowed the non-Muslims and non-Hebrew Tunisian nationals 
to be exempted from the Code of Personal Status.
Thus, all Tunisian nationals were in September 1957
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made subject to the Code of Personal Status. Yet the
law of 27 September 1957 abolishing the Rabbinical
courts recognised that uniformity in the law applicable
to all Tunisian nationals might not be absolute. For
article two of the decree provided that if there were
no positive or legislated law on a question in point,
231
then Hebrew law could be used to fill the gap. This 
meant that while the principles expounded in the Code 
of Personal Status were applicable to all Tunisian 
nationals, the *J i,jtihad” which judges could use to 
determine detailed rules would differ according to the 
original personal status of the litigants. The principles 
of the Code of Personal Status had been derived from 
the Shari*a. Even the radical reforms in polygamy and 
talaq, which reconciled Muslim and non-Muslim mores, 
were based on Islamic jurisprudential reasoning. Yet 
there was no indication that for detailed points the 
judges could turn only to Islamic texts for guidance.
The law of 27 September 1957 allowed them to refer to 
Rabbinical sources if need be. By analogy, judges could 
also turn to any non-Muslim sources for any non-Muslims
231 ‘Article 2: One will undertake the new suits which
would have been under the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical 
court before the competent courts of common law. Yet 
the questions for which no secular legislated law is 
found remain subject to the rules which were effective 
before the Rabbinical court. (Law No. 40, 27 September 
1957, J.O.R.T. of 27 September 1957)*
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and to texts of the Shari^a for Muslim litigants • No 
case yet has arisen specifically on the authority of 
the judges relying on * ijtihad 6f the Code of Personal 
Status to consult non-Muslim texts when the litigant 
is non-Muslim, The case which one might use to indi­
cate how such a hypothetical case might be solved arose 
ten years after the law of 27 September 1957 appeared.
The supreme court (cassation, tacgTb) ruled on a case 
known as the Hourya case, involving interpretation of
the Code of Personal Status when it is silent on a given 
232
issue. Article eighty-eight of the Code names spe­
cifically homicide as a cause for disinheritance. Two 
lower courts interpreted the article strictly by ruling 
that homicide was the only impediment to succession.
The supreme court interpreted the article broadly by 
ruling that homicide is only an example of an impediment 
to succession. For other impediments the court relied 
on Islamic law. In the case one party involved was a 
Muslim. The other was originally of Muslim personal sta­
tus. The opinion of the supreme court was criticised 
for being an obstacle to the secularisation of Tunisian 
law, if one defines secularisation as basing rules on 
what befits the welfare of litigants or befits public
232.
Judgment No. 3384, 31 Janurary 1966, civil cham­
ber, Supreme Appellate Court (taccrib). Found in Al Qada* 
wa*l tashri*, No. 6, June 1967,p.37.
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policy, not what sacred sources of law merely prescribe* 
The Hourya case, however, was in line with the conces­
sion made in the law of 27 September 1957 to religious 
sources, when, in case of the silence of Tunisian legis­
lation, the need for 3 ijtihad arises*
Land law during 1956 to 1957 was less subject to 
change than the law of personal status. On 31 May 1956 
the public lands in 3ahbas, that is, lands whose reve- 
nues were destined for charitable or public uses, were 
abolished. A year later the decree of 18 July 1957 
abolished the category of private and mixed 3ahbas (lands 
whose revenues went to private uses and charitable
uses). Lands in 3ahbas had covered about one-quarter of
234
the total acreage of Tunisia. The hubus had been
an important source of political leverage and revenues
for the State. In the centuries after the HafsTds the
' Tunisian rulers created 3 ahbas for powerful military 
235 *
families. Given land for their use, the families
O 0 Q
*Revue Tunisienne de Droit, 1968, page 116 et sq.
234.
Jambu-Mer 1 in, page 299.
235.
Jean Poncet, La Colonisation et ly agriculture 
europ£ene en Tunisie cTepuis 1881 (Paris: Mont on, 19^2), 
page 5§".-------------- --------
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were indebted to the Bay; but the inalienable nature of 
the hubus prevented them from controlling the land com- 
pletely and from exerting commercial pressures on other 
landholders favoured by the Bay, Many lands also kept 
their status of melk (milk), that is, land whose owner­
ship as well as whose usufruct could be alienated. Owners 
of melk (milk) founded 3 ahbas often in favour of their 
own families as well as for charitable works. When the 
European powers imposed an international commission on 
Tunisia to bring order to the finances of the State sifter 
the fall of the Prime Minister Khaznadar, one of the 
first bureaux which Khair ad Din organised was the 
Jam*rya al 3ahbas (decree of 19 March 1874), This govern­
ment department had charge of administration of the 
public 3ahbas. By keeping regular account of the reve- 
nues due to charity, public health, teaching, and up­
keep of religious buildings, the Government could keep 
its budgetary contribution to these domains at a minimum 
and assure that revenues exceeding the needs of the bene­
ficiary institutions went into the budget of the JamtTya, 
The revenues of the public * ahbas were also used to pay 
for the salaries of the judges of the Shar7ea and main­
tenance of their courts. By the 1920fs the importance 
of the Jam^iya as a source of revenue was diminishing;
348
the Public Treasury had to contribute to the maintenance
-r 236of the courts of the Shanca. By 1954 the Jam*iya
237
was known to be an impecunious institution. Whether 
the public 3ahbas were abolished or not, the Public 
Treasury would have had to shoulder the costs of chari­
table and religious institutions. Upon abolition of 
public 3 ahbas all lands and revenues administered by the 
Jamtiya were transferred to the Public Domain where the 
State was free to sell or dispose of them as it liked.
While the abolition of the public ^  ahbas could be 
justified solely for financial reasons, the private 
hubus came under attack for both economic and legal rea- 
sons. The private hubus, it was well known, had been 
used to exclude certain heirs from the inheritance. The 
public hubus had stayed within the pious charitable 
bounds for which the institution of hubus was originally 
intended. The private hubus thus had selfish ends con­
trary to the law of rnirath, but the French government had 
never taken steps to curtail the creation of more private 
3ahbas. The Code Foncier of 1885 recognised constitutions
236.
Ministry of Justice, Note for the Resident Minis­
ter on the Salaries of the SharT€a. See page 281 above.
237.proposal from the President of the Tribunal Mixte 
on publicity of 3ahbas and census of 3ahbas, 25 May 1954. 
He proposed that the Jam*Tya replace negligent mugaddam to 
safeguard private property.
Ministry of Justice, Remarks of the Committee of 
Juridical Studies, June 1954.
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of * ahbas (article twenty-two) and allowed registra- 
tion of all the obligations attached* The most notable 
obligation on a hubus was enzel (inzal), perpetual rent* 
Enzel (inzal) essentially meant that a person, especially 
a non-beneficiary, bought, as in a sale, rights to 
rent exclusively the hubus* This right was fully alien- 
able or exchangeable, unlike the land itself* The 
price of the sale went to the beneficiaries of the hubus *
The price was paid at set intervals like a rent, but 
no date could be fixed for the termination of the con­
tract; nor was the value of the rent ever changed* That 
is why enzel (inzal) was called perpetual rent* While 
a hubus was perpetually subject to an enzel (inzal) once 
made, the person holding the right of enzel (inzal) 
could change; for an enzelist could sell his rights of 
usufruct to another* Many of the early French colo­
nisers acquired use of lands through contracts of enzel
228
(inzal)* Despite the French1s willingness to allow 
hubus to continue, they were constantly aware of the abuses 
which the private hubus engendered and continuously 
passed legislation on the matter* In 1913 (j*O.T* of 
3 May 1913) a Beylical decree made administrators of 
3ahbas whose beneficiaries were minors responsible to 
a government bureau (Bureau of the Mugaddam, Section d'Etat)*
From a survey of the Minutes du Tribunal Mixte for 
the latter years of the nineteenth century.
3S0
Left unsupervised were the muqaddam of 3ahbas whose 
beneficiaries were of the age of majority# Cases brought 
before the courts of the SharT*a revealed complaints 
of beneficiaries against the corrupt muqaddam# Often 
the muqaddam himself had been named a beneficiary of 
the revenues of the hubus and looked more often after 
his own interests than the interests of his co-bene- 
ficiaries# Account books were known to belie the real 
state of matters; while the muqaddam marked in an ex­
pense for improvement and maintenance of the property, 
in actuality the sum went for the personal use of the
muqaddam# Rather than abolish the problem, the Tunisians
239
preferred improving the supervision of the muqaddam#
Just after the abolition of the public 3ahbas in 
1956, the Ministry of Justice pointed out other abuses 
which warranted the abolition of private 3 ahbas too#
The main inconveniences listed were: l) lack of pub­
licity for the constitution of the hubus: This meant
that if there had been a sale of the property after the 
hubus had been formed, the sale was null and the pur- 
chaser in good faith could go back only to the seller 
who was often insolvent#
2) the abuses of
the usufructuary: His interest was to draw within the
2^*Muhammad Tabet, "Report on the situation of .the 
private hubus (olive groves and fruit orchards) adminis-
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quickest time the maximum profit from the private hubus, 
even to the detriment of the property.
The remedy for these abuses in Tunisia had been enzel 
(inzal). This meant that the beneficiaries, the ones 
most expected to take pride in the property no longer 
had the right of enjoyment of the hubus, only the 
right to the rents. Duty of maintenance of the property 
was no longer in the hands of the beneficiaries, but 
in the hands of the lessees* Variations on the types of 
leases multiplied. One type (kirdar) was revalued ac­
cording to the value of the property as assessed every 
three years. Where a house was made into a hubus often 
the space in the house was sold and owned by one person 
while the walls of the house were for the use of the 
beneficiary. There remained dissatisfaction with these 
expedients, for the leases for rent attracted only 
amateurs. Persons who had capital wanted to buy, not 
to be tied with a perpetual rent. The decree of 
22 January 1905 aimed at allowing the beneficiaries of 
the revenues of the hubus to free their lands of rents■f— ■-
by paying one-third of the rent or an indemnity to the 
lessee. The drawback to the decree of 1905 was undoubtedly 
that in cases where beneficiaries had no capital to in­
ter ed by mugadclam111 Services economiques indigenes'.' on 
behalf of beneficiaries of a hubus of 19*000 olive 
trees, Tunis, 1920 (in French).
vest in the land those who did still could not buy-
240
from the beneficiaries.
Hence, when the decree of 18 July 1957 abolished
the private hubus there were several kinds of rights
which the government had to consider, specifically rights
of beneficiaries versus rights of actual users of the
land# The general rule was that the beneficiary would
become pure owner of his share in the hubus, with rights
of full disposal like melk (milk). The share of a
beneficiary was made equivalent to what would have been
his inheritance share in the property if it had never
241
been made a hubus. If a founder of the hubus were
still alive at the time of the partition of the hubus,
the property reverted to him, unless the beneficiaries
whom he named were already in actual possession of the 
242
property# Devolution of shares in the hubus by in-
2^"°*Ministry of Justice (juridical Service), "Le 
Doctrine du habous du droit musulman” (The D be trine of 
Hubus in Muslim Law and Legislation), n.d# (probably no 
Earlier than September 1956).
241.Article 2: Every private hubus that is existing
at the time of the present decree is dissolved and the 
estate reverts as property to the beneficiaries according 
to their quota in distribution (of inheritance} •••
However, if the act of foundation pro 
vides for an order of devolution by generation the owner­
ship of the estate will revert to the present benefi­
ciaries and to the heirs of those of the same degree, de­
ceased, according to their quota in the devolution (of 
inheritance}, or according to the quota of their parent##
242*Article 2: ...If the founder is still alive the
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heritance quotas was particularly important for female 
descendants. The decree abolishing *ahbas allowed 
female descendants to share even where they had been ex­
cluded by the founder of the hubus• Yet this innova--g"-— —
tion was qualified by the provisions protecting the 
rights of occupants and tenants of the rural * ahbas•
The decree of 2 July 1935 on occupation of rural lands 
was still applicable# The decree of 1935 made the bene­
ficiary of a hubus the one who detained and cultivated 
the land in a direct and continual manner for thirty- 
three years before 1926# Such rights of occupation 
were transmittable only to the male descendants of the 
deceased occupants# This provision cut short any prob­
lems of female descendants ceding to their husbands
243
rights to invest in the lands# The decree of 1957
only changed the number of years necessary for claiming 
status as ah occupant: "There would be kept on the
land the occupants who, belonging to a Tunisian family 
traditionally installed on a rural hubus, could justify
estate of the trust will revert to him in full ownership, 
but if the beneficiaries had already taken over possession 
the estate reverts to the beneficiaries in full ownership.##
243.
Letter from Director of Judiciary Services,
Juridical Counselor of the Government, to the Director 
of the Interior, Tunis, 11 July 1928.
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that they detained and cultivated a parcel of this land 
in a direct and continuous manner, either by themselves 
or their ascendants, since 1 January 19471 (article 
nineteen). Many such occupants included tenants leasing 
land by a contract of lcirdar (variable rent). All con­
tracts of kirdar were to remain valid for at least
_ 244
ten years, Enzel (inzal) was ended (article twenty).
Yet the commissions which were set up for supervising
the abolition of 3ahbas were to enforce redemption of
rents so that the land returned to beneficiaries, a
practise which had been only voluntary before 18 July 
245
1957. The French who leased land by enzel (inzal)
were to be removed and the land returned to Tunisians.
For a founder, of a hubus could be only Tunisian and
his descendants —  the persons who could inherit the
private hubus converted to melk (milk) —  could be only
’  246 
Tunisians or naturalised Frenchmen of Tunisian origin.
2 /M  ' - - - - , -  ...........................   -
Article 20: The procedures for subjecting hubus
to enzel (inzal),that are effective at the time of the
present decree, will be pursued in conformity with the
previous legislation until they come to expiration.
24R .
•^ Ministry of Justice, Committee of Juridical Studies,
"Explanation of the Remodeling of the Regulation of
3ahbas.11 (In French)
" ‘ r  ■ ■  ■
’Judgment No* 3384, 31 January 1966, Supreme Court 
of Appeal (taCgib).
Letter from Director of Tunisian Justice to the 
Resident General, No. J-766-I, stamped 18 April 1933, on 
naturalised French Muslims.
See problems raised in Hourya case,pp. 482-486 of 
Chapter IV postjfootnote 36).
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Hence, among Tunisians themselves the reform was not 
to be too upsetting. It aimed to protect the occu­
pation rights of peasants who would have been a source 
of trouble if the conversion of the 1*ahbas to melk (milk) 
had not protected them against eviction. The rights 
of women in the property became important,but subject 
to the priorities of long-time occupants, especially 
in rural areas.
The next most important land legislation was the 
Code of Property Rights (majaliat al hugug al itaTnTyat) 
promulgated by law number 65-2 of 12 February 1965•
In relation to previous laws, the Code was a consolida­
tion of all previous land laws. The Code Foncier of 
1885 is no longer applicable in Tunisia, but the pro­
cedure for the Land Court (Tribunal Immobilier, or 
al mahkama al :*agarTa, no longer the Tribunal Mixte) re- 
mained basically the same. The decree of 3 August 1956 
(modifying the Code of Procedure for secular courts) 
was abrogated, thus ending the application of the rules 
of the SharTca for lands as defined in the texts of the 
jurists to unregistered lands. One code at last came 
to prevail for registered and unregistered lands.
Despite the abrogation of these previous texts, they 
also served as sources of principles for the Code of 
Property Rights. The authors of the Code borrowed from
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the Majallat al *Ahkam as Sharia (Code o£ the Sharira), 
Part II, on land matters, for prescription and division 
of lands, as opposed to co-ownership of lands* The 
Majallat as SharT^a was the code originally drafted by 
the commission headed by JafcTt, the Minister of Justice 
and the MalikT Bach Mufti, in 1949 (see page 309 et sq*)* 
The Majallat had originally covered land rights 
(shuf^a; prescription; mugasama; co-ownership, called 
shuyu*; land claims, or *istihgag, because of sale or 
the contract of mugarasa; gratuitous transferals of 
property through will and gift; and wagf)* Since 1959 
the law of wills and gift had been incorporated in the 
Code of Personal Status. The wagf (hubus) had been 
abolished. Only land rights in general and land claims 
remained to be incorporated in the national law. The 
principles taken from the Sharr^a were mostly those not 
elaborated in the Code of Obligations and Contracts of 
15 December 1906 and the Code Foncier of 1 July 1885•
The Code of Obligations and Contracts was a monument to 
an attempt to reconcile the Sharif a and French law on 
all types of obligations and contracts, whether involving 
moveables or immoveables. It was applied at first only 
by Tunisian secular courts, though the judges of the 
Sharia were encouraged to make sure that Muslim notaries
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were familiar with the provisions of the Code.
Many of the provisions of the Code of Obligations and 
Contracts are still in force today. The Code Foncier 
and several foreign laws (Swiss, Egyptian, Syrian, 
French) were used for classifying most of the land 
rights which had been recognised since 1885 for regis­
tered property: usufruct, usage, habitation, servi­
tude, emphyteose (emphyteusis, long term pledge of en­
joyment of land to pay a debt), sureties, hypotheca­
tion (mortgage). Like the Code Foncier, the Code of 
Property Rights included provisions for the procedure 
for voluntary registration of lands by decisions of 
the Land Court.
The innovations in the Code of Property Rights were 
not as striking as in previous reforms. The Code car­
ried farther certain trends already started by the law 
abolishing the private *ahbas. The commissions set 
up for transforming the lands of 3ahbas into melk (milk) 
and distributing the various parcels to their rightful 
owners were responsible for accepting or rejecting 
any agreement made among the former beneficiaries on 
whether to subject the land to gasama, or to sell the
— —
_ Draft of the Prime Ministers circular to the 
gudah on the Code of Obligations and Contracts at the 
tirfie of promulgation in 1906.
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land as a whole unit to a third party or to one of the.
beneficiaries, as long as the rights of long-time ten-
248
ants were not prejudiced (article five). In the
event that beneficiaries could not agree, the regional
commission could order total or partial division of
the land, leaving some in a state of co-ownership
(shuyu*), or could order the sale of the property in
249
part or in total by public auction (article eight).
248.
Article 5: Within a delay of six months from the
day of the appearance of the present decree the bene­
ficiaries will be able, without prejudice to the rights 
of the third party holders of real property rights over 
the estate, to proceed by friendly agreement to the 
division of the property or to sell it for the benefit 
of themselves or of a third party.
The agreement of the beneficiaries 
must be the subject of a notarised document which will 
be submitted, according to the conditions of article 
ten, for approval from the Regional Commission for 
the Liquidation of *Ahbas, provided for in the following 
articles. (Decree 'aft~olTshing private and mixed
*ahbas, 18 July 1957)*
249.
Article 8 The Regional Commission for Liqui­
dation of the 3Ahbas will hear all litigations born 
out of the application of the present decree.
The Commission can, after having 
tried to reconcile the parties and undertaken the neces­
sary investigations, take the following decision:
1) to approve the agreement among the parties in the 
conditions provided for in article 5;
2) order total or partial division of the estate of 
the hubus;
5) order public auction of all or.part of the said 
estate;
4) concede by title of kirdar...to the occupants of
the rural estates, the object of article 19, the surface
of the lands they occupy, within the conditions of the 
present decree...
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In cases involving mixed *ahb as, particularly lands 
given in hubus for the benefit of religious shrines 
and descendants of persons caring for the shrine (zaouia, 
see pages 24-25 of Chapter I above), the com­
mission had to consider the shares of the beneficiaries 
after having assigned to the shrine or institution the
part necessary for its economic viability (article thir- 
250
teen). It was hoped that the decisions of the com­
mission in whatever case presented itself would stimu­
late the economy by putting many lands back into com­
merce. However, Tunisia still found itself saddled 
with many properties held in co-ownership. Co-ownership 
or co-tenancy had derived from voluntary agreement or
251
had been forcibly imposed when a succession was opened. 
According to the Islamic law applicable by the decree 
of 3 August 1956 (modifying the Code of Procedure), 
the co-ownership could not be broken, except by unani­
mous agreement. A partner could never take his share
250 ’Article 13: ...According to the status which will 
be given to the institution, the Commission will deter­
mine in the estate of the trust:
1) the part necessary 
for the maintenance and functinning of the institution;
2) the part that must
revert to the beneficiaries...
251.
Chief of the Juridical Services, Ministry of 
Justice, "Explanation of the Code of Property Rights1'
(in French).
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out of co-ownership and dispose of it as he liked. He
could sell his share to a third party; but then the
252
third party had to enter co-ownership. This rule
had been applicable only to non-registered lands during
the years of the Protectorate. Registered lands had
been subject to French law (article eight hundred fifteen
of the Code Civil), which allowed a co-partner to de-
253
raand an end to the co-ownership. Article seventy-
one of the Code of Property Rights of Tunisia essen­
tially adopts French law: "No one can be constrained
to remain in co-ownership (shuyuc); each of the co­
owners has the right to ask for division (qasama) and 
any condition which conflicts with this is considered
252.
"In Muslim law, the co-owner is not forced to 
remain in co-ownership, but neither can he demand di­
vision; he is free only to sell his part in the co­
property. Article 815 (of the French Civil Code) being 
a rule of propertied status is not applicable in 
Tunisia to non-registered immoveables held in co-owner­
ship by Muslims. But this article would be applicable 
if the immoveable were registered (Judgment of civil 
court, Tunis, 29 May 1896, Journal Tunisien (j*T.) 96, 
319; Susa, 18 June 1897, J#T. 444)•*' (From Code 
Foncier, Annotated, t. I, paragraph 5 from top, page 6)
253.Article 815 (Code Civil of France): No one can
be forced to remain in co-ownership and division can 
always be invoked, regardless of any prohibition and 
agreements to the contrary.
One can,
however, agree to suspend division during a limited 
period: this agreement cannot be obligatory beyond five
years; but it can be renewed.
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ineffective* However, the co-partners have the right 
to agree in writing not to divide the property for a 
defined period of time, and the court has the right 
to decide on the nullification of the agreement and can 
order division (gasama) when valid reason is found*
And the period of time agreed upon cannot surpass five 
years and if it does the period of time will be cut to 
five years, and that period cannot be renewed at the 
time of its expiration except by another written agree- 
ment*" Article eight hundred fifteen of the Code 
Civil reads: ”No one can be constrained to remain in 
co-ownership, and division can always be invoked, regard­
less of prohibitions and agreements to the contrary*
One can, however, agree to suspend division during a 
limited time: this agreement cannot be obligatory
beyond five years; but it can be renewed*11 In 
regard to heirs who want to end the state of enforced 
^huyuc, article one hundred thirty-one of the Code of 
Property Rights in Tunisia permits division of inheri­
tance only by value (al qasama biJl gTma), not by kind 
(la qasama rigab)* The decree of 18 July 1957 abolishing 
private and mixed *ahbas had allowed division (qasama)
N
Under traditional law or by sale of the property* Ar­
ticles one hundred thirty-one to one hundred forty-one 
of the Code of Property Rights allow only sale of the
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whole property to one person and distribution of the
proceeds to the heirs, or allotment of omits that
form an economically viable whole (such as a factory)
to one heir and compensation to the other heirs. The
purpose of the reform was to avoid fragmentation of
land and to encourage consolidation of lahd into coop- 
254
eratives, However, the abolishing of division by
O R A
 ^ Ministry of Justice, "Explanation of the Code of 
Property Rights" (in French),
A judgment of 1964 illustrates . the
difference between the traditional law of qasama and the 
changes introduced by the maiallat al hugug al ^aTniyat 
(Civil Case No. 2753 (madanTj o^ l1,4/1964 in~tKe Court 
of First Instance, Tunis). The muwarrith of the par­
ties had left several registered properties to his 
heirs. The plaintiffs (the widow and sons of the 
muwarrith) claimed to be prejudiced by the state of co- 
o\mership and wanted the defendants (the daughters and 
one son-in-law of the muwarrith) to agree to qasama or 
liquidation by sale. The defendants so agreed. The 
report of the expert conducting investigations on the 
properties observed that qasama in kind (caTnan) was 
not possible because of tne i^inute size of" the shares, 
but that it was possible that the properties be divided 
so that the plaintiffs got some and the defendants got 
some, but the defendants would have to pay eighty-two 
dinars to compensate the plaintiffs for getting more of 
the actual property than they were due. The COurt of 
First Instance observed that the Islamic figh would 
not allow qasama in kind in this case because it was 
not possible to divide the property on the basis of the 
least of the shares; nor could the Islamic figh apply 
to allow the defendants to compensate the plaintiffs in 
a case where all the property was to be divided because 
the parties did not all agree to this method. The only 
action which the court could adopt was liquidation of the 
entire property by sale, according to article 1355 of the 
Code of Obligations and Contracts (this article is now 
abrogated by the Code of Property Rights)•
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kind raises many questions of interpretation, which 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters. One such
problem is the validity of a will that distributes an 
estate in kind to the heirs, the value of each item 
being equal to the fractional shares of the *irth. 
Whether the reform has in practise upset traditional 
patters since the drive to cooperatives has died re­
mains to be seen.
On the matter of registration oflands, the Code of
Property Rights kept registration voluntary (article
255
three hundred seventeen). The decisions of the Land
Court also remain definitive, no appeal being allowed
256
from them (article three hundred thirty-two). The
decree abolishing the private and mixed * ahbas and 
creating commissions to decide who received what was 
a boost, no doubt, to registration. The decision of 
the regional commission for the liquidation of a hubus 
constitutes a title to the parcel in question (article 
eight, decree of 18 July 1957)* The methods of cadas­
tral surveying used by the commission for determining
255.
Article 317: Registration is by choice.
256.
Article 332: The decisions of the Land Court
are not subject to challenge by opposition, appeal 
(^isti^naf), or any other recourse.
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boundaries : Bre the same as the Land Court uses.
There is no question of the validity of the decision
of the commission (unless appealed to the supreme 
258
court), as compared to the ancient Arabic titles
presented to justify a petition for registration. 
Hence, if one could present a decision of the commis­
sion of 3ahbas one could facilitate registration.
257■"•Article 7: The Regional Commission for Liquida­
tion of *Ahbas, created in each Governorship, includes:
1) a magistrate.,.
2) a representative of the Governor
3) an official appointed by the Ministry of Finances
4) an engineer from the Agricultural Services and an agent 
of the Service for Land Affairs, appointed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture,
The Commission will be assisted by a topographer or any 
expert of its choice,*. (Decree of 18 July 1957)
258.
Article 10: ...The Commission passes judgment 
in last resort in the presence of the beneficiaries and 
eventually in the presence of third party holders of 
real property rights, or occupants, or of their respec­
tive representatives, or those duly summoned.
The decision rendered is brought 
to the notice of the parties who have not appeared and 
who were not represented. A copy of the judgment can be 
delivered to any interested party. The Secretary of the 
Commission is responsible for notification.
The occupants, the beneficiaries, 
third party holders of real property rights and the Public 
Minister can, within a delay of twenty days since the pro­
nouncement of the decision or the notification, whatever 
the case, make an appeal against the decision of the Com­
mission for violation of the law.
The Supreme Court of Appeal rules 
on the appeal. If the decision is reversed, the affair 
is sent back to the Regional Commission composed of 
other members.
Conclusion
One can say that the legal legacy left by the French 
to the Tunisians and the reforms which the newly inde­
pendent Tunisians made were often motivated by political 
exigencies. The threats of the Europeans in the nine­
teenth century forced the Bayat to change the Islamic 
rule that no foreigner could own property in Tunisia.
The negotiations for independence in the twentieth 
century pressed on Tunisia reforms in the procedure of 
her judiciary and in the substantive law of public or­
der (such as marriage and divorce). After independence 
economic evolution became the dominant force in reform. 
Article one of the Code of Property Rights b£ 1965 
stresses the need for the law to look at life from a 
commerical and economic point of view: "Properties are
all things which are not left out of commerical trans­
actions because of their nature or because of a pro­
vision of the law, and which can be the object of a 
right (hagg) having a monetary value." The French Civil 
Code (CQde Civil) only begins its second book on prop­
erties by classification: "All properties are moveables
or immoveables" (article five hundred sixteen). If 
reforms in the law continue in this vein, reforms will 
be most likely less frequent for lack of consensus (see 
pages 543 & 545 of the Annotated Bibliography of Chapter
and based on less concise jurisprudence.
In the following chapters we shall examine one 
aspect of the reforms. The purpose is to see how 
Tunisian judges have interpreted the codes, that is, 
to what extent they do and can justify reliance on 
the SharT*a in their search (3 i.jtihad) for correct 
application of the codified principles to the factual 
details of cases.
Annotated Bibliography
Archive of Wizara al cAdl
The Ministry of Justice has a comprehensive 
collection of all official correspondence written by 
officials in the Ministry and written to officials of 
the Ministry, Although the Ministry was established 
only in 1921, some documents relate to events in the 
late nineteenth century. The archive also contains 
a daftar of complaints from private individuals to 
the government. Many of the original drafts of legis 
1ation are found in the Ministry, though in recent 
years the Conseiller d*Etat in the Prime Ministerfs 
Office in the Kasbah has often supplemented the work 
of the Ministry of Justice.
The staff in the archive have not yet com­
pleted a system for a comprehensive classification of 
the documents.
CHAPTER III 
PROMULGATION OF THE LAW OF WILLS 
Introduction
This section is devoted to a specific part of the 
Tunisian law, the law of wills. The purpose of having 
onefs attention focused on one aspect of the law is 
to see how difficult it can be in an Islamic legal 
system to develop a coherent jurisprudence which
would support a thorough reform throughout Islamic
\
law.
To understand such difficulties one must look 
to the history that forged the law of wills. Chapter II 
already described the introduction of reforms in mar­
riage and divorce appearing in the Code of Personal 
Status as motivated by political concerns (namely 
independence from France) but as implemented and ex­
pressed in a purely Islamic manner. The law of 
wills was not part of the original Code of Personal 
Status when it was promulgated by a decree of 
13 August 1956. It was not until well after the 
fall of the Bay that the law of wills was added to 
the Code of Personal Status by law 59-77 of 19 June 
1959 (J.O.R.T. no.4 of 1959). Law 59-77 reproduced the 
traditional principles of the Islamic law of wills.
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One cannot quarrel with tradition simply because it 
is tradition; for coherency of the law may require that 
certain parts of the law remain unchanged* But one 
can gather from the history of the provisions on wills 
that the drafters of the law borrowed from various 
sources of law without having a coherent philosophy 
or political pressures to guide their choices*
Consistency within a legal system becomes particularly 
significant for the domain of testamentary rights 
because the exercise of such rights is influenced by 
the land laws* When law 59-77 was enacted, the land 
laws were basically traditional* The only reforms had 
been those made in the law of wagf, and indeed the 
provisions of one article, article 1821, were written 
with the reforms in wagf in mind. Six years later 
the Code of Property Rights (majallat al huguq 
al ^alniyat) was enacted. The Tunisian Ministry of 
Justice, as Chapter II has shown (pages : 359
to 362 , supra), has made it clear in its
explanation of the Code that the Code was designed to 
reform the Islamic law* It was clear also that the
1.
Article 182, Code of Personal Status: The wa^iyya
of usufruct (manafi^a) is valid only for one generation 
and^upon their dying out the wasiyya will have the corpus 
(f ain) returned to the estate (tariJca) of the testator.
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new land law was based on an economic philosophy. Mean­
while, the law of wills remained the same, based on a 
traditional philosophy of jurisprudence (namely, reliance 
on the *ahadith and isolated opinion). If one accepts 
the Code of Property Rights as a basic core around which 
other related laws should be built, then one wonders
whether certain provisions of the law of wills cease to
A
have a raison d*etre. For example, the provisions for
the obligatory wasiyya for grandchildren originated out
of concern over orphaned grandchildren. For it was
highly unlikely that they would ever have a share in the
fruits of the labour of their predeceased parent since they
would most likely be excluded from the estate of their
grandfather by persons of higher degree or another class.
Such a plight was undoubtedly a by-product of the system
of co-ownership (milk shaHc ) which had developed out
of a need to counteract the fragmentation which the Is-
—  2lamic law of mirath induces. Co-ownership is more
2.
Ustaad Tayyib Bessis, Deputy President of the Court 
of Land Matters (Tribunal Immobilier, mahkama al_ (agariua), 
T u n i s " A l  Wasiyya al wajiba f 1* 1 t a s h r i a t  tunisi,'*
Al Qada* wa11 tashri(, No. 10, 1965, pages 9-10. My 
argument derives more from an interest in the origin of the 
problem than does the argument of Sayyed Bessis. He 
defends the obligatory wasiyya as part of general family 
responsibility. Since the father of the orphaned grand­
child contributed most likely to the making of the es­
tate of the grandfather, then the children should have 
the benefit of their father*s work.
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appropriate for an economy based on immoveables while 
fragmentation best survives in an economy based on 
moveables like sheep. Given the prevalence of co-own­
ership in Tunisia, when a parent died before his own 
parents he most likely did not have any property of his 
own because all family lands were owned by his father 
and uncles. He would have expected to succeed to the 
family property in joint ownership with his brothers 
and cousins. He would not have had an individual holding 
to pass on to his children until his own father died; 
so alas for his children if he predeceased his own father. 
The majallat al hugug al fainiyat attempts to mitigate 
the effects of co-ownership, since it favours individual 
ownership and partition of land over co-ownership. En­
couragement of such individual ownership could reasonably 
be expected to lead to either of the following situations: 
a father would assign portions during his lifetime by 
gift or sale to his adult sons so that by the time a 
married adult son predeceased his father, the grand­
children would have received a share in the dead sonfs 
land; or else, a father would prefer to keep his own 
individual holdings and encourage his sons not to depend 
on the family heritage for their fortunes, but rather to 
depend on fortunes which they would build up individually.
Should a parent then die before his own father, the 
parentfs independent fortune would go in part to his 
own sons (grandsons) so that failure of the grandchil­
dren to obtain a share in the grandfather's estate would 
not pose a problem* Then the need for obligatory
wasiyya would become less*
*
Another difference in the aims of the land law and 
the aims of the law of wills arises in the case of wills 
made to an heir. The Code of Property Rights gives 
preference to division of an estate by value rather than 
by item (article one hundred thirty-one). The Code of 
Personal Status forbids wills to heirs in principle 
(article one hundred seventy-nine). The only type of 
will that does not fall within this prohibition is a 
will specifying which items of an estate shall go to 
which heirs, as long as the value of the item does not 
exceed the fractional value of the intestate share due
o
to the heir (article one hundred eighty). If the Code 
of Property Rights is meant to cover all estates, whether 
testate or intestate, then the land law might be inter­
preted as rendering the will of "specification" useless 
if the court disagrees with the apportionment of the
T.
Code of Personal Status, article 180: The testator'
designating during his lifetime for all of his heirs or 
some of them specific items from his property which are 
equal to their intestate shares is permitted and is up­
held upon his death...
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items. If the court agrees that the testator has wisely 
apportioned the property in the economic interests of
4
the property, the will stands. Article one hundred forty
of the majallat al huguq al rainiyat allows the court to
*
interfere in estate of landed property. Article one hun­
dred forty-one of the same code allows interference of 
the court in moveable property if it be of the nature of 
papers of the family or objects of affection.
Reforms in the law of wills have been proposed.
None have been implemented. Reluctance to implement 
them probably reflects both the social and jurispru­
dential forces which are responsible for the obstacles 
that stand in the way of a coherent jurisprudence that 
could justify thorough reforms in Islamic law. The 
law of wills probably reflects what still exists in 
rural Tunisia, namely an economy based on immoveables 
held in co-ownership; whereas the Code of Property 
Rights reflects what the government would like to see 
for the future. The case law will reveal how the courts 
(regular and the court of land registration) bridge the 
gap.
4.
Article 140 of the Code of Property Rights: If
there be among the properties of the estate an agricul­
tural or industrial or commercial productive unit which 
constitues an economic whole, one is allowed to designate 
it to one of the heirs according to what is most benefic­
ial ...
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History of drafting of the law of wills: the lav of
property or law of personal status?
When the Code of Personal Status appealed in 1956, 
surprisingly, the law of wills was absent. It was particu­
larly surprising since the decree of 12 July 1956 on the 
personal status of non-Muslims and non-Hebrew Tunisians 
had included in its definition of personal status success-
5
ion, wills and dispositions connected with death. The 1956
Code of Personal Status covered inheritance (mirath) but
not wills (wasiyya) • The lacuna has usually been attributed 
#
to the haste with which the Code of Personal Status was 
written. It would appear, however, from a study of the
5.
Decree of 12 July 1956, article 2: Personal Status
includes disputes relating to status and to capacity of per­
sons, to marriage, to matrimonial systems, to reciprocal 
rights and duties of spouses, to divorce, to repudiation, 
to separation, to paternity, to recognition and to disavowel 
of paternity, to relations between ascendants and descen­
dants and to the duty of maintenance between relatives, to 
legitimacy, to adoption, to guardianship, to custody, to 
minority, to majority, to gifts, to succession, to testament, 
and other dispositions due to death, to absence, and to 
presumption of death.
6.
Muhammad Snoussi, Conseiller dfEtat, Office du Pre­
mier Ministre.
R* Jambu-Mer1in, Le Droit prive en Tunisie (Paris 
Librairie General de droit et de jurisprudence, R. Pichon 
et R. Dran, I960), page 120, pages 182, 263, 266.
Jules Roussier, Professeur \ la Faculte de Droit 
dfAlger, charge" d»enseignment du Droit musulman, MLe Code 
Tunisian du StatutPersonnel", Revue Juridigue et politique 
de 1*Union francaise (1957) volume TT, pages 213-230, at 
p. 215.
The absence in the Code of Personal Status of provi­
sions for wills was obvious and commented upon by several 
authors, but no explanation given.
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documents which were available to the persons drafting 
the Code of Personal Status that the absence of provi­
sions on wills was not due to oversight. It was rather 
due to indecision over how far the new codes should re­
flect the Code of the Sharl^a which had been drafted since 
the late 1940*s by the commission headed by ^Abdulaziz 
J a cit (Minister of Justice and Maliki Mufti). The Code 
of the Shari^a had been divided into two main books: one
on personal law and one on property law. Intestate in­
heritance (mirath) had been a chapter unto itself. The 
law of wills and the law of gifts during mortal illness
7
were included m  the book on property law.' Apparently 
the government’s judicial counselors thought it best to 
retain the basic distinction between personal law and pro­
perty law and to publish each of the two books separately, 
after much re-editing, of course. After the promulgation 
of the first book on personal law (marriage and divorce and 
guardianship) and the provisions on intestate inheritance 
in the Code of Personal Status, the Ministry of Justice 
turned its attention to re-editing the second book-of the
Later the law of gifts (hiba) was enacted as part of 
the Code of Personal Status by Law 64-17 of 28 May 1964, 
J.O.R.T. No. 27 of 1964* Article 206 of the Code of Per­
sonal Status provides that gifts in death sickness will be 
governed by the rules of al wasiyya .
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Code of the Shari 6a on real status pahwal al *agariya).
0
What the Ministry had to deal with was a book comprising
chapters on claims Pistihgag), shufa*, partition and dis-
«
tribution (gasama) of property held in co-ownership, and 
gratuitous dispositions (including testamentary disposi­
tions)
This second book of the draft of the Code of the 
Shari*a was considerably re-edited and renamed the ma- 
.j all at al Hstihaglyat. One of the early drafts of the 
ma.jallat contained a section on succession and settlement 
of estates (al mirath watag-PIya al tarika). Its provi­
sions were intended for testamentary disposition of landed 
properties, chattels, and usufruct. The appearance of 
testamentary dispositions in a code of property laws was 
not unusual. There was the French example to follow.
For the laws of testamentary dispositions in the French
Civil Code (Code Civil) are included in the third book on
g
the different ways by which one can acquire property. As 
part of the law of property in the majallat al * istihagiyat,
8.
Memo from >AbdulazIz Jafit to the Bay, 1 Feb. 1955*
9-
Dalloz, Code Civil Annote, 1970-1971 edition. Be­
ginning article 711: Ownership of goods is acquired and
is transmitted by succession, by gift inter vivos or tes­
tamentary gift, and by obligations.
the law of wills was regarded as a matter of a gratuitous 
disposition when treated as a transfer of ownership (article 
one hundred twenty-four).^ When treated as an obligation 
on the estate of the testator the will was regarded as a 
contract which would reach perfection only upon the death 
of the testator:
(article one hundred twenty-five of the draft): The
musi must have capacity to contract to form a will as well
m
as to revoke unilaterally his offer.
(article one hundred thirty-nine of draft): When the
consent of the heirs of the musi is needed to validate cer- 
tain wills, these heirs must have the capacity to contract.
These articles differed from both the Maliki law in the 
Code of the Shari *a (article eleven hundred fifty) and the 
Hanafi law (article eleven hundred forty-five), which pro­
vide that such heirs of the musl must have the capacity to
11 —  -*• make gifts. The Maliki and Hanafi laws probably were
1 0 .
Draft of the ma.jallat al >istihagiya, article 124: 
Wasiyya is taking possession of what exists after death by 
way of giftgratuitous disposition)whether it be of corpus 
or of usufruct.
11. „ _
Code of the Sharifa, article 1150 ^ M a l i k i ) I f  the 
heirs permitted after the death of the musi the wasiyya to 
an heir or a wasiyya exceeding the one-third, that is deemed 
from the start 5. gift from them.* It is not execution of the 
wasiyya.••
article 1145 (Hanafi): Wasiyya to an heir is not
allowed, nor is wasiyya exceeding the one-third to a non- 
heir unless the heirs consent to it in the two cases after 
the death of the musi and they have capacity of gift (tabarruQ
not followed because provisions for capacity to make 
gifts had not been enacted whereas provisions for capacity 
to make contracts had long been codified in the Code of
Contracts and Obligations (decree of 30 June 1907, J.O.T.
12
of 6 July 1907, page 557)* Hence, it was not surpri­
sing that general principles in the Code of Contracts and 
Obligations were intended to be part of the law of wills. 
Article one hundred twenty-eight of the draft of the 
majallat al >istihaqiya corresponded to article sixty- 
two of the Cod^ of Contracts and Obligations, that is the 
object of a will (or object of an obligation) had to be 
something which was a valid object of commerce. Article 
one hundred twenty-nine of the draft agreed with article 
four hundred forty-one of the Code of Obligations and 
Contracts, Article four hundred forty-one requires 
written evidence as proof of the existence of an obliga­
tion. Article one hundred twenty-nine of the draft of 
the ma.jallat recognized only written documents as proof 
of wills —  notarised or signed and dated by the testator - 
as valid. Even revocation could not be implied (e.g. 
converting the object of the will). Revocation had to
12.
Code of Contracts and Obligations: article 1
reads: Obligations derive from agreements and other
declarations of will, quasi-contracts, responsibility for 
damages and quasi-responsibility.
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. - 13be in writing.
Despite the fact that the provisions on wills were 
part of the property code, there were in the draft of the 
ma.jallat al *istihaqiyat only three provisions relating 
directly to wills disposing of landed property. By viftue 
of article one hundred twenty-six the traditional Islamic 
rule that the law of wills is not limited to Muslims (arti­
cle eleven hundred twenty-six, Maliki and Hanafi of the 
Code of the Sharira)1^ was to be qualified: "The foreign­
er could not have unfettered right to enjoy landed pro­
perty by way of will: Intent on the part of the testator
had to be subject to the limits of any Tunisian law issued
13.
_ Draft of the majallat al *istihaqiya, article 140:
The musi has the right to revoke the wasiyya either expli­
cit ly^Sr by implication and explicit revocation is by writing.
Article 177 of the Code of Personal Status: The
will can be revoked but such is proved only by provisions of 
article 176 (creation of will only by written document).
1 4 .
Sharlra Code, article 1126 (Maliki): A wasiyya from
the free man is valid in the matter of the object being to 
pass ownership of property conclusively. Rushd is not re­
quired nor majority nor Is Icon,
(Hanafi): Conditions
for validity of wasiyya are existence of the musi as a 
free adult, sane, free in will, and having capacity to 
make gift (gratuitous disposition, tabarrur); and that the 
legatee be alive in fact or by implication; and that the 
bequest be capable or being_accepted as a thing to be possess­
ed after the death of the musi. Islam is no condition; for 
the wasiyya of a Muslim to a dhimmi is valid and vice versa; 
a bequest to the apostate is not valid.
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on the subject.” This disposition was probably intended 
to incorporate into the law of wills the nationalist feel­
ings which were running high against foreigners owning land 
(page 354 , supra, of Chapter II). Article
one hundred forty-two of the draft allowed a will of landed 
property to stand in regard to the surface of the land if
the testator eliminated the plants and buildings on the
15land when the will was orignially formed. ^
When the Tunisian government decided to remove testa­
mentary dispositions from the draft of the majallat al 
>istihagiya and to place them in the Code of Personal Sta­
tus, the number of articles dealing with the subject re­
mained the same. What changed was the emphasis on the 
will as a gratuitous disposition taking effect upon the 
death of the testator and giving expression to the testa­
tor's intent. This is reflected in the treatment of the 
object of the will. The draft of the majallat al >isti-
hagiyat had defined a legal object of a will as anything 
•
that could be used in commerce. The draft for the Code of 
Personal Status merely required that the object, if it 
_
Draft of the majallat al *istib5qryat, article 142: 
If the musl undertakes an increase or diminishing of the 
value of the thing bequeathed without affecting^the ob­
vious character of nature of the thing, the wasiyya is not 
null •
_ ^ If the thing bequeathed were landed property and the 
musi eliminated the plants or buildings on top of it, the 
wasiyya is effected only in relation to the surface area...
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were especially designated, had to exist at the time the 
will was being made (article one hundred ninety-eight of 
the draft, presently article one hundred eighty-six of the
-I
Code of Personal Status).
The second draft for the law of wills for the Code of 
Personal Status also placed more emphasis on the will as an 
instrument of succession. This is reflected in three of 
the articles:
l) Article two hundred one of the draft (presently 
article one hundred eighty-eight of the Code of Personal 
Status) added the right of the testator to surpass the usual 
limit of the one-third and to dispose of all his possessions 
by will, provided that he had no heirs upon his death and not­
withstanding the rights of the Bait al Mai under Maliki law.1^
" i"6 •
Code of Personal Status, article 186: The object of
the will must be existing at the time (of the making) of 
the will in the property of the testator when the object 
is specifically designated by its essence.
■^•Sharx^a Code, article 1148 (Hanafi): If one be­
queathed all of onefs wealth and one'did not have any heir 
the will is effected and there is no need for permission 
from the Bait al mal. Footnote: Maliki jurists generally
disagree. Only ibn fArafa accepted the Hanafi view.
This article agrees with the Code of Personal Status, 
article 188.
Sharifa Code, article 1142 (Maliki): A will to a
dead person whom the musi knew to be dead at the time he made 
the will is valid and the will is effected to pay for his debts 
if there be any or effected to his heirs. If he had no debts; 
and if he had_no heirs, the will lapses and is not given to 
the Bait al Mal. (This is to say that there is an exception 
to the rule that the Bait al Mal is entitled to the vacant 
estate of a deceased person. It is not entitled to that part 
of the vacant estate which came from a bequest made to bne known 
dead at the time the bequest was made.)
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2) Article two hundred five (presently article one 
hundred ninety-one of the Code of Personal Status) in­
troduced the wasiyya al wa.iibiya, which makes the sue-
cession of grandchildren to the estate of their deceased
18grandparent obligatory. The grandchildren are to re­
ceive the share which their predeceased father or mother 
would have received had he or she been alive at the time 
of the death of the grandparent. The concept of substi­
tuting grandchildren for their predeceased parents had 
existed in Tunisian law in the form of the Maliki law of 
,,inzal,, (inzalahu manzilata fulan), also called "tanzil" 
The main difference between the obligatory wasiyya and 
inzal is that the former is an obligatory charge on the 
estate and the latter depended on the discretion of the 
testator.
18.
Draft of the provisions of wills for the Code of 
Personal Status, article 205* There is instituted an 
obligatory bequest in favour of the grandchildren of either 
sex whose father or mother died before or at the same 
time as their ancestor. The bequest is equal to the in­
heritance share which their father or mother would have 
had to receive in the estate of the said grandfather and 
it cannot in any case surpass the one-third...
An Arabic version read: This (jobligatory^ frasiyya
will be effected for the first generation of agnatic ‘ 
grandchildren and it will be divided on the basis of two 
shares to the male.
i9.
Shari^a Code, article 1183 (Maliki): If a person
substitutes the children for his dead son, their father, 
that is a wasiyya which comes out of the one-third, but
383
is divided among the substitutes on the basis of two _ 
shares to the male for every female. Footnote: Istuli,
p. 510.
article 1163 (Maliki): There
is permitted a wasiyya to the son of one's heir or to 
one of one's near;relatives and the wasiyya is made by 
someone who suspects that the bequest tfillbe returned to 
the heir. So if the heir pleas that that was an imposition 
and transfer by will the heir has the right to have the 
legatee swear. If he does not swear he is not given the 
bequest* If the testimony established that generally 
the testator intended to favour some heirs over others 
the wasiyya is null and the bequest becomes part of the 
intestite inheritance• Testimony is by open hearing or 
by a condition set by the testator or by the legatee 
deeming it so. Footnote: Tasuli, p. 513.
M. Hachemi Karoui of the Centre d ’Etude et de 
Recherche economiques et scientifiques (formerly CERES, 
now IPSEJES, University of Tunis) brought my attention 
to the practise of "inz'ai" in Southern Tunisia where 
he was undertaking field research.
384
3) As for the rights of heirs, article one hundred 
'eighty-nine (presently article one hundred eighty-two of 
the Code of Personal Status) brought the rules of will of
usufruct more in line with the rules for will of corpus.
-  20 
Under Hanafi law in the Code of the Sharica the heirs
had no rights in the usufruct of a specified thing if the
Of) _
’Code of the Shanta, article 1187 (Hanafi): If the
legatee was given a specified usufruct, th§n the legatee 
dies in the lifetime of the testator, the wasiyya is null; 
and if he dies after the testator died the object of the 
usufruct returns to the heirs of the testator and not to 
the heirs of the legatee.
(Maliki): If
the legatee was given usufruct of something for a specified 
time, and the legatee takes it then dies the heirs of 
the legatee inherit it if there remains any of the 
specified time left.
^ article 1188 (Hanafi): If the
wasiyya of usufruct w a s :made to apply without any limit 
of time or if it were made for forever, the legatee has 
the right to avail himself of it for his lifetime. Then 
after his death it reverts to the heirs of the testator.
If the wasTyya was made for a specified time the legatee 
has the right to avail himself of it for that time. If 
the testator said that he bequeathes to the legatee usu­
fruct of something for some years without further explana­
tion, the wasTyya is effected for three ye^rs, and no 
more •
legatee died regardless of whether the will specified 
a definite time for the duration of the usufruct or pro­
vided that use could be forever. Yet in regard to a will
21
of corpus, the heirs of the legatee tinder HanafT law 
could accept the bequest in place of the legatee if the 
legatee died after the death of the testator but before 
having accepted the'bequest. Article one hundred forty- 
seven of the draft of the majallat al3 istihagTya had 
followed the HanafT law on the will of usufruct. Article 
two hundred two of the draft of the Code of Personal Status 
did the same. Yet article one hundred eighty-two, which
21.
Code of the SharT^a, article 1137 (HanafT): If.
the legatee dies before the death of the testator and 
before having accepted the wasTyya or rejected it, his 
death presumes his having accepted the wasTyya and the 
bequest enters in the property of his heirs.
(MalikT): If
the legatee rejected the wasTyya before the death of the 
testator, he then has the right to accept it after the 
death of the testator and that is obligatory once given.
If the legatee so designating dies after.the death of the 
testator and before having accepted the wasTyya his heirs 
stand in his place. If some of them accept and some 
others reject, then the portions which were not accepted 
return to the intestate estate. Footnote: TasulT, p.512.
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appears presently in the Code of Personal Status, allows
one generation of persons to make use of a bequest of
usufruct of a defined object. Undoubtedly the aims of
article one hundred forty-seven of the majallat al 3 isti-
haglya and article two hundred two of the draft of the 
•
Code of Personal Status were the same, namely, to constrain 
persons from using wills to create what would in effect 
amount to a hubus, a kind of disposition which had been 
prohibited in 1957 (Decree of 18 July)• The final ver­
sion of the law in article one hundred eighty-two of the 
Code of Personal Status has the same intent, but when read
with' articles one hundred eighty-nine and one hundred
22ninety-four of the same Code, it also gives the first
generation of heirs of the deceased legatee a chance to
benefit from a will of usufruct as the immediate heirs of
23a deceased legatee would from a will of corpus.
22.
Code of Personal Status, article 182: The wasiyya
of usufruct is valid only for one generation and upon their 
dying out the wasiyya will have the corpus returned to 
the estate of the testator. ^
Article 189: The wasiyya
giving usufruct of a specified thing is effective for a 
fixed period; when this period is not indicated, the 
legatee enjoys the thing for his lifetime, unless the 
wagiyya establishes the contrary.
Article 194: Rejection
of the wasiyya must be after the death of the testator 
within a period of two months from the time the legatee 
is notified of the wasiyya. The silence of the legatee 
despite the notification of the wasiyya during these two 
months is deemed to be acceptance.
23.
Next page
(continued next page)
If he dies during this period his heirs will 
step in his shoes from the day they are notified of 
the wasiyya*
23.
^Contrast with the Code of the Shari^a, article 
1166 (Maliki): If one bequeathed the one-third to a
child of one’s own child the wasiyya is divided among 
the descendants Q  ahfad) after the extinction (by death 
or otherwise) of th£ generation of the father (i.e., 
the child does not take the bequest until after the 
generation of the father dies). If the bequest consists 
of landed property its corpus is preserved and its pro­
ceeds are of benefit. If the bequest is not landed 
property one buys with the bequest a landed property if 
most possible, and if not, deals in trade, and what 
comes out in the form of revenue before the existence 
of the descendants belongs to the heirs. If some of 
the descendants exist, the present revenue is divided 
among them preferably. If there are found persons
other than descendants, the distribution is determined
for them. When one of them dies none of the revenue 
goes to his heir. Thus it goes on until there is no 
hope of increasing the legatees. Then one supervises 
(administers) the wasiyya as rightful property of the 
descendants at the time of no hope of increasing them, 
disregarding anyone who died before the time when no 
hope set in^ for nothing belongs to the heirs.
(Hanafi): If one bequeathed the one-third to the
child of one’s own child, the wasiyya is divided among 
the descendants living in law or in fact on the day of 
the death of the testator and the bequest becomes their 
property. If there are not existing on the day of the
death of the testate any of his descendants the wasiyya
reverts to his heirs.
The debate as to whether the law of wills should 
have remained part of the law of property or become part 
of the law of personal status had significance only as 
long as certain Tunisians were exempt from the Code of 
Personal Status (Decree of 12 July 1956)2^ because of 
their religious law. If during the years of such ex­
emption wills had been part of the law of personal status, 
then the law of wills would have varied from community 
to community. If instead, testamentary law had been 
part of the law of property, then the Islamic version 
would have been applicable to all inhabitants, all persons 
being subject to the lex loci regardless of religion.
Once the Rabbinical Court was abolished (Decree of 27 
September 1957) and all Tunisian citizens subjected to 
one written law, the law of wills became the same for 
everyone. Hence, it made no difference by that time 
whether the law of wills was part of the law of property 
or the law of persons. However, the decision to include
24.
Article 1 of the decree of 24 June 1957 on the 
personal status of non-Muslim and non-Hebrew Tunisians: 
Article 1 of the decree of 12 July 1956 is 
abrogated and replaced by the following pro­
visions: Foreigners are regulated in matters
of personal status by their own national law. 
For a temporary period Tunisian national# of 
non-Muslim or non-Hebrew confession remain 
regulated in this matter by the provisions of 
the French civil law, in force at the date of
the present decree.
See page 341 above of Chapter II.
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the law of wills in the law of persons had the merit of 
good form, that is, the decree of 12 July 1956 on status 
of persons had listed the law of wills among the concerns 
of personal status. Such decision was also consistent 
with history, for under the Protectorate the French 
courts had treated succession as part of the law of per­
sonal status. This had meant that even though land was 
registered and accordingly subject to the jurisdiction 
of French courts, succession to registered land was 
still governed by the laws of personal status of the de 
cujus. Today the appearance of the provisions for wills 
in the Code of Personal Status will serve the advantage 
of those persons who wish to argue that by article two 
of the decree abolishing the Rabbinial Court the Tunisian 
courts are bound to apply the personal law of the liti-
25.
Article 2 of the Code Foncier (Zeys, p. 899): The
provisions of the French civil code which are not contrary 
to either the present law or to the personal status (A) 
or to the rules of successions (B) of the holders of real 
landed rights apply in Tunisia to the registered immovea­
bles and to the real rights over these immovables (thus 
modified by Decree of 16 May 1886).
(A) The Tribunal Mixte does not have the power 
to settle disputes relating to the personal rights con­
nected to the registered immovables (Civil Court of Tunis, 
23 May 1894, Journal Tunisian (J.T.) 94,350).
(B) Succession is regulated in Tunisia by the na­
tional law of the deceased, even in regard to immovable 
property. This rule is established by_the customs which 
have the force of law (Civil Court of Tunis, 31 May 1892, 
J.T. 99,588).
See pages ZHZ and ZHZ, supra, of Chapter II.
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gants where the Code of Personal Status or any other se­
cular legislation fails to provide for the problem in 
litigation.*^
Nonetheless, the fact that the provisions for wills 
appear in the Code of Personal Status does not mean that 
the Code is exclusively intended to govern wills. The 
majallat al huquq al * alnTyat promulgated in 1965 replaced
9
the provisions for settlement of estates (tasflg al tarika) 
in the original draft of the majallat al * istihagiya with 
provisions for the general administration and distribution 
of estate (gisma al tarikat)• Articles one hundred thirty- 
one and one hundred forty-one of the Code of Property 
Rights on the distribution of estates give no indication 
that they apply only to intestate estates* One could 
presume that they would apply to both testate and intes­
tate estates.
26.
Law No. 40, of 27 September 1957* J.O.R.T. of 
27 September 1957* on abolishing the Rabbinical Courts 
article 2:
One will undertake the new suits which 
would have been under the jurisdiction 
of the Rabbinical Courts before the com­
petent court of common law. Yet the 
questions for which no secular legislated 
law is found remain subject to the rules 
which were effective before the Rabbinical 
Courts•
See page 344 above of Chapter II.
History of the promulgation of the law of wills: under­
lying .jurisprudence
As for most of the laws enacted in Tunisia, the
Ministry of Justice prepared an explanation of the docu-
27ments used to prepare the provisions on wills. The 
Tunisian legislation, according to the Ministry of Jus­
tice, was derived from the draft of the Code of the 
Sharifa, the laws of the Sharlfa (traditional), and the 
codes of personal status found in other contemporary 
Islamic states.
As for the derivations from the Code of the Shari*a, 
there have been noted those sections of that Code which 
agree and do not agree with the provisions for wills as 
found presently in the Code of Personal Status.
As for derivations from the codes of personal status 
found in contemporary Islamic states, the provisions for 
al wasiyya al wajibiya (articles one hundred ninety-one 
and one hundred ninety-two of the Code of Personal Sta­
tus) are similar to those in the Egyptian law.
Nonetheless, all of the four provisions of the law 
59-77 of 1959 on wills which the Ministry of Justice 
considered outstanding and noteworthy were based on Is­
lamic jurisprudence:
27 —
'•Ministry of Justice, Bayan mustanadat (n.d.).
l) Article one hundred seventy-six, refusing recog­
nition to oral wills, was supported by writings of cer­
tain fugaha9 as well as by public policy and requirements 
for witnessing contracts* The jurist Tasull made wit­
nessing crucial for the validity of the will. The will 
under the Code of Personal Status may be notarised or 
written by the testator. As for the will written and
signed by the testator, it was regarded in traditional
law as licit but mubah (indifferent from a moral point of 
28view). Article one hundred seventy-six of the Code of 
Personal Status does not state whether witnesses are re­
quired or not for a will written, signed, and dated by the 
testator. Whether courts would follow the Maliki law 
on this matter has not been established. By Maliki law 
(article eleven hundred seventy of the Code of the Sharifa)
28.
Ibid.
29.
_ ^Code of the Sharira, article 1170 (Maliki): If
the musi wrote the wasiyya in his own handwriting, then 
it is found in his estate and it is known that it is his 
handwriting according to the testimony of two upright 
witnesses... If the written wasiyya is found in the hands 
of the legatee or in the hands"of an >amin and evidence 
establishes that he possessed it during the lifetime of 
the testator, the wasiyya is proved and effected and if 
possession during the lifetime of the testator is not 
established, the wasTyya lapses.
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a will written in the hand of the testator and found a- 
mong his possessions upon his death would be recognised 
if two upright witnesses testified as to the handwriting 
being that of the testator. If the written will were 
found in the hands of the legatee or in the hands of an 
Jamin, then the court would have to be satisfied that the 
legatee or the * amin took possession of the will during 
the lifetime of the testator. Most likely the Tunisian 
courts would apply article four hundred fifty-nine of the 
Code of Contracts and Obligations, which provides that the 
written unwitnessed paper (al kitab al ghair al rasml) 
would stand as valid unless the heirs or an interested 
party disputed the handwriting, in which case proof and 
verification of the handwriting would be ordered by the 
court•
2) In regard to the rights of the testator to desig­
nate which items of his estate should go to which heirs 
(article one hundred eighty of the Code of Personal Sta­
tus, as long as the value of the item does not exceed
— 30the share of the farud of the heir), the explanation
30.
Code of Personal Status, article 180: The testa­
t o r s  designating during his lifetime for all of his heirs 
or some of them specific items from his property which are 
equal to their intestate shares is permitted and is up­
held upon the death of the testator.
Any amount exceeding the intestate share is sub­
ject to the rules for wills to heirs.
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from the Ministry of Justice notes that this is derived 
from some of the ShafifI and Hanball fugaha* * There 
are not like provisions in the Maliki or Hanafi majority 
opinions expressed in the Code of the Sharifa. Although 
the explanation from the Ministry of Justice does not say 
so explicitly, the provisions of article one hundred 
eighty of the Code of Personal Status are consistent with 
the view expressed by the Hanball jurist Ibn Qudama in
_ _  O 1
Al Mugni. Ibn Qudama surmised that if one made a will
of a particular item whose value was equivalent to the share
of the farud due to the heir, then the will would be valid,
*
even though made to an heir* For example, if one willed
a male slave worth one hundred dirhams to the son and a
slave girl worth fifty dirhams to the daughter, the will
would be consistent with the principle of tafsib* He
deduced this conclusion by defining the inheritance rights
of the heirs as rights in fixed proportions and not rights
32m  particular property.
^1#^Abd Allah Ibn 1 Ahmad, called Ibn Qudama, al MaqdisI, 
Al JJxjgnl: A Treatise on the law according to the Hanball
school, edited according to the^abbreviated version*of 
Khanafi, by Muharamed Rashid Rida, 3rd edition, 1947* pp.6-70f 
"Kitab al wasaya"•
32
'Consistent with article 131 of the Code of Property 
Rights of 1965: In matters of succession distribution is
by value (glma) and not by kind (rigab)•
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Another kind of will to an heir was subject to more con­
troversy* There is no provision in the Code of Personal 
Status explicitly for or against it* According to Ibn 
Qudama, there was no dispute among the jurists about the 
Prophets dictum, no wasiyya to an heir (unless consented 
to by an heir —  which seems to be a juridical deduction)* 
However, jurists held different opinions about the validity 
of wills made to benefit the heir indirectly. Ash-Sha£if1 
and *Abu Hanifa agreed that if a person by way of will 
absolved his heir from a debt or willed the settlement of 
that debt, or if a woman absolved by way of will her hus­
band from paying the mahr, or if a person made a will to 
the debtor of an heir, then the will was valid in each 
case. ’Abu Yusuf disagreed, on the principle that even 
though considered as an indirect will to an heir, it was 
still subject to the bar of no wills to an heir, for the 
heir would profit from having his debt fulfilled out of 
the will.
3) One of the most striking innovations in the Tuni­
sian law of wills was the obligatory will (al wasiyya al 
wajibiya)* The Ministry of Justice accepted the inter­
pretation of a minority of early Islamic writers on the 
verse in the Qur’an on bequests: "It is written that when
any of you approach death and should you leave properties 
the wasiyya belongs to the father and mother and the close
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relatives in all fairness as a right in kindness.” (sura
r* /-N /m a  /-> *v* rsrl rv -i /rln 4-t r •
The explanation from the Ministry of Justice names Ibn
Hanbal and Daud Zahirl as supporters of the obligatory 
»  #
wasiyya to near relatives. ( Ibn Hazm was particularly 
known for regarding as obligatory the bequest to close 
relatives who could not inherit as intestate heirs. To
his mind, the verse of bequests had been abrogated by the 
verses of inheritance only in regard to relatives who could 
inherit and not in regard to relatives who could not in­
herit. Just as in the law of talag the Tunisian govern­
ment felt justified in abolishing what was considered 
reprehensible (makruh), the government also felt in re­
gard to the law of wills for close relatives justified in 
making obligatory something which was recommended as good 
(mandub). Such reasoning implies that there is nothing 
sacred about certain categories of actions. What is for­
bidden or what is obligatory by revelation cannot be 
changed, but any type of action in between, namely, recom­
mended, (mandub), indifferent (mubah), or reprehensible 
(makhruh), can be made a part of one of the two extreme 
categories (prohibited or obligatory)• Once the princi­
ple of the obligatory wasiyya was written into the Tunisian
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law, there arose the question of which close relatives 
would be eligible• Just as there was a limit on who shall 
be an intestate heir, the Tunisian Ministry of Justice 
must have felt that there had to be a limit on who would 
qualify as a testate claimant. The Ministry interpreted 
the term "bi* 1 mafrud” appearing in the verse of bequests 
to mean that in all fairness only the grandchildren of the 
de cujus should take the share of the predeceased father 
or mother (article one hundred ninety-two of the Code of 
Pers onal S t atus). ^
Finally in support of the principle that the obliga­
tory wasiyya have priority over the ordinary bequest, the 
Ministry of Justice cited Ibn Muflih as reported by Imam 
* Ahmad and Ta*usi.
a  •
4) A fourth innovation which was not mentioned in 
the bayan from the Ministry was the restriction in article 
one hundred eighty-two of the Code of Personal Status on 
wills of usufruct. The article forbids one to make a will 
of usufruct to a particular person and his family for an 
indefinite length of time. The usufruct is limited to
33.
Code of Personal Status, article 192: The obliga­
tory wasiyya benefits only the first generation of grand- 
childreA, the issue of a child of either sex, and the 
qasama among them is on the basis of two parts to the male 
and one part to the female.
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one generation. After the end of one generation the ob­
ject of the usufruct returns to the heirs of the testator. 
No doubt this rule keeps the law of wills consistent with 
the law that abolished *ahbas in Tunisia, Otherwise, a 
person could have used his will to create a usufruct 
which for all intent and purposes would have had the ef­
fect of a hubus. There appears to be no rule in the 
Shari*a which was directly contrary to the limiting of the 
duration of usufruct as in article one hundred eighty- 
two of the Code of Personal Status. According to the 
Code of the Sharica, the Maliki law allowed the heirs 
of a legatee to enjoy the will of usufruct when the will 
specified usufruct for a fixed length of time and the ori­
ginal legatee had died before that time had expired (arti-
v 34cle eleven hundred eighty-seven). ^ Article one hundred 
eighty-two of the Code of Personal Status limits the length 
of time to one generation; it does not adopt the Hanafi
34.
Code of the SharTra, article 1187 (Maliki): If
the legatee has the right of usufruct of a thing for a 
specified period, then the legatee takes it and he dies 
it is inherited from the legatee if there remains any of 
the time for the use of the thing left.
Article 1187 (0anafl): If the legatee has the right
of usufruct for a specified period, then dies during the 
lifetime of the testator, the wasiyya is null. And if 
he dies after the death of the testator, the corpus with 
the usufruct returns to the heirs of the testator and 
does not revert to the heirs of the legatee.
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rule that the usufruct could not go to the heirs of the 
legatee if he died before the time specified in the will 
had expired.
When viewing the bayan from the Ministry as a juris­
prudential document, one cannot help comparing this ex­
planation on wills with the explanation from the Ministry 
on the law of talaq and polygamy. By comparison, the 
law of wills offered far less striking innovations. This
is seen in the difference in sources used to draft the
_  and
codified rules. The rules for talaq^polygamy derived 
from direct reinterpretations of the ^ahadith of the Pro- 
phet and verses in the Qur*an. The rules for wills, 
however, derived from opinions of old jurists; however 
much they were in the minority in their time, such jurists 
never challenged fundamental interpretations of the *aha- 
dith and the Qur*an. Two reasons may account for the 
difference in approach to the laws of marriage and divorce 
and the law of wills. One explanation, as noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, is that there was not as 
much political pressure from the French for reform in the 
law of property as there was in the law of marriage and di­
vorce. The French having themselves a complex system of 
inheritance could hardly quarrel with an Islamic system 
which agrees with the French principle of an estate con-
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sis ting of a disposable quantity and an indisposable quan-
3 5tity (article nine hundred thirteen of the Code Civil).
A second reason is that the law of wills is closely related 
to the law of mlrath. The law of mirath in the Qui^  an 
is much more explicit than the law of marriage and divorce. 
Likewise, the laws of wills in the JahadTth appear more 
explicit than the law of talaq in the *ahad!th. For this 
reason, reforms in the laws of mirath and wills would re­
quire that the legislator go directly against the words of 
the hadith or the Qur*an, or that he devise hiyal. Neither 
way is very appealing. There is need, instead, for re­
thinking the degree of reliance on hadith. This in turn 
requires rethinking the science of >ahadith and the his- 
torical reliability of >ahadith. The fourth and fifth 
chapters shall be devoted to the problems of reform in 
al-mirath and al-wasiyya. For now it suffices to say 
that the law of wills of 19 June 1959 amending the Code of 
Personal Status retained the fundamental principles govern­
ing the ultra vires bequest (that is, no will beyond the 
one-third and no will to an heir).
3 5 Code Civil, article 913 (Chapter 3 on the portion 
of the disposable property and on reduction): Gratuitous
dispositions*, whether inter vivos or by will cannot exceed 
one-half of the properties of the person disposing of them 
if he leaves upon his death only one legitimate child; 
one-third if he leaves two children; and one-fourth if he 
leaves three or more children...
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History of the lav of wills: comparing past practise and
present lav
Given that the law of wills of 1959 brought in some 
innovations without disturbing the principles which no 
jurist ever seems to have disputed, one should measure 
these innovations against pre-Independence practises*
An analysis of some cases and. situations during the Pro­
tectorate will reveal that the law of wills of 1959 did 
not deviate far from practise.
On the question of written wills as opposed to oral
wills, one can turn to a royal mafrud which laid down the
*
value of written evidence in court. In 1941 the Bay was 
advised to order every Hanafi gadi "to give as much weight 
to titles and written documents as was given to any other 
(oral) forms of proof in Islamic law." Specifically in 
matters of distribution of proceeds from wagf, the gadi 
was ordered to give priority to the written evidence of 
the wishes of the founder of the hubus. The written 
documents could be opposed by oral evidence and testimony 
of witnesses on what was the established practise in mat-
^  *Ma*rud of 16 June 1941.
4G2
ters of hubus, or by oathf but the object.of the order of
the Bay was to prevent any Hanafi gadi from throwing out
titles and written documents simply because they were writr
tfen . The intervention by the Bay into the law applied
by the HanafI courts was justified by the fact that the
Hanafi qudah were divided on the issue* No doubt such • 1 *
division caused concern over whether a defendant could get 
justice, for such division of opinion among the qudah 
would have allowed a plaintiff to choose the gadi who was 
known to hold the opinion more favourable to his case* 
Although the mafrud was intended specifically for 
matters of >ahbasf the explanation attached to the marrud
1 1 w  i ii i-
covered principles that apply to many other matters. The 
explanation stated the arguments in favour of courts to­
tally rejecting written documents simply because they were 
written* The main argument was that custom and usage 
(£urf) of a particular location determined whether the 
gadi would even admit a written document as evidence. In 
some areas written evidence was admitted only if it were 
a written public document from the political sovereign. In 
other areas any written evidence was admitted whether pub­
licised or not* For example, in such areas, a creditor 
(for that matter, a legatee) could demand from the heirs 
of the deceased payment of a said sum by producing a writ­
ten agreement between himself and the deceased* If hon-
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ourable witnesses declared the handwriting authentic, 
the debt had to be paid out of the estate. In other areas, 
however, the payment of the debt would have been allowed, 
not because of the establishment of the authenticity of 
the handwriting, but because such kind of agreement con­
formed to the custom of the area (that is, it was a likely
37agreement between such kind of parties). In opposition 
to the opinion that written documents in themselves are not 
admissible evidence because of the custom prevailing in the 
area, the author of the explanation of the mafrud pointed 
out that the general custom in Tunisia was to admit writ­
ten documents as evidence* The system of notaries and 
all the written official work of the qudah themselves were 
evidence of the acceptance of written documentation as 
valid. Secondly, the author of the explanation pointed out
the injustice of a law that admitted evidence only according
38to the customary practises prevailing in various regions.
Under such a legal system there was no protection for the 
person who had received possession of some land by a writ­
ten agreement whose terms constituted a general legal 
alienation, though the alienation was not by the usual cus-
37.
Muhammad al Mokhtar, "As Shahada al Khat't," 15 
June 1941, based on Ibn Abidine's "Nachir al fUrf"«
38# -  >Ibid., cites fatwa of Tunisian Sheikh Ahmad Belkho.ia.
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tomary way in that area. If the original owner then by 
a customary transaction of sale alienated the same land 
to a second person, custom would uphold the second sale, 
supported by oral evidence, and not admit the written 
evidence of the first alienation. Even if the written 
document were admitted, it might not have settled the mat­
ter in favour of the person claiming priority, but at least 
it would have given him a basis for opposing eviction from 
the land.
Among the Malik! courts admission of written evidence
was no problem. Imam Malik was known to have advocated
39admissibility of written documents. Admissibility, how­
ever, did not preclude evidence as to its authority or falsity.
The Code of Personal Status continues the official 
line of thinking expressed in the ma(rud of 1941.^
As for cases of succession under the Protectorate, 
the types of problems which came to the attention of the 
Administration arose from disagreement among heirs about
^ * Ibid., cites Ibn Abidine’s "Nachir al f Urf” .
40 t-'Code of Personal Status, Article 176: The wasiyya
is proved only by notarised document or by a writing drafted
and dated and signed by the testator.
Article 177• Revocation of the wasiyya is allowed 
but proof of revocation is according to th§ provisions of 
article 176.
the appointment of an administrator of the estate, from
doubts over the existence of particular heirs (especially
the f asaba), and from doubts over calculations appropriate
for tanzil (inheritance by a grandchild from the estate of
his grandparent by representing his predeceased parent)
(see page 382 above).
In a case of Muslim Moroccans before the French civil 
— 41court in Tunis the heirs were a germane brother, a widow, 
and two daughters* The women were to receive their fixed 
shares and the brother the remainder, but they disagreed 
over the appointment of the brother as administrator to set­
tle the estate* The Maliki gadi appointed a judicial ad­
ministrator, but the brother appealed to the French court, 
for an appointment* The present law of administrator of 
estate as found in the majailat al hugug al fainiyat would
have been applied similarly in such case* Article one
42hundred thirty-three of the majallat allows the heirs to
* Abdullah, son of El Kader v* Madame Khediia Bent: 
Belcracem El Kader and Misses Behina and Fatima, interven­
tion by Sherifs of Ouezzan, Affaire Marocaine, copy of 
minutes of public audience of 17 June 19 (n.d.)(in Wizara
'Code of Property Rights, article 135: If one of
the heirs demand appointment of an administrator of the 
estate the president of the competent court will appoint 
by an order an administrator either upon which choice the 
heirs agree unanimously, or who, as far as possible, is 
one of the heirs.
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decide on an administrator, who would then be officially 
appointed by the competent court. Should the heirs fail 
to agree unanimously on an administrator, the president 
of the court would have the authority to appoint an ad­
ministrator, preferably from among the heirs.
In another matter during the years of the Protectorate 
the administration of the estate posed a problem when it
appeared that the only heirs left by the deceased were his
43widow and an uncle who lived m  Morocco. The widow was 
not appointed administrator of the estate.* The uncle 
would not answer any letters asking him to place a claim 
in the estate. The former employer of the deceased sug­
gested that the Bait al Mai represent the uncle and pro­
ceed, in the presence of the widow, with an inventory of 
the estate, However, two other casaba were found to be 
existing. These relatives were residing in Morocco. In 
a document notarised by the local court in Morocco twelve 
members of the tribe of the deceased attested to the fact 
that the two <asaba knew the deceased and were the sole
44male heirs. The uncle was declared judicially absent.
43 n'Letter from Director of Caisse Fonciere to Resident
General, Tunis, 2 September 1939, re: estate of El Hadj
Massaoud, Affaire Marocaine.
44• * ✓ *
Letter from the French delegue at the Ministry of
Tunisian Justice to the Director General and Common Admin­
istration, 8 December 1931.
4C7
The Bureau of Private 7Ahbas and Supervision of Property 
refused to place the estate under their supervision for 
the protection of the interests of the absent heir, for 
he was not a minor and did not lack ability to secure his 
own representative to supervise his interests once notified
of the opening of the s u c c e s s i o n O n l y  these two *asaba
■ ■ «
from the Moroccan tribe communicated an interest in the 
succession. They appointed a representative in Tunis and
the appointment was brought to the notice of the Maliki
— — 46
qadi in Tunis.* *
Besides illustrating problems of locating distant re­
latives, the above case also illustrated the principle 
underlying the rights of the Bait al Mai in an estate o-
_ _ Note from the Bureau de Tutelle et Ahbas Prives
(da*ra at tagadim wa*l >ahbas al khasa), 4 November 1939, 
re! succession of Hadj M£ssaoud. ^
46 • ✓ / /
Letter from Resident General to French delegue at 
the Ministry of Tunisian Justice, 20 May 1940.
Series of letters on the Moroccan affair: 2
Sept. 1939, Director of Caisse Foneiere to Resident Gen­
eral; 9 Sept. 1931, Resident General to Secretary General, 
No. 2234; 16 Sept. 1939, Commandant of Algerian-Moroc­
ean border to Resident General, No. 4.599; 14 Oct. 1939, 
French deldgue at Ministry of Tunisian Justice to Direc­
tor of General Administration, No. 386 SD; 4 Nov. 1931, 
Note fron^ Office of Tutelle and Mokkadems; 8 Dec. 1939, 
French delegu^ at Ministry of Tunisian Justice; 20 May 
1940, Resident General to French del^gu^ at Ministry of 
Tunisian Justice.
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pened for succession. At first the authorities of the
Bait al Mai thought that the estate was vacant and were
prepared to collect the entire estate. Then when the
authorities of the Bait al Mai thought that the only
heir of the deceased was his widow, they were prepared
to take the surplus as €asaba. Upon the discovery of
blood *asaba the question of inheritance by the Bait al
Mai was dropped. Today the same situation would be
treated very similarly. By virtue of article eighty-
seven of the Code of Personal Status the Bait al Mai
continues to enjoy rights in a vacant estate. By virtue
of articles one hundred fourteen and one hundred fifteen
of the same Code the Bait al Mai is treated as fasaba"" ■" ■ '■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■ ■
whose rights in the succession can be exercised only in 
the absence of any other ^asaba by blood (or agnatic 
daughters, according to article one hundred forty-three 
bis of the Code of Personal Status). (See page 410 et sq. 
post.).
In the law of wills, however, there appears to be 
a difference between the solutions of the 1940*s and 
those of today. If the deceased had given by way of 
will all his property to his wife and she had been in 
fact the only heir by family relation upon his death, 
the Islamic law of 1940 would have voided the will to
an heir.47 The Code of Personal Status today is not so
clear. Article one hundred eighty-eight removes all
rights of the Treasury in the estate when a testator wills
away all his estate, provided that the testator has left
48no debts nor any heirs. While article one hundred 
eighty-eight is an exception to the general principle that 
one cannot dispose of more than one-third of one*s es­
tate by will (article one hundred seventy-nine), except 
by consent of the heirs (including the Bait al Mai in 
Maliki law), there appears to be no explicit exception 
to the general principle that one cannot dispose in 
favour of an heir if the bequest exceeds the heir's 
share in the farud. Hence, it appears today that a tes­
tator cannot will all his property in favour of his wife 
even if she were the only heir. It is not even clear 
from the terms of the article one hundred forty-three A
47* • ^
Sharl<a Code, article 1145 (MalikT): Wasiyya to
an heir is null under any circumstances as is wasiyya to
a non-heir for more than one-third unless the heirs allow
it. ^
(Hanafi): Wasiyya to an heir is not allowed, nor
is wagiyya to a non-heir exceeding one-third, unless the
heirs allow the wasiyya in the two instances after the
death of the testator, and the permission would take the
nature of a gift (gratuitous disposition^ tabarruf).
Article 1148 (ganafi, none for Maliki) provides
for one instance when wasiyya of more than one-third is
allowed, namely when the testator has no heir.
48
#Code of Personal Status, article 188: One who has
no debts nor any heirs can execute a wasiyya even if it 
covers all his wealth without depending on the Treasury 
(for permission).
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whether the widow as sole heir could collect the entire
49estate according to the law of intestacy. For article 
one hundred forty-three A allows only the agnatic daughters 
or granddaughters to collect the entire estate as intestate 
heirs whether in the presence of blood * asaba or the Bait 
al Mai. Nonetheless, the widow who is the beneficiary of 
a will of the entire estate as the sole heir might succeed 
by referring the court to the terms of the first para­
graph of article one hundred forty-three bis. By article 
one hundred forty-three bis the widow might be able to 
inherit the entire estate by radd. For the first para­
graph provides for radd to the fara*id in the event of 
the absence of <asaba. Given that the Bait al Mai is 
always present, one could reason that the rights of the 
Bait al Mai are to be overlooked for the purposes of the 
operation of radd. Otherwise, if the word n*asaban as 
used in the first paragraph of article one hundred forty- 
three bis were interpreted to mean that the Bait al Mai
49.
Code of Personal Status, article 143 A (bis):
When the <asaba are not present and the shares of the 
farud do not absorb the estate the remainder returns to 
the Sharers of the farud in proportion to their fixed 
shares. r
As for the daughter whether plural or single or the 
daughter of the son howsoever low, they shall have the re­
mainder even despite the presence of * asaba of the nature 
of brothers, uncles and the Bait al Mali
is always present, the provision would have been a dead 
letter from the start. Hence, if the spouse relicit 
were the only surviving heir, the Bait al Mai for all in­
tent and purposes would be regarded as absent like any 
other *asaba; and while a will that disposes of the entire 
estate to her might be ultra vires, the court could approve 
it on the principle that she would be entitled to the en­
tire estate anyway by radd, under the rules of intestacy.
Besides the legal rights of the Bait al Mai, the French 
administration also encountered the problem of inheritance 
rights of grandchildren in their grandparent1s estate. A 
few years before Egypt introduced the law of obligatory 
bequests (1946), the Director of the Caisse Fonciere in 
in Tunis was presented with a case of distribution of the 
proceeds of a hypothecated loan among the widow, children 
and grandchildren of the deceased. The Director never 
questioned the right of the grandchildren to share in the 
estate by tanzil. What he questioned was the
method he should use for calculating their shares in the 
estate. In describing his problem to the officials at 
the Ministry of Justice, the Director wrote: ”It happens
sometimes that the Caisse Fonciere is presented with 
claims from debtors who fall under the title of legatees 
or representatives of their predeceased father.” The
50 '#Letter from Director of Caisse Fonciere to French
delegue at Ministry of Tunisian Justice, No.932, 6 March 1940
solution, as the Director was told, depended on whether one 
treated the grandchildren as legatees to a will or as re­
presentatives of a predeceased son who would have inherited 
by the laws of intestacy had he remained alive. The 
treatment of the grandchildren and hence the systems for 
calculating their shares varied from region to region in 
Tunisia. The Director of the Caisse Fonciere wanted to 
know what principles determined which calculations were 
to be used, but wanted no method to do harm to anyonefs 
rights in the estate. The Ministry of Justice consulted 
the Maliki m u f t i . T h e  muftiys opinion was consistent 
with an opinion voiced by Professor Si Muhammad Es Sadok 
Ech Chatti, of the Grand Mosque in Tunis, in a treatise 
published about that time on succession according to the 
Maliki rite. Both agreed that there were two ways one 
could treat grandchildren and hence two methods for calcu­
lating their shares in the estate of their grandparent.
Whichever one was adopted was supposed to depend on the ex-
52press wishes of the grandparent.
According to these two Maliki jurists of the 1940fs,
5 1  •
Note from Belhassen En Nadjar, Maliki mufti, 3 
April 1940 (25 Sfar 1359).
52.
Belhassen En Nadjar ^ ^
Director of Caisse Fonciere to French delegue, 6 
March 1940, referring to Ecfr Chrattiys treatise.
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if the de cu.ius had said that he "constitutes his grandson
as an heir to the same rights as his (predeceased) son",
then the share of the grandchild was treated simply as 
53a legacy. The method used for calculating the amount 
of such legacy was called the "adamou hirmane" (the person 
who was excluded from inheritance). According to this 
method the administrator of an estate was to calculate 
first the share of the grandchild, then remove it from 
the estate, and finally distribute the remainder of the 
estate to the heirs by the rules of intestacy. It was 
the same as if the de cujus had willed one-third of his 
estate. The obligation of the one-third was met like 
any other debt, then the remaining two-thirds was distri­
buted among the intestate heirs. The difference between 
the legacy by representation and the ordinary legacy was 
that the amount of the legacy by representation was not 
specified by the testator. The calculation of the grand­
child’s share was left to the administrator of the estate. 
When the administrator interpreted the words of the testa­
tor to mean that the administrator should use the method 
of "adamou hirmane", the administrator undertook a two-
53.
Hachemi Sebai, Chief of Bureau of Personal Status 
and Land Litigations, for. the commissionnaire of the Govern­
ment, in response to question from Director of Caisse Fon- 
cifere, 24 April 1940.
Belhassen En Nadjar.
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step calculation for finding the precise amount of the 
share of the grandchild* In the example posed by the 
Director of the Caisse, Fonciere in 1940, the claimants to 
the estate were a widow, three sons, and a grandson* The 
first step an administrator of the estate would have taken 
would be based on the fiction that the fourth son —  the 
father of the grandson —  were still alive. The results 
would be: l/8 to the widow, 7/32 for each of the three
living sons and the fourth fictitious son* The share 
then of the fictitious son was to be taken out and assigned 
to the grandchild* The remaining 25/32 was to be divided 
among the heirs (widow and three living sons).
The two jurists, Mufti En Nadjar and Professor Ech 
Chatti, were not the only ones agreeing to this method of 
calculating the shares of grandchildren. For half a cen­
tury at least, the notaries in Tunis who were responsible
for liquidating estate had tended to sue the same method
54of "adamou hirmane".
According to the jurists, a second method of calculation 
was used if the de cujus had said that "the child repre­
senting the predeceased child will receive a share equal 
to that of my other sons". The grandchildren were treated
54.
i f Letter from Director of Caisse Fonciere to French 
Delegu4 in Ministry of Tunisian Justice, No. 5516C.F.1,
6 March 1940.
as equals to their uncles^ (within the limits of the 
56one-third). The calculation befitting such intention 
was called "tessaoui" (tasawin, equivalence). Professor 
Ech Chatti was known for his conclusion that most grand­
parents really intended that the administrator of the es­
tate use this method of calculation regardless of the
* /
words they actually used in constituting their grandchil- 
ren as sharers in their estate. By the rules of "tessa- 
oui” (tasawin) the administrator of the estate was to 
undertake a two-step calculation for determining the 
exact amount of the share of the grandchild. In the ini­
tial calculation he determined the shares of the widow 
and the three sons as if there were no grandchildren.
Next the equivalent of the share of one son was assigned 
to the grandchild (or total of grandchildren). The grand­
child was then allowed to enter the estate and his share 
added to the previously calculated shares of the intestate 
heirs• Because the sum of the shares then would be more 
than the whole of the estate, each share of each claimant 
was then reduced proportionately by c awl. The absolute
55.
Belhassen En Nadjar
56.
Ustaad Muhammad <al Qarui, Deputy Public Prosecutor 
for mafrkama al ta^gib, "'Atykam al wasiyya wa* 1 tanzTl" ("The 
rules of wills and tanzil"), Al Qada^ wa*l tashrTf, No.5t 
1959, p. 8. * "
416
amount of the shares of each claimant was reduced, but 
the intent that the uncles and the grandchild take in 
equal proportion was preserved. By contrast, the cal­
culation called 11 adamou hirmane” preserved for the 
grandchild the absolute fraction of the estate which the 
predeceased father would have received had he remained 
alive; how the share of the grandchild related to the 
share of his uncles was irrelevant.
While both notaries and jurists accepted the method 
of calculation called ”adamou hirmane” , the notaries
disregarded the notion of the jurists of the calculation
57
called "tessaoui" (tasawin). The practising 
notaries treated all claimants a s ' if they were intestate 
heirs, the grandchildren standing in the Shoes of the 
deceased son. The result was that the widow received 
her part of the farud and the remainder of the estate 
was divided among the three living sons and the grand­
son equally as if there were four sons living. There
58
was no need for cawl.
57.
Hachemi Sebai to Commissionaire of the Government, 
No. 5516 C.F.L., 5 March 1940.
58 •
Notaries* version of ”tessaoui” (tasawin) would 
be difficult to apply where the share of the grand­
child would exceed one-third. Presumably if the share 
of the grandchild exceeded one-third, the notaries would 
have then applied the rules of testate distribution, 
that is, the one-third would be assigned then the re­
maining two-thirds redistributed among the intestate 
heirs. For example :
W 1/8 *awl 1/15
S 7/8 «awl 7/15
S's S 7/8 Cawl 7/15
Given that the share of the grandson of 7/15 is more 
than one-third, one would suppose that the notaries 
would have used the following calculations 2
W 1/8 = 3/24
S 13/24
S ’s s 1/3 = 8/24
How can one explain this difference between the 
version of the notaries* "tessaoui" (tasawin) and the
version of the jurists? One explanation is that the
notaries were concerned with simplicity while the jur­
ists were concerned with finer points of law. To the 
mind of the practicising notary, a claimant was treated 
either as a legatee or as an intestate heir. If he 
were treated as a legatee, his share was calculated 
and subtracted from the total of the estate. The 
calculation called "adamou hirmane" was apt for such 
purpose, that is, when the claimant was a grandchild 
representing his predeceased father. If the grand­
child were treated as an intestate heir, there was no
need to affect his share by such further calculations
as *awl. Compared to the simpler version of the no­
taries of "tessaoui" (tasawin), the version of the jurists 
added a third category to the already existing two 
categories of legatee and intestate heir. This third 
category was a half-way house, half-way between the 
rules of testate distribution and the rules of intestate 
distribution. For the jurists borrowed from the rules 
of testacy by calculating the share of the grandchild 
separately from the shares of the intestate heirs; but 
then, instead of subtracting the share of the grandchild 
from the total of the estate, the jurists added the
419
share to the shares of the intestate heirs, then applied 
*awl as if the estate were intestate overburdened with 
sharers of the farud.
To the minds of the jurists, no doubt, the nota­
ries sacrificed an important principle of law,to sim­
plicity. That important principle of law, which any 
administrator of an estate had to keep in ijiind, was 
that the sharers of the farud and the *asaba are -fixed. ■ -y 11 i ■ ■ 1
by law. When a given relative such as a grandchild
59
is excluded de jure (or de facto ) from inheriting 
according to the rules of intestacy, he cannot be made 
a rightful heir by the will of the de cujus. At best 
the de cujus can only make him a legatee, subject to 
the laws of al wasTyya.with a minimum of variation.
The jurists could very well charge the notaries with 
violating this basic principle in their version of 
"tessaoui" (tasawin). For their version was based on 
a fiction, a fiction that the grandchild was always 
the same as the living son, and accordingly the share
59.
By normal testamentary rules even exclusion 
de facto entitles an excluded relative to a legacy.
Furthermore, according to social principles underlying 
the obligatpry will, no inheritance rule should be in­
terpreted to work hardship on the orphaned grandchild 
(Bessis, Al Qad5> wa*l tashrT1, No. 10, 1965).
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of the grandchild was the same as the deceased would 
have received if he had remained alive. The jurists 
could not deny that they had also relied on that same 
fiction in their calculations, whether in the one 
called "tessaoui" Itasawin) or the one called "adamou 
hirmane". Yet the jurists had relied on the fiction 
as only one of the steps in the calculations needed to 
arrive at the share of the grandchild. The version of 
the jurists of "tessaoui" (tasawin) did not result in 
the grandchild receiving exactly the same as his pre­
deceased parent would have received had he remained 
alive. All that mattered was that the ratio between the 
share of the grandchild and the share of the uncles 
was the same as the ratio would have been between the 
shares of the live sons and the share of the deceased 
son.
As a corollary to their concern that heirs and non­
heirs be kept distinct, the jurists could also have 
argued in support of their version of "tessaoui"
(tasawin) that the intestate heirs should equally share
60
the burden that a grandchild placed on the estate.
60 •
Mufti En Nadjar: "In deciding that his grand­
children will represent his son (by either tessaoui or 
adamou hirmane) the testator wanted to conserve a judi­
cial fiction, the survival of his said son. There then 
must take place a calculation of the share of the said 
son as if he were living and then a distribution among
421
If any one heir were to suffer from the presence of a 
grandchild allowed to share in the estate, then all 
other heirs had to share the consequences* Of the 
three possible methods for calculating the share of a 
grandchild, the version of the jurists of "tessaoui” 
(tasawin) was the most equitable for the intestate heirs. 
This was because the percentile reduction which any 
one : intestate heir suffered in his original intes­
tate share when the grandchild entered the estate was 
exactly the same as any other intestate heir suffered 
in the same estate* Below are tables showing the steps 
an administrator of an estate would go through to ar­
rive at the shares of heirs and grandchildren* If one 
compares columns A and C one can see by what percent­
age the shares of the intestate heirs have been re­
duced or raised because of the presence of a grand­
child representing the interests of his deceased parent* 
In the table labeled "adamou hirmane", the wife and two 
sons —  the only intestate heirs —  have suffered re-
his children on the basis of 2:1 in favour of the males. 
As a result, the interests of the heirs, both the 
sharers of the farud and the *asaba must be equally 
compromised* The grandchild representing his parent is 
not assimilated in all aspects to his parent: for if
he were, the prejudice (to the heirfs interests) would 
affect only the residuary heirs."
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ductions from the initial shares by almost the same 
percentage* There is a very slight weighting in favour 
of the sons* In the table labeled "jurists1 version of 
tessaoui11 f the wife and the two sons have all suffered 
a reduction of thirty per cent. In the table labeled 
"notaries* version of tessaoui" it is only the sons who 
suffer the burden of the presence of the grandchild; 
the wife gets the share she would have received had 
there been no grandchild taking part in the estate*
”ADAMOU HIRMANE”
B
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intestate share tanzTl: 1st tanzil: final
by ordinary rules step: ficti- allocation
of mirath tious son
common denominator
8832
Widow 1104 1104 782
reduced from 
1104 by 29.2%
Son 3864 2576 2737
Son 3864 2576 2737
Sons* total 7728 5152 5474
reduced from 
7728 by 29%
Son’s son X(excluded) 2576 2576
W:sons=l:7 W:sons=l:7
Widow
Son
Son
Sons1
Son1 s
4£4
JURISTS• VERSION OF "TESSAOUI” (TASAWIN)
A B C
i n t e s t a t e  sh are  t a n z T l ; 1 s t t a n z T l : taw l
by o rd in a r y  r u le s  s te p :  f i c t i -
o£ m ira th  t io u s  son
common denominator 
8832
1104 1104 768
reduced from  
1104 by 30.4%
3864 3864 2688
t o t a l
3864
7728
3864 2688
5376
reduced  from  
7728 by 30.4%
son X (e x c lu d e d ) 3864 2688
W:2 sons=l:7 W:2 sons=l:7
NOTARIES1 VERSION OF "TESSAOUI" (TASAWIN)
Widow
Son
Son
Sons*
Sonfs
A B C
in t e s t a t e  sh a re  t a n z T l : 1 s t  ta n z T l:  f i n a l
by o r d in a r y  r u le s  s te p :  f i c t i -  a l lo c a t io n
o f m Trath  t io u s  son
common denom inato r  
8832
1104 1104 1104
3864 2576 2576
3864 2576 2576
t o t a l  7728 5152
reduced  fro m  
7728 by 33.3%
son X(excluded) 2576 2576
W:2 sons and 
g ra n d s o n = l:7
W:2 sons and 
grandson=l:7
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The result of the query of the Director of the Caisse 
Foneiere about the rules governing the succession of 
grandchildren by tanzTl was that the Ministry of Justice 
rejected the version of the notaries of "tessaoui" 
(tasawin) and left to the discretion of the Director the 
choice between the version of the jurists of "tessaoui'* 
(tasawin) and the calculation called f,adamou hirmane"•
After the Independence of Tunisia the question of in­
heritance of orphaned grandchildren arose again when the 
Code of Personal Status was completed by amendments for 
the law of wills. The Tunisian government accepted the 
notion that a grandchild can inherit as a special lega­
te e  when that grandchild is excluded from the inheritance 
and when the parent of that grandchild has predeceased 
the de cujus (the grandfather of the grandchild). Going 
beyond this basic principle, which was part of the rules 
of tanzTl, the Tunisian lawmakers brought about major 
variations on an old theme. These variations are con­
siderably different from the details of the rules of 
tanzTl. For a start, article one hundred ninety-one of 
the Code of Personal Status no longer left the question 
of grandchildren taking part in the estate to the whims 
of the grandfather; article one hundred ninety-one made 
the legacy to a grandchild obligatory. Since the Minis­
try of Justice found justification for such a forced
4 £ 7
will in the doctrines of Ibn Hazm of the extinct Zahin. •
s c h o o l, and n o t in  th e  r u le s  o f  t a n z T l , th e  d e t a i ls  o f  
th e  law  o f o b l ig a to r y  w i l l s  a re  fe w e r th an  th ose  f o r  
ta n z T l and a re  more c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  laws f o r  o rd in a r y  
w i l l s .  The r u le s  f o r  c a lc u la t in g  th e  sh a re  o f  th e  g rand ­
c h i ld  i l l u s t r a t e  t h is  p o in t .  The s t a r t in g  p o in t  f o r  th e
calculations is found in the rule that the grandchild
\
inherits the share his predeceased parent would have re­
ceived from the grandfather*s estate if the parent had 
died immediately after or simultaneously with the grand­
father (article one hundred ninety-one of the Code of 
Personal Status). The illustration in the 1970 edition 
of the Code of Personal Status does not reveal all the
steps by which the share of the grandchild is to be de- 
61
termined. In the example, the grandparent leaves two
61.
M.T. Es Snoussi edition. Article 191 (Arabic ver­
sion only), footnote 1: An illustration of the theory of
a l  wasTyya a l  w a j ib a :
FATIMA
Daughter Daughter Son
share of l/3
Son
their share of 
1/3
dead in life­
time of Fatima 
and he left
Son
share of 
1/3
Does the designated grandson enter (the estate) validly or not?
(cont* d)
I
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daughters, one son, and one grandson (child of a prede- *, 
ceased son). One can turn to a commentary on the obliga- 
tory wasTyya for an interpretation of all the steps of 
of calculation. According to the author of the com­
mentary, Sayyed BessTs, the administrator of an estate is 
to treat the predeceased son as if he died immediately 
after the grandfather but only as a preliminary step in 
determining the share of the grandchild. This step is the 
same step used in the calculations for tanzTl, whereby the 
predeceased parent is treated as living then forgotten, 
as his share is then assigned to the grandchild. The 
share of the grandchild is treated as a legacy and like 
ordinary legacies removed from the estate while the re­
mainder is divided among the intestate heirs. Sayyed 
BessTs does not thus interpret the rule of article one 
hundred ninety-one literally ("as if the son died imme­
diately after the grandfather"); for if he did, the 
share of the fictitious son would have been first deter­
mined as if he were a living intestate heir, then divided 
among his two sisters, germane brother, and son. Such a 
method would affect the share of the grandchild only if 
the claimants to the estate of the fictitious son had
Answer: Ye£, he does not enter by way of intestate inheri­
tance (mTrath) but enters by the obligation of the 
obligatory wasTyya.
62.
Tayyeb Bessis, pages 24-26.
63
included a mother. The interpretation by Sayyed BessTs 
of article one hundred ninety-one corresponds to the 
method of "adamou hirmane" in the rules of tanzTl. Ap­
parently today, the grandparent has no more freedom what­
soever in deciding whether the grandchild shall take a
share according to the calculations of "tessaoui" (tasawin)
64
or "adamou hirmane"•
63.
Calculation for literal interpretation of words 
"as if the son died after the grandfather" :
(l) GF dies (estate of £768)
Daughter
V 1
Daughter Son Sona
1/6
=£128
1/6 2/6 
=£128 =£256
2/6
=£256
(2) Son dies (estate of £256) a
Germane(sister 
X
Germane|s is t er Germane» Brother 
X X
Sc*i
All
The results of the 
The results would :
second calculation are the same as in footnote 61. 
not be the same if a widow were present:
(1) GF (estate of £768)
i—
Widow
l/ 8=£96
• I f
Daughter Daughter Son
7/48=£112 7/48=£112 14/48
=£224
1
Son
14/48
=£224
(2) Son, dies (estate of £224) a
Mother Germane'sister Germane Germane Son
sister brother
l/6=£37.3 X X X 5/6
64# =£186.5
Next pa 9 e
footnote 4S0
64
There has not been any court case in Tunis, court 
of first instance, or appellate, to my knowledge speci­
fically directed to problems of calculating the share of 
grandchildren* A more traditionally minded judge could ac­
cept the interpretation of Sayyed BessTs of article 191; 
a more liberal minded one could determine the question by 
construction*
If the de cujus left no will all the courts would prob­
ably adopt TEe interpretation of Sayyed BessTs of article 
191: for if they wished to adopt the calculation of
11 tessaoui” (tasawin) they would not be in a position to 
decide with which heir the grandchild should take equally.
If the de cujus did leave a will, a more conservative 
judge mightTfisregard the will in relation to the calcu­
lation of the shares of the grandchildren and apply the in­
terpretation of Sayyed BessTs; while a more liberal judge 
might allow a calculation according to the rules of 
"tessaoui” (tasawin) if construction of the will lends it­
self to such* The illustration in the footnote to article 
191 gives no indication in itself that ”adamou_hirmane” 
has been used in preference to "tessaoui” (tasawin)*
Because of the particular combination of heirs in the ex­
ample, calculations by either method would result in the 
same fractions for each claimant:
FATIMA (according to "adamou hirmane”)
 r-----
Daughter
1/6
Daughter
1/6 
Son
2/6
son(grdson of Fatima) 
2/6 = 1/3
FATIMA (according to "tessaoui”) 
*_____—  jurists* version
f-----------  r
Daughter
1/4 
Daughter
1/4 
Son
2 /4
Son predeceased
2/4
son(grdson of Fatima)
tawl *awl *awl *awl
1/6 1/6 2/6 2/6
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Such freedom of choice would have been useful on at 
least two counts. First, the method of "adamou hirmane” 
could be used to 'favour the rightful fcasaba over the 
grandchildren where poverty dictates. For in the steps 
of calculation, the method of “adamou hirmane” allows 
the rightful tasaba to move from a 1:1 ratio in relation 
to the grandchildren to a ratio favouring, even if slight­
ly, the *asaba. The method of “tessaoui”, or tasawin, 
(”let the grandchildren take as one of the living 
children") would have been useful for a grandparent who 
wanted to avoid the case where a granddaughter takes more 
than the daughter when the only claimants are a son, a 
daughter, and a granddaughter (daughter of a predeceased 
son). The application of the rules of “tessaoui"
65
(tasawin) would result in the "child of the loins", 
namely the daughter, taking at least the same amount as 
the more remote issue (the granddaughter). This would be 
of particular satisfaction to persons who are interested
in preserving the most one can for the more immediate
66
family. This aim becomes particularly desirable for 
this combination of claimants (daughter, son, granddaugh­
ter) because the daughter wo^ld have no more of a second
g —  -
Tayyeb BessTs, page 25, footnote 2.
66.
See J.N.D. ANderson, "Recent Reforms in Islamic Law
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chance than the granddaughter to inherit in the estate 
of the son (the daughter*s brother) should the son die 
before the daughter and leave a son.
of inheritance," International and Comparative Law Quar­
terly. vol. 14, April 19^5, pages 34^-365, at page 357:
Under the 1961 reforms in Pakistan, 
the grandchild steps into the shoes of his or her 
predeceased parent; no limit of one third applies 
to the share of the grandchild. Professor Anderson 
objects to the following anomaly that can arise under 
the Pakistani law:
"P. has two children, a daughter (A.) and a son 
(B*). The son predeceased, leaving daughter 
(C«)• If no other relatives are involved, 
the Pakistani law will result in the sonfs 
daughter (C.) taking two-thirds of the estate, 
as the share which her deceased father would 
have taken, and the daughter (A.) taking one- 
third; whereas the usual rule in all the 
Sunni schools would have intially allotted 
one half to the daughter and one-sixth to 
the son*s daughter, and would then have given 
them (after application of the principle of 
return) three-fourths and one-fourth respec­
tively."
In Tunisia the share of the granddaughter would be 
limited to one _third of the estate. Under the rules of 
"tessaoui*' (tasawin) the granddaughter could inherit the 
equivalent of the daughter or the son, according to the
instructions of the grandparent:
Initial
allocation
cAwl - . 
cation
Son 2/3 (mTrath) 2/4
Daughter l/3 (mTrath) 1/4
Son*s daughter l/3(equivalent to 
daughter*s share)
1/4
Total 4/3
continued next page
433
Son
Daughter 
Sonfs daughter
Total
Initial
allocation
2/3 (mTrath)
l/3 (mTrath)
2/3(equivalent to 
sonfs share)
5/3
tAwl - final allo­
cation
2/5
1/5
2/5 6/15, more 
than l/3; 
hence, must 
be reduced
to 1/3.
If the share of the granddaughter were determined 
according to the rules of "adamou hirmane" then the grand­
daughter would receive more than the daughter:
Grandparent
Son Daughter Son predeceased
2/5 1/5
Daughter (grdchild of 
grandparent)
2/5 = 6/15, more than l/3; 
share reduced to l/3
remaining 2/3 distributed
2/3 x 2/3 
= 4/9
1/3 x 2/3 
= 2/9
4/9
final distribution:
2/9 3/9
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While the rules for calculating the obligatory leg­
acy of the grandchildren come closer to rules of wills 
in that the child1s share is determined then removed and 
the remainder distributed among the intestate heirs, 
there is one rule in the amendments which works hard­
ship on an obligatory legatee* This is a rule of ”hotch- 
pot" (article one hundred ninety-one), that is, any gifts 
made by the grandparents inter vivos to the grandchild 
shall be counted against the maximum one-third allowed to 
the obligatory legatee* It is a rule for which neither 
the method of Mtessaoui” (tasawin) nor ”adamou hirmane” 
provided* It emphasises even more the peculiar position 
of the obligatory legatee* By virtue of article one hun­
dred ninety-one, he becomes the only type of claimant 
(legatee or heir) to an estate who cannot receive gifts 
inter vivos with impunity. If the gift to the obligatory 
legatee in itself or in combination with the obligatory 
wasTyya exceed the quota of one-third, the heirs must con­
sent to the excess. Presumably if the heirs do not con­
sent, then the grandchildren must return the excess gift* 
There is thus no assurance of immediate benefit, unless
the gift consists of a property in which rights of usu-
67
fruct can be exercised immediately. In regard to any
A similar problem would arise under the French law 
of revocation of gifts inter vivos * Article 953 of the 
Code Civil names survival of children of the donor as one 
of the exceptions to the rule that a gift once made is ir-
4S5
strangers or intestate heirs, the de cujus has every right 
during his lifetime (if he is in good health) to dispose 
of the whole of his estate by gift in their favour* The 
gift takes immediate effect and no intestate heir would 
have the right to have the gift revoked on the ground 
that the deceased donor deliberately had his estate re­
duced by the passing of the gift* The heirs are thus pro­
tected from inter vivos gifts only when favouritism is ex­
ercised for the benefit of grandchildren who qualify as 
obligatory legatees.
The "hotchpot11 rule of article one hundred ninety- 
one has no precedent in Islamic law, regardless of wheth­
er one wants to classify the obligatory legatee as an in­
testate heir or testate beneficiary* The equivalent of
an "hotchpot” rule in French law is found in article
68
eight hundred forty-three of the Code Civil*
revocable. According to article 962 of the Code, "The gift 
(inter vivos) will remain likewise revoked, even when the 
donee would have been put into possession of the goods 
given**.; without however, the donee being held to re­
store the fruits collected by him, whatever the nature 
of the fruits be, if this was not done from the day of no­
tification of the birth of the child or its legitimation 
by subsequent marriage..."
68.
Article 843 of the French Civil Code (Code Civil): 
Any heir, even a beneficiary, entering the succession, 
must yield to his co-heirs everything that he received 
from the deceased by way of gifts inter vivos directly or 
indirectly: he cannot retain the gifts made to him by
the deceased, unless they were given to him expressly by
footnote 436
stipulation of advantage (preciput, or praecipuum) 
or with dispensation from yielding account of the gifts.
The legacies made to an heir are deemed to have 
been made by advantage (preciput) unless the testator 
expressed contrary wishes, in which case the legatee 
can claim his legacy only by taking the least amount.
Article 191 on the Obligaotry Bequest in the Tunisia 
Code of Personal Status states:
f,W henever a person  d ie s  le a v in g  c h i ld r e n ,  m ale  
o r fe m a le , whose f a t h e r  o r  m other d ie d  b e fo re  o r  a t  th e  
same tim e  as t h a t  p e rs o n , th o se  c h i ld r e n  s h a l l  be due a 
w asTyya, c a lc u la te d  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  s h a re  t h e i r  f a t h e r  
o r*m o th e r w ould have re c e iv e d  fro m  h is  a n c e s to r ( th e  
p r a e p o s itu s ) , w ith o u t t h is  sh a re  exceed in g  one t h i r d  o f  
th e  e s t a t e .
These descendants cannot claim the above 
wasTyya (l) If they inherit (intestacy) from the parent 
(grandfather or grandmother) of their parents.
(2) If their grandfather or grandmother be­
queathed to them in his lifetime, or gave them a gift 
without recompense (Iiwad)f whose value^is that of the 
obligatory bequest (al was l y y a al wa.jib T ya ) .
But i f  th e  g ra n d p a re n t bequeathed  (o r  gave) 
som ething  th a t  is  le s s  (th a n  th e  amount o f  th e  o b l ig a -  
to r y  w as lyya  th e  g ra n d c h ild re n  w ould have r e c e iv e d ) ,  
i t  is  counted  as a supplem ent f o r  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between  
th e  o b l ig a to r y  wasTyya and th e  v o lu n ta r y  bequest 
( a l  wasTyya a l  * lk h t iy a r T y a ) •  I f  th e  g ra n d p a re n t be­
queathed  more th an  th e  o b l ig a to r y  wasTyya th e  grand­
c h i ld r e n  would have re c e iv e d , th en  i t  is  deemed an ex­
cess and g e n e ra l r u le s  o f  a l  wasTyya ( a l  * i k h t i y a r i y a ) 
a p p ly  to  i t .
The o b l ig a to r y  beq uest ( a l  wasTyya a l  • wa.j ib T y  a ) 
ta k e s  precedence o ver th e  v o lu n ta r y  b eq uest ( a l  w as iy ya  
a l  > ik h t iy a r T y a ) ♦ S e v e ra l v o lu n ta r y  bequests  a re  in  an 
e q u a l fo o t in g  and i f  in  c o m p e tit io n , th e y  a re  d is t r ib u t e d  
in  p ro p o r t io n  (a b a te  p r o p o r t io n a te ly ,  as opposed to  f i r s t  
in  t im e  ta k in g  p re c e d e n c e ).
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Paragraph one of article eight hundred forty-three applies 
an "hotchpot" rule to any intestate heir and non-heir 
beneficiary taking a share in the estate. The grandchild 
in Tunisia, in order to qualify as an obligatory legatee, 
cannot simultaneously qualify as a legal intestate heir. 
Hence, article one hundred ninety-one of the Code of Per­
sonal Status agrees with paragraph one of article eight 
hundred forty-three. When compared with the French Civil 
Code (Code Civil), the Tunisian law for the obligatory 
legatee treats the grandchild as a non-heir beneficiary. 
However, under French law, the deceased could provide ex­
pressly that these heirs and beneficiaries be exempt from 
having to report all gifts inter vivos. However, French 
law and Tunisian law diverge when an heir (and grandchild 
to qualify as an obligatory legatee in Tunisia cannot be 
an heir) is also the beneficiary of a bequest; the French 
law presumes that he need not account for gifts inter 
vivos made to him by the testator. If the testator ex­
pressly provided that the testamentary gift is subject to 
account of gifts inter vivos, then the law will comply 
with his wishes.
It would appear that the writers of article one hun­
dred ninety-one of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status 
adopted the French notion of the "hotchpot" rule without 
considering reasons for which the obligatory legatee should
be so r a d i c a l l y  d is t in g u is h e d  fro m  th e  o th e r  h e irs  to  th e  
e s t a t e .  The T u n is ia n  l e g is l a t o r  may have been m o tiv a te d  
by th e  f e a r  th a t  th e  g ra n d fa th e rs  would c o n tin u e  t h e i r  
t r a d i t i o n a l  ways o f u s in g  ta n z T l e i t h e r  by way o f w i l l s  
o r th e  e q u iv a le n t  in  g i f t s  i n t e r  v iv o s  to  orphaned g rand ­
c h i ld r e n ;  in  w hich  c a s e , th e  "h o tc h p o t"  r u le  would keep  
th e  o b l ig a to r y  bequest fro m  d u p lic a t in g  th e  sh a re  g iv e n  
by t a n z T l« However, i t  w ould  seem th a t  th e  l e g is l a t o r  
c o u ld  have l im i t e d  th e  "h o tc h p o t"  r u le  o n ly  to  tes tam en ­
t a r y  g i f t s  made in  excess o f th e  o b l ig a to r y  bequest and 
n o t have d is c r im in a te d  a g a in s t  th e  o b l ig a to r y  le g a te e  in  
re g a rd  to  g i f t s  i n t e r  v iv o s .
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CHAPTER IV 
COURT JUDGMENTS: NO WASIYYA TO AN HEIR:
no wasiyya beyond the third
,Introduction
The most distinctive features of the Islamic law
of bequest are: no bequest beyond the third, and no
bequest to an heir* Their jurisprudential base is
not the Qur*an; it is the hadTth. The two hadTth for
“ *  ^  1
the bequest are deemed to be early and unimpeachable.
They are perhaps among the most illustrious examples of 
Islamic legislation apart from the Qur*an* They do not 
merely affirm a verse in the QurJan or clarify an am­
biguous verse. They fill in a significant omission.
The Qur-*an dictates the fractional intestate shares
of the family of the deceased. The a*imma interpreted
2
them as obligatory. As for 'testate succession, the
QurJan speahs of Muslims fulfilling a bequest or paying
1.
R. Marston Speight, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
Hartford Seminary, Connecticut, 1969. He proposes that
the authenticity of a hadTth be determined by its
literary form,(MA Stud^ of Islamic HadTth as Oral Literature"),
2. _ _
Sura four (Alt Nisa* ), verse thirteen:
Sura five (Al Ma>idah), verse eleven:
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a debt left by the deceased before giving the remainder 
of the estate to certain relatives of the deceased.
When the deceased leaves no child, but parents and 
brothers (sura four (Ah Nisa*), verse eleven); or no 
child, but spouse, or child and spouse (sura four, verse 
twelve); or no child, but brothers and sisters (sura 
four, verse twelve), the Qur^an enjoins the administra­
tor of his estate to pay the bequest and debts first.
Where the deceased leaves children and/or parents (sura 
four, verse eleven) the Qur*an makes no mention of be­
quest excepting that Allah Himself would bequeathe to 
the deceased an order that he provide for his children 
(one share for the female and twice that for the male); 
it would thus seem that the wasTyya of a devout Muslim 
would be Allah’s wasTyya. If an interpreter of the Qur*an 
were to take the verses at face value, they could mean 
that a deceased Muslim who had no children and .left only 
brothers and any other collateral ; relatives could 
will away his property any way he wished and expect his 
bequests to be fulfilled after his death. Thus, the 
rights of children and parents of the deceased would seem 
to be more protected than the rights of brothers and
sisters (sura four, verse eleven : "You know not which
3 .
is closer, your parents or your children." ).
M l
If the Qur3 an is seen in the light of a distinction 
between issue of a deceased Muslim competing with be­
quests for shares in the estate and the collateral 
relatives of a deceased Msulim competing with bequests 
for shares in the estate, then the hadTth forbidding 
the bequest beyond the third can be seen in a perspective 
other than the traditional one. The traditional view 
is that Sa^ad Ibn Waqqas, the dying testator, who wished 
to bequeathe all of his property for charitable motives, 
was forbidden by the Prophet to deprive his family of the 
entirety of his wealthy estate. This interpretation 
fails to give any significance to the details in the 
hadTth. One such detail is the fact that the family of 
Sacad Ibn Waqqas consisted of an only daughter. Though 
Sa*ad might have had other blood relatives, his daughter 
constituted the only family < eligible to be an heir.
The argument which Sa^ad put to the Prophet for bequeathing 
away all or most of his estate was that he had only a 
daughter to inherit from him. This fact takes on a new 
significance if one remembers that the Qur*an enjoins 
fulfilling bequests made by the deceased when heirs are 
present in a certain combination, but is silent about 
bequests per se when the only heirs are children (or 
parents) and exhorts the dying to leave a provision for
such children. Thus, it may be said that the Prophet 
was chastising Sacad Ibn Waqqas for wanting to be- 
queathe his property for the reason that he had an only 
daughter to inherit from him. The reluctance of the 
Prophet to grant Salad’s request would be respectful of 
the silence of the Qur*an on the administering of bequests 
bequests when issue are the only heirs. Nor does the 
Prophet forget the duty of care for one’s children which 
the wasTyya of Allah to the dying bids to be done,for 
the Prophet finally relented to Salad’s request with 
these words: "The third is much and it is better not
presence of issue in the hadTth had been given crucial 
significance by jurists, then the limit of the one-third 
would have applied only when issue (or parents) were the
Translation of the full hadTth: "Malik from...from... 
from Waqqas reported from his iather that he said the Mes­
senger of God came to me, an ill person, in the year of 
the Prophet’s last pilgrimage. I was severely ill. I 
said, ’Oh, Messenger of God, it is a very hard illness 
as you can see and I have some property and the only heir 
I have is a daughter (wa la yarithunT a ilia a ibnatun lT) • 
Should I give (* at as adTaguJ two-thirds of my property as 
charity?’ Then the'Messenger of God said, ’No.’ ’One- 
half?’ He said, ’No.’ Then the Prophet said, ’One-third 
and the third is much. It is better to leave your heirs 
richer than it is to leave them begging from other 
people.* ” _ _
(Reported by Imam Malik in the Muwatta*. found_in Muhammad 
ibn cAbd al Baqi, al ZurganT, Sharif cil Zurqani cala ygl~ 
Muwatta* of Malik iin^nas, Volume 4, page 62,530, Cairo, 
1355/f936)
4
to leave relatives begging in the streets♦” If the
4
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only heirs, and no limit would have been applicable
when collateral relatives (alone or with parents; or
spouses with issue) were the only heirs*
Instead, traditional juristic reasoning refused
to restrict the meaning of the hadTth of Sa*ad Ibn Waqqas
1 "■ mnm " •
to its particular details. The result of juristic 
reasoning was that the making of a bequest was allowed 
regardless of who the intestate heirs were; likewise, 
the amount of the bequest was limited regardless of 
the degree or class of relationship of the intestate 
heirs. The rationale for limiting the bequest came 
to be that the interest of the -family of the deceased
1/
as a whole had to be protected. Thus, brothers and
sisters are treated no differently from children so
far as bequests are concerned.
In summary, the argument is that the Qur3 an prima
facie allows a testator to make bequests when he or
she does not leave children or parents, that is, he or
5
she leaves brethren or brethren plus parents. Whether
15
The concept that the right to bequeathe depends on 
the kind of heirs left was well-known to Hebrew legal 
scholars. Baba Bathra, 8.1 from the Mishnah reads: 
"Certain (near of kin) both inherit and be­
queathe property, some inherit but do not 
bequeathe, some bequeathe but do not in­
herit, and some neither inherit nor bequeathe. 
These both inherit and bequeathe: a father
inherits from his sons, and sons from their 
father and brothers by the same father, and 
they can bequeathe property to them. A man
a testator cannot leave bequests when he leaves chil­
dren is not explicit in the Qur^an. The hadTth re­
lating the plight of Sarad Ibn Waqqas shows that a 
dying person can leave bequests when he leaves a child.
The hadTth thus serves to solve an ambiguous point of  .
interpretation. Nor does the Qur*an forbid the dying 
Muslim to bequeathe away all of his property so that 
his brothers and sisters of spouse has nothing to take.
The hadTth again has an answer for the gap* The dying 
Muslim must leave his relatives two-thirds of the 
estate. The hadTth thus becomes a significant piece of 
legislation, laying down the .magic figure of one- 
third, which does not appear in the Qur^an.
The second hadTth introducing a rule for the law of
bequests has a less substantive story behind it than
the one of Sa*ad Ibn Waqqas. The second hadTth merely
appears as a dictum: uNo wasTyya to an heir." The
inherits from his mother, and a husband from
his wife and sisters1 sons, but they do not
bequeathe a property to them. A woman be­
queathes property to her sons, a wife to her 
husband and maternal uncles, but they do not 
inherit from them. Brothers by the same 
mother (but another father) neither inherit 
(from one another) nor bequeathe property 
(to one another).” Translated by H. Danby,
The Mishnah, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1st edition,1933,p.376.
^#Malik, Al Muwatta*, ed. cAbd Al BaqT, Al ZurqanT,
Cairo, 1355/1936, vo'fdme 4, chapter 532, sect .1535,page68 :
"Yahya said I heard Malik say that this verse 
was abrogated: if you have property the wasTyya is 
for the parents and near relatives. It was abro- 
gated by the revelation on the far a* id in the
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Qur^an merely provides for giving shares to named classes 
of relatives after paying the bequests and debts* It 
does not say whether these bequests and debts belong to 
strangers, or non-heirs, or heirs* Again any inter­
pretation of the Qur*an that allows a testator to deny 
certain heirs (such as collateral relatives) rights in 
the estate by bequeathing all rights to one heir is 
foiled by the hadTth, "No bequests to an heir*"
The hadTth forbidding a bequests to an heir does 
not give details of a story whose meaning could throw 
light on the motives which lie behind the rule of no
bequests to an heir* Nonetheless, this hadTth  does
•"1 111 "" 1
raise some interesting questions when it is juxtaposed, 
from the point of view of chronology, with the hadTth
on the limit of the one-third* If the hadTth on the one-
7 "*
third came f i r s t ,  in point of time, jurists would
have found that the hadTth left some questions open. One
Qur*an. He said I heard Malik say the established 
undisputed sunna among us is that a wasTyya to 
an heir is not allowed unless the he1rconsent 
thereto*1
7.
According to the theory of R.M. Speight (footnote 1 
above), most likely it would come first, since JahadTth 
in the form of dicta, like the one forbidding beqilests 
to heirs, appear to be a later form of reporting than the 
story type. The hadTth about Sacad Ibn Waqqas is a 
story type. ^
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such question -would be whether a dying Muslim could use
his limited testamentary power for the benefit of any
heir. For example, the dying testator might wish to
augment the share of a daughter who gets only one-half
of the share of the son (see page 560 et sq, of
Chapter V post). The second hadTth sufficiently answered
th e  q u e s tio n : no bequest to  any h e i r .  Such hadTth
could be justified by the effect which it would have of
8
reducing dissension : among the heirs who could expect 
only set shares, and of relieving a judge of the task 
of construing the words of a testator when an heir com­
plained that the reasons for which the testator favoured 
one heir over another are unjustified and inequitable.
8.
Dissension among heirs is still a problem today.
One relative is inevitably accused of fabricating a dis­
position which counteracts the will —  Civil Case (madanT) 
No. 9360 of 3.6.1967 and Personal Status (shakhsTyal 
Case No. 27375 of 11.5.1971. In case no. 9360,'the 
defendant, claiming as legatee, accuses the plaintiff of 
fabricating a hiba disposing of the same property that 
was disposed oi" in the will. When the petition was 
refused, the same parties appeared in case no. 27375.
Later in this chapter we shall discuss more 
Tunisian cases of wasTyya in which the Court is asked to 
decide between two dispositions, a bequest and a hiba.
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If the hadTth limiting a bequest to one-third was 
reported second in time, subsequent to the hadTth for- 
bidding a bequest to an heir, then it is arguable that 
the rationale underlying the hadTth forbidding bequests 
to heirs without any regard to quantitative limits was 
to prevent any one favoured heir from receiving all of 
the estate at the total expense of other heirs. Even 
the subsequent reporting of the hadTth restricting
bequests to one-third would still have left open another 
question, namely, can an heir receive a bequest as long 
as it is within the limit of one-third? The answer, 
arguably, could have been in the affirmative and still 
be consistent with the policy that no one heir should 
take the entirety of the estate by testamentary disposi­
tion, For a bequest which did not exceed one-third, but 
was made to an heir^  would augment the intestate share 
of the favoured heir, but would not cut off other heirs 
from partaking of the remaining two-thirds. Hence, a 
bequest to an heir up to the limit of one-third would be
legitimate, as advocated among the Shi*T jurists, not
_ 9
the SunnT.
Q
N♦J• Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, 
Cambridge: The University Press, 1971, page 240: "Accord­
ing to the ShTca, the ruling of the Prophet is to be
interpreted as abrogating the duty to make bequests to 
near relatives (as enjoined in the Qur*anic verse of be­
quest) but not the right to do so."
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Since it is impossible to date one hadTth vis a vis 
another, one can appreciate the approach of the MalikT 
madhab, prevalent in Tunisia (see page 26 of Chapter I 
and pages 127, 128, 131 of Chapter II above)* That 
approach was to treat the two traditions as totally un­
related. One is deemed to deal with the size of the 
legacy; and the other with the eligibility of a bene­
ficiary* Thus, if the .jurists and qudah could deter- 
mine from a simple dictum who is a beneficiary of a be­
quest, namely, a non-heir, then they need not compli­
cate matters by wondering whether beneficiaries of be­
quests could be heirs as well, as long as there was always 
something remaining in the estate for the other heirs 
who were not named beneficiaries. It was simpler to 
deal with a dictum saying, "No bequest to an heir," 
than with a discretionary principle which determined 
who was a beneficiary to a bequest according to the
degree to which such a bequest to an heir prejudiced the
10
interests of the other intestate heirs.
iO. _
According to Malik in Al Muwatta*, the sunna ia his 
community accepted beyond dispute thAt verse lSo of sura 2 
(Al Bagarah) which allows a wasTyya to parents was abro­
gated. Thus, logically, something that is abrogated is 
not then allowed in the least. Thus, no bequest to an 
heir under any circumstances.
The commentary on the Muwatta* cites a hadith in
which the Prophet said: "Each has Jhis lawful share.
Therefore no waslyya to an heir."
0
(Al ZurqanT, Volume 4, page 68)
A commentary on the Muwatta* indicates that the rule 
of no bequest to an heir is based jurisprudentially on 
the sunna of the community and *i jma*. Jurists agreed 
that sura two (Al Bagarah), verse one hundred eighty of 
the Qur^an on bequests to parents was abrogated by the 
verses of inheritance found in sura four (Aft, Nisa? ),
11
even though there was no direct proof of abrogation*
_  ^  _  12 
Another treatise, Al MugnT by Ibn Qudama refers to
the rule of no bequest to an heir as a rule of 3 ijma*
among the *ahl al cilm, for the hadTth of the Prophet
announcing no bequest to an heir because each heir has
13
his legal share was reported only by Da*ud and Tirmidh*
The Tunisian legislators will continue to accept these 
two basic rules governing bequests until they find a 
jurisprudential base to replace them* The pressure to 
find a new jurisprudence will probably rise as reforms 
in land laws are more extensively enforced. Reforms in 
the law of wagf (hubus) in 1957 and the distribution 
(gasama) of property (under the majallat al hugug 
al 3istihgagT) already are working to clear away economic
cobwebs. For one, the abolition of *ahbas ends co-owner- 
_
See footnote 10 above.
12 -»• _"Edited by Muhammad Rashid Rida, Third_edition,__1947,
from the version of "Al KhanafT, pag£ 6 of Kitab al Was ay a.
13. —"Ibn Qudama, Kitab al WagSva, page 1.
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ship of many estates (see pages 357-358 of Chapter II
above). Each beneficiary goes to the Commission for
Abolition of the *Ahbas (la.jna tasfTya al 3ahbas) to
get a ruling on abolition and collects his share in the
farud. When no hubus is involved, articles one hundred ..— -,-r ■«- ■ ■ ■
twenty to one hundred forty-one of the Code of Property 
Rights (ma.jallat al hugug al caTnTyat) of 1965 autho­
rise courts to interfere in the gasama of the property of 
succession so that individual ownership of one economically 
viable unit of land is encouraged (see pages 
post). Finally,the decree of 4 June 1957 (j.O.R.T. No.45 
of 4 June 1957), modified by Law No. 63-25 of 15 July 
1963 (J.O.R.T. No. 33 of 12-16 July 1963) aims to pre­
vent excessive fragmentation of real estate. The law re­
quires that the authorisation of the administrative 
officer in charge of the district where the property is 
located be given before the property is subjected to 
any division. The authorisation is given only if the
property be of a minimum size and is applicable only
14
when the property is of agricultural nature.
_
Civil Case (madani) No. 11811 in the Court of First 
Instance, Tunis, of 11.2.1969, applying amendment to the 
law of 1957.
Civil Case (madani) No. 4057 in the Court of First 
Instance.;,! Tunis, of 2§.1.1964, in which the expert in­
vestigator reported to the Court that the acreage of the 
property in question was only 5oo square metres. The
footnote 451
minimum for gasama is 800 square metres.
Law No. 63-26 of 15 July 1963, relating to im­
moveables: "Article 1: The first article of the decree
of 4 June 1957 relating to matters of immoveables, 
modified by law no. 59-68 of 9 June 1959 is abrogated 
and replaced by the following new text: ’Article 1: In
order to be valid, subject to whatever is ordered, con­
tractual transactions (sale or gratuitous alienation^ 
inter vivos of property and of the enjoyment or any 
transferal or apportionment (tagslm), affecting the im­
moveables or the propertied rights in Tunisia, and af­
fecting lands used for agricultural purposes as well as 
lands not having any constructions or not being par­
titioned and hereinafter enumerated, must be authorised 
by the Governor of the district where the immoveable is 
situated:
l) cession in exchange for compensation, or gratu­
itously, inter vivos of the entire property or of the 
usufruct ^
2} formation of enzel (inzal)
3) formation of servitude
4) taking shares in companies
5) leases of a duration of more than two years
6) any distribution (gasama) or any act or any 
operation which has the effect of transmitting 
or attributing, in whatever manner, to a partner 
(sharlk) or third party, the full ownership or 
usufruct of immoveables, resting on the assets 
of a company
7) formation of a hypothecation (mortgage, rahn).
The preceding dispositions apply equally to any 
ceding of actions, obligation, company shares, shares 
of founders, shares of beneficiaries in the companies, 
whatever be the form but whose main or subordinate object 
is the exploitation of lands of agricultural use.1
The present law will be published in the Journal 
Officiel de la R^publigue Tunisienne (al ra*ida al rasmi 
li’l jumhurtya at tunisTya) as one of the laws of the 
state.
Issued at Tunis, on 15 July 1963 (24 Sfar 1383). 
President of the Tunisian Republic, Habib Bourguiba 
(Al Habib Eu—Ra'quib'&h)."
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If the property be below that minimum size, the co-
15.;
owners may agree to a sale of the property at a
public auction. Then the proceeds of the sale are di­
vided among the co-owners. Co-owners are allowed to
16
bid in the auction like any other non-owner.
The laws which aim at discouraging co-ownership 
and excessive fragmentation of land at least create an 
atmosphere which is conducive to reforming the law of 
wills. For there is hardly any point in changing the 
laws of testamentary disposition unless a property 
owner is unfettered by concerns for a score of relatives 
who share in the ownership of the property and unless 
the testator is able to pass on more than his minute
Article 120 of the Code of Property Rights of 
1965: When physical division of the property is not pos­
sible or if it entails a considerable depreciation of 
the property, the judge will order sale of it.
The sale will take place , depending on the case, 
according to the rules of the Code of Civil and Commerical 
Procedure on the matter of sale of moveables or adjudi­
cation of immoveables, to the extent that they are not 
contrary to the dispositions of the present chapter and 
to the nature of the division.
If the co-owners, being masters of their rights, 
are unanimously against calling a third party to the public 
auction, the sale can take place with the waiving of 
legal publicity.
The proceeds of the sale are distributed among the 
co-owners in proportion to the share of each of them.
*Civil Case (madani) No. 4714 in the Court of First 
Instance, Tunis, of 4.1.1964, in which one of the broth­
ers co-owning a house that was inherited from their fa­
ther offered to buy the house when it was accepted that 
the house could not be subjected to qasama. The Court in­
formed him that he could not buy immediately, butr could bid 
in the public auction if he wished.
share. An example in point arose in Personal Status C3.se 
(shakhsTya) No. 27375 in the Court of First Instance, 
Tunis, of 11.5•1971* Briefly, the facts were that in 
1946 the deceased had made a bequest of one-third of 
all his property to the plaintiff. One half hour after ' 
having the will notarised, the testator made a hiba of 
one^fourth of the house whose ownership he shared with 
the uterine sister of the defendant. The hiba was for 
benefit of the defendant. The defendant had taken pos­
session of the one-quarter share of the house before the 
donor died. The plaintiff claimed that the hiba was 
invalid because it touched on the same property as the 
wasTyya. The Court of First Instance of Tunis ruled 
that both dispositions were valid. They were not in com­
petition for the same property. The hiba disposed of 
a specific piece of property, namely, one-quarter of a 
house. While it is true that the one-quarter was part 
of the total property of the testator when he made the 
will, he did not make a specific bequest of the house.
He made a general bequest of a fraction of his entire 
possessions, including moveables and immoveables. This 
fraction was to be taken out of whatever property was 
legally part of his estate at the time of his death.
By the time of his death the one-quarter of the house 
in question had in fact departed from the estate via the
hiba.
The hiba in this case served to mitigate the frag­
mentation of the estate. If the one-quarter of the 
house had been deemed to have remained in the estate 
and been calculated in the one-third of the total due 
to the legatee/plaintiff, the fractions of property due 
to the survivors of the testator and the beneficiaries 
of his will would have been even more ridiculously' re­
duced.
The above case is only one example of the several 
which form the subject of this chapter. They all deal 
with the law of wills. They illustrate the application 
of the rules of no bequest beyond the one-third and 
no bequest to an heir. For each case we will examine 
possible reforms in the law and point out jurispru­
dential bases for such reforms.
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Cases
No, 20510 (shakhsTya) of 15.2.1966
The number of disputes over wills coming to the 
Court of First Instance (* ibtida*T) in Tunis since 
independence in 1956 are few, but raise a number of 
problems;
The first case arising under the rules of no bequest
beyond the third and no bequest to an heir was personal
status case no, 20510 of 15.2,1966 (date of judgment).
One of the main issues was a question of conflict of
laws. Since the parties were of Judaic confession,
though of Tunisian nationality, and the disposition
left by the deceased was made according to Mosaic law,
the Court of First Instance was asked to decide whether
17
the Mosaic law applied or the Code of Personal Status 
of Tunisia. The Court applied the Code of Personal 
Status since all Tunisians regardless of religious 
affiliation are subject to the one and same law in mat­
ters of succession, and the estate was opened for suc­
cession after the date when religious laws ceased to 
apply in Tunisia,
17.
Standard source of Mosaic law used by the courts 
and lawyers is S. Tibi, Le Statut personnel des israelites 
et specialement des israelites tunisiens, Tcmis, 1921-23 
"Tibi was 'a IawyeFT.rT‘Sasa",Shd 'mfeffibisr "Of the Grand Conseil.
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The facts of the case were the following:
The plaintiff was the wife of the deceased Maarek.
He had made a written disposition dated 29.2*1952, at a 
time when Rabbinical law was in force in Tunisia. In 
the document he gave to his wife a share in the building 
whose ownership he shared with the children of his pre­
deceased brother* The property was registered property 
(Title 8276). Twelve years later, on the 1st of October 
of 1964, the husband of the plaintiff died. The lower 
District Court (nahTya) of Tunis deemed that the wife, 
the plaintiff, and the widowed germane sister, the 
defendant, were the heirs of Maarek. The Court also de­
termined that Maarek left a building registered under;;
TF (Titre Foncier) 8276. The plaintiff was living in 
the same building at the time of the dispute.
The plaintiff then asked the defendant to aid her 
in having the gift that was made in 1952 registered on
the title deed, as all transfers of ownership of regis-
18
tered property must be registered. The sister re-
#Article 204 of the Code of Personal Status: Gift
is valid only by official document (hu.j.ja rasmTya).
As
for tangible personal estate, the tradition of delivery 
shall apply, subject t_o_the special rules for registered 
personal estate (mangulat).
Article 204 is consistent with the provisions of ar­
ticle 373 of the Code of Property Rights of 1965: The
following must be rendered public by being inscribed on 
the title of property, in order to be opposed by third 
parties: l) All transactions and agreements inter vivos
of a gratuitous nature or incurring obligation, aii“"j^"d!<j-
sisted. The wife then asked the Court of First Instance
of Tunis to declare the gratuitous disposition of 1952
19
valid. She also demanded one thousand dinars in 
damages from the sister for resistance without justi­
fication, or else payment of all legal costs by the sister 
The Court of First Instance accepted written proof 
of the marriage between the deceased and the plaintiff 
according to Hebraic law* The Court accepted the pro­
visions of the gratuitous disposition to be the fol­
lowing:
"My wife shall in co-ownership have one-half
ments that have the effect of constituting, transmitting, 
declaring, modifying, or extinguishing a real landed 
right, of rendering it inalienable, of restraining free 
circulation, or modifying any other condition of its 
inscription;
2) Transactions and judgments on the ceding 
of use of common walls;
Leases of immoveables exceeding three years as 
well as the leases of less duration or their renewal 
when they bring about disposing of the enjoyment of the 
immoveable for a period of time whose term exceeds the 
expiration of the third year from the date on which they 
made agreement. *.
4) Transactions and judgments confirming the 
liberation or ceding of a sum superior to a year of rent*.
5) Transactions and judgments confirming the 
liberation or ceding of a sum superior to a year of 
arrears of enzel (inzal)•
(This article 373 is a duplication of article 343 of the 
former Code Foncier; see page 232 of Chapter II above)•
19.
One dinar in 1971 was equivalent to about £1. It 
was the same in 1965 also.
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o£ the property that is registered under 
TF 8276, and located in Tunis* She also has 
four cubits of land located in the Holy Land.
"I give her for her lifetime all of the 
revenue accruing from both halves of the prop­
erty located in Tunis. She has likewise the 
moveable furnishings, jewels,and clothing in 
that place. She will live there for all-.her 
life without paying rent, but she will pay 
taxes and water and electrical bills. After 
she dies the place goes to my adopted daughter 
for as long as she likes.
"The nu-property of the place in Tunis goes 
to my wife from today. The usufruct will com­
mence one hour before my death.
"The children of my brother cannot possess 
the revenues until after my wife’s death."
The Court of First Instance deemed the document to 
have taken effect at the date of the death of the author, 
namely, in 1964. The Court determined that the law 
governing the effect of the document was the law in 
force at the date of the death of the author of the dis­
position. The law in force on that date, concerning the 
classification of gratuitous dispositions, was the Code 
of Personal Status. For Law No. 4 of 27 September 1957 
had abolished the application of Mosaic law (j.O.R.T. 
of 27 September 1957)* Given the nature of the disposi­
tion and the fact that its author specified that it 
would take effect fully and completely upon his death, 
the Court deemed the document to fall within the rules of 
al wasTyya, not al hiba. Since the document was deemed 
a will, the wife automatically lost capacity to take 
under the will (article one hundred seventy-nine of the
Code of Personal Status: “No bequest to the heir and no 
bequest that exceeds one-third (of the estate) unless the 
heirs permit after the death of the testator.11) • Nor 
was the sister willing to approve the bequest. No 
mention was made in the judgment as to whether the 
nephews qualified as casaba who would also have to give 
their consent. The Court then dismissed the petition 
and ordered the property named in the will to be distrib­
uted according to the rules of intestacy in the majallat 
al Jahwal as shakhsTya (Code of Personal Status).
The widow appealed to the Court of Appeal (3 istianaf) 
of Tunis, under case no. 26728/3, judgment no. 599966, 
rendered on 31.7.1967,(affirmed the decision of the 
Court of First Instance).
It should be noted that the plaintiff argued that 
the gratuitous disposition should take effect as a 
gift (hiba) inter vivos. Since both the Court of First 
Instance and the Court of Appeal accepted that the law 
applicable was that of the Code of Personal Status, the 
hiba still would not have been valid. What would have 
made it ineffective was the fact that the donor had 
specified that effective use of the property would not 
be immediate, as required by article two hundred one 
of the Code of Personal Status. The widow sought to 
transfer ownership and possession in her name only after
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the donor's death* Given that the property was regis­
tered, possession and ownership could, according to the 
actions of the widow, be deemed to have been established
only from the date of the registration of the gift on
20
the title deed* It was unfortunate that the date of 
attempted registration was not the same as the date of 
the deed of disposition*
The case well illustrates the dilemma of a husband 
who wishes to provide solely for certain designated mem­
bers of his family after his death* He can provide 
by making a gift inter vivos, but this is not wholly 
satisfactory. For if the husband should make the com­
pleted gift, then afterwards the wife predeceases him, 
or has been divorced from him before he dies, the pur­
poses of the donor/husband are frustrated* In the event
*The Code of Personal Status reflects the HanafT 
strictness on gratuitous dispositions such as hibci.* A 
comparison between the Hanafi and MalikT provisions from 
the draft of the Code of the SharTea illustrates the 
strictness of Hanafi ,law:^
Article 1227 (MalikT) —  If the donee works hard 
at possessing the hiba, but the donor procrastinates un­
til he dies, the hiba is valid, and the endeavour spent 
on taking possession takes the place of actual possession.
(Hanafi) —  Hiba is void with the 
death of the donor before possession is seized by the 
donee, even if the donee has worked hard in demanding the 
gift.
Article 201 of the Code of Personal Status —  Hiba
is completed by the delivery of_the thing given to tHe
donee. And the hiba is void (batil) if the donor or
donee dies before the delivery and even if the donee has 
tried to his utmost to demand the thing given.
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of the wife predeceasing him, he has to share the pro- 
erty with the heirs of the deceased wife. In the event 
of the donor divorcing his wife after the completion 
of the hiba, he loses the property entirely to his 
wife’s heirs, including her second husband if she re­
married.
The same problem would arise if a husband named his 
wife beneficiary in his will; but by the time he died 
and before he had a chance to revoke the will, she was
no longer his wife. Being no longer his wife, she would
qualify, under the provisions of article one hundred 
seventy-nine of the Code of Personal , Status^ as a non­
heir beneficiary. However, the husband might think 
to resolve the problem by conditioning the bequest on 
her still being his wife by the time of his death. Yet 
even this condition would not save the bequest since no 
bequest can be made to an heir.
A third possibility which a husband could explore
is a bequest of usufruct. In the above case of Maarek,
the main purpose of the bequest was to provide the wife
with use of a building and use of the revenues for in-
21
come. The Code of Personal Status does not explicitly
‘Article 143 of the Code of Property Rights of 1965: 
The holder of usufruct has a right to the natural and 
civil fruits.
Article 145: Civil fruits are rents, enzel (inzal)
in arrears, interests of credits and other similar items.
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draw any distinction between a bequest of usufruct,and
a bequest of corpus in regard to the rule of no bequest
to an heir (article.one hundred seventy-nine). The
term "bequest" could prima facie be interpreted in its
widest sense to mean bequest of corpus and/or usufruct.
Such interpretation would agree with the MalikT and
HanafT provisions of the draft of the Code of the,
•
SharT*a. Article eleven hundred eighty-five of that Code
specifically subjected a bequest of usufruct to the
rule of the one-third (the one-third is calculated out
of the value of the corpus whose usufruct is bequeathed).
One would then expect by way of logical extension the
rule of no bequest to an heir also to apply to a bequest 
22
of usufrue t•
22.
Code of the SharTca, article 1185 (MalikT): If 
one bequeathes usufruct of a property, like habitation 
of a house, one refers to that property whose usufruct 
is the legacy. If it rests on one-third of that corpus, 
the bequest is executed; if not- on the third of the 
value of the corpus, the heirs choose between allowing the 
bequest or bestowing one-third of that corpus and all 
else left by the deceased. It is a gift.
(HanafT): It
is valid to make a bequest of usufruct lik£ living in 
a house or getting revenue or getting fruits of the 
field. If the corpus and profits of the house derive 
from one-third of the property of the testator, delivery 
is to the legatee who makes use of it according to the 
calculation of the wasTyya. If it does not derive from 
the one-third, and th£re is a possibility of gasama and 
the testator has no other property, the property is di­
vided by thirds or as joint usufruct (muhaya>a) for th 
time or the usufruct. The legatee gets oitc-t m ra and
heirs two-thirds. If the testator has property other
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In terms of sources of jurisprudence, these rules 
on usufruct derive from human legal reasoning. Hence, 
they are not binding for all time. It is possible to 
argue that the corpus and the usufruct of a property 
could be the objects of two distinctly different rules. 
The usufruct could be given freely without any limits 
by the testator for a maximimum period of the lifetime 
of the legatee and without consent from the heirs of 
the testator. Whereas, ownership of the corpus could 
continue to be subject to the limits of the one-third 
and the prohibition against heirs taking bequests. In 
this way a husband who has been responsible for main­
taining his wife during his lifetime could continue to 
provide for her maintenance notwithstanding his death 
(via rules of usufruct) and leave the nu-property in­
tact within his family upon the death or remarriage of 
his wife.
The existing legislation in Tunisia, however, does 
offer some limited possibilities. The will of spe­
cification is worth examining as a possibility. It 
is provided for in article one hundred eighty of the 
Code of Personal Status. In a will of specification the 
testator is allowed to assign to each of his heirs
than the corpus whose usufruct was bequeathed, the one- 
third is calculated out of all the property.
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specific pieces of his property as long as the value 
of each piece does not exceed the value of the in­
testate share of the particular heir.in question. In 
the case of Maarek neither the lawyers nor the Court 
discussed whether the value of any of the items be­
queathed to the wife was equivalent to or exceeded her 
legal intestate share. If it were she would be en­
titled to have it without sharing its ownership with the 
sister. The will of specification has one obvious 
drawback, it being that the intestate share of the 
wife will not always be large enough to encompass the 
amount with which the husband may want to provide for 
her.
No. 21647 (shakhsiya) of 14«1«1966
Again in another case decided by the Court of First 
Instance (* ibtida*T) of Tunis, the Court had to judge 
on the validity of a gratuitous disposition left by a 
husband to his wife and minor children borne by her.
In the Courtfs daftar the case is labelled with the head­
ing 3 ibtal al wasTyya (invalidity of bequest). In 
the record of the judgment the advocate for the plain­
tiff uses the words musT lahu and wasTyya when referring 
respectively to the beneficiary under the document 
and the document itself. The Court, on the other hand, 
specifically calls the document a sadaga and legally 
treats it as a hiba . Hence, the rules of al wasTyya 
were not applied. Yet the case will be discussed as 
an example of the difficulties facing a person who 
wishes tou provide for his family after his death by 
means other than the rules of the fara*id.
The facts of the case were as follows:
Muhammad hin Yusuf Al FusatawT jJ? L-JO wrote on 
9.7• 1963 a document disposing of a sadaga. It- was no­
tarised by two notaries in Djerba. The sadaga was in 
favour of Muhammad’s wife nnd her two minor sons, the 
defendants, and any other children whom she might have 
in future. He died two years later, on 27.1.1965 in 
TTlnis. The District Court (nahrya) of Tunis determined
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in judgment number 4841 of 20.2.1965 that Muhammad 
left as sole heirs his son HabTb, his daughter Beya, 
the two plaintiffs; his wife, and his two minor sons 
borne by her* Two months?later the chamber for matters 
of guardianship conferred on the widow the status of 
mugaddam (legal guardian) over her minor children 
(No. 4502 of 10.4*1965)* In the same month, two 
notaries in Tunis drafted an inventory of the estate, 
establishing that the deceased left moveables and im­
moveables located in Tunis and Djerba (16.4.1965)*
The itemization of the estate in the judgment of the 
Court of First Instance shows that the estate was quite 
large, containing ijiany unregistered pieces of real 
estate*
The Court of First Instance of Tunis in case 
no. 11835 (shakhsTya) of 28.4*1965 authorised one of 
the plaintiffs, namely, the adult son of the deceased 
Al FusatawT, to act as administrator of the estate, ac- 
cording to article one hundred thirty-five of the
23
ma.jallat al hugug al *istihgagT (Code of Property Rights).
23 ‘Article 135: At the request of one of the heirs,
the president of the competent court shall appoint, by 
order on request, a musaffT (administrator) for the 
estate, either upon unanimous agreement of the heirs on 
the choice, or upon the choice of the court from among 
those who are capable among the heirs.
By way of comparison, the French law gives the court
even fewer guidelines. The Dictionnaire de Droit, Paris, 
1966, paragraph 29-4 on thTT^ T^ pOT'iltmeht of provisional 
administrator reads: ”a) Provisions of the Civil Code
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When he reported to the Court within three months of 
the appointment, as specified in the court order, he 
told the Court of the document of sadaga. The defendant 
wife had presented it to him in the course of the 
administration of the estate*
The plaintiff and his sister then brought a suit 
demanding nullification of the sadaga and distribution 
of the estate by the rules of intestacy*
The Court found that the document purported to dis­
pose of a number of the properties in the estate on the 
following terms:
"The deceased made a sadaga of a number of 
properties to his wile and the two sons 
he had by her and any other children she 
would bear in future* The latter would 
share in the properties according to in­
testate calculations. In particular he 
made__a sadaga of two commercial houses 
in Tunii to the existing minor sons. To 
the plaintiffs he gave a house and land 
planted with olive trees and dates, lo­
cated in Djerba. The deceased explicitly 
denied immediate effect to the sadaga*
He reserved for himself the usufruct 
(*intifa*) of the gifts for his lifetime*
Nor were the donees to take possession 
(tahwTz) of the gifts until after his death.
(Code Civil): the heir is in a position to handle the 
provisional administration of the inheritable estate.
In case of a plurality of heirs, the administration 
of the estate assumes the agreement of the co-owners 
(estate devolves bn heirs in a state of co-ownership, 
then division takes place). One can also resort to the 
court for appointment of a provisional administrator. 
The courts can confer on the administrator the widest 
powersf and even charge him with liquidating the 
estate.when there is need to provide payment of a debt 
which is immediately due.
However, the donor gave possession to the 
donee wife by way of agency, that is, he gave 
a mandate to the named Ibn Mahmud bin ZakarT 
to hold the property on behalf of his family 
until his death*"
The Court deemed the rules of hiba in the Code of 
Personal Status applicable to the sadaga* According 
to articles two hundred one and two hundred two of the 
Code, the donees had to take possession (taslim) of the 
gift as a purchaser does of a thing sold, if the trans­
action is to be valid* The donor died before the 
gifts were actually delivered into the hands of the 
donees* Therefore the gift was void. The Court or­
dered the estate to devolve according to rules of in­
testate inheritance, al fard as sharTfta.
The widow appealed to the Court of Appeal (*isti*naf) 
in case no* 26477/2. Judgment no. 59140 of 25.10.1966 
affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Court 
of Appeal expounded in more depth on the legal prin­
ciples applied.
First of all, the Court of Appeal applied the rules 
of hiba to sadaga for determining whether possession of 
the gift by the donees must take place before or after 
the death of the donor. The Court argued that the only 
difference between sadaga and hiba is that sadaga is done
'«“ " 1 ' ■' ■ " M 1 T    ■",L'-1
out of gratuitude to Allah, and hiba out of grata tUcJe
towards the donee. They both result in transfer inter 
vivos of property without recompense (Mwad). Further­
more, the Code of Personal Status does not explicitly
24
or implicitly distinguish between the two. Com­
pletion of hiba, and likewise of sadaga, must take place 
before the death of the donee or donor. Completion is 
signified^ by delivery of the gift into the hands of the 
donee. In the case of Al FusatawT the donor kept the 
gifts in his hands until he died.
As for the legal significance of the claim of the 
wife that possession passed to a third party on be­
half of the donees, the Court relied on the opinion of
24.^ The draft of the Code of the Shari^a agrees. Arti­
cle 1196 (HanafT and MalikT) reads: Hiba is transfer of
ownership Without compensation for sake of gratuity. 
Sadaga is transfer of ownership without compensation for 
lakeof spiritual profit. (HanafT: Sadaga is like hiba
in its rules except there is *no revocation of it if it 
is completed.)
Article 1273 (HanafT): in no way is revocation of
sadaga valid once delivery has taken place (gabd).
Article 1274 (HanafT): Revocation of hiba is allowed
in part or totally* even if the donor lets drop his 
right, as long as one of the obstacles to revolcation is 
not present.
Note that when parties to a case are Muslim, the 
court is not instructed explicitly in any written law to 
fill gaps in Tunisian legislation by referring to the 
Islamic figh. The court that turns to Islamic figh could 
only argue by analogy from article 2 of the law no. 40 
of 27 September 1957 (abolishing Rabbinical Courts). 
Article 2 permits courts to apply traditional Mosaic law 
when there is lacking Tunisian legislation dealing with 
the matter arising; by analogy Islamic figh will apply
when parties are Muslim and the statutory law does not 
specifically deal with the question that has come before 
the court. See page 344 of Chapter II above).
470
the fug aha* for an answer. The fug aha* had ruled that 
the gift in order to be effective must leave the hands 
of the donor at some time, regardless of whether the 
gift be returned to the hands of the donor within the 
course of the year. The donee may himself take pos­
session, or he may appoint a wakTl to do so; or the 
legally appointed mugaddam of a minor may take pos­
session. The Court found that the mandator named by 
the donor in the document of the sadaga was neither the wjul
s>5i
nor the mugaddam of the donees•
The wife also lost on a third count.. The rules of
al wasTyya.were: applied to the detriment of her cause.
The Court of Appeal likened al hiba to al wasTyya since
both are gratuitous dispositions. The rule that no
wasTyya be made to a person not yet conceived by the time
the will is made (article one hundred eighty-four of the
Code of Personal Status) was applied equally to hiba.
The sadaga made to whatever more children the wife of the 
■* 26
deceased was to bear was thus void.
25.
These same words appear in article 1233 of the 
draft of the Code of the Shariea (HanafT): If the hiba
is to an adult, he must take possession (gabd) himself 
or a wakTl can, even if the donee be dependent on the 
donor•
(MalikT): If the donor
had his making of a hiba witnessed and the thing given 
was lent and in the possession of the borrower (mustaCir), 
the possession of the borrower suffices for validity of 
the gift to the donee even though he himself has not pos­
sessed it jyagabada) and the thing given remains in the 
hands of the bdjU'bVer until the term of borrowing ex—
footnote
pires, at which time the donee takes the thing*
2 6  •The draft of the Code of the SharT^a does not 
specifically provide that no hiba can be made to a per­
son not in existence, or that no hiba can be made to a 
foetus* Yet the conditions for making a gift —  offer 
and acceptance then delivery —  presuppose that the donee 
is actually living, not merely conceived*
Article 184 of the Code of Personal Status per- 
mits a wasTyya to a child not yet born by the time the 
testator dies, but the child must have been conceived 
by the date of the will. The legacy will be preserved 
for the child between the date of the testator1s death 
and the birth of the child. In this case at hand 
(no. 21647) the wife of the testator was not even 
pregnant by the time he died.
It is not uncommon for testators to provide for 
their children already born and to be born. The cas-e 
no. 5589 (madanT) in the Court of First Instance, Tunis, 
of 15.3*1965 involved a wasTyya of one-third which the 
deceased grandfather had m&de to the sons of his own 
four sons. Each descent group was to receive one-fourth 
of the one-third. The testator named in the will two 
of the grandsons living at the time the will was no­
tarised on 26.1.1949. He forgot to name a third grand­
son, Husain, also living then. The father of this third 
grandson had two more sons born after the making of the 
will. The father brought a suit on behalf of his three 
minor sons along with his two adult sons. He wanted 
the Court of First Instance of Tunis to deem Husain 
a legatee. The Court found that even though he was not 
specifically named in the will, he fell within the class 
of persons called "sons of my sons already alive and 
to be born". Husain was already born, by the time the 
will was made.* The Court granted the request. The 
father then was allowed to register Husain on the title 
deed as one of the owners *of property bequeathed.
Nothing in the case file indicates the date of the 
death of the testator. It could well have been about 
1959, when the gasama of the property took place. If 
so, then it is strange that no one questioned whether 
the one child of the petitioner born after the date of the 
gasama could legitimately be a party to the suit.
The deceased Al FusatawT had the same problems as
#
the deceased Maarek in the previous case# They both 
wanted to provide for families after their deaths by 
means other than mTrath. One made a Hebrew death gift, 
giving the wife the ownership of the property but re­
serving the usufruct for himself# The other made a 
sadaga, violating the rules of delivery of the gift 
to the donee before the death of the donor#
In the case of Al FusatawT, the donor had the right 
to make a sadaga of any size to any of his living
27 _  ^
children# Nonetheless, Al FusatawT obviously wanted 
control over his own property# While he could have 
controlled the property given to his minor sons since 
he could be their legal guardian, he would have had no 
control over the property given to his adult son and 
daughter, the plaintiffs#
^Draft of the Code of the SharT*a, article 1205 
(HanafT): Everny owner of property is allowed if he
hcis capacity for gratuitous disposition to give in a 
state of health all of his wealth or some of it to whom­
ever he wishes no matter whether it be a direct family 
member or a collateral or a near relative or a stranger, 
even if he be of a different religion from the donor#
(MalikT): It is valid for a father to make a hiba of
all or part of his wealth while he is in good health 
to some of his children (i#e#, he can favour some over 
others if he wishes)#
However, a hiba from a mother cannot be un­
limited. According to article 1203 (MalikT) the law 
allows a wife to make a hiba only up to one-third. Be­
yond that she must get tlie consent of her husband (no 
like stipulation appears in HanafT law). This restric­
tion is also cited in the Report of the Sheikh ul Islam 
on the Law of the SharTKa, published for the benefit of
An alternative which Al FusatawT could have con- 
sidered is the sadaga of usufruct. We submitted in the 
discussion of the Maarek case that the law bequests 
be reformed to.the extent of releasing bequests of 
usufruct —  not bequests of corpus —  from the limits 
of the one-third and the rule of no bequest to an heir 
(see page 463 above). The fugaha* were divided in 
their opinion about the hiba of usufruct. The MalikT 
opinion as found in the draft of the Code of the 
SharT*a (article twelve hundred thirty) allowed a hiba 
of land or a house if use of the fruits or revenue 
were excluded and if the donee took control (rigba) of 
of the thing given before any impediment arose. No 
opinion was given for a hiba of use of the fruits with­
out use of the land or house. The HanafT opinion in
*
the Code of the SharT*a definitely ruled against a 
hiba that bestowed on the donee land out of which he 
was to maintain himself. The hiba was fas id. Yet if 
the donor gave something like olive trees whose fruits 
the donee was to use to maintain himself, the hiba of 
fruits was deemed valid, but the condition of mainte­
nance deemed void. Any condition attached to a hiba
foreigners who wanted to know local law of sale, dated 
22 Caada_1300 (c. 1883). Found in the archives of the 
Par al Bay, Series E, carton 155* Dossier 6 (SharTra 
law of property). See footnote 142 of Chapter II above
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(such as, given for the lifetime and maintenance of the
donee) was deemed void (article twelve hundred thirty-
two, HanafT, no opinion being given from the MalikT 
• 28 
madhab)•
v —
In Civil Case (madanT)No. 10522 of 6.11.1967, the 
Court of First InstanceToF^Punis did not challenge the 
validity of a hiba of a house which the plaintiff gave 
to her sister (so the relationship appears from the 
names of the parties). The hiba was based on the con­
dition that the defendant use it for her lifetime. (It 
is not clear whether the Court means lifetime of the 
donor or of the donee, but the wording in the summons 
tends to give the impression that the Court means life­
time of the donee.)
The document of the hiba was notarised on 3.2.1967.__ On 
24.4*1967 the wilayat [district administrator) of Tunis 
granted to the defendant permission to accept the hiba. 
The defendant, however, showed towards the plaintiff 
obvious dissatisfaction with the conditions of the hiba. 
The plaintiff brought suit to nullify the hiba according 
to article 210 of the Code of Personal Status. Article 
210 allows the donor to "revoke the hiba...if the 
donee fails to fulfill the obligations towards the donor 
inasmuch as this failing is a serious ingratitude 
towards the donor (amounting almost to rejection of the 
gift).1* The defendant did not deny her ingratitude.
The Court then deemed applicable, in addition to ar­
ticle 210 of the Code of Personal Status, article 414 
of the majallat al ^ittizamat wa^l cuqud (Code of Obli­
gations and Contracts). Article 414 allows contractual 
obligations to end when, as soon as they are concluded, 
the parties agree to abandon them, in the instances 
where such termination is permitted by law (e.g., by 
ingratitude in article 210 of the Code of Personal 
Status).
A decision from the Supreme Court of Tunisia 
(ta^gTb), number 1823 of 7.5.1963 (reported in Al Qada? 
wa’l TashrTc . "NashrTya MahkamatT Al TaCqTbT," Mm- 
istry oiTJustice Publication, 1964, pages 22-23) affirmed 
a ruling from the Court of Appeal of Sfax on the Maliki 
rule found in article 1230 of the draft of the Code of 
the Sharica. In the case the donor had made a sadaga
The MalikT opinion when expanded to include a hiba 
specifically of use of fruits or revenue while the 
ownership of the nu-property remains in the hands of 
the donor would best serve the aims of a husband who 
wishes to make provision for his family before dying. 
Nothing in the Code of Personal Status prevents extension 
of the MalikT opinion in this way. Such solution would 
mitigate the fears which the donor might have about 
maintaining himself if his only, or main,source of 
income were revenues from his lands. The donor would 
probably have to reach an agreement,separate from the 
hiba,with the donees about the sharing of fruits of the 
land.
but reserved the revenues of the land for herself 
for her lifetime. The_Court exercised its juris­
diction according to MalikT law, which, it said, 
nullifies a donor's stipulation that the donee be 
excluded from all revenues for the lifetime of 
the donor. Furthermore, possession of the gift was 
found to be incomplete.
No. 33137 (shakhsTya) of 12.1.1970
Another case found in the chamber of personal sta­
tus in the Court of First Instance of Tunis does not 
involve violation of the limit of the rule of the one- 
third. It does illustrate the competition that can 
arise among heirs, in this case, between the immediate 
family of the testator and a collateral relative of 
the testator.
The facts of the case were as follows:
Rabih made a notarised will on 13 September 1948.
.
He bequeathed to his brother's son, the defendant, 
one-third of all his estate located within Tunisia 
and outside Tunisia. Eighteen years later on 
15th of March 1966 he made another notarised will in 
Tunis. In this one he said that he was revoking a will 
which he had made in favour of the issue of his brother. 
He further explained in the document of revocation that 
he had made a bequest of one-quarter of his estate to 
such issue.
The testator died two years later on 21.1.1968 in 
Tunis. He left a house registered under TF 53715*
The house was located in the very same suburb of Tunis 
where the testator's wife was living at the time of 
her petition to the court. Presumably, she was living 
in the same registered house left by the testator.
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On 13.3,1968 the defendant recorded his acceptance 
of the bequest in a notarised document. The wife of 
the deceased, being obviously keen to prevent her 
husband*s nephew from sharing in the estate, petitioned 
the court to prevent the bequest from taking effect.
Her petition in essence argued thatthe testator had 
made a mistake in his will of revocation of 1966. The 
petitioner accepted that the testator had in fact men­
tioned that he had made a bequest of one-fourth to 
his nephew and he was revoking that bequest. The 
petitioner argued that he really meant to say that he 
was revoking a bequest of one-third. She wanted the 
court specifically, first, to correct the mistake in 
the will, changing one-fourth to one-third, and then 
to declare the bequest of 1948 to. the nephew null and 
void, it having been revoked in 1966.
There was no formal explicit indication in the file
of the case as to who were the surviving heirs of the
deceased. If they were only the widow and nephew, the
bequest to the nephew would have been subject anyway to
29
the rule of no bequest to an heir.
O Q
Article 143 A of the Code of Personal .‘Status would 
not apply in this situation. The article allows the 
principle of radd to operate in favour of the daughter 
and agnatic granddaughter when she is the only one of 
the fara> id present with the collateral *»asaba. Wives
are not named in the article to a position where they 
can take advantage of the radd in the presence of col­
lateral relatives.
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Nor was the Court of First Instance concerned with 
the document of the wafah (certificate of death) naming 
the surviving heirs. It addressed itself to a pre­
liminary question of jurisdiction. The Court recog­
nised that there was one legal aspect of the situa­
tion falling within its jurisdiction. JThat aspect 
was the need to interpret the intention of the testa­
tor (article five hundred fourteen, paragraph one of
the majallat al 3ittizamat wa^l^Uqud (Code of Obliga-
30
tions and Contracts): Did the testator mean to refer
to the previous bequest of one-third or had there been 
a bequest of one-fourth? On one hand, the Court knew 
that one-fourth referred not to another bequest but to 
one-third, for one-fourth was deemed a customary con- 
tractual expression not to be taken literally. On 
the other hand, the request of the petitioner was, un-
30 *Article 514, paragraph 1 of the Code of Obliga­
tions and Contracts: "Interpretation of the agreement 
(fcagd) is warranted when : l) the terms (or expres­
sions) used are inconsistent with the evidence aim that 
the author had in mind in writing the agreement;..,"
An annotated version of the majallat cites brief 
summaries of nine decisions from tne Supreme Court of 
Tunisia (al garar at tafeqTb)♦ These would serve to 
guide lower courts. The second ruling cited forces a 
court to interpret documents solely according to arti­
cle 514 et sq. and not according to field investiga­
tions, Ruling number 5 allows a court of original juris­
diction the right to interpret the agreement (from 
Majallat al *Ittizamat waJ1 MJgud at Tunislyya: mucaddala: 
*'aiar f asuliha biJ 1 * ahkam al gad5Ji, by Mahmud Ibn
As Sheikh, Advocate General for "the Secretariat of Justice, 
1966, page 197)*
fortunately, in the nature of correcting the will 
of revocation of 1966. The Court found that its juris­
diction for correcting documents was limited by law 
to only two instances: l) mistakes in certificates
of civil status, a subject of public importance,: reg­
ulated by article sixty-three of the Law of Civil Sta­
tus (qanun al halatT al madanTyati), No. 3 of 
1.8.1957, amended by Law No. 42-64 of 3.11.1964 in 
J.O.R.T. No. 53 of 1964;
2) mistakes in judgments, and
decisions, and reports of inquiry in court proceedings,
regulated by article two hundred fifty-six of the
Code of Civil and Commerical Procedure (majallat
^  31
al murafatat al madanTya wa*l tijariyya)•
The Court deemed the terms of the petition outside 
the purview of these two types of legal correction.
The Court also determined that the nature of the 
intent underlying the petition made the case one that 
fell within the domain of land claims (*istihgagT), 
which were to be handled by the chamber of madanT af­
fairs, not the chamber of shakhsTya affairs. The 
Court, thus, refused on another ground to entertain the
_
Examples of corrections: spelling,errors, sub­
stantive (material) errors in name, calculations, 
obvious irregularities•
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petition.
The social tensions underlying the case of Rabih
•
(no. 33137) afford an opportunity to re-examine the
hadTth which put forth the rule of no bequest beyond
the one-third. The particular words of the Prophet in
that hadTth that are relevant to this case are: "The
third is much. Indeed it is better to leave your heirs
in no need than to leave them as dependents who beg
32
from people..." Different scholars, placed different
interpretations on these words. According to Ibn 
33
Qudama -•Abu11 Khattab and one qadT said that if a.. 1 ■ * •'
testator is rich, a maximum wasTyya of one-third is 
preferred istihabb), meaning, if a testator leaves 
his relatives well-off and has even more to spare, he 
should use his power of charitable bequest to the fullest 
extent allowed. This implies that if a testator has 
not much or does not leave relatives well-off, he 
should either not make a bequest, or make only a small 
one, less than one-third. Another hadTth supporting 
this interpretation is that of *Umar. It tells of a 
sheikh who said that he was a powerful sheikh with much 
money and that his heirs upon his death would be 
Bedouin of distant relation. He was told not to be-
QO r , '
*Malik, Al Muwatta*, ed. Al Zurqanf, Chapter 530, 
section 1533, page 63.
33 ”  —Al Mugni, ed. Muhammad Rashid Ri<Ja, version
of Al Khanafi, Chapter on Al Wasaya, pages 4-5.
queathe all his property, for "Ishaq said that the one-
fourth is the sunna unless the testator be a man known
to have gotten his wealth by ill means or otherwise.
34
Then he has the capacity for giving the one-third."
However, the seeming reluctance of the Prophet
to allow Ibn Waqqas to make a bequest of even one-
.
t h i r d  and th e  hadTth  o f Sa*ad b in  Malik would su p p o rt
the idea that even the wealthy —  and the poorer more
so —  should be discouraged from bequeathing the full
o n e - t h i r d .  The hadTth  of S acad b in  Malik re u o r ts  th a t■■■ ■ ■ ■' ■ —
Sa*ad had much money and his heirs, were rich already.
He was told to bequeathe only the one-third, and the
35
one-third is much.
Prom a social point of view, however, one can see 
that the limit of the one-third served well the in­
terests of an early Muslim community. The limit would 
have helped to conserve property within the hands of 
the Muslim members,as opposed to the non-Muslim mem­
bers, of a convertfs family. The laws of intestate in-
34# Al ■ MugnT,page 4. Reported from cUmar of con- 
versati on betwee'n him and the wealthy sheikh.
35.
Ibid. Reported from visit by the Prophet.
heritance favoured Muslim members by barring a non- 
Muslim relative from inheriting from his Muslim blood 
relative. The limits on testamentary powers introduced 
a compromise by allowing a non-Muslim to be a testa­
mentary beneficiary. At the same time, however, the 
rule of the one-third kept a Muslim testator from sym­
pathising with his non-Muslim relatives to the larger 
detriment of his Muslim relatives; at least two- 
thirds of the property would remain with the faithful.
In the twentieth century, in Islamic countries, the 
chances of a Muslim having non-Muslim relatives are slim.
Q
"Article 88 of the Code of Personal Status names 
only murder as an impediment to succession. In the well- 
known Hourya case, the Supreme Court of Tunisia held 
that it would have extended w. , article 88_to
include difference in religion (reported in Al Qada* 
wa*l Tashri* No. 6 of June 1967, page 37> decision 
noT3!T8T"oFT31.1.1966, originating from judgment no.
1005 of 3.3.1964 of the Court of Appeal of Sousse; com­
mented on in Revue Tunisienne de Droit, Faculte de Droit 
de l1University de Tunis, 1968, pages 114-120). In the 
case three co-heirs wanted to divide the property in­
herited. A brother resisted allowing one of his sisters 
to share in the gasama. He argued that she was an 
apostate, a non-Muslim, who could not inherit from their 
deceased Muslim mother. He believed her to be an apos­
tate on the ground that she had married a Frenchman.
The Supreme Court rejected the ground. It reasoned that 
while marriage to a non-Muslim was void, the woman’s 
religious status remained intact. But if it could be 
proved that the woman had acquired a French nationality 
then she could be deemed an apostate. In the end the 
Supreme Court rejected the brother’s petition because 
the lower court had not fully investigated the truth 
of the allegation that the woman had acquired French 
nationality. The Court did not specify further that the
footnote
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investigators should also discover whether she had 
acquired a non-Muslim religion in addition to a 
non-Tunisian nationality. The argument was that a 
change in nationality, not necessarily religion, is 
sufficient to remove a Muslim from the purview of 
the authority of the rules of his religion (*ahkam 
ad din)• '
The Court1s final order seems to contradict all 
its prior reasoning based on the,traditional Sharira.
The Court accepted that difference of religion is a 
bar to inheritance, and should be incorporated by ju­
dicial reasoning into article 88 of the Code of Per­
sonal Status. The Court also accepted that marriage 
between a non-Muslim man and a Muslim woman does not 
render the Muslim party an apostate; only the marriage 
is affected. Yet when the Court ordered the trial court 
to reinvestigate the question of nationality, it im­
plied that change in nationality renders one an apos­
tate. Without saying so, the Court would thus make 
a change in nationality an exception to the tradi­
tional rule that only religious confession, not any 
other behaviour, such as marriage or change in na­
tionality, is the key to determining who is an apos­
tate. The Court's reasoning raises the following 
anomaly, an anomaly at least by standards of the 
SharTra: A Christian Tunisian heir can inherit from
a deceased Muslim Tunisian relative; but a Muslim 
French heir cannot inherit from a deceased Muslim 
Tunisian relative. Surely the fugaha* never intended 
that a Muslim be barred from inheriting from another 
Muslim relative. The fugaha* did, however, have dif­
ficulty in dealing with the Muslim who belongs to an 
enemy territory (Muhammad Jawar Mugarvtyd Al Was ay a 
waJl MawarTth, Sharika at Tabaka al HadTtha, n.d. J 
pages 10-13). Whether such Muslim l*f harbi should 
have been accorded full rights in general was ar­
guable. In particular there was question about the 
right of a Muslim Id. harbi to take a bequest from a 
Muslim ll dar; one would "expect equal doubt to be 
raised aFout a Muslim ll harbi taking a share of^the 
estate of a Muslim ll oEar’under the rules of mirath.
In such politically delicate matters, the legislator 
or jurists should try to keep the question of whether 
a foreigner can be an heir quite distinct from the ques­
tion of how freely a foreigner who is an heir can dis­
pose of the property which he or she has inherited.
If the unstated, but very real^concern of the Court in
i
footnote
the Hourya case was that the State is reluctant to 
allow foreign nationals, regardless of religion, to 
own property in Tunisia, then it would seem that a 
special law forbidding ownership by non-Tunisian 
nationals would be the most convenient way to solve 
the problem rather than extending the scope of the 
article 88 on impediments in the Code of Personal 
Status. So far it is only in regard to agricultural 
holdings that Tunisia has enacted a law forbidding 
non-Tunisians to own land in Tunisia (Law No. 64-5 of 
12 May 1964 in J.O.R.T. No. 24 of 12 May 1964). In 
regard to non-Tunisian heirs, the Tunisian legislature 
could consider enacting a law which allows a non- 
Tunisian to inherit from a Tunisian relative; but the 
other Tunisian heirs would exercise a kind of trust 
with certain limited rights of disposal over the 
share of the non-Tunisian heir.
For the sake of juridical clarity for the present, 
the Court in the Hourya case could have tried to deal 
with the decree of 12 July 1956, the law no. 40 of 
27 September 1957 (J.O.R.T. of 27 September 1957), and 
the Code of Personal Status, and show how they relate- 
to one another and support the ruling of the Court.
It would have pointed out that article 1 of the decree 
of 12 July 1956 allows persons of non-Tunisian na­
tionality to have their own personal law (meaning re­
ligious or national is not clear in the decree) ap­
plied to them. Correspondingly all persons of Tunisian 
nationality are subject to the Code of Personal Status, 
regardless of their religious confession (see pages 
342 - 344 of Chapter II above). Therefore, if
a non-Tunisian is not subject to the Code of Personal 
Status, then he or she is outside the Code of Personal 
Status, as well as outside Tunisian Muslim law, for the 
Code of Personal Status, especially its provisions on 
inheritance, is rooted in Muslim law. In a very technical 
sense then, a non-Tunisian who may in fact confess the - 
Islamic religion, is not a Muslim for purposes of 
Tunisian law of personal status; but a Tunisian who may 
in fact confess Christianity is a Muslim for purposes 
of Tunisian law of personal status. However, the Court 
could have brought technicality and fact closer if it 
had made a distinction between the law applicable to
the estate of the de cujus and the law applicable to
the heir. On the Fasis of such a distinction the Court
could have argued that the estate of any deceased.
Tunisian national is subject to the explicit provisions 
of inheritance found in the Code of Personal Status,
footnote
and in the Hourya case the deceased mother was a 
Tunisian national. But what finer details of rules 
not explicitly found in the Code of Personal ..Status 
would apply to the rights of the heirs would depend 
on the rules of the religious confession of the de­
ceased. Application of the rules of the religious 
confession of the deceased could be justified by ex­
tending the spirit of article 2 of law no. 40 of 
27 September 1957 (J.O.R.T. of 27 September 1957$ on 
the abolition! of the Rabbinical Courts) to all non- 
Muslim Tunisians. Article 2 allows courts to apply 
Mosaic law when there is no Tunisian legislation deal­
ing with the matter being raised between parties of 
the Judaic confession. Consequently, if the Code of 
Personal Status is not clear about difference of re­
ligion being a bar to inheritance, then, if the de .cujus 
be a non-Muslim Tunisian, then traditional non-Muslim 
law applies to the question of whether religion 
is an impediment. If the de cujus be a Muslim Tunisian, 
then traditional Muslim law barring non-Muslims from 
inheriting applies. It so happened in the Hourya case 
that the deceased was a Tunisian of Muslim confession.
If her surviving daughter were of Muslim confession, 
albeit of French nationality, she should have been al­
lowed to inherit, according to the traditional rules of 
apostasy in the SharTca, but subject to any separate 
rules which the legislator might wish to make con­
cerning foreign nationals owning property in Tunisia. 
(Example of traditional rules of the SharTca being used 
to interpret the Code of Personal Status i.s personal 
status case (shakhsTya) no. 21647 (Al FusatawT)of 
14.1.1966. All parties had Muslim names. #See page 469 
et sq. above).
When the Hourya case is placed in historical per­
spective, the confusion that the ruling raised is not 
surprising. There is precedent in Tunisia for a rule 
that difference in nationality is a bar to inheritance, 
as seen in a decision of the Court of First Instance 
of Tunis, no. 8657 (madanT) of 12.11.1966. This case 
originated in a request by the son of the founder of 
a hubus to have distributed the lands of the hubus as 
mi lY Ye tween himself and the sons of his deceased brother. 
The evidence presented before the Court showed that the 
muwarrith of _the plaintiff had in fact three sons. When 
he died the gadT of Tabaraba (*V^ >i)f where the muwarrith 
had died, rulefi, on. 13.12.1954, that the third son was 
interdicted from inheriting from his father because the 
son had become a French national. The Supreme Court of
footnote 486
the SharTta supported the gadT in its judgment of 
27*7.1955* Another precedent is the case of the 
Tunisian Muslim who wanted to become a French national 
in order toe get the revenues from a hubus♦ But he 
was warned by the local gadT that he Goulet be cut off 
entirely from the Muslimj5risdietion, to the point- 
of being eliminated from the list of beneficiaries to 
the revenues of the hubus (see pages 276-278 of
Chapter II above)* I'he French were more flexible*
While French courts had jurisdiction over Algerian 
nationals, they applied the personal Muslim law of 
the Algerians in matters of family and inheritance 
(see page 264 of Chapter II above)* The harshness 
which Muslim Tunisians felt towards naturalised 
Muslims probably has roots in the conflict that arose 
in the nineteenth century between the Bay and the Euro­
pean consuls over the status of the European nationals 
living in Tunisia (see pages167-68^ 203 of Chapter II 
above)* The result of that conflict was that the Euro­
pean was not to be treated as a dhiimrii subject to the 
sovereignty of the Bay, but remaineff in law a harbT* 
Understandably the Tunisian Muslims would thenttmake 
the Tunisian who preferred the nationality of the 
foreigner to the sovereignty of the Bay pay the price 
that entailed being ostracised from his or her Muslim 
community.
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Thus, the spirit of those 3 ahadith which discourage 
even a wealthy person from bequeathing the full one- 
third would befit the early Muslim community. Whereas, 
the spirit of the *ahadTth which encourage a wealthy 
person £o make use of the full one-third, but dis­
courage a poorer person, would befit the twentieth 
century.
From a jurisprudential point of view, the inter­
pretations of the 5ahadTth are not fixed for all time.
The opinion of JAbu-*l Khattab that a wealthy person make
• •
use of his powers of bequest would serve the interests
of the widow of Rabih in case no. 33137* If her hus-.
band had left her only one house and that was to be
her means of livelihood, she would be reluctant to
share with a nephew any revenue which she might derive
from the property. On the other hand, if she were a
woman of wealth and her husband left several houses,
sharing of the wealth would probably do good. On the
basis of JAbu*l Khattabfs opinion, the Tunisian legis-..
lators could formulate a law whose essence would resemble,
but even be more extensive than, the family maintenance
37
provisions found in English laws of testacy. If a
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act (l & 2 Geo.6, 
c.45) of 1938, as amended by the Intestates* Estates 
Act 1952; the Family Provision Act 1966; Family Law 
Reform Act 1969; the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provi­
sions) Act 1970. . n-c o
By way of comparison, article 205 or tne
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husband left only enough for sustenance of his heirs or 
less, the courts would have discretion to reduce the 
fraction of the bequest according to the needs of the sur­
viving heirs, no heir being automatically disqualified 
by the fact that the deceased had not in fact been respon­
sible prior to his death for the maintenance of all the 
surviving heirs. The effectiveness of such a proposal 
will depend on a much larger issue. That issue is the 
credibility of the judiciary. Only a judiciary whose 
reputation warrants trust from people would be able to 
handle the power of discretion. In turn a judiciary 
can build its good reputation if it be supported by good 
investigatory services. Otherwise, only laws of set 
formulae not admitting of much equitable discretion will 
hold sway.
Code Civil (1971 edition) reads: "The children owe main­
tenance to their father and mother or other ascendants 
who are in need. The estate of the predeceased spouse 
owes it too, in the same case, to the surviving spouse.
The period within which the claim must be made is one 
year from the date of the death and can be extended, in 
case of division of the estate among the heirs, until 
the completion of the division.
"Maintenance is raised 
out of the estate that is inherited. It is supported 
by all the heirs, and in case of an insufficient estate, 
by all the specific legatees, in proportion to their 
shares•
"However, if the deceased 
has expressly declared that such a legacy will be paid 
out of preference to the others, it will apply article 
927 of the Code 0-egacy to be fulfilled as long as the 
portion of the reserve is not exhausted)."
Annotation no. 8: "The
surviving spouse can obtain maintenance only in the 
amount of the properties which compose the estate after
footnote
payment of debts; then the maintenance is taken out 
of the remainder of the solvent estate. Trib. Civ. 
d'Avesnes, 13*7*1894, D.P. 95*2.201, note de M. Planiol."
Annotation no. 10: "The gift, 
made by the predeceased spouse to his or her spouse, of 
the usufruct of the estate, does not prevent the donee 
from demanding maintenance out of the estate, when it 
is recognised that the usufruct is insufficient to keep 
the surviving spouse alive. Grenoble, 23.7.1909 
D.P. 1910.2.288."
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No. 33276 (shakhsTya) of 4*7*1970
In this case the testatrix seems to have been 
wealthier than the testator in the preceding case. She 
left only two heirs, who were not of the immediate 
family. They were her germane brothers.
The facts of the case were as follows:
-*Umm Hani had two brothers. She bequeathed land 
to the issue (hafTd) of one of her brothers by a no­
tarised will dated 14*3.1961. She died on 6.4*1969, 
according to the wafah approved by the District Court 
of Tunis on 30*4*1969* The Court determined that her 
heirs were her germane brothers. Her estate comprised
parcels of five hanashir (large country estates whose
38
acreage can be one thousand hectares or more) lo­
cated in various places in Tunisia, portions of olive 
groves, jewelry, clothes, and cash (over £300). The 
defendant accepted the legacy of land by notarised docu­
ment on 15*11*1969, thinking that he had thus completed 
the transfer of ownership.
The two brothers of the deceased then brought a 
suit against the legatee, who by relation, was the 
nephew of the first plaintiff and the son of the second
F ' ' S'S ' " ' ' ' " ' ............... f r "  " ' ' ' "*J. Saurin, Constitution de la Propri£t£ et les con- 
trats de culture indigenes' en Tunisie, Paris: Berger- 
Levrault et Cie, 1897, page 11.
J. Dufour of F.A.O./Tunis gave figures of 500 to 
2000 hectares ("Le Probl^me des terres collectives en 
Tunisie,1 typewritten manuscript, dated 4*11*1970, Tunis, 
F.A.0. Headquarters, page 4).
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plaintiff, The brothers at first alleged that the 
legacy amounted to more than one-third of the estate*
The bequest, therefore, would have needed their con­
sent to be valid.
The Court of First Instance entertaining the peti­
tion determined that the will specifically referred to 
the portions which the deceased held in a hanshir at 
Fahs, known as caTn al fatiya, registered property having
TF 115972, and to a portion in a hanshir located at
->Awlad Al JAmir, in the province of Beja.
According to the calculations of the defendant, the 
two properties amounted to less than one-third of the 
estate; the plaintiff argued that they exceeded the 
one-third. The expert appointed by the Court and ac­
cepted by both sides in the dispute, investigated the 
property and found that the legacy was less than one- 
third of the estate. The plaintiffs then presented the 
argument that the permission of the heirs of a testator 
is needed whenever the legacy is not equivalent exactly 
to one-third. If more or less than the one-third, it
was executable only by consent of the heirs.
Before the final judgment was rendered, the second 
plaintiff died. He was the father of the defendant.
He left a wife, two daughters and two sons. The defen­
dant asked the Court to continue the proceedings, render
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judgment in his favour, and explain to the heirs that 
the bequest was valid if one-third or less. Then its 
validity would not depend on the permission of the heirs.
The Court of First Instance applied articles one 
hundred seventy-nine and one hundred eighty-seven of 
the Code of Personal Status. Article one hundred seventy- 
nine reads: "One cannot dispose by will in favour of
an heir; one cannot dispose of more than one-third of 
one’s estate. The bequest made for the benefit of an 
heir or which exceeds one-third is executed only upon 
the consent of the heirs after the death of the testa­
tor.” Article one hundred eighty-seven reads: "The
bequest made in favour of someone other than an heir 
is carried out only in regard to one-third of the estate 
without depending on the consent of the heirs."
The Court ruled that a bequest of less than one-third 
is allowed automatically as long as it is not for the 
benefit of an heir. The original petition of the 
brothers of the deceased was not accepted, and the be­
quest declared valid.
JUmm HanT’s bequest would have been approved by 
JAbu*l Khattab (from Al Mvgni; see page 480 above), 
since she was well-off, left few heirs and exercised her 
charitable sense by a bequest. In this case, therefore, 
there is little need to consider the plight of deprived
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dependents surviving the deceased*
An aspect which distinguishes this case from the 
previous ones is the alleged right of the intestate 
heirs to approve the bequest before it can be executed*
The plaintiffs, in trying to extend the power of con­
sent to bequests which were not exactly equivalent to 
the one-third, but more or less, were obviously keen 
that the defendant be subject to the control of his 
parent, the second plaintiff* It is conceivable that 
the second plaintiff may not have wanted one of his 
sons to be favoured over his other children* He died 
in the course of the case, leaving to his children the 
share which he had received from the estate of his sister* 
His son, as legatee to his aunt and as son of his aunt's 
brother, would have received a double portion from the 
aunt's estate* On the other hand, the deceased aunt 
may have wanted the particular portions of land which 
she had bequeathed to be kept as whole economic units 
under the management of one person*
Thus, there could be two very legitimate, but con­
flicting, concerns at stake in the case*
The father, the second plaintiff, would have fa­
voured a law based on the spirit of the rule against
39
double portions in the law of obligatory bequests*
^'Article 191 of the Code of Personal Status: "The
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If the rule against double portions were extended be­
yond the obligatory wasTyya, it would read thus:
If intestate heir A sees that his own future 
heir B was left a bequest from the estate 
in which A inherits, then the bequest shall 
take effect to the one-third* When the 
intestate heir A in turn dies before B, the 
legatee, the bequest to B shall count against 
the intestate share which B claims from 
Afs estate, unless the co-heirs sharing 
in A's estate consent to his taking his 
full intestate share* Their consent shall 
be given in the same way as required when 
a bequest exceeds the one-third or is in 
favour of an heir of the testator. If 
the bequest exceeds or equals the intes­
tate share due to B, B shall not receive 
any of his intestate share from the estate
descendants of the deceased cannot claim the obliga­
tory wasTyy a : *.*2) if their grandfather or grand-
mother bequeathed to them in his or her lifetime or gave 
them a gift without any recompense (J iwad) whose value 
is that of the obligatory wasTyy a * But if the grand­
parent bequeathed something And it is less than the 
amount of the obligatory wasTyy a the grandchildren would 
have received, it is counted as a supplement for the 
difference between the obligatory wasTyya and the. volun­
tary bequest* If the grandparent bequeathed more than 
the obligatory wasTyya the grandchildren would have re­
ceived, then it is deemed an excess and the general rules 
of al wasiyya (voluntary) apply to it.”
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of A, unless the co-heirs consent. If 
the bequest be less than his intestate 
share and the co-heirs do not consent to 
his talcing his full intestate share, the 
difference between the legacy and the in­
testate share of B shall be distributed 
equally among all heirs of A, including 
B, according to the rules of mTr ath.
The above rule is complicated and illustrates how 
too much concern for equality among heirs can be detri­
mental to juridical clarity. For, preserving ality, 
to the extreme, among heirs leads to more fragmenta­
tion and co-ownership, and in turn more litigation to 
effect gasama. The effects of fragmentation and co-
ownership can have far more detrimental effect on the 
economy than some inequality among heirs has on the 
psychology of the family. If cooperatives are not en­
couraged, by either the legislators or the people, as 
a way to transform co-ownership into an energetic force,
then the curing of ill-effects of fragmentation will have
40
to be left to the rules of gas ama.
^°*Moshen Chebil, Directeur des Affaires Fonciferes, 
Sous-Secr^tariat dfEtat a 1*Agriculture, Tunis, in his 
paper "L’Evoiution du regime fondier Tunisien en liaison 
avec les programmes de developpement agricole,11 Expos£ 
sur les projets nationaux No. 5, F.A.O. (United Nations), 
Centre de developpement sur la politique et la coloni­
sation agraires au proche-orient, Tripoli, 16-28 October
footnote
of 1965, shows that in 1965 three-fifths of Tunisia1s 
lands were held in hubus, tribal nomadic lands (terres 
collectives) and co-ownership (indivision) of the ex- 
treme degree. The remaining two-fifths were privately 
owned, the numbers of co-owners on any one plot being 
less than the number on the other three-fifths of land.'
J. Dufour of F.A.0./Tunis gave a short history of 
the cooperative movement in Tunisia in his typewritten 
manuscript ,!Le Probl'&me des terres collectives en 
Tunisie,” 4 November 1970, with a bibliography of 
thirty-four references (in dossier of J.P. Dufour,
File C.C. 4.2.25, F.A.O. Headquarters, Tunis). The 
law of 4 June 1964 on collectives provided for grouping 
small plots into units of 100,000 hectares for coop­
erative farming. After the political disgrace of the 
main promoter of cooperatives, the law of 22 September 
of 1969 was passed. It maintained the rights of the 
cooperatives, but emphasised the freedom of a person 
to join or not to join a cooperative and softened the 
movement towards collectivisation considerably. As a 
result nearly every one took back his lands and re­
verted to the traditional system. But Mr. Dufour had 
hopes for continuation of the large cooperatives started 
by the Programme Alimentaire Mondiale (F.A.O.).
Mr. Dufour lamented the fact that there is no law 
limiting the number of owners that can possibly own 
one plot of agricultural land. He does not specifically 
refer to:the law of 1963, but there is a law (Law 
63-257 of 15 July 1963, J.O.R.T. of 12-16 July 1963,
No. 33) prescribing the minimum number of square metres 
into which land can be sub-divided and given to each 
co-owner. If the land cannot be sub-d.ivided, then it 
is sold at the request of the co-owners who share the 
proceeds of the sale. But no law limits the number of 
co-owners. Mr. Dufour would agree that the rules of 
gas ama in article 140 of the majallat al hugucr al caTnTyat 
(Code of Property Rights) c oul dbeusecL 16 reduce : 
the ratio of co-owners to hectares of land.
Already the ma.jallat al hugug al ta‘TnTyat allows the 
competent court to interfere in the gasama of an estate 
on the grounds that the welfare of the property may 
require that the normal rules of inheritance not 
operate. Article one hundred forty of the majallat 
allows the courts to assign a productive economic 
unit —  whether agricultural, industrial, or commer­
cial —  to one of the heirs. All other heirs will be 
compensated in cash if the value of the economic unit 
exceeds the value of the legal share (the fard) of its 
new owner.
The deceased brother in the case of JUmm HanT 
would probably have wanted article one hundred forty 
extended to cover property devolving by consent of 
co-heirs, that is, property that is the subject of an 
ultra vires bequest (see footnote 5k post).
In other words, if the heirs failed to give consent 
to the testator’s wishes and if failure of consent 
works any hardship on the economic operation of the 
property as provided for in article one hundred forty, 
the heirs1 decision would be subject to the approval 
or disapproval of the court of competent jurisdiction. 
Failure on the part of the heirs to give consent 
would automatically give rise to a court investigation. 
This investigation could be part of the District Court’s
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jurisdiction to certify wafayat and inventories of an 
41
estate.
41 •
This proposal would be one answer to J. Dufour1 s 
pessimism about the effectiveness of the majallat 
al hugug al *aTnTyat. In a paper entitled "Devolution 
sucdessorale, morcellement et indivision de la 
propri§te agricole en Tunisie1 (6 June 1967, F.A.O./
Tunis, dossier of J.P. Dufour, file C.C. 4.2.25)
Mr. Dufour fears that the majallat will not have far 
reaching effects for three reasons:
1) The provisions come into operation only at the re­
quest of the heirs.
2) The State does not support financially the opera­
tions needed to effect the majallat.
3) The majallat does not contro1 . fragmentation of prop­
erty occurring in transactions inter vivos.
In answer to the last criticism the Tunisian legis­
lator could extend Law 63-25 of 15 July 1963 (J.O.R.T.
No. 33 of 12-16 July 1963). That law already requires 
authorisation of the concerned administrative official 
to sub-divide agricultural lands. The authorisation 
could be extended to control transactions inter vivos 
so that any kind of property does not become so weighted 
with co-owners that it cannot be sub-divided when co­
owners wish to end co-ownership.
A recent judicial decision leads one to conclude 
that the task of meeting Mr. Dufour1s criticisms will 
have to be done by the legislator rather than the courts. 
The Supreme Court of Tunisia (cassation, tacgTb) held 
that the kinds of considerations that the courts must 
take into account when allowing gasama according to ar­
ticle 131 (gasama by value,: not by^kind; see footnote 
32 of Chapter Yll above) and article 140 (an economic 
unit within an estate should go preferably to one of 
the heirs and the other heirs be compensated; see page 373 
of Chapter III above) of the Code of Property Rights 
apply only when the property is an estate open for suc­
cession. Articles 131 and 140 do not apply when the 
property presented for gasama is acquired by sale.
Case reported in Al Qad-qJ wa*l Tashric , No. 7 of
July 1972, pages 40-42,
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Nos. 24713 of 17.1.1967; 29486 of 17.4.1967; 29689
of 13.6.1967; and 27690 of 2.7.1968 (all shakhsTya)
Only four cases of obligatory wasTyya were recorded
in the daftar of the chamber of personal status of the
43
Court of First Instance in Tunis. Only case 
no. 27690 dealt specifically with the limit of the one- 
third on the obligatory wasTyya. The other cases arose 
from petitions requesting correction of notarised 
wafayat or correction of errors in District Court judg­
ments when notaries and judges neglected to take into 
account the provisions of article one hundred ninety- 
one of the Code of Personal Status (on obligatory
wasTyya, partu of Law No. 99-77 of 19.6.1959, J.O.R.T.
44
No. 34 of 1999).
42 • . . .Commented upon by E. LaGrange m  Revue Tunislenne
de Droit, Faculte de Droit de 11 UniversitlT"de Tunis',' 196'8, 
pages 120-123.
43_/#The madani chamber of the Court of First Instance 
of Tunis admitted two obligatory legatees to the share 
of the obligatory wasTyya in the revenues of the estate. 
The defendant, son o£ the muwarrith (who died on 
29.1.1961) was ordered to 'share' the revenues with his 
sisters, and nephew and neice, the plaintiffs. The case 
was number 9631 (madanT) of 19.6.1968, confirmed on ap­
peal by judgment no. 62132 of 21.7.1970 for appellate 
case no. 28677/2.
^*In judgment no. 27892 of 24.6.1971 the Court of 
Appeal of TUnis held that a notary1s determination of 
heirs is not conclusive on the Court (Al Qadci1 wafl 
Tashric: , No. 1 of January 1972, pages 89-93).
The parties in case no, 27650 of 1968 had been the 
same parties to case no, 25685 of 1967* In the earlier 
case of 1967 the grandchildren of the de cujus won the 
right to take from the estate as obligatory legatees.
The other heirs, the defendants, had argued that the pro 
visions of the law on obligatory wasTyya had effect 
only from the day of the enactment of the law, namely, 
1959# The mothers and father, whom the plaintiff 
grandchildren represented, had died in 1934 and 1943,
The Court of First Instance of Tunis rejected the ar­
gument of the defendants and accepted the argument 
that the law of obligatory wasTyya operates from 1959 
onwards, The only other material date is the date of 
the grandparent1s death (in this case, on 20 March 1964) 
Thus, the date of the death of the parents whom the 
grandchildren are representing is immaterial, for ar­
ticle one hundred ninety-one directs the court to cal­
culate the amount of the obligatory wasTyya as if the 
parent of the legatees had remained alive after the 
death of the grandparent of the legatees.
The totality of shares of the predeceased parents, 
nonetheless, was subjected to a ceiling of one-third of 
the estate of the grandparent. The original summons in 
case no, 27650 of 1968, issued in the name of the grand­
children to their two aunts, demanded that the estate be
equally divided among the claimants: 
one-fourth to one aunt 
one-fourth to the second aunt 
one-fourth to the children of one predeceased 
daughter
one-fourth to the children of a second pre­
deceased daughter.
The share of the child of the predeceased son was not 
even included in the calculation. Even if it had been 
included the total amount which the grandchildren would 
have claimed would have been equal to two-thirds of 
the estate. See diagram below:
Grd. M
1/6 1/6 ( 1/6 1/6 2/6
"  “ " ' " ' " *" ■ ' ' V "  '
2/3 more than l/3
The Court of First Instance rejected the original claim 
since the totality of the shares of the predeceased 
parents exceeded the one-third. The Court accepted 
the notarised wafah of the deceased grandmother as valid 
according to the wafah two-thirds was distributed to the 
two living daughters, the defendants, and one-third to
the grandchildren,the plaintiffs.
The final distribution ordered by the Court to the 
obligatory legatees was 2/4 of the one-third to the 
sons of the predeceased sons; 1/4 of the one-third 
to the daughter of the predeceased daughter; and 
1/4 of the one-third to the two sons and two daughters 
of the second predeceased daughter on the basis of a 
two to one ratio in favour of the males.
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Madani Cases
The next series of cases were decided by the civil
(madani) chamber of the Court of First Instance of
-  45
Tunis. These cases are actions in *istihgagT,
that is, claims to real property. Often an heir will
appeal to the court to force a co-heir to release the
inheritable estate when the co-heir collected the estate
46
and uses it all for his own benefit. Or else the 
claimant/ heir has become dissatisfied with the manage­
ment of the co-heir in whose hands the co-owned (rala 
shuyu*i ) estate has been placed for administration 
(such as, collection of revenues is centralised in one 
heir) and he wants the state of co-ownership ended so
45.In the draft of the Code of the Shari*a articles 
1533-1534 define *istihgag as judgment for the plaintiff 
to extricate his right1 of" poss ess ion from the hands of 
the one holding it so that it goes to the hands of the 
plaintiff•
The origin of the right of possession can be contract 
(mufcawada) or donation (tabarruc) or inheritance (*irth) 
or possession of sections of uncultivated lands in 
which there has not been established any privilege.
^ ‘Civil Case (madani) No. 9563 of 27.1.1968: The
petitioners were the sons, daughters and widow of the 
deceased (died 20.5.1964)• The defendant was a son of 
the same deceased. The petitioners accused the defen­
dant of taking over the administration of the house 
left by the muwarrith and of refusing to acknowledge 
the claims of the petitioners.* At first the defendant 
denied the claims of the petitioners, then admitted them 
before the investigating judge. The Court of First In­
stance of Tunis then proceeded to approve gasama on the 
basis of rules of intestate distribution, applying ar­
ticles 95 (widow*s share) and 103 (paragraph 3: daughters 
agnatised by sons) of the Code of Personal Status.
5C4
that each partner is given his own share to administer 
47
by himself.
47.
Civil Case (madanT) No. 4675 of 8,2.1964: The
plaintiff claimed her share in her mother’s estate which 
had originated from the estate of the petitioner’s ma­
ternal grandfather. The defendant had been vested with 
co-ownership and supervision over all the land. He had 
forbidden the petitioner to administer her share in 
the estate. Thus she sought detachment of her share 
and the end of co-ownership. _S.he established her nasab 
to the latter’s father by wafah. Her petition, however, 
was not granted, for lack oJr an official inventory^1) 
of the estate, or document establishing hubus, or a de­
cision from the CommissjLon For the Abol if ion of * Ahbas 
(laina tasfTya al Jahbas)• *
(l) Dictionnaire de Droit, Paris', 1966, "Succession,” 
paragraph 29-3: 1 Inventory —  Inventory is obligatory
only exceptionally. But it is always useful to allow 
the heir to know the cause for the inventory. The in­
ventory is a notarised document. It is preceded by a 
title of inventory (intitulfe d’inventaire) which serves 
to establish the capacity 'heir for' 'ttie claimant 
of this right."
While the Tunisian courts require an inventory (kashfa 
al *ahsa> to know what the heir can claim (articTe^TS^ 
of thS’Code of Property Rights names taking of inventory 
a£ one of duties of administrator of estate), French 
law uses inventory for other reasons found in article 
802 of the Code Civil; "The effect of the benefit of 
inventory is to give the heir the advantage: . l) for 
not being held responsible for payment of debts of the 
estate except to the amount of the value of the prop­
erties which he has received and even for being able
to discharge payment of the debts while abandoning all 
the properties of the estate to the creditors and 
legatees;
2) for not
confusing his personal properties with those of the 
estate and to preserve against the estate the right to 
claim payment of what is to his credit."
(2) In Tunisian law the heir is not held responsible 
personally for the debts of the estate; only the
de cuius is held responsible. In French law the heir, 
“ oTFias the right to choose to accept or reject his in-
footnote 505
testate share in the estate, is personally responsible out 
of his own pocket for the debts of the deceased if the 
heir accepts his intestate share. Article 241 of the 
majallat al hugug al caTnTyat provides that when the 
heirs refuse*the accept their shares, they cannot be forced 
to accept, and they are not held responsible for the 
debts of the estate; the creditors can in this case 
only pursue the debts against the _estate, sTdT Al Bashir 
Zahra, of the Court of Appeal of Tunis in his essay 
"Al ^ Irth al muwazafa falaihi dTn wa calaqa al waritha 
bi daJinT at thrika,11' ("The inheritable estate upon which 
is laid a debt and the relation of the heirs to the 
creditors of the estate") Al QadaJ waJl Tashri* No, 5 
of May 1969, page 9, writes that' article 241 means that 
the heir cannot claim in the estate unless he accepts 
the share without any condition and any bond (gaidj,
This shows the great' difference between Tunisian law 
and French law, French law allows debts of the deceased 
to be fulfilled from the personal property of the heir 
if need be (article 724 of the Code Civil: "The legiti­
mate heirs, the natural heirs, and the surviving spouse 
are attached with absolute rights in the properties, 
rights and actions of the deceased, on condition that 
they are obligated to acquit all the debts of the 
estate,
5C6
Or else one heir might have purchased the legal shares 
of some of the co-heirs, but the sellers had not
48
yet turned the property over to the purchasing heir*
48.
Civil Case (madani) no. 7515 of 26.6.1966: The
plaintiff claimed her share of inheritance from her 
deceased father's lands as well as half of the share 
of her father's wife and all the share of her uncle.
She alleged that she had bought the latter two shares.
The sisters of her deceased father had usurped control 
over the estate since 1950, the date of the death_of 
the muwarrith. The Court of First Instance of Tunis 
did not accept the petition because sufficient evidence 
of the sale was not presented.
In a Personal Status Case (shakhsTya) No. 17353 
of 5.7.1965 (on appeal to the Court of Appeal of 
Tunis, case no. 26201/3, judgment no. 58824, rendered 
on 19.5#1966, affirming lower court), the Court of 
First Instance of Tunis accepted as proved the pur- . 
chase by the son of the shares of the wife and daugh­
ter.
Civil Case (madanT) No. 9163 of 11.2.1967: The
petitioner claimed that she and her brother had bought 
together ten years ago a portion of land. Her brother 
built on the land, then proceeded to register the 
real estate in his name without specifying the partner­
ship with the sister. He then wished to sell the prop­
erty. The sister protested and sought judgment at­
tributing half of the property to her. The Court of 
First Instance of Tunis had to refuse the petition for 
lack of documentary evidence establishing her claim.
In Civil Case (madanT) No. 9263 of 17*1*1967, 
the son of the deceased' bought the share of the widow 
of the deceased and recorded the sale in a notarised 
document dated 11.2.1965* The son and his brother 
then sought judgment against their sisters forcing them 
to complete gasama of a house in which the two sons of 
the deceased and one daughter resided at the time the 
suit was instituted. The competent administrative of­
ficial in the district had refused to authorise gasama.
The Court of First Instance of Tunis refused the petition.
Civil Case (madanT) No. 9390 of 25*2.1967: The
daughter of the deceased (who died on 12.8.1950) claimed 
her inheritance share in the deceased's estate as well
footnote
as the share which she had bought from the deceased's 
widow and germane brother (sale on 9*10.1952). The 
mother, germane sisters, and another daughter of the 
deceased controlled the estate. The petitioner sought 
control of her shares by demanding gasama of the estate. 
The expert who carried out investigations of the real 
estate deemed the land unsuitable for gasama. Liquidation 
by sale was recommended. The parties to the case ac­
cepted the recommendation. The Court of First Instance 
of Tunis ordered distribution of the proceeds of the 
sale according to the rules of mTrath, taking into ac­
count the purchase of shares by the petitioner and 
by her sister, one of the defendants.
An action in *istihgag could also arise when administra­
tion by co-ownership is impossible; hence, co-owners
49
demand termination of the state of co-ownership 
(see footnote 254 of Chapter II above and page 248).
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Civil Case (madanT) No. 6345 of 14.6.1965' The 
petitioner requestecTIiquidation of the estate by sale. 
The defendants opposed the sale because the sale would 
deprive them of a place of habitation. The defendants 
lost because of the rule that no one co-owner can force 
another to remain in a state of co-ownership (article 
71 of the ma.iallat al hugug al caTnTyat). Although it 
was not noted in the judgment, article 120 of the same 
ma.iallat allows co-owners to take an unanimous decision 
that the sale not be open to any third party. In this 
way the property is kept in the hands of the co-owners 
who need it.
No. 8704 (madanT) of 28.2.1967
This case in the madanT division of the Court of 
First Instance in Tunis corresponds to the Maarelc 
case in the shalchsTya division (no. 20510, page 455 
above). It dealt directly with the validity of 
a hiba bi1! wasTyya that was in favour of an heir and 
exceeded the one-third.
The facts of the case were as follows:
Sa^al made a notarised hiba on 12.6.1952, according 
to Mosaic law, in favour of his children and grand­
children. The Rabbinical Court having jurisdiction 
at the time approved the gift, verifying the validity 
of its form in a judgment rendered on 1.7•1952. Some 
years later Sa^al hypothecated one of the registered 
properties that had been disposed of in the gift, and 
on 25*3*1959 (inscribed 1-4-1959 depot, vol. 59* 
no. 323) had inscribed on the title deed of the second 
property disposed of in the gift a sale to a third 
party. Saral died on 10.8.1964* In 1966 his children 
and grandchildren registered the transfer of ownership 
by gift on the title deed for the first property 
which had been hypothecated. The Conservateur Foncier 
had accepted the 1952 deed of gift as valid for legal 
transfer of ownership.
Sa*al had also left among his heirs his wife. She
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was not the mother of the children whom Sat-al had 
favoured with the gift of 1952. She brought a suit 
against the children and grandchildren, requesting the 
Courtof First Instance of "Tunis to l) nullify the 
hiba bi*l wasTyya because it was contrary to article 
one hundred seventy-nine of the Code of Personal 
Status; 2) to have the registration of the transfer 
of ownership on the title deed annulled; and 3) to 
attribute to her one-eighth of the properties of her 
husband.
From the submissions of the advocates kept in the 
case file one saw that by the terms of the gift the 
two sons of the deceased’s son (that is, the two grand­
sons of the donor) and the wife of the deceased’s 
son (that is, the daughter-in-law of the donor) were 
to have shares of two-fifths, two-fifths, and one- 
fifth, respectively, in the house which had been 
hypothecated. The deceased’s daughter-in-law was living 
on the property at the time of petition. Another 
property, which was later sold, was originally given 
totally to the daughter of the deceased’s son. The 
moveables owned by the deceased were given to the de-
i
ceased’s son and grandsons in equal proportions.
The Court deemed the gratuitous disposition a gift 
inter vivos, which had been made effective by the de-
cision of the Rabbinical Court. As the law of 
27 September 1957 abolishing the application of 
Mosaic law was not retroactive, the Court of First 
Instance deemed itself bound by the Rabbi’s ruling 
of 1952. The decision of the former court took prece­
dence over the fact that the gift was not registered 
on the title deed until after the death of the donor, 
usually registration is deemed an indication of de­
livery and completion of the gift (see page 460 above).
The Court did not refer to the shakhsTya decision 
no. 20510 of 15*2.1966, confirmed on appeal in ap­
pellate case no. 26728/3, judgment no. 59966 of 
31.7*1967 (Maarek’s case, page 455 above) in 
which a gift made according to Mosaic law was deemed 
a wasTyya; and since it was made to an heir it was 
declared void. The difference in facts between case 
20510 and the Sa*al case is that the deceased in case 
no. 20510 ordered that his disposition not be read be­
fore the Rabbinical Court until after he had died.
By the time he had died the competent court was the 
Court of First Instance, applying the Code of Personal 
Status. The instructions left by the testator were 
deemed to mean that the disposition was not to take 
place until after he had died. The legal nature of 
such disposition is testamentary.
T^e rna^ an‘i chamber in the Sa*al case (no. 8704) 
went on to rule that the gift of the landed property 
was valid, and hence, removed from the estate of the 
deceased.
The widow appealed to the Court of Appeal under
case no. 27640, judgment no. 60070, being rendered
50
on 15*11*1967* The Court of Appeal affirmed the
decision of the lower court. The widow could not in­
herit- the property that was the object of the gift.
The terms of the gift cited in the judgment do not 
correspond exactly to the terms cited in the advocates’ 
submissions (perhaps because the Court was exercising 
jurisdiction only over the immoveables and not the 
moveables). The Court referred only to the property 
given to the sons and wife of the deceased’s son, 
and to the property originally given to the daughter 
of the deceased’s son then later sold. The widow’s 
share in the estate was limited to what remained after 
the properties were given away to the children and 
grandchildren. Within that remainder she was entitled 
to claim one-eighth according to article ninety-five 
of the Code of Personal Status (the Code being cited
The judges rendering the decision in this case 
were not the same as the ones rendering the Court of 
Appeal judgment confirming shakhsTya decision 
no. 20510 (Maarek’s case). ’
513
in her plea, not in the judgment). The Court did not 
specify what constitued the remaining properties.
The kind of gift inter vivos validated by the
Court in the above case is the kind which Al Fusatawi
•
in the shakhsTya case no. 21647 of 14.1.1966 had 
wanted to effect (see page 465 et sq. above). He had 
wanted to retain control over the properties during 
his lifetime but assure that they passed to his wife 
and her minor children upon his death. He failed to 
win the law to his side since the Islamic rules in the 
Code of Personal Status were applied. His disposition 
of sadaga was null and void by the rules of both hiba
wasTyya. in the Sa*al case at hand, the gift 
was valid because of Mosaic law, and even if it had 
been deemed a bequest subject to the Code of Personal 
Status, it would still have been valid. For in so far 
as the beneficiaries were concerned, it was a bequest 
to non-heirs, the children of a living son of the de­
ceased and the daughter-in-law of the deceased. Only 
the submissions of the lawyers in the case file sug­
gest that the gift would have been nullified because 
of the amount, which was alleged to exceed the one-third 
of the estate.
While the wishes of the deceased were granted in the 
case of Sacal, one must still ask whether their effect
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was fair to the widow* The plight of the widow in 
this case does not seem as grave as that of the widow 
in the case of Maarek. Maarek*s widow seemed to be 
depending solely on the one property left by her husband, 
who wanted her to have it, but whose wishes were 
foiled by the law. In the Sa*al case at hand the prop­
erty in dispute was inhabited by one of the beneficiaries 
(daughter-in-law) of the gift and the two other bene­
ficiaries were living in France (at least at the 
time the suit was instituted)•
If the plight of the widow were grave, she would
be an example (until she remarried if she did) that
encourages the arguments proposed for reinterpreting 
the words of the Prophet, "And the third is much"
(see page 480 above). By virtue of the reinterpreta­
tion she would have the court exercise its discretion 
in such a way that gratuitous alienations that are not 
registered until the death of the donor will be varied 
according to the resources and needs of the surviving 
widow of the donor.
The Sa*al case is also similar to the situation 
found in the shakhsTya case no. 33276 of 4*7.1970 
(-•Emm Hani • s case). In both cases an heir to an estate
sees that his own future heirs have been given a gra­
tuitous share in the estate. In the case no. 33276 the
father disputed the gratuitous disposition to his son. 
In the Sa*al case the son of the deceased did not ob­
ject to the gift to his children. Yet had Sakai’s son 
died before his own children and wife, the donees, his 
wife and children could, according to the rule proposed 
for case no. 33276 (see pages 494-495 above),
decide whether or not the amount of each gift should 
count against the amount of each intestate share due 
to them from the estate of Sakai’s son.
As for the state of co-ownership prescribed by the 
deceased donor in the Sa*al case (two fifths to each 
grandson and one-fifth to the daughter-in-law in one 
property), the welfare of the property would probably 
require that the court not wait for a request from the 
co-owners for gasama. The court of competent jurisdic­
tion could at the time the succession opened have 
applied article one hundred forty of the majailat 
al hugug al caTnTyat. At that time the court could 
have decided whether or not the interests of the prop­
erty and the individual members of the family would 
best be served by attributing ownership to only one 
owner.
Case No. 11012 (madanT) of 15*4.1968
One of the most interesting issues in a case of 
a wasTyya to an heir is found in case no* 11012.
It is an example of traditional Shari^a encountering 
twentieth century financial customs.
The facts of the case were as follows:
Yusuf, the deceased, was the son of the plaintiffs. 
He had taken out a life insurance with an insurance com­
pany located in Tunis. He made his wife, the defendant, 
the beneficiary of the insurance in the event that he
died. The insurance was valued at two hundred fifty 
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dinars•
When Yusuf died, his parents wished to benefit from 
the insurance also. In a petition of claim (* istihgag) 
to the Court of First Instance, they called the benefit 
derived from the insurance a wasTyya. They argued 
that since no bequest to an heir is valid and they were 
not willing to consent to it, the Court should deem 
the insurance money part of the taraka (estate) of 
Yusuf. Then the estate would be distributed among 
the heirs mentioned in the wafah of Yusuf. They wanted 
the wife to be forced to pay them their share.
Unfortunately, the Court of First Instance was not
51*
In 1971 one dinar was the equivalent of about 
one pound sterling. It was the same in 1965.
able to pass judgment on the petition for two reasons. 
One was that the parents did not bring any evidence of 
the insurance policy. The other was that the defendant 
never appeared. The dispute turned on the outcome of 
the interpretation of the insurance policy, and until 
that was settled, the Court could not make a decision.
Although the petition was not judged upon, the 
facts are cause for speculation. As the Court ob­
served, the terms of the insurance policy would deter­
mine the outcome of the case. No doubt the Court had 
in mind the fact that the terms would determine who 
was the actual owner of the policy by the time of the. 
death of the person insured. The terms of some policies 
allow the insured to be paid the proceeds if he is still 
alive once all the premiums have been paid. In that 
case the person insured is the owner of the policy.
The terms of other policies allow payment only to the 
beneficiary. All interest vests in the beneficiary 
who becomes the owner of the policy. In case of such 
policies the creditors of the insured generally cannot 
claim rights in the policy, even though the debtor/in­
sured has paid the premiums•
How might one then interpret the legal effects of 
life insurance policies in terms of the SharT^a? One 
might start with the instructions from the Qur^an that
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debts must be paid before the inheritance is paid
-  -  52
(sura four( An N isaJ ), verses eleven to twelve)*
The rights of the creditors thus could determine the 
rights of the heirs vis la vis the beneficiaries of the 
policy. If the terms of the insurance policy be of 
such nature that creditors of the deceased could not 
touch it, then the insurance policy can be deemed out­
side the estate of the deceased* As to how the law 
could justify a conclusion that the creditors could 
not touch the proceeds of the policy, the Court would 
have to examine the essence of the insurance policy*
It would have to determine whether insurance is a gra­
tuitous contract or a contract of *iwad. The Court 
would have further to decide whether the policy con­
stitutes two contracts or one. It could be two con­
tracts in the sense that the interest of the benefi­
ciary arises from a gratuitous transfer of ownership 
but the responsibility of the insured for paying the
^2#Sura 4, verse 11 (inheritance verses): n...but 
if he has brothers, for his mother is the sixth, after 
(payment of) a bequest he may have bequeathed or a 
debt.•
verse 12: “...your share is a fourth 
of what they leave after (payment of) any bequest 
they may have bequeathed or a debt. ...but if you 
have a child, their share is the eighth of what you 
leave after (payment of) a bequest you may have be­
queathed or a debt."
(From translation of Maulana Muhammad Ali, The Holy QurJah)
premiums arises from a contract of *iwad. In this
case the gratuitous transfer to the beneficiary would
be subject to the rules of al hiba; and if the Court
considered that delivery was not immediate and the
insurance remained in the estate, then the insurance
w ould be s u b je c t  to  th e  r u le s  o f a l  w asTyya. On th e
other hand, the policy could be deemed one contract
in the sense that the terms of the contract necessitate
a beneficiary,. As long as the price is paid, and the
contract valid in itself, the effects of the contract
derive from the contract itself, not being subject
to any other special rules like those of al hiba or
a l  w asTyya, T h e re fo re , as th e  c o n tra c t  s t ip u la t e s
who shall be the beneficiary, no person outside this
stipulation should be able to claim to be a party who
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benefits from the contract.
Should the Court decide that the proceeds of the
life insurance policy are part of the estate of the
deceased insured, then it can accordingly apply rules
of waslyya of specification. If the amount of the in- 
*
surance policy exceeds the share of the inheritance of
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The problem can be cast in the form of the argu­
ments which Ibn Qudama presented about the validity of 
bequests which indirectly benefit an heir, such as a 
bequest that absolves an heir of a debt (see page 395 
et sq. of Chapter III above).
the wife, then the wife depends on the good graces 
of the parents of the deceased. If they fail to con­
sent to the excess, the wife could put her hopes in 
the proposal previously discussed for case no. 33276 
(shakhsTya) of 4*7•1970. It was submitted that failure 
of consent to a bequest should be subject to the 
scrutiny of the Court (see page 497 above).
However, the argument for the interference of the Court 
rested on concern for the welfare of the property as 
well as for the interests of the family members. This 
argument is more appropriate for immoveable property 
than moveable property like money, which is the nature 
of proceeds from an insurance policy. A more apt 
argument in favour of the wife would be based on 
the words of the Prophet, "It is better to leave your 
relatives in no need than to leave them as dependents 
who beg from people" (see page 480 above). If 
a testator has made a bequest to an heir with the pur­
pose of continuing maintenance that was due during 
the lifetime of the testator, then if co-heirs do not 
consent to the bequest, the Court should scrutinise 
their failure to give consent. The Court would deter­
mine in its inquiry whether the consent is refused for 
selfish reasons, or for the reas>on that the co-heirs 
were as dependent on the testator in his lifetime ;
as the legatee. Where the legatee is a spouse and 
the Court would grant the bequest in his or her favour, 
he or she would have to relinquish to the co-heirs 
whatever remained of the bequest when .he or she re­
married or returned to his or her parents for main­
tenance.
Conclusions
The volume of petitioners appearing before the 
Court of First Instance in Tunis for nullifying a 
bequest on grounds that it is to an heir or exceeds 
the one-third is not.overwhelmingly large. The 
problems which the petitioners in fact raise, however, 
inspire a re-examination of the two most fundamental 
rule of bequests. The two most fundamental rules 
arise from two traditions: no bequest to an heir;
no bequest beyond the one-third. The reasoning of the 
fugaha* has prevented these two rules from becoming 
hard and fast in the extreme. For the consent of the 
heirs of the deceased (in part or in unanimity) deter­
mines the extent of the testator’s testamentary powers. 
They can consent to a bequest to an heir or a bequest 
beyond the one-third. Article one hundred seventy- 
nine of the Code of Personal Status embodies these 
rules. Its provisions have the same tenour as the
HanafT provisions in the draft of the Code of the 
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SharTea.
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Draft of the Code of the SharT^a, article 1149: 
(HanafT) —  The permission of the heir for the wasTyya 
t6 another heir or a wasTyya to a stranger exceeding 
the one-third is not deSned permission unless it oc­
curs after the death of the musT. If it occurs during 
the lifetime of the musT, the Heirs have the right to 
revoke their permissiori after the musics death. If
footnote
their permission be after the death of the musi, they 
have no right to revoke consent and they can ie forced 
to hand over the bequest if they refuse. If some 
of the heirs permit the wasTyya and some of the heirs 
deny' : the wasTyya, the w&sryya is permitted up to the 
amount of the 'Share of the 6ne giving permission and 
is batil in regard to the right of the other heirs.
(MalikT) —  If the heirs permit.before the death of 
the muwarrith a wasTyya from the muwarrith to an heir 
or exceeding the ofte-third, and the 'permission was 
given during a state of good health of the musT, the 
permission is not binding. If the permission4were 
given during a state of illness of the mugT, the per­
mission is binding on the following conditions:
1) that the sickness be feared (be a cause of death);
2) that the musT does not clearly recover after his 
illness; " * 1
3) that there is not a justification in their permis­
sion like "their being maintained^or their having 
luxuries, or they fear his (the musT1s ) influence 
against them; — r—
4) that the person giving permission is not someone 
who feels (yahmala) that he has the right of re­
fusal and per&is s Ton; if the person giving per­
mission be one who is ignorant, his swearing that 
he did not know that he had the right to reject
wasTyya renders his permission unbinding;
5) if the person giving permission has full legal 
capacity (mukallaf) without being subject to any 
interdiction.
When one of the conditions is not fulfilled, the per­
mission is not binding.
Article 179 of the Code of Personal Status:1 ♦. .There 
can be no wasTyya to an heir and none exceeding the one- 
third except by permission of the heirs after the 
death of the musi.1
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If legislators wish to reform the law in order 
to meet a diversity of needs of people, they would 
begin by asking the following question: Will the law
allow malicious withholding of consent by the heirs?
If the answer be no, the legislators can turn to sura 
two (Al Bagarah), verse 180 of the Qur^an for affirma­
tion.
According to sura two, verse 180, it is incumbent 
upon a Muslim to bequeathe to his parents and near 
relatives. The fugaha* reasoned that this verse was 
abrogated by the verses of inheritance because a dead 
person1s wishes should not automatically upset the rules 
of the fara4id (see footnote 20 above). If
he were allowed this power, he would make a farce of 
the laws of succession. It is for the faraJid and
■■■  ............. r
*asaba to decide the fate of their rights. However, 
it is well known that some legal thinkers did not 
think that sura two, verse 180 was completely abro­
gated, Ibn Hazm being one*of them. It was thought 
not to be abrogated in regard to orphaned grandchildren. 
The Tunisian legislators have already incorporated 
Ibn Hazmfs opinion in article one hundred ninety-one 
of the Code of Personal Status (see page 396 et sq.
of Chapter III above). The opinion of Ibn Hazm was 
appealing to the Tunisian legislators for probably two
reasons. One being that logically there was no reason 
that sura two, verse 180 should be abrogated since 
such grandchildren were not heirs; hence, bequests to 
them would not violate the rule of no bequest to an 
heir.. A second reason would be that in practise 
Tunisian grandfathers were already providing for their 
grandchildren by way of tanzil. TanzTl had the same 
effect as an obligatory wasTyya, except that tanzTl 
was a voluntary action. The provisions in article 
one hundred ninety-one of the Code of Personal Status 
that any voluntary wasTyya or gifts made by the grand­
parent to the obligatory legatee would count against 
the amount of the obligatory wasTyya cover, situations 
where grandparents continue to think in terms of 
tanzil today (see page 438 of Chapter III above).
The Tunisian legislators could have gone a step 
farther and found a third justification for the obliga­
tory wasTyya, namely, in sura two, verse 177•
11 It is not righteousness that you turn your face 
towards the East and the West, but righteous is 
the one who believes in Allah and the Last Day, 
and the angels and the Book and the prophets, and 
gives away wealth out of love for Him to the near 
of kin and the orphans and the needy and the way­
farer and to those who ask and to set slaves 
free and keeps up prayer and pays the poor-rate; 
and the performers of their promise when they 
make a promise, and the patient in distress and 
affliction and in the time of conflict. These 
are they who are truthful; and these are they who 
keep their duty.1 5^
Translation from Maul ana Muhammad Ali, The Holy 
Qurfan, 5th edition, Lahore: The Ahmadiyyah Anjuman 
ishaIat Islam, 1963.
This verse gives the moral basis on which rests the
prescription of a bequest to parents and near relatives
in verse 180*
If the Qur*an says that it is good to give wealth
to near of kin, the orphans (including children and
widows, who are called orphans in sura four (A1 Nisa*),
verse three, which authorises polygamy), and the
needy, then why should not the refusal of heirs to
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consent to the bequest which is ultra vires . .be - 
subject to the scrutiny of the courts? The purpose of 
the scrutiny would be to determine whether refusal does 
injury to the near relatives, the orphans, or the 
needy. The issues in the cases discussed in this 
chapter suggest that the power of the courts to scru­
tinise the heirs1 refusal to consent could fall within 
the provisions of article one hundred forty of the 
ma.jallat al hugug al caTnTyat. That article allows
the court to interfere in the qasama of an estate if
57
the interests of the property so require.
*N.J. Cotilson, Succession in the Muslim Family, 
Cambridge University Press, 1971, page 235: "In the con­
text of succession law, an act or transaction of the 
praepositus which offends against’the interest of the 
legal heirs established by the laws of inheritance may 
properly be termed ultra vires since it exceeds the 
permitted limits of the discretionary transmission of 
property at death.1
Article 140 of the Code of Property Rights: ,fIf
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However, there would be need for a law which 
covers both moveable and immoveable property in an 
estate# Such a law could first of all purport to 
implement the prescription of sura two, verse 177 of 
the Qurtan Such a law then would borrow from the 
law of talag as reformed in the provisions of the Code 
of Personal Status, which provides that the court can 
use its discretion to grant the wife.damages (gharamat) 
from the husband if the divorce causes her injury 
(darar), or grant the injured husband consideration 
(ta*vicfat) • The courts powers derive from article 
thirty-one, paragraph three of the Code of Personal Sta­
tus# This provision is based on the exhortation of 
sura two, verse 241 of the Qur>an: ,
^  li*
(And for the divorced woman, provision (must be made) 
in kindness* ,-This is incumbent on those who have re­
gard to duty. y)
there exist in the wealth of the estate a productive 
unit, agricultural, or industrial, or commerical, which 
is considered to be one economic unit, it can be at­
tributed to one of the heirs according to what is 
welfare requires.
The amount of cash for balancing (or compensating} 
the shares of the rest of the co-owners will be determined."
ET O
‘Footnote three of the annotated version of the 
Code of Personal Status by M.T. Es Snoussi, 1970 edi­
tion, page 32 of Arabic version, pages 24-25 of French.
-^'Translation from Maulana Muhammad Ali, The Holy 
QurJan« 5th edition, Lahore: The AJhmadiyyah Anjuman 
Isha1at Islam, 1963.
The spirit of this verse, like the spirit of sura two, 
verse 177 on charity to the near relatives, orphansf 
and needy, is one of concern that works against the 
laws that work harm to the deserving.
There is already a provision in Tunisian statutory 
law which allows generally for compensation for in­
jury resulting from a legal right being exercised by 
another. This provision is in article one hundred 
three of the majallat al Jittizamat wa4l cugud (Code 
of Obligations and Contracts:
nNo civil responsibility (liability) 
falls on a person, who without in­
tention to do harm has done what his 
right requires. When the exercise of 
this right causes serious (fadih ) in­
jury to another, and this damag?"-can be 
avoided or discontinued, without damage 
(khasara ) to the holder of the right, 
thenJ'tliere is civil responsibility to do 
what is necessary to prevent or discon­
tinue the injury."
A 1968 case of *istihgag illustrates the applica­
tion of article one hundred three. In case no.11796 
(madanT) of 21.10.1968, ,21 Ahmad, a former husband,
IT - r  T — -f-'T -  #
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Tunis for 
revocation of a hiba which he had made to his divorced 
wife Fatima and their six children (minors). The 
hiba had been made by notarised document on 21.8.1965 
and comprised a villa in the suburbs of Tunis. On
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27*10.1966 the husband obtained a judgment of talag
against his wife. The wife was awarded seven hundred
dinars in damages,^0 payable in monthly installments.
The husband remarried and had five children by his
second wife* He wished to revoke the hiba to his first
wife on the grounds that article two hundred ten of
the Code of Personal Status allows revocation of hiba
if the donor finds himself in a state of relative
poverty which prevents him from maintaining the standard
of living that is consistent with his social position,
or from meeting his legal obligations of family main- 
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tenance. In addition, the former husband wanted dam-
60 •
In 1971 one dinar was equivalent to about one 
pound sterling. It was the same i n 1965*
61 #The provisions for revocation of a hiba in the 
draft of the Code of the SharTca are divided into two 
kinds. There is revocation taking place because of cer­
tain conditions relating to the donee; there is revoca­
tion taking place because of certain conditions re­
lating to the donor.
Article 1278 (MalikT): "There are four obstacles to
revocation: ...3) the donee married or incurred debts 
(* istidanat) after the hiba: if the donee was given the
hiba while he was married or indebted, revocation is 
not prevented."
The HanafT provision allows revocation 
on grounds of marriag£ when the marriage is between the 
donor and the donee.
In regard to the behaviour of the donor, Article 
1218 (MalikT; reads: "A condition for completion of 
hiba is that the donee take possession before there occurs 
some obstacle like the donorfs death, his insanity, or 
his charging a debt on the property given."
(HanafT): "A judgment of hiba is completed only by
ages of two hundred dinars from his former wife, the 
defendant. The Court of First Instance granted the 
petition after examining the monthly salary of the 
petitioner, a government employee, and the number of 
obligations which he had to meet. His obligations 
were found to exceed his income. The Court deemed the 
petitioner impoverished, and the house comprising the 
hiba the only propel?ty owned by the petitioner. Ac­
cordingly, the Court allowed revocation of the hiba, 
and ordered the defendant and her children to leave 
the house. The Court r.feduced the petitioners demand 
for two hundred dinars in damages of inconvenience and 
lawyers* fees to twenty dinars, which the defendant 
was ordered to pay.
The defendant appealed under case no. 28867/3, 
whose judgment no. 61340 was rendered on 19.6.1969.
The Court of Appeal of Tunis reversed the judgment of 
the lower court. For the Court of Appeal accepted the
the donee talcing possession before there occurs an ob­
stacle like the death of the donor, insanity, or a 
debt charged to the property given."
The provisions of the Code Civil of France do 
not contain the Tunisian provisions for revocation 
for reason of poverty. The Code Civil (article 953, 
Dalloz edition, 1970/71) has the same provisions as 
the Tunisian Code of Personal Status has for revoca­
tion for reason of ingratitude of the donee or birth 
of a child to the donor after the gift (article 210,
paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Code of Personal Status).
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emotionally moving arguments of the advocate for the 
former wife* The advocate first submitted that it 
was not the former wife ^ 3ho had done injury to the 
husband by holding the house* It was the husband*s 
revocation of the hiba that made him guilty of injuring 
her according to article one hundred three of the majallat
al J ittizamat waJ1 *ugud (Code of Obligations and Con­
tracts). The husband had married her for his own 
pleasure, and enjoyed her by having six children by 
her. She then became the servant of him and his chil­
dren, to the neglect of her own health. He abused her 
with talag after ten years of marriage; and in the 
case at hand he wanted to abuse her with revocation of 
the hiba*
The second submission of the advocate of the former 
wife dealt with the finances of the husband. It was 
discovered that he had in fact bought a second house 
with his second wife. He and his second family were 
living-in that house. Furthermore, a bank : in Tunis 
had high enough esteem for the financial position of the 
husband and had made him a loan. The bank had not at­
tached his salary, a fact which indicated that the for­
mer husband was not insolvent, as the lower court
had been led to believe. A third house which the for­
mer husband used to own had been sold to pay for the
seven hundred dinars in damages due to the first wife 
uPon talag. Hence, the payment of damages was not 
coming from his salary. In summary, the advocate for 
the former wife proved that all conditions for the 
operation of article one hundred three of the Code of 
Obligations and Contracts were met; that is, first, 
the exercise of the right of revocation would do injury 
to the former wife and her six children; and secondly, 
forcing the husband to desist from exercising his 
legal rights of revocation would not cause him grave 
financial inconvenience srince he was financially sol­
vent •
The advocate for the former husband tried one more
defence* He argued that the husband was having to
increase the amount of legal maintenance due to the
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five children of his second wife* The advocate 
for the former wife scoffed and contended that the law 
does not allow a man to change responsibilities like 
shirts. He had no right to ask for more maintenance 
for his second family than for his first. All eleven 
children were his. He had not been forced to procreate 
a second family; he did so voluntarily.
‘Papers in the court file of the case show that 
the District Court in case no. 1837 of 20.8.1965 ordered 
twenty-five dinars per month for nafaqa of the former 
wife and children.
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The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the former 
wife and returned the twenty dinars in damages which 
the- lower court had ordered her to pay* The respondent 
was ordered to pay the legal costs.
This decision sets a progressive precedent for
equitable application of time-honoured rules. This
was the first time. Such a spirit motivated some of
the reforms brought by the 1948 Code of Procedure for
63
the Courts of the Shan^a. The same spirit of 
equity could be applied to the case of a potential 
legatee who is an heir of the testator or claimant 
to a bequest of more than the one-third, if the peti­
tioner proves that the refusal of the heirs to grant 
the bequest causes injury to him. Reform in the law 
of bequests would require that the established opin­
ions about the abrogation of sura two, verse 180 be re­
vised. A new version of abrogation would recognise that 
sura two verse 180 was abrogated in so far as a be-
63.
See pages " 307-309 of Chapter II above. A
Minister in a memorandum on codes for the SharTca im­
plied that one way a court could go about adjudicating 
cases where parties assert rights und^r- two different 
laws is to decide which party has best proved that his 
needs and interests are more important and in greater 
need of immediate fulfillment. This would seem to 
cause judges to recognise more easily when an established 
rule begins to create more abuses than it cures.
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quest to an heir or a bequest exceeding the one-third 
becomes an ultra vires bequest; but the verse was not 
abrogated to the extent that consent of heirs should 
be withheld from the needy* A statutory law based 
on this reinterpretation could interfere with the 
consent or refusal by the heirs by allowing damages 
to a legatee who was proved to be wronged by refusal; 
or the statute could allow power to a court to decide 
which plan of gasama would best fit both the needs of 
economic operation of the estate and all the claimants 
(legatees and heirs), if consent or denial by the heirs 
worked hardship*
Tunisia has earned, among European scholars of 
Islam, the reputation as the holder of the key to
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the door of *i.itihad. In the tradition of Ibn Hazm
“ 1 r 1 •
—  the proponent of the obligatory wasTyya —  the science
of abrogation involves the most fundamental rules 
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J ijtihad. A re-examination of the established 
opinions about the abrogation of sura two, verse 180
^*See page 333 of Chapter II above.
N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh: 
University Press, 1964, page 210.
65* _  _
Muhammad *Abu Zahra, Ibn Hazm, Dar al Fikr 
al cArabT* n.d., page 328. *
would be yet another way in which Tunisia could 
continue to keep the door of 3ijtihad open.
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Chebil, Mos.hen.!,LfEvolution du regime foncier Tunisien 
en liaison avec les programmes de developpement 
agricole," October 1965*
The department of Affaires Foncieres in the 
Ministry of Agriculture has the important task of 
supervising land tenure in Tunisia. It keeps docu­
mentation on cooperatives and lands held as Jahbas.
Ift this conference paper the Director of this de­
partment, M. Chebil, gives a statistical outline of the 
average acreage for plots, and gross figures for the 
amount of acreage tied up in xahbas, tribal collective 
lands in the southern frontier, private ownership, and 
co-ownership in the more productive areas of the north. 
The lands which support the highest number of co-owners 
were in 1965 in a very precarious legal position, since 
many of the inhabitants on the land could not easily 
justify their right to be on the land.
The author briefly touches on foreigners owning 
lands in Tunisia. The law of 12 May 1964 (j.O.R.T. 
no. 24 of 12 May 1964) forbids persons nf non-Tunisian 
nationality to own agricultural land from 12 May 1964 on­
wards. Under this law 460,000 hectares returned to the 
State domains.
The paper reviews the laws and functioning of 
machinery set up for quick easy registration of. 
lands. It remains for the reader to obtain the 
actual texts of the laws, read them for himself, and 
evaluate them.
Archives of the Court of First Instance, Tunis
All cases referred to in the thesis, unless other­
wise noted, were collected from the Qasr al *adala
■       ■
(Palais de Justice). All judgments are written only 
in Arabic (only a few early ones in French).
Each chamber in the Court of First Instance, Tunis 
keeps its own daftar (in Arabic) since 1957* Cases 
are listed in order by number. The number means that 
the case was filed for suit and hearing. Beside the 
number are written the names of the parties, a brief 
classification (e.g.,talag) of the nature of the suit, 
the date of the hearing for final judgment, the out­
come of the decision (e.g., rejected), and the amount 
of fees paid.
The number of the case is the key for finding the 
court file on the case. All files for the shakhsTya 
and mad an! chamber are kept in the same store room,.
The files are stored in order of number, thus facili­
tating the search for them.. Many files contain the 
original summons to the defendant, the advocates1 sub­
missions (although sometimes the advocates will remove 
these when the case is terminated), a record of the 
outcome of every session held by the court on the case 
copies of documents (e.g., marriage certificate, wafah
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although these too are sometimes removed by the advocates), 
and the original, usually handwritten, of the final 
decision of the court* Typewritten copies of the de­
cisions can be obtained from another section, which is 
responsible for reproducing copies of judgments for 
parties to suits*
When a case has gone to the Court of Appeal, which 
is located in the same building as the Court of First 
Instance, there is a note in the case file in the ar­
chives of the Court of First Instance that the con­
tents have been removed to the Court of Appealf In the 
Court of Appeal case files are found under the case 
number, while copies of the judgment are found under 
a second number, the judgment number*
Another place where files are sometimes sent is 
the office of the WakTl al hagg al*amm (Procureur 
General), when a question of public importance arises.
As for the old judgments of the courts of the SharT*a 
and the decisions of the Rabbinical courts, the system 
of storage and indexing is rather haphazard* The 
archive of the Court of First Instance has judgments 
going back to 1950* I found the texts of some of the 
judgments of the SharT^a which were referred to in post- 
Independence cases. When the courts were consolidated 
and transferred to one building, many of the old records
540
were not removed to a central place, and hence, are 
store in various places (e.g., the former Dar as SharTca, 
now a library, and the headquarters of the Destour 
Party).
A register for the judgments of the former French 
courts is kept in the office of the chief clerk of 
the Court of Appeal.
The total number of cases in the shakhsiya chamber 
dealing with the laws of succession between 1957 and 
1970 was twenty-one* Several deal with wills made by 
Europeans and Hebrews, but the testators were subject 
to European laws* There is a large number of petitions 
for correcting waJ? ay at, so that the number of heirs ap­
pearing on the death certificate will increase or de­
crease. The main problem in inheritance cases seems 
to be deciding who are the relatives of the deceased.
In the madanT chamber of the Court of First Instance, 
the ■files of cases on succession are more numerous, 
but the issues usually centre around proof of the nasab 
with the muwarrith, inventory of the estate, and judg­
ment ordering intestate shares due to the claimant. The 
number of cases actually dealing with wills since 1957 
totalled twenty-four.
The number of cases in the courts is of course no 
indication of the number of wills made. Only a search
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among the files of hundreds of notaries in Tunis 
would reveal that. Some of the lawyers in Tunis feel 
that the number of wills being made is decreasing, since 
the law of monogamy was passed. They maintain that 
under the system of polygamy, wills were used to 
specify which child and which wife was to get what 
out of the estate.
The other important archive for decisions is found 
in the office of the Chief Greffier of the Court of 
Land Matters (al mahkama al cagarTya), next to the 
Court of First Instnace, Tunis, All decisions issued 
by the Court of Land Matters since its establishment 
as the Tribunal Mixte applying the Law of 1st July 1885 
are bound and stored on open shelves in the Court,
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Dufour, J.P.
"Devolution successorale, morcellement et .'iridivision 
de la propridt£ agricole en Tunisie," 6 June 1967,
Tunis
"Le Probleme des terres collectives en Tunisie,"
4 November 1970, Tunis*
J*P. Dufour was with F.A*0* , Tunis, which was ad­
vising on a large cooperative scheme, while he wrote 
two manuscripts (Dossier J*P* Dufour, file C*C* 4*2*25,
0*N*U* Office, Tunis)* He has since left and joined 
the Universite Libre in Brussels*
The first paper discusses the theory of succession 
in several countries* The author concludes that despite 
the ideological differences that dominate various 
economies, the trend has been towards breaking down the 
individual right of property. The principle of the 
social function of property comes to predominate.
The Islamic system of land-holding and succession 
is likened to the Napoleonic system, which also led 
to fragmentation and co-ownership. France and Tunisia 
have adopted similar solutions in regard to succession 
to lands, that is, one heir gets the land and the others 
are compensated in cash.
The vast majority of Tunisian agricultural lands 
were known in 1967 to be fragmented and carrying many 
co-owners* The ten year plan aimed to end this problem 
by using cooperatives. Dufour reviews succinctly the
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legislation dealing with cooperatives in Tunisia, and 
compares it briefly with the legislation of other 
countries• He faults the Tunisian legislation for not 
covering transactions inter vivos, for what is the use 
of regulating succession when fragmentation can talce 
place during the lifetime of a person? He cites legis­
lation from other countries, especially European, 
which controls every transaction so that the land will 
not be fragmented to its disadvantage. The situation in 
Tunisia should improve as more lands are registered; 
then transactions are more publicised.
Just how serious the land situation in Tunisia was 
in 1967 was difficult for Dufour to judge definitively.
He notes that precise statistics on the number of owners 
and extent of fragmentation are lacking. Some local in­
tensive field reserach studies in some areas reveal some 
statistics, which are taken as representative more or 
less of most of the country. But Dufour warns the 
reader that the statistics so far do not say much about 
the economic functioning of the land. Hence, he does not 
say exactly how a plot carrying many co-owners is in 
fact managed, and whether Tunisian farmers know how to 
avoid these problems of co-ownership. One does not know 
how often it is that only one person, manages the land 
as if it were his own and his co-sharers virtually leave
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him alone; or whether management is too often hampered 
by "too many cooks spoiling the broth."
Dufour proposes solutions to the problems which he 
sees Tunisia has in agriculture* The solutions are 
similar to the German ones, namely, all co-heirs ceding 
their parts to a principal heir. He proposes expro­
priation from those owners who own very small plots 
and do not farm them themselves for five years. To avoid 
fragmentation in cooperatives, he recommends that the 
heirs no longer succeed to rights in the land, but suc­
ceed to the right to acquire the status of a member 
of the cooperative*.
The paper is the work of an adviser on economic
problems which the government has pinpointed. The author
in proposing solutions presupposes that the reader knows
the problems in depth. He abstracts the problems of
Tunisia so that in essence the reader sees that Tunisian
«
problems are no different from those in European coun­
tries. Therefore, the solutions proposed are general 
ones which have worked in other countries. A student of 
Islam, naturally being interested in the peculiarity of 
Islamic instituUions, would ask whether the author might 
be oversimplifying in his effort to get at the essence 
of the problem and to phrase that essence in technical 
economic language* Hence, he does not consider how his
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solutions would be applied in depth within the Tunisian 
Islamic context.
The 1970 paper reviews by regions the types of 
land holdings in Tunisia and average acreage of each 
(e.g., milk, hanshir, hubus, tribal collective lands, 
which vis *a vis tribal members, are a collection of 
individual plots, and vis \ vis foreigners, land sub­
ject" to the control of the group).
Dufour also reviews the stages of .thinking, liberal 
and conservative, through which Tunisian land policy 
has progressed since the colonial days until 1970. Until 
a full cadastral survey of land and registration are 
completed, it will be difficult, the author concludes, 
to know what to write precisely in legislation that 
aims generally at limiting monopolisation by large 
land-owners, while also avoiding tiny fragmented plots.
The 1970 paper contains a comprehensive bibliog­
raphy of research studies (all in French) made on land 
tenure in Tunisia from the turn of the century to 
the present.
The paper basically does not propose solutions; 
rather it brings attention to the groundwork that is 
needed before legislation can be enacted.
Muganiya,J- Muhammad Jawar• Al Wasaya waJl mawarTth
cala al madhahib al khamsa (Al JarafarT, al HanafT,
as Shafi^T, al HanbalT), Sharilca at Tabaka
• •
al HadTtha, n.d.
•
This slender volume, found in Lebanon, gives 
in clear simple language the basic principles of suc­
cession, and how they relate to marriage and divorce*
At a quick glance one has all five schools of thought 
compared on all points* In several places the author 
notes which points of law in all schools are not 
really established, since opinion is more or less 
evenly divided*
My thanks to the Honourable sTdT Mahmud 
Al *AnnabT, First President of the Court of Appeal,
Tunis, for lending me his copy with notes.
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Revue Tunisienne de Droit and Al QadaJ waJ 1 Tashrit. ,
The Revue is published yearly, sometimes 
every two years, in French by the Faculty of Law and 
Political and Economic Sciences at the University of 
Tunis, and is printed by the Government Printer, The 
chief editor for volumes 1963 to 1970 was 
Mile. E.D. de LaGrange, professor of law at the Univer­
sity. The committee of editing changes from year to 
year.
Each volume contains four to five articles by 
legal luminaries in Tunisia on a topic of current in­
terest. The bulk of each volume is devoted to trans­
lations of judgments that have been selected from the 
Supreme Court and lower courts in Tunis. It duplicates 
some of the material found in Al QadaJ wa*l Tashri1 ,
- I- —  i I . -  »■ ■ i > » « -  — I '■'■■■' ■■ — —
a Ministry of Justice publication of cases (in Arabic, 
sometimes with brief summaries in French) mostly 
appellate, but the latter contains a much more com­
prehensive review of cases since it is published more 
often (monthly) than the Revue. The Revue differs also 
in regard to its publication of cases in that the 
decision is annotated. In the note to the case, the 
reviewer points out the rjierits and demerits of the de­
cision. Since Mile, de LaGrange lectures on family law,
many of the decisions applying the Code of Personal
\
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Status are analysed briefly and noted by her in the Revue,
Another difference between the Revue and Al Qada*■    ■ ■- " ■ *»■ *' ■
appears in the cadre of authors of articles* In 
Al Qada* many of the contributors are judges, and mem­
bers of the Tunisian courts* The Revue, as to be ex­
pected in a university journal, depends on academics 
and practising lawyers.
Following the cases in the Revue is a chronicle 
of the legislation enacted for the year. This section,, 
is for information, not analytical. It contains 
only the titles and dates of decrees and laws, 
whereas Al Qada* will sometimes print selected pro­
visions from the laws.
The classification of cases and decrees and 
laws in the Revue is elaboratef; in the style of 
European indexing, which facilitates quick reference.
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Zahra, Muhammad JAbu. Ibn Hazm, Dar al Fikr al *Arabi,
•  - - T "
n.d., 538 pages( in Arabic).
This is a study of the life and thought of 
Ibn Hazm. It is a modern study, since it covers his 
family roots, political background, and his legal 
training, with a view to understanding his thought.
The book also puts Ibn Hazm into a political, social, 
and economic context, paying particular attention
to the state of *ijtihad in the era of Ibn Hazm.
rr 1 •
The reader is led through his thoughts on 
jurisprudence and acquainted with what others have 
thought of Ibn Hazm. His contributions are discussed 
un3*rsuch headings as Al Qur*an, abrogation, Ji jiria*.
The author then shows how his opinions in jurisprudence 
led him to certain conclusions on details of the 
rules of the SharTta, particularly in the law of suc­
cession.
The book concludes with a note on the 
ZahirT madhab after the death of Ibn Hazm.
CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF 
THE LAW OF SUCCESSION
The government of Tunisia has not been insensitive 
to the potential for reform in the law of succession.
In 1966 there were drafted proposals for amendments to 
twelve articles of the Code of Personal Status, including 
article one hundred seventy-nine, which provides, no 
wasTyya to an heir, and no wasTyya beyond the one-third. 
None of the proposals were implemented. In 1966 Law No.49 
of 3 June 1966 (j.O.R.T. of 3 June 1966, page 880) did 
amend three articles of the Code of Personal Status on 
guardianship of children, but these three were not in­
cluded in the ambitious original proposal for amendments.
Despite the abortion of the proposals, they are
worthwhile examining. They indicate currents of thought
1
and potential tenour of changes. The policy motivating 
the proposals was set forth as follows:
"Ten years after its promulgation the Code of Per­
sonal Status gives us a chance to raise its numerous 
qualities and to affirm that it has some gaps.
1#Much appreciation is expressed to the Ministry of 
Justice for their kind permission to me to look through 
the file on Tutelle, Emancipation, Egalit£ entre des sexes.
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"Its qualities are well-known: simplicity, concise­
ness, flexibility. It contains the germ of great possi­
bilities of evolution —  something which explains why the 
legislator can, without destroying the harmony of the 
edifice raised in 1956, bring to it a certain number of 
perfections. Let us cite, for example, the introduction 
of the rules relating to the will (Law Nof 59-77 of 
19 June 1959, in J.O.R.T. No. 34 of 1959) and the provi­
sions concerning hiba (Law No. 64-17 of 28 May 1964, in
2
J.O.R.T. No. 27 of 1964).
"The lacuna in the Code are equally well-known. Certain 
rules were lacking: so it was with wills and gifts. We 
have been since 1956 the Code has been completed on this 
point. In other domains the legislator has united purely 
and simply the spirit of Islamic law, disregarding the 
foreign customs and usages which have been grafted onto 
Islamic law.
"Today, a new step must be cleared. There subsist in 
the Code traces of inequality among the sexes, an inequal­
ity which is no longer justifiable at the present time, 
when the woman assumes the same responsibilities as the man.
"Here are the reforms that are projected:
"l) The marriage guardian, with authority to consent
p...  - - - - - -  .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
‘When the Code was promulgated in 1956 it lacked pro­
visions on will and gift. The Tunisian legislator filled 
the gaps in 1959 and 1964 respectively. It is not beyond 
the legislator to admit imperfections and to correct them.
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to the marriage of the minor must be of the masculine
sex. Henceforth, the mother is also vested with these
3
functions (article six of the proposals). The judge 
intervenes only if the minor has neither father nor mother 
or where there is disagreement between the parents (article 
seven).
‘*The last paragraph of article seven provides for a 
particular case. When the minor has not attained the 
legal age for marriage, that is, twenty years for a man
and seventeen years for a girl, a special authorisation
4
of the judge is necessary (article five). There the 
judge intervenes in order to remove the ..minor from an 
incapacity. But when the minor has neither father nor 
mother, the judge intervenes in capacity as guardian 
(walT) (article seven).
Present article 6 of the Code: "A man or a woman
who has not reached the age of majority must obtain con­
sent for marriage from their guardian. In case of refus 
al of the wall and the perseverence of the minors in 
their desire, the matter goes before the judge.
Present article 8: "The wal? is the nearesj: agnatic 
relative. He must be mentally able (*aqalan), a male, 
and of the age of majority...*1
Present article 5: "... the judge will grant per­
mission for only very serious reasons and in the interest 
of the two spouses."
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Must there be in this case a double authorisation, since 
the judge acts in two different capacities? Certain 
people support this. Theoretically this opinion is 
valid. But practically one cannot conceive of the judge 
in capacity as wall, then giving an authorisation that 
he would refuse in so far as he is the legal represen­
tative of the authority. This is why it is decided that 
in this hypothetical case, a single authorisation is 
given by the judge.
f,The Code of 1956 does not attach a sanction to the 
failure to get the authorisation of the marriage wall.
This is the object of article eight. In case of absence 
of authorisation, the marriage is void. The effects of
5
the nullity are those of article twenty-two of the Code.
"However, this nullity is subject to a special ruling. 
Nullity can be invoked only by the Public Minister or by 
the father or by the mother who.would have had to give 
authorisation to the marriage. Furthermore, this nullity
^"Article 22: ...The consummation of the void marriage 
carries only the following effects: a) The right of the 
woman to reclaim the dowry fixed by the marriage contract 
or by the judge;
b) legitimacy;
c) The duty of the woman to observe cidda from the 
date of separation of the spouses;
d) Degrees of affinity preventing marriage.
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can be changed, that is, if the consent or authorisation 
is given in time (later), the marriage is validated retro 
actively and the action in nullity is without cause.
This kind of validation can come about as long as judg­
ment has not been pronounced.
”2) Articles one hundred fifty-four and one hundred 
fifty-five of the Code attributfeethe right of guardian­
ship to the mother after the death of the father. The 
mother is preferred to the testamentary guardian if 
there be one.
"The guardian whoever it be can renounce his func­
tions or be discharged from them. The judge will render
a decision according to whether he thinks the reasons
6
involved are legitimate.
^3) Article twenty-three of the Code obliges a woman 
to contribute to the costs of maintaining the household, 
her share being proportional to her personal property.
11 In fact the idea of making the woman share in the 
duties of marriage already appears in the 1956 text of
‘Present article 154: The judge must appoint a
guardian (mugaddam) for the minor who has neither father 
nor testamentary guardian.
article 155: Guardianship is exercised as 
of right by the .father or the testamentary guardian.
It ceases only upon order from the judge for legitimate 
reasons.
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the Code, but it does not seem that it has been per­
fectly understood. The new proposed text makes it 
7
explicit.
11 On the other hand, the obligation of the woman
persists after the dissolution of the marriage in regard
to the maintenance owed to the children common to both
8
parents (article forty-seven).”
"4) Among those who can claim maintenance, the 
maternal grandparents do nnt appear. This lacuna is
9
filled (article forty-three and article forty-four).
^•present article 23: ... (The husband) must face up 
to the duties of marriage and provide for the needs of 
the woman and their children according to his abilities and 
the status of the wife. She contributes to the duties of 
marriage if she has property...
Proposed article 23: ... The husband must face up to 
the duties of marriage and provide for the needs of the 
woman and their children according to his abilities and 
his status. The wife shall contribute to the duties of 
the marriage in proportion to her personal property...
o
•present article 47: In case of poverty of the
father, the mother precedes the grandfather in providing 
maintenance to her children.
Q
Present article 43: The following relatives have
a right to maintenance: a) the father and mother, and
the paternal grandparents howsoever high;
b) descendants howsoever low.
Present article 44: The child or well-to-do
children, male or female, owe maintenance to the parents 
and the paternal grandfathers and paternal grandmothers 
who are poverty-stricken.
”5) A question which has caused much discussion is 
this: whether the minor, in marrying, benefits from the
new juridical capacity (tarshTd)• Article one hundred 
fifty-nine answers in the affirmative. In effect it is 
a question of a person who has been recognised as capable 
of undergoing one of the most serious steps of civil 
life: marriage. There is no reason for not assimilating 
that person to an adult for other acts.
"However, to avoid marriages of fraud or accomoda­
tion, the judge can, after the dissolution of the mar­
riage and on condition that the concerned party has not 
yet completed his twenty years, decide that the party
will relapse into minority (article one hundred fifty-
10
nine, paragraph two).
"6) Article one hundred seventy-nine offers the pos­
sibility for the testator, when it is a question of his 
own children, not to respect the rule- which forbids a 
disposition in favour of an heir. In this case he can­
not only dispose in their favour, but also designate 
equal shares to sons and daughters, that is, without 
taking into account the principle of no bequest beyond 
the third.
"Such is the object of this draft."
The above proposals are obviously daring, especially 
the proposed amendment to article one hundred seventy-nine
‘Present article 159: THe minor cannot be made an
adult (tarshTd) before fifteen years of age have been 
completed
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Equality of the sexes was the motivating force. This 
version of amendment does not aim so much at reform in 
the law of bequests per se; rather it aims at using the 
wasTyya as an instrument for reforming the law of mirath. 
It evokes the very fear which early fug a h ?  held about 
the power of testamentary freedom overriding completely 
the law of mirath. Their fear would have a legitimate 
basis, given the phrasing of the draft of the amendment. 
The drafter may have intended that the parent use his 
testamentary powers only to equalise the shares of his 
sons and daughters. Yet the phrasing itself suggests 
that while the testator can equalise the shares, he is 
not forbidden to designate a ratio of shares that is 
even more unequal than the prescribed two to one ration 
he is not forbidden to prescribe, for example, a five 
to one ratio in favour of the son.
The motive behind the proposals is very legitimate. 
The need for providing equally for the daughter and son 
does exist. The need will become more pressing as the 
traditional sources of income cease to bear fruit and 
traditional duties of maintenance cease to fall solely 
on men. One of the traditional sources of income for 
daughters was the mahr. The Code of Personal Status 
supports the mahr by prescribing that the amount of 
mahr be serious and that no maximum limit be set (arti-
5£8
cle twelve, paragraph two). In practice, however, in 
urban areas, it is well-known that the President of 
Tunisia paid only one dinar for the mahr of his present 
wife* That is the example to be followed. In cases of 
divorce, the insignificance of the mahr has been compen­
sated in part by the damages which a court can award a 
woman if divorce causes her hardship (article thirty- 
one, paragraph three). Yet the amount of damages awarded 
depends on the courtfs discretion and the financial cir­
cumstances of the moment, not taking into account a 
possible deterioration in economic standing in the fu­
ture. For the woman who remains married to her husband 
until he dies, the insignificance of the amount of the 
mahr to be claimed from his estate becomes more obvious 
and serious. The widow gets no compensation or damages 
for the death of her husband. She can depend on only 
inheritance shares, which are half the amount which her 
brother could claim from the estate of their parents 
or of his spouse. As the law stands now, and even as 
proposed in 1966, the woman would have* the same obliga­
tions of maintenance as the man towards children and 
relatives. Their contributions would be proportional 
to their financial capacity. From a purely statistical
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point of view, the law is fair, since it takes into ac­
count the fact that women might have different levels 
of fortune than men. From a point of view of principle 
or policy, the law perpetuates the material inequality 
between the sexes when it comes to the basic traditional 
sources of income, namely, inheritance. If the policy 
be to create equality between the sexes in material things,
then duties should be made equal, and capacity to ful-
11
fill those duties made equal in turn.
Perhaps because the law seemed statistically fair, 
the legislators were not convinced of the need for reform.
To their mind the advantages of reform would not outweigh 
the disadvantage of a seeming violation of the Qur1 an.
Another draft of an amendment for article one hundred 
seventy-nine reveals a different approach to reforming 
the law of succession. This draft aimed more directly 
at reforming the law of al wasTyya. Its approach was 
more in keeping with the jurisprudence of taglTd. As the 
text of the proposed amendment will reveal, the drafter 
was relying on the rules of the ShT*a and of radd.
The first part of the proposed amendment read as 
follows: "The wasTyya of the one-third of the corpus or
the usufruct to an heir or a non-heir is valid and exe-
•Example in point is article 41 of the Code of Personal 
Status: "If the wife provides for herself while her 
husband is absent, she has recourse like a creditor against 
him for the amount of maintenance."
A policy of equality between the sexes would be 
cause for amending the article so that it applied to either 
spouse who is absent without providing his or her con-
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cutable without resting on the permission of the heirs.
"The bequest is also valid for more than the one- 
third, but it is executable only by permission of the 
heirs
If this amendment had been adopted, Tunisia would have
joined the ranks of countries like Egypt, Iraq, and
Sudan, which have allowed bequests to an heir up to the
12
third without permission from the other heirs. The 
interest of some of the members of the Tunisian judiciary 
in bequests to heirs arose from reading a book that com­
pared the five madhahib, a book entitled A1 Wasaya wa’l 
mawarxth *ala al madhahib al khamsa (al HanafT, al JatafarT,
al Malikl, as Shafi*T, al Hanbali) by Muhammad Jawar
  _• #13
Mugahiya (Sharika at Tabaka al Haditha). The author
pointed out that the madhab al Ja cafarT allows the bequest
to an heir within the one-third (page thirteen). Thus,
there was no difference between the dhimm? and the heir.
The second part of the amendment proposed for article
one hundred seventy-nine read as follows: "And the testator
has the right to equalise among his children, male, and
tribution to maintaining the household.
12 *N.J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, 
Cambridge University Press, 1971 * page 254*
13 —My^warmest appreciation to Justice Sidi Mahmud _
Al *Armabx, First President of the Court of Appeal of Tunis,
for this book. He very kindly allowed me to use his
library and to look at his lecture notes on the law of
inheritance and wills.
female, whatever he bequeathes to them.
"And he has the right, 
when he leaves no descendants (al far* al warith), to 
allocate in full the usufruct of his estate or whatever 
augments the value of the entire corpus; and that falls 
within the principles of radd in mTrath.
"The bequest of usufruct
postpones the distribution of the estate to the date of
14
the death of the usufructuary."
This second part of the proposed amendment to article 
one hundred seventy-nine stated exceptions to the general 
rule in the first part that a bequest can be made to an 
heir up to the one-third. While the bequest of the usu­
fruct is an obvious exception to the rule of the one- 
third, the bequest to children can be interpreted both 
as an exception and not an exception. It could be not 
an exception in the sen$e that the testator may use not
y  <LJb)L
' ^  ^  c— iL^ y
i j j t  o j U  » iiii y iJiJ/ ^  ?
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more than the one-third to equalise the shares of his 
children. It could be an exception in the sense that 
the testator may bequeathe whatever amount —  even more 
than the third —  is needed to equalise the children’s 
shares; or even may bequeathe whatever he wishes to the
children as long as the final shares of the children
in the estate are equal. If the testator could bequeathe 
whatever he wanted to his children, then he could give
them all the estate to the exclusion of any other heirs.
Since the aim of the amendment was only to equalise 
shares between the sexes and not to favour children over 
other relatives, the drafter most likely meant for the 
testator to bequeathe whatever is necessary to equalise 
the shares between the sons and daughters.
Again, a bequest which upsets the ratio of shares
/ *
prescribed in the Qur^an is difficult to justify in Is­
lamic law. There is one far-fetched possibility, and 
even it has its limitations. The possibility lies in re­
interpreting Sura 4 (An-Nisa*), verse 11: "YusTkum
Allahu fT Jawladikum lT dhakari mithlu hazzi
15 # #*
al *unthayaini.••" It could be reinterpreted to
mean that if there be one son and two or more daughters, 
the son gets the share of two daughters; but if there
^ " The Holy Qur^an, edited by Maulana Muhammad *Ali 
Fifth edition, 1963.
583
be one son and one daughter, or a plurality of sons 
and a plurality of daughters, each son gets the same 
share as each daughter. Any other dhawu»l fara»id in­
heriting along with the children would receive their 
shares and the calculations would be subject to *awl.
Then there would be only one instance (one son and 
two daughters) where the testator would use his testa­
mentary freedom to equalise the shares of his children. 
Even that power is difficult to justify except on the 
basis of need, sanctioned by Sura 2 (Al-Bagarah), 
verse 177 ("The righteous is the one who believes in
giving his wealth to the near relatives, the orphans
16
and the needy...").
The bequest of usufruct of all the estate also 
violates the rule of no bequest beyond the one-third.
This provision can rest on ra*y since human reasoning 
was the origin of the belief that usufruct is treated 
like corpus in the law of bequests. The heirs would not 
suffer loss from the usufruct. For if the property be 
of such that it is consumed while being used, the usu­
fructuary must return the like of such property con­
sumed to the estate when the usufruct terminates (article
16•The Holy Qurian .
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one hundred f o r t y - n in e  o f th e  m a .ia lla t  a l  huquq
- 17 a l  ^ a T m y a t) .
17 'French law treats usufruct differently from absolute 
ownership in matters of intestate succession. When the 
predeceased spouse does not leave direct descendants the 
surviving spouse receives absolute interest in the suc­
cession, varying from one-half to total, depending on the 
type of other heirs present. When the predeceased spouse 
leaves direct descendants, the surviving spouse receives 
usufruct in the estate. See article 767 of the Code 
Civil below.
In testamentary succession it seems that the bequest 
of usufruct is subject to the same rules as the bequest 
of corpus, no article in the Code Civil drawing any dis­
tinction.
Article 767: w.•. The surviving undivorced spouse 
who does not succeed to full ownership and against whom 
there is no judgment of separation with force of res 
.judicata has a right of usufruct of the estate. That right 
is:
equal to the one-quarter if the deceased leaves one 
or several children of the marriage;
equal to the portion of the legitimate child who 
takes the least, without it exceeding the one- 
quarter, if the deceased has children born of 
a preceding marriage;
eqqal to one-half, if the deceased leaves natural 
children, brothers and sisters, descendants of 
brothers and sisters or their ascendants;
equal to the totality in all other cases, whatsoever 
be the number and capacity of the heirs.
The calculation will operate on all 
the properties existing at the death of the de cujus, to 
which there will be added, by legal fiction, all those 
properties which he disposed of, either by transaction 
inter vivos, or by will, to the benefit of those who suc­
ceed , if there is not an instruction that the benefi­
ciaries do not have to report these transactions.
(
footnote
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But the surviving spouse will be able 
to exercise his or her right only over the properties 
which the deceased will have disposed of neither by trans­
action inter vivos nor by will, and without prejudice 
to the rights o£ the reserve share (as opposed to the dis­
posable share) nor to the rights of return (retour refers 
to property that is returned to the donor or his descen- 
dants and not subject to rules of succession, page 303 
of Amos and Walton1s Introduction to French Law, 3rd 
edition by Lawson, Anton, Brown, Oxford, 1967).
He or she will cease to exercise 
this right in the case where he or she would have received 
from the deceased gifts, mdde by preciput or otherwise, 
and whose amount would attain to that of the rights which 
the present law attributes to him or her, and if this 
amount be inferior, he or she can claim only the supple­
mentary in the usufruct.
Until the definitive division of the 
estate among the heirs, the heirs can demand, by way of 
sufficient sureties and ”guarantee of maintaining the 
initial equivalence” that the usufruct of the surviving 
spouse be converted into a life annuity (rente viagfere; 
that is equivalent of the usufruct.
If they are in disagreement, the 
conversion will be at the discretion of the courts.
The bequest of the usufruct of the entire estate 
is limited to one situation, namely, where the testa­
tor left no descendants ( see pages 462-463 of 
Chapter IV above)* It appears that there would have 
been another limitation when the author of the draft 
stated that the doctrine of radd underlies the proposal. 
It could mean that the doctrine of radd applies to the 
surplus of revenues which accrue from the corpus. Or it 
could mean that implicitly the legatee can only be one 
of the dhawu*l fara>id. For radd techincally means 
augmentation of the fixed shares. Only the JacafarT 
school of thought would provide some thoughts remotely 
akin to the proposed Tunisian amendments. That is the
opinion that the husband may benefit from the radd when
18
there are no other heirs. Nonetheless, the obvious 
interpretation of the amendment seems to allow a be­
quest of usufruct of all the estate to any one the testa­
tor chooses, as long as he does not leave descendant 
heirs.
Despite their boldness, the amendments proposed in 
1966 do not cover one obvious area where reform is 
needed and would be simple. There is an obvious gap in
18 —  —  mm mm^'Muhammad Jawar ?Muganiyay.« Al Wasaya wa1!
MawarTth, "page 89. r
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the Code of Personal Status* The Cdde does not cover the 
case where the deceased leaves only a spouse and casaba. 
Under the Code the deceased has no power to bequeathe 
the entire estate to the spouse. Only in two instances 
can a testator bequeathe all the estate: Articles one 
hundred eighty-eight and one hundred forty-three bis (A). 
Article one hundred eighty-eight allows the testator who 
leaves no heir nor any creditor to bequeathe all his 
estate to the exclusion of all rights of the Bait al Mai. 
Article one hundred forty-three bis (A) allows a daugh­
ter or an agnatic granddaughter to take the entire estate
19
when competing with only collateral tasaba. Article
one hundred forty-three bis (A) also allows any heir who
takes a fixed share —  like a spouse —  in the absence
of any casaba to take the entire estate by radd to the
-  20
exclusion of rights of the Bait al Mai. The testator 
then could make a bequest of specification (article 
one hundred eighty) and it would be within the limits 
of the law.
19 *... As for the daughter, one or more, or the daugh­
ter of the son howsoever low, the remainder of the estate 
returns to them even in the presence of the *asaba bi nafs, 
as are the brothers and uncles and Bait al Mai:
20
_  ‘Article 143 A: When the *asaba are absent and the 
farud do not absorb all the estate, the remainder goes to 
the Holders;6f the farud in proportion to their shares...
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An amendment to Book Eleven (Al WasTyya) of the Code 
of Personal Status could extend, by way of bequest, radd 
to a spouse who is the only sharer of the fard competing 
with only collateral Casaba bi nafs. In deference to 
the reluctance of the MalikT schobl to allow radd to 
spousesf the amendment would not render the rights of 
the surviving spouse to the entire estate automatic; 
rather the right would be subject to the voluntary will
-r 21of the testator, unlike the obligatory wasTyya* Yet 
the bequest would not be deemed ultra vires * It would 
be both valid and executable without the consent of the 
tasaba.
One defendant before the Court of:First Instance of 
Tunis in a 1967 case would well have favoured such an 
amendment. In civil case number 9557 (madanT) of 
25-3-1967, the muwarrith of the petitioner and the de­
fendant died, 8-1-1965* He left only two heirs, his 
brother's son, the petitioner, and his wife, the defen­
dant. His estate consisted of a house, a rug, and four 
hundred fifty-seven dinars in cash. The nephew, who
lived in Libya, claimed three-quarters of the estate,
...      .
’The draft of the Code of the Shari*a contains a 
provision for a bequest to a spouse in article 1152(HanafT):
A wasTyya from the husband to his wife and a
wasTyya from the wife to her husband is valid if
th^re be no other heir. If there be another heir,
the bequest is executed according to permission 
of that heir.
No provision appears from the Merliki: school.
and wanted a court judgment ordering the defendant to 
give him his share. The widow had already in fact 
given him three hundred dinars. The petitioner wanted 
the remainder of his share. The Court granted the peti­
tion, applying articles ninety-four (one-quarter to the 
widow without children) and one hundred fourteen (son 
of the brother is an *asaba who takes the remainder) of 
the Code of Personal Status. The Court, however, refused 
to grant the petitioners request for damages and made 
him pay the legal costs. For it was clear that the money 
he claimed had been insured by him at the Libyan Embassy. 
Nor had the widow disputed his legal claim to three- 
quarters of the estate or prevented him from taking his 
due.
The widow appealed in Case number 27714/3 to the 
Court of Appeal, whose judgment number 60408 was rendered 
on 14-3-1968. She tried to keep the estate by arguing 
that the motarised inventory of the estate was inaccu­
rate. She also pleaded that some of the estate had been 
earned by hard work and was.nbt her husbands. She
brought witnesses to testify that her husbands nephew
.
had come boldly to her house and forced her to give him 
most of the cash. The Court of Appeal <£&uld accept cor­
rection in the inventory of the estate of 21-1-1965, 
which had been approved by the District Court, only if
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the widow proved that it contained a falsehood* She did 
not so prove, and lost the appeal* However, the Court 
of Appeal ordered the nephew to return the three hundred 
dinars which he had taken from the widow, for the judg­
ment was only confirming a legal claim to three-quarters 
of the estate and not ordering the delivery of a certain 
sum of money. The legal costs were divided equally 
between the two parties.
A wasTyya of usufruct, or a wasTyya of radd from 
the deceased husband would have removed any challenge 
from the nephew. However, one of the arguments presented 
by the widow suggests another kind of reform which would 
serve the interests of the surviving spouse. The widow 
argued that some of the estate had been earned by hard 
work and did not belong to the deceased. She may have 
meant that her work or her money had helped her husband 
acquire what he did, even though the property was legally 
in his name. While Islamic law allows the woman total 
independence in administering her property, it takes no 
account of contributions made by one spouse to purchases 
by the other when the purchase is in the name of only one 
spouse. The law treats them as gifts, unless it can be
22
proved that the wife was forced to make such contribution.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _
‘Draft of the Code of the Sharica, article 1207(Hanafi):
Hiba is no good if it occurs under .coercion; even if a*
woman gives something to her husband and she pleads that 
he forced her to do it, her plea will be heard.
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Where there is no proof of which spouse owns what at the 
matrimonial home (mata*), Tunisian law provides for di­
vision among the spouses according to oath from each 
when there is a dispute (article twenty-six of the Code
of Personal Status). This law applies when the goods
23
could be used either by a man or a woman. Should one 
of the spouses die, the heirs of that spouse will stand 
in his or her place in case of such dispute (article 
twenty-seven). If these articles were applied liberally 
in disputes between a surviving spouse and other non­
descendant heirs of the deceased spouse, the courts might 
more readily remove from the estate of the deceased 
those parts of properties which were gained with the 
help and work of the surviving spouse.
The Tunisian judiciary are to be commended for their 
search for perfecting the laws according to the spirit 
of Islam. They are to be commended for their efforts 
to wipe away centuries of crust that obscure the essence 
of the Islamic spirit. They are also to be encouraged 
to yield fruits of an even more intensive and penetrating 
search.
23 ' ' '  "      ■ '
Article 26: In case of dispute between the spouses
on the matter of ownership of the properties found in the 
matrimonial home and in the absence of proof, the claim 
of each spouse shall be legal under force of oath. Each 
will take respectively the goods normally belonging to 
men and those belonging to women. If the properties are
footnote 5 7 2
merchandise, they will by force of oath be attributed 
to the spouse who is in business. Goods that can be 
possessed by either men or women will be, under oath, 
divided between them.
A case applying article 26 is Personal Status case number 
30348 (shakhsTya) of 1-4-1969. The plaintiff was the 
wife who had'been divorced from the defendant, her 
former husband, by judgment number 28448 of 18-6-1968*
She wanted her possessions in the matrimonial home 
(nature of possessions not specified) returned to her 
since her former husband had become a stranger to her*
The Court of First Instance of Tunis granted her the 
right to collect her possessions worth 1095 dinars 
(approximately £1095).
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